JUDGMENT K.B. Asthana, J. - A Division Bench of the Court has referred this Special Appeal to a larger Bench as in its opinion the decision of another Division Bench in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rajendra Shanker Nigam required, 1973 A. L. J. 703 reconsideration. This Special Appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh is directed against the decision of our brother K. N. Singh, in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, quashing the order of the State Government dated 22-3-1971 suspending the petitioner Jawahar Lal Bhargava from service presumably under Rule 49-A of the U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 2. The petitioner-respondent Jawahar Lal Bhargava at the material date when he was suspended was posted at Etah as a Judicial Officer. Certain complaints were received against his conduct in the discharge of his duties as Judicial Officer. The District Judge of Etah by his letter dated 26-3-1971 informed Sri Bhargava that the Governor of Uttar Pradesh had suspended him with immediate effect Pending inquiry against him and appended a copy or the letter dated 22-3-1971 from the Commissioner-cum-Secretary, Appointment (C) Department, the material part of which translated by me into English is as follows :- "I am directed to say that the Governor has ordered that Sri Jawahar Lal Bhargava, Judicial Officer, Etah, be suspended with immediate effect during the pendency of the inquiry against him." 3. The petitioner's case was that although it was mentioned in the order that the petitioner had been suspended pending inquiry against him, this statement of fact in the order was incorrect as no charge sheet had been issued to the petitioner and that at the time when the order of suspension was passed neither any inquiry was proceeding against the petitioner nor was any such inquiry contemplated and further even though the order of suspension was passed as far back as 22-3-1971, no charge sheet had been served on the petitioner till even the day when the petitioner under Art. 226 of the Constitution was filed in toe High Court on 14-5-1973. In the petition it was pleaded that the Government has not yet made up its mind that it will institute a regular departmental inquiry against the petitioner nor it obviously made up its mind at the time of the passing of the order of suspension of the petitioner and that in the case of the petitioner there was no exceptional or compelling circumstance because of which the order of suspension was necessary much prior to the Government having even found a prima facie case against him for making up its mind to hold a departmental inquiry. It was averred that despite representations having been made to the High Court and to the Government no relief was afforded and the petitioner had no other alternative but to challenge the order of suspension by way of a writ petition. The grounds on which the order of suspension was assailed were; (1) that no inquiry was either pending or contemplated against the petitioner at the time of the passing of the impugned order of suspension dated 22-3-1971 (2) that even though the order of suspension was passed on 22-3-1971, no charge sheet had been served on the petitioner till the day of tiling of the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution: (3) that no departmental inquiry was pending against. the petitioner and (4) that there was no valid charge against the petitioner. 4. The relief claimed was that a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the order of suspension dated 22-3-1971 and to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the high Court of Judicature at Allahabad, to pay to the petitioner the balance of his salary and other allowances and to reinstate him in service. 5. 5. In a counter affidavit sworn by Chandra Kant, Upper Division Assistant in the Appointment (C) Department, Uttar Pradesh Civil, Secretariat, Lucknow, filed on behalf of the State if Uttar Pradesh, it was stated that there were serious charges against the petitioner and his service record contained a number of adverse remarks; that a number of complaints were received against the petitioner and a report from the Intelligence Department was received by the State Government, that thereafter the matter was referred to the High Court for setting further inquiry made through the Vigilance Cell of the High Court and consequently the High Court got an inquiry made through the Vigilance Cell and sent its report to the State Government with a letter dated 17-4-1972 and further a supplementary report was received from the High Court on 16-5-1972; that on 8-2-1971 the High Court by its letter wrote to the State Government that :- "On an inquiry made by the Court about the conduct of Sri Jawahar Lal Bhargava, Judicial Officer, Etah, it has been found that he is not an honest and straight Officer and `that in certain cases he has passed orders on extra judicial consideration. The Court is, therefore, of the view' that he should be placed under suspension forthwith." and consequently the petitioner was suspended by the State Government by its order dated 22-3-1971, that an inquiry against the petitioner was clearly contemplated when the order of suspension was passed against him by the State Government and on receipt of the further reports from the High Court the matter was referred to the Administrative Tribunal, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow and the petitioner was served with a charge sheet on 24-7-1973. No appearance was put in behalf of the Court and no contest was raised on its behalf in the writ petition. 