( 1 ) THIS petition under Art 226 of the Constn. had come up, in the first instance, before a single Judge, Venkataramiah, J. , who has referred it to a Division Bench His Lordship felt that though the question arising for decision in this petition, is covered by a ruling of a Division Bench (consisting of Narayana Pai, CJ. , and Range Gowda, J.) in WP. 2115 of 1967, that question has not been considered therein from a particular angle. The material facts in this petition, are not in controversy. The petitioner was a Revenue Inspector. He was prosecuted for an offence, under s. 417 rea,d with S. 109 IPC. In view of the, pendency of the prosecution against him, he was kept under suspension on 22-10-1952. He was convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge, Mysore. In appeal, Crl. A. 227 of 1957, this Court set aside the conviction and sentence, on the ground that the trial was wholly vitiated on account of misjoinder of parties and charges and multiplicity of charges. This Court did not permit his being tried again as such re-trial was considered to amount to his harassment at that distance of time. After his acquittal he was reinstated in service. He requested the authorities that the entire period o-E his suspension might be treated as his having been on duty and that he might be granted the benefit of full pay, allowances and usual increments he would have got, had he not been placed under suspension. But the Govt. did not accede to his request. He was not granted any emoluments over and above the subsistence allowance paid to him during the period of his suspension. His application for review of the decision of the Govt. , was also rejected by the order of the Goverment dt. 17-1-1972 (Ex. 'g' ). ( 2 ) IN this petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the G. O. dt. 17-1-1972 (Ex. 'g'), and for a direction to the Govt to treat the period of his suspension from 22-10-1952 to 11-11-1960 as his haying been on duty and togrant him ail the benefits of service,, such a^ full pay, allowances and increments he would have got, had he not been kept under suspension- in the impugned G. O. dt. 17-1-1972 (Ex. 'g'), and for a direction to the Govt to treat the period of his suspension from 22-10-1952 to 11-11-1960 as his haying been on duty and togrant him ail the benefits of service,, such a^ full pay, allowances and increments he would have got, had he not been kept under suspension- in the impugned G. O. dt. 17-1-1972 (Ex. 'g'), it is stated that the acquittaj of the petitioner by this Court, was not on merits, but due to defect in the trial and that as he had not been honourably acquitted he could not claim the full emoluments during the period of his suspension. Rule 101 of the Karnataka Civil Services Rules (which will herein after be referred to as the Rules) provides, inter alia, that a Government servant against whom proceedings have been taken on a criminal charge and who is kept under suspension during the pendency of the criminal proceedings, shall, if he is ultimately acquitted, be given the full emoluments during the period of suspension, only in the event of his acquittal of the blame. ( 3 ) AS stated earlier, the petitioner who was kept under suspension during the pendency of the criminal proceedings against him, was ultimately acquitted in appeal. The only question that arises for determination, is whether he was acquitted of the blame. ( 4 ) THE learned Govt. Pleader contended that the petitioner was acquitted on a purely technical ground, namely, mis-joinder of parties and charges and multiplicity of charges, and that he was not honourably acquitted or exonerated of the blame. The learned Govt. Pleader sought to draw a distinction between acquittal of charge arid acquittal of the blame. According to him, mere acquittal of the charge is not sufficient and that he must also be acquitted of the blame in order to claim full emoluments during the period of suspension. ( 5 ) THIS very contention based upon the alleged distinction between acquittal of the charge and acquittal of the blame, was considered by the bench consisting of Narayana Pai, CJ. , and Range Gowda, J. , in H. V. Seshagiri Rao v. State of Mysore, WP. 2115 of 1967. Repelling that contention, this is what Narayana Pai, CJ. ( 5 ) THIS very contention based upon the alleged distinction between acquittal of the charge and acquittal of the blame, was considered by the bench consisting of Narayana Pai, CJ. , and Range Gowda, J. , in H. V. Seshagiri Rao v. State of Mysore, WP. 2115 of 1967. Repelling that contention, this is what Narayana Pai, CJ. , who spoke for the Bench said :" There cannot, in our opinion, be any doubt that the actual legal position under the said rules is that the expression acquitted of the blame means acquitted of the offence with which a person is charged, whether the acquittal is for