Order: The petitoner was an employee of the South Central Railway. He worked as Assistant Medical Officer in the Railway Hospital at Dornakal till 4th September, 1969 on which date his residence at Dornakal was searched by an Officer of the Special Police Establishment, Hyderabad. He was charge-sheeted under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Act“in G.C. No. 27 of 1971 on the file of the Special Judge for S.P.E. and A.C.B. Cases, Hyderabad, on the ground that he was found in possession of assets of the value of Rs. 1,16,646.99 Ps. and they were disproportionate to his known sources of income to the extent of Rs. 84,455. 51 Ps. Before the trial was taken up, the petitioner filed an application before the Special Judge under section 530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, with a prayer to drop all further proceedings against him alleging that section 5 (1) (e) of the Act came into operation only on 18th December, 1964 and before that date it is not an offence to be in possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income by any Government servant, that the charge against the petitioner comprises the entire assets of the petitioner including those that were acquired prior to 18th December, 1964 and that the charge as framed amounts to giving retrospective effect to section 5 (1) (e) of the Act which is not permissible under Article 20 (1) of the Constitution. The learned Special Judge without agreeing with this contention dismissed the application. Hence this revision. 2. The charge against the petitioner is that he joined the service of the Central Railway on 15th February, 1956 as an Assistant Surgeon starting on a salary of Rs. 100 per month. Subsequently he was promoted as Assistant Surgeon Grade I with effect from 1st August, 1957 and was later promoted as Assistant Medical Officer in the then Central Railway with effect from 1st January, 1966. The total income of the petitioner from his known sources during the period from 15th February, 1956 to 4th September, 1969, the date on which his residence at Dornakal was searched, was Rs. 1,00,691.04 Ps. and the total expenditure incurred by him during the said period was Rs. The total income of the petitioner from his known sources during the period from 15th February, 1956 to 4th September, 1969, the date on which his residence at Dornakal was searched, was Rs. 1,00,691.04 Ps. and the total expenditure incurred by him during the said period was Rs. 68,499.56 Ps., whereas on 4th September, 1969 he was found in possession of assets of the value of Rs. 1,16,646.99 Ps., as against his likely savings during the period of the extent of Rs. 32,191.48 Ps. Thus the assets of the petitioner were disproportionate to his known sources of income to the extent of Rs. 84,455.51 Ps. The petitioner could not satisfactorily account for the said pecuniary sources and assets which were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Thus the petitioner committed the offence punishable under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (e) of the Act. 3. Sri T.V. Sarma, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the assets of the value of Rs. 1,15,646-99 Ps., which the petitioner was found in possession of on 4th September, 1969 include the assets which he acquired prior to 18th December, 1964 on which date only section 5 (1) (e) of the Act came into operation, the assets which the petitioner acquired prior to that date cannot be taken into account and what has to be considered is after ascertaining the assets which the petitioner was owning as on 18th December, 1964 and adding to those assets the subsequent income of the petitioner and out of the total of the two after deducting the probable expenses of the petitioner during the period subsequent to 18th December, 1964 the balance alone has to be looked into to find out whether the petitioner was in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income or not. Therefore the charge as framed on the basis of calculating the total income from 15th February, 1956 to 4th September, 1969 and deducting therefrom the probable expenses during the said period and on that basis to find out whether the assets which were found in possession of the petitioner as on 4th September, 1969 were disproportionate to his known sources of income or not amounts to giving retrospective effect to section 5 (1) (e) of the Act which is not permissible under Article 20 (1) of the Constitution. 4. 4. Section 5 (1) (e) of the Act reads thus: “5. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct: (e) if he or any person on his behalf is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession, for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income.“ 5. From a plain reading of the above provision it is clear that at any time during the period of his office if a public servant is found in possession of assets which are disproportionate to his known sources of income and for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, it would be criminal misconduct on the part of the public servant. Here according to the allegations, while the petitioner was in service, on 4th September, 1969 he was found in possession of assets which are disproportionate to his known sources of income and which the petitioner could not satisfactorily account. Simply because section 5 (1) (e) came into operation on 18th December, 1974 it cannot be contended that the acquisition of assets by a public servant prior to that date cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of section 5 (1) (e). What all section 5 (1)(e) says is that, at any time during the period of his service, if a public servant is found in possession of assets which are disproportionate to his known sources of income and which the public servant cannot satisfactorily explain, it would be criminal misconduct. There is nothing in section 5 (1) (e) from which it can be said that a public servant is obliged to explain the assets acquired by him only subsequent to the date on which that provision came into force. From the language used in section 5 (1) (e) the matter is very clear. There is: no ambiguity at all about it. Simply because a public servant is obliged to account for the assets acquired by him even prior to the date on which section 5 (1) (e) of the Act came into force, it would not amount to giving to that provision retrospective operation. 6. There is: no ambiguity at all about it. Simply because a public servant is obliged to account for the assets acquired by him even prior to the date on which section 5 (1) (e) of the Act came into force, it would not amount to giving to that provision retrospective operation. 6. The Supreme Court came to consider this aspect of the matter in the decision Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab1, with regard to the property acquired even prior to the Act came into force in the year 1947. There, their Lordships were considering section 5 (3) of the Act which was repealed and in its place section 5 (1) (e) was enacted. Under section 5 (3) a mode of proof of the offence of criminal misconduct was provided by means of drawing a presumption of misconduct when a public servant is in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income and he fails to satisfactorily account for such possession. In that case it was contended before the Supreme Court that if the pecuniary resources or property acquired before the date of the Act is taken into consideration under sub-section (3) what is in fact being done is that a person is being convicted for the acquisition of pecuniary resources or property, though it was not in violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of such act of acquisition. Repelling that contention, the Supreme Court observed thus: ”If this argument were correct a conviction of a person under the presumption raised under section 5 (3) in respect of pecuniary resources or property acquired before the Prevention of Corruption Act would be a breach of fundamental rights under Article 20 (1) of the Constitution and so it would be proper for the Court to construe section 5 (3) in a way so as not to include possession of pecuniary resources or property acquired before the Act for the purpose of that subsection. .......................................................................... Looking at the words of the section and giving them their plain and natural meaning we find it impossible to say that pecuniary resources and property acquired before the date on which the Prevention of Corruption Act, came into force should not be taken into account even if in possession of the accused or any other person on his behalf. Looking at the words of the section and giving them their plain and natural meaning we find it impossible to say that pecuniary resources and property acquired before the date on which the Prevention of Corruption Act, came into force should not be taken into account even if in possession of the accused or any other person on his behalf. To accept the contention that such pecuniary resources or property should not be taken into consideration one has to read into the section the additional word ‘if acquired after the date of this Act’ after the word ‘property’. For this there is no justification." 7. In the decision Hemanta Kumar Mohanty v. State of Orissa1, the Orissa High Court considered a similar matter arising under section 5 (1) (e) of the Act. It held that letting in evidence of property acquired before the amendment (18th December, 1964 the date on which the section 5 (1) (e) came into force) would not amount to giving retrospective affect to the amendment. The expression used in section 5 (1) (e) being "is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession" there is no justification for introducing a clause into it "of assets acquired after this amendment." 8. I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the contention of the petitioner that the evidence of his acquisition of property prior to 18th December, 1964, on which date only section 5 (1) (e) of the Act came into force cannot be taken into a consideration and if taken into consideration it would violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 20 (1) of the Constitution has to be rejected. Therefore, there are absolutely no merits in the revision. Accordingly it is dismissed.