JUDGMENT : 1. These petitioners have preferred this revision petition against the JUDGMENT : of the B.P. Jha, J. lower appellate court dated 17.5.1968 passed by Shri Muneshwar Prasad Verma, Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarpur. These petitioners have been prosecuted in respect of the offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (Act X of 1955). It is relevant at this stage to quote the charge hereinbelow: "That you on or about the period between the 1st day of April, 1964 and the 10th day of August, 1964 at Chhatabazar in Muzaffarpur town under Town P.S. being dealer in foodgrain under Bihar Foodgrains Dealer's Licensing ORDER :entered into transaction involving storage for sale of foodgrains i.e. rice in speculative manner prejudicial to the maintenance and easy availability of supply of rice in market, withheld from sale supplies of foodgrains, i.e. rice ordinarily kept for sale charged in respect of sale of rice to Sushil Seth, Prabhudeyal Sah and others a margin of profit in excess of the rate prevailing in the market at the time and at the rate in excess of the maximum margin of profit rate i.e. 2 p.c. fixed by the North Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Industry a representative body of food grain dealers for Muzaffarpur and did not maintain the stock register and cash memo book of the firm in accordance with the conditions of the licence issued to you and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7 of the E.C. Act 1955 and within my cognizance and hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge." 2. On a perusal of the charge, it is clear that these petitioners were charged with respect to these following facts, namely: (i) That between 1st April, 1964 and 10th August, 1964, these petitioners withheld sale of rice from certain customers: (ii) That these petitioners charged profit exceeding 2 per cent fixed by the North Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Industry which was representative body of foodgrains dealers for Muzaffarpur ; (iii) That these petitioners did hot maintain stock register in accordance with the conditions of the licence; (iv) That these petitioners did not maintain cash memo in accordance with the conditions of the licence issued to these petitioners. 3. 3. The lower appellate court acquitted these petitioners in respect of the former two charges but it convicted in respect of the two latter charges. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the facts mentioned in charge nos. 3 and 4 for the simple reason that the report on which cognizance was taken by the Subdivisional Magistrate did not disclose the facts constituting the offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (Act X of 1955). He also contended that these petitioners have been seriously prejudiced in defending their case in view of the ambiguity in the charge. 5. In respect of point no. 1, learned counsel for the petitioners relies on Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act, which runs as follows : 11. "Cognizance of offences: No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this Act except on a report in writing of the facts constituting such offence made by a person who is a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1850)”. Relying on the section, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act only on a report which discloses the facts constituting such offence. In other words, the Court shall not take cognizance in respect of those facts which are not mentioned in the report. It is not necessary for the public servant to disclose the details of the facts constituting the offence. If the sum and substance constituting an offence is not mentioned in the report, the Magistrate will be debarred from taking cognizance of those facts which are not mentioned in the report and, as such, the trial court will also be debarred from trying those facts constituting offence which are not mentioned in the report. The written report (Ext.7/1) was lodged before the Subdivsional Officer on 10.8.1968 by the Supply Inspector (P.W. 12). The Subdivisional Officer asked the Officer-in-charge Police Station to institute a case and investigate into the offence. In this written report, it was alleged that these petitioners withheld sale of rice from certain persons and that they sold the rice at a profit exceeding 2 percent in contravention of the resolution dated 15.4.1964 passed by the North Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In this written report, it was alleged that these petitioners withheld sale of rice from certain persons and that they sold the rice at a profit exceeding 2 percent in contravention of the resolution dated 15.4.1964 passed by the North Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Industry. The lower appellate court acquitted the petitioners in respect of these two allegations. Against the JUDGMENT : of acquittal in respect of these charges, the Government preferred Government Appeal no. 38 of 1968 and the Government appeal was dismissed by me, and I affirmed the JUDGMENT : of acquittal passed by the lower appellate court by JUDGMENT : dated 9.4.1975. 