lack of evidence, or on benefit of doubt being given to the person concerned. The essence of the matter is a competent Court of Law has decided that the person concerned is not liable to-be punished. " ( 6 ) THE above view is in consonance with the views of Davis, CJ. , and constantine, J. , in Muhammad Ayoob Khuhro v. Emperor, AIR. 1946 Sind 121. There, the petitioner, Khuhro, wag tried for the murder of Allahbakhsh and was acquitted by the Sessions Judge who, however, observed thus in the course of his judgment: "i have only held that the case has not been proved beyond resonable doubt against the accused. There still remains a considerable amount of moral suspicion against the accused, but meire suspicion cannot take the place of evidence, nor can a conviction ever be based upon it. ( 7 ) AS the accused Khuhro occupied a prominent place in political life, it is necessary for me to point out that I have not given him a clean bill. I am not prepared to say definitely that he is innocent. I ha,ve only held that the prosecution case against him is not proved beyond reasonable doubt and I am bound tp give him the benefit of doubt just like anyone else. I cannot say even after considering all the, evidence that there is no suspicion against him. . . . . . All that I can say is that the trial has not completely cleared him of all suspicion of complicity in the crime. ( 8 ) ACCUSED Khuhro made an application before the Sind Chief Court under s. 439 and S 561a Crlpc. 1898, for expunging the aforesaid remarks of the Sessions Judge. . . . . . All that I can say is that the trial has not completely cleared him of all suspicion of complicity in the crime. ( 8 ) ACCUSED Khuhro made an application before the Sind Chief Court under s. 439 and S 561a Crlpc. 1898, for expunging the aforesaid remarks of the Sessions Judge. Though the above remarks were not expunged, their lordships made certain observations This is what Davis, CJ. , said at page 124 :"my comment on the first passage is that not only I do not think it is necessary but also I do not think it is proper for a Judge to point out that he has not given an accused person a clean bill; it is not for him to give an accused any bill at all. On the second passage my comment wou3d be that the learned Judge is not asked to say whether he has found the accused innocent or not; he is asked to say whether he has found the accused guilty or not guilty; and having found the accused not guilty, it is not for him in this manner to cast doubt upon the innocence of one whom he has acquitted by saying that hei is not prepared to say that he, the accused is innocent. " ( 9 ) IN his separate, but concurring judgment, Constantine, J. , observed thus :"i think it inconsistent with judicial propriety that the learned judge after finding the accused not guilty should then proceed under the heading of general remarks to use language calculated to create an impression that though the accused has been acquitted yet he, may still have been in fact responsible for the crime. It is outside the scape of a Judge's duty to go beyond the issue of not guilty or guilty. Once an accused is acquitted, he stands not guilty, and there cannot be gradations in a finding of a guilty. " ( 10 ) WE are in respectful agreement with the view taken by Narayana, pai, CJ. , and Range Gowda, J. , that the expression acquitted of the blame means acquitted of the offence with which a person is charged. " ( 10 ) WE are in respectful agreement with the view taken by Narayana, pai, CJ. , and Range Gowda, J. , that the expression acquitted of the blame means acquitted of the offence with which a person is charged. Once he is acquitted, whether such acquittal is on account of lack of evidence, or on account of any defect in the procedure in the trial, or on account of the Court extending the benefit of doubt, so long as such acquittal stands, the presumption of innocence of the accused, should be given the full effect and he must also be regarded as being acquitted of the blame flowing from any of the acts or omissions which formed the subject matter o,f the charge. ( 11 ) HENCE, the reason given by the Govt. for not paying the petitioner his full emoluments during the, period of his suspension, is, in our opinion, clearly unsustainable. In the result, we allow this petition and quash the G. O. dt. 17-1-1972 (Ex. 'g') in So far as it holds that the petitioner was not honourably acquitted and denied him the benefit of full emoluments during the period of his suspension. We direct the Govt. to pay the petitioner full emoluments including annual increments, between the date of his suspension and the date of his reinstatement, as if he had not been kept under suspension, after deducting such sums as were paid to him by way Off subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in this petition. --- *** --- .