6. On a perusal of the written information lodged by P.W. 12 on 10.8.1964, it appears that the written report (Ext. 7/1) did not disclose that the petitioners did not maintain register in accordance with the conditions laid down in the licence issued under the provisions of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing ORDER :, 1963 It is also not mentioned in the written report that the petitioners were not maintaining cash memo in accordance with the conditions laid down in the licence issued to the petitioners. It is conceded by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State that these two facts are not mentioned specifically in the written report. On the basis of the written report, the police held investigation under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure and submitted a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, against these petitioners mentioning the following facts constituting the offence: "In brief the facts of the case is that the accused persons were hoarding the rice in their stock and did not release it due to prejudicial and ulterior motive with a view to take more profit in selling the rice when the price of it would go high. The accused realised some of the retail dealers with an exorbitant rate which was purchased on low rate. Accordingly, his stock was checked and 127 bags of rice were seized by the complainant and the written report of the complainant was received through S.D.O. Sadar and a case under Section 7 E.C. and 41 D.I.R. was drawn up against the accused persons. Accordingly, his stock was checked and 127 bags of rice were seized by the complainant and the written report of the complainant was received through S.D.O. Sadar and a case under Section 7 E.C. and 41 D.I.R. was drawn up against the accused persons. During the investigation of the case a prima facie case is well proved against the accused persons shown in columns 3 and 4 and accordingly chargesheet under Section 7 E.C. and 41 (v) D.I.R. submitted against them under the ORDER :s of Police to face their trial in the court. The complainant has been informed accordingly." 7. On these facts, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that in the report submitted by the police under Section 173 on 23.9.1964, the Sub Inspector of Police (public servant) did not mention in the report that these respondents did not maintain stock register or cash memo in accordance with the terms laid down in the licence issued to these petitioners under the provisions of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963. In such, circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the trial court is prohibited from trying those facts constituting offence which are not disclosed in the report filed by the Supply Inspector under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It is clear by the ORDER :of the Subdivisional Magistrate dated 25.9.1964 that he took cognizance on the basis of the chargesheet (report) submitted by the police on 23.9.1964. These facts, namely, that the petitioners were not maintaining stock register and cash memo in accordance with the terms of the licence issued to the petitioner are not mentioned either in the report submitted by the police or in the written report lodged by the Supply Inspector. It is also conceded by the learned counsel for the State. On these facts, learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the trial court erred in trying these facts, namely that these petitioners were not maintaining stock register and cash memos in. accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence for the simple reason that these facts constituting the offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act were not mentioned in the report of the public servant. accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence for the simple reason that these facts constituting the offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act were not mentioned in the report of the public servant. It is for this reason that the counsel contended that the trial of the petitioners in respect of those facts which were not mentioned in the report is without jurisdiction. In my opinion there is force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. In this connection, a reference was made to page 263 of Craze on Statute (7th Edition) and the relevant portion runs as follows: "If the requirements of a statute which prescribes the manner in which something is to be done are expressed in negative language, that is to say, if the statute enacts that it shall be done in such a manner and in no other manner, it has been laid down that those requirements are in all cases absolute and that neglect to attend to them will invalidate the whole proceeding." Relying on the above observation, I hold that the whole trial of the petitioners in respect of those facts which were not mentioned in the report is illegal and without jurisdiction. Section 11 of the Essential Commodities Act clearly lays down that the Courts will take cognizance of an offence in respect of the facts constituting the offence mentioned in the report. It is, therefore, cleat that the accused persons will be tried in respect of the facts constituting the offence mentioned in the report and not in respect of any other facts constituting offence which are not mentioned in the report. Suppose the report discloses “A” and “B" as facts constituting offence, the trial court will try in respect of these two facts, namely, A and B and the trial court will have no jurisdiction to try in respect of the facts, namely, C and D which are not mentioned in the report. The statute clearly prohibits the trial of those facts constituting offence which are not mentioned in the report. If the statute enacts certain negative provision and directs that the Court will act in a certain manner, the Court will have to follow the direction. If the Court neglects to follow the negative direction, it will invalidate the whole proceeding. The statute clearly prohibits the trial of those facts constituting offence which are not mentioned in the report. If the statute enacts certain negative provision and directs that the Court will act in a certain manner, the Court will have to follow the direction. If the Court neglects to follow the negative direction, it will invalidate the whole proceeding. In this circumstances, I hold that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in trying those facts, namely, that these petitioners did not maintain stock register and cash memo in accordance with the terms and conditions in writing. I concede that it is not necessary for the public servant to give detail of the facts constituting the offence. It would have been enough if it was mentioned in the report that these respondents did not maintain stock and cash memo in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence. It was not necessary for the prosecuting agency to give details about the facts constituting the offence. In the present case, the report submitted by public servant under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not mention that these respondents did not maintain stock and cash memo in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence issued to them and, as such, I hold that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in trying these facts. 8. In this connection, learned counsel for the State contends that it is not necessary to state separate facts constituting the offence in respect of the same offence in the report. In my opinion, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the State is baseless. The words 'take cognizance' are qualified by the words 'the facts constituting such offence'. The intention of the legislature is that the facts constituting the offence must be mentioned on the face of the report. If the Courts are prohibited from taking cognizance in respect of the facts constituting offence which are not mentioned in the report, then the trial court also cannot try those facts in respect of which cognizance has not been taken. To me, it seems that the Court can take cognizance in respect of the facts mentioned in the report and the trial court will also try those facts mentioned in the report and not in respect of other facts. To me, it seems that the Court can take cognizance in respect of the facts mentioned in the report and the trial court will also try those facts mentioned in the report and not in respect of other facts. It is not necessary to give detail of facts constituting the offence in the report. It is enough, if the sum and substance of the facts constituting the offence are mentioned in the report. In the present case, these petitioners were tried for not maintaining stock register and cash memos in accordance with the conditions laid down in the licence. It is conceded by the State Counsel that these facts were not mentioned in the report (chargesheet). If it is so, the trial court had no jurisdiction to try these facts because the Magistrate did not take cognizance of these facts constituting the offence. In my opinion, it is not necessary to give details of facts constituting the offence. It is enough if it is mentioned in the report that the accused persons are maintaining stock register and cash memos in accordance with the conditions laid down in the licence. If these facts are not mentioned in the report, the trial court will have no jurisdiction to try these facts. 9. It is stated that the petitioners were running a firm known as Debraj Ganga Prasad. These petitioners were partners of the firm. They were holding wholesale dealers' licence under the provisions of the Bihar Foodgrains Control ORDER :, 1958. In 1958, Licence no. 24/58 was issued in the name of the firm (Vide Ext. 8/1). The endorsements of the Deputy Collector on the licence suggested that the licence was renewed on 13.12.1963 for the year ending 31st December, 1964. I have been informed by counsel of the petitioners and the State that in the year 1864 the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963 was in force. The licence under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963 used to be issued under Form B. Clauses 3 and 8 of the terms and conditions which are relevant are quoted herein below: 3. The licence under the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963 used to be issued under Form B. Clauses 3 and 8 of the terms and conditions which are relevant are quoted herein below: 3. (i) "The licensee shall except when specially exempted by the State Government of by the licensing authority in this behalf maintain a register of daily accounts for each of the foodgrains mentioned in the paragraph 1 showing correctly: (a) The opening stock on each day; (b) The quantities received on each day showing the place from where and the source from which received; (c) The quantities delivered or otherwise removed on each day showing the places of destination; (d) The closing stock on each day; (e) The licensee shall complete his accounts for each day on the day to which they relate, unless prevented by reasonable cause the burden of providing which shall be upon him; (ii) A licencee who is a producer himself shall separately show the stocks of his own produce in the daily account if such stocks are stored in his business premises. (iii) A licensee who is a producer himself shall separately show the stocks of his own produce in the daily account if such stocks are stored in his business premises; “8. The licensee shall, except, when specially exempted by the State Government or by the licensing authority in this behalf, issue to every customer a correct receipt or invoice, as the case may be, giving his own name, address and licence number, the name, address and licence number (if any) of the customer, the date of transaction, the quantity sold, the price per quintal and the total amount charged and shall keep a duplicate of the same to be available for inspection on demand by the licensing authority or any officer authorized by him in this behalf.” Such clauses were also mentioned in the terms and conditions of the licence issued under the Bihar Dealers Licensing ORDER :, 1958. 10. The allegation against the petitioners is that they did not maintain correctly the stock register for the period between 1.4.64 and 10th August, 1964. The stock register did not disclose the place from where these petitioners purchased the grains. It is for this reason that learned counsel for the State contends that these petitioners contravened Clause 3(i) of the terms of licence issued to them. The stock register did not disclose the place from where these petitioners purchased the grains. It is for this reason that learned counsel for the State contends that these petitioners contravened Clause 3(i) of the terms of licence issued to them. Clause 3 of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing ORDER :, 1958 and Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing ORDER :are identical. Clause 3(b) requires that the Stock Register should mention the place from where and the source from which the dealer purchased the food grains. It is alleged by the prosecution that these petitioners contravened Clause 3(i)(b) by not mentioning the place and the source from which they purchased the rice. In this connection, reference was made to the evidence of P.W. 12, Supply Inspector. In his evidence, the Supply Inspector stated that he demanded the stock register and Bijak from the accused. He also stated that the accused showed him Bijaks (Exts. 1, 1/1 and 1/2). These Bijaks (Exts. 1, 1/1 and 1/2) suggested the names of the firm from which they purchased the rice. Ext. 1 was proved by P.W. 2 who was the Munib of Shri Janki Rice Mill. Ext. 1 disclosed that the firm of the petitioners purchased 51 bags of rice from Janki Rice and Oil Mills on 1.5.1964. The evidence of P.W. 3 disclosed that the firm of the petitioners purchased 125 bags of rice on 1.4.1964 from Sita Ram Rice and Oil Mills (Ext.1/1). P.W.3 also staled that Sitaram Rice and. Oil Mill sold 105 bags of rice on 3.4.1964 to these petitioners (Ext. 1/2). It is, therefore, clear on a perusal of Ext. 1, 1/1 and 1/2 (Bijaks) that these petitioners were holding stock of 281 bags (51 bags + 125 bags + 105 bags = 281 bags) These petitioners also filed statements (Exts. 16 to 16/7) before the Supply Department showing the existing stock of rice. It is on the basis of Ext. 1 and 16 series that the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there was no intention on the part of these petitioners to disobey the terms as laid down under Clause 3(i) (b) of the licence issued to these petitioners. As soon as the Supply Inspector demanded Bijaks, these petitioners immediately handed over to him these documents. In my opinion the invoices (Exts. As soon as the Supply Inspector demanded Bijaks, these petitioners immediately handed over to him these documents. In my opinion the invoices (Exts. 1, 1/1 and 1/2) clearly disclosed the place and the source from where the petitioners purchased the rice. In this circumstance, I hold that there was no intention on the part of these petitioners to flout the terms and conditions laid down in Clause 3(i) (b) of the licence. It is well settled that mens rea is an important ingredient in constituting an offence under the Essential Commodities Act. If these petitioners had no intention to contravene the terms laid down under Clause 3(i) of the licence issued to them in my opinion these petitioners are not guilty in respect of the offence charged. I, therefore, give benefit of doubt to these petitioners for not showing the source from which they purchased the rice in the Stock Register. 11. The other allegation against these petitioners is that they did not maintain correct cash memo in accordance with condition no. 5 as mentioned in the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers Licensing ORDER :, 1958 and condition no. 8 of Bihar Foodgrains Dealer's Licensing ORDER :, 1963. These clauses provide that the licensee shall issue correct receipt giving the name and address and the licence number in the cash memo, the date of transaction, quantity sold etc. The cash memos are Exts. 3 and 3/1. The first page of the each memo is a printed document and it suggests the name of seller Debraj Ganga Prasad, Chhatta Bazar, Muzaffarpur. The name of the purchaser is also mentioned. They also disclosed the quantity sold, the date of transaction as well as the name and address of the licencee. Exts.18 and 18/1 are duplicate copies of the cash memos. These duplicates are in the printed form. The duplicates of the cash memo, i.e. Exts.3 and 3/1 show the name of the purchasers, the date of transaction, the quantity sold and the price charged, but the duplicates of Exts. 3 and 3/1 do not show the name of Debraj Ganga Prasad, Chhatta 'Bazar, Muzaffarpur. The name and style of the firm is mentioned in the original cash memo but in the duplicate cash memo, it is not mentioned. 3 and 3/1 do not show the name of Debraj Ganga Prasad, Chhatta 'Bazar, Muzaffarpur. The name and style of the firm is mentioned in the original cash memo but in the duplicate cash memo, it is not mentioned. In my opinion, it does not amount to contravention of Clause 8 of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963 or Clause 5 of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1958. In my opinion, these petitioners had no intention to contravene condition no. 8 of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963 or condition no. 5 of the Bihar Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1958. 12. The second argument of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the charge is ambiguous and it contravenes Section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. On a perusal of the charge as quoted above, it is clear that four charges in respect of different facts were amalgamated in one charge which clearly contravenes Section 234 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this circumstance, I hold that the petitioners were seriously prejudiced in their defence in view of the amalgamation of the four charges at one place which is foreign to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. In the result, I give benefit of doubt to these petitioners in respect of the offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (Act X of 1955) and their convictions and sentences are set aside and they are acquitted. Application allowed