6. From what has been stated above, it is clear that the State of Uttar Pradesh took its stand in justification of the impugned order of suspension on the ground that an inquiry against the petitioner was contemplated and it was the letter of the High Court dated 8-2-1971 on the basis of which the impugned order of suspension was passed. It is necessary, there. It is necessary, there. fore, to quote the letter of the High Court dated 8-2-1971, a true copy of which is annexure B-1 to the Counter Affidavit of Chandra Kant, an Upper Division Assistant of the Appointment (C) Department. "Confidential Allahabad. D. 0. No. C. 179/71 February 8, 1971 Dear Sri Gupta, I am desired to refer to the correspondence resting with Sri G. M. Sinha's ,D. 0. Letter No. 5803/thirty-nine-24J/13/69, dated January 15, 1970 and to say that on an inquiry made by the Court about the conduct of Sri Jawahar Lal Bhargava, Judicial Officer, Etah it has been found that he is not an honest and straight Officer, and that in certain cases he has passed orders on extra judicial considerations. The Court is, therefore, of the view that he should be placed under suspension forthwith. I am, Therefore, to request that the Government's approval to his being suspended with immediate effect may kindly be obtained and communicated to the Court at a very early date. I am to add that the vigilance Bureau of the Court is making a secret inquiry against Sri Bhargava and its report will be sent to Governed as soon as it is received. Yours sincerely. (V. N. Varma) Addl. Registrar. Sri M, L. Gupta, Under Secretary to Govt. U. P. Appointment (C) Deptt. Lucknow." 7. Brother K. N. Singh, who heard the petition, as appears from his judgment dated 31-8-1973, relying upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in the State of U.P. v. Rajendra Shanker Nigam, 1973 A. W. R. 271 and having found that the order of suspension was passed at a time when the preliminary inquiry was being held and the State Government had not applied its mind nor had considered the existence of any exceptional or compelling circumstances because of which it was considered necessary to suspend the petitioner even before the service of charge on him held that the order of suspension was not passed in accordance with the requirements laid down under Rule 49-A and as such it was invalid and it continued to be so throughout. He further observed that the service of charges subsequently after two years will not validate the order of suspension against the petitioner. He further observed that the service of charges subsequently after two years will not validate the order of suspension against the petitioner. In the result he quashed the order of State Government dated 22-3-1971 and further held that the petitioner will be entitled to salary and allowances during the period he was placed under suspension. The State of Uttar Pradesh then filed the Special Appeal, which has been referred to us. 8. In support of the appeal the Chief Standing Counsel foil the U. P. State, argued that the purpose to be served in suspending a Government servant when serious allegations of misconduct are alleged against him is to keep him out of position of power which he enjoys as a public servant lest he mis-uses it to impede or thwart the collection of evidence against him in devious ways as also to subserve the public interest, hence Rule 49-A should be interpreted in such a manner as to make a suspension efficacious in achieving the above said purpose. He submitted that the expression an inquiry is contemplated' ,occurring in Rule 49-A should be given widest possible meaning as permitting the appointing authority, its discretion, to exercise the power of suspending the Government servant the moment it decides on receiving serious complaints of misconduct against him to find out the prima-facie truth behind the allegations of misconduct. According to the learned Chief Standing Counsel, a preliminary inquiry or an informal inquiry for finding out whether there was any substance in the allegations of misconduct with a view to initiate formal inquiry against the delinquent servant will be covered by the expression `inquiry is contemplated' and if that were not so there would be no distinction, between a Government Servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated or a Government servant against whom an inquiry is proceeding which distinction Rule 49-A in its opening part makes. This argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel did not find favour in this Court on an earlier occasion. Seth, J. in Rajendra Shanker Nigam v. State, 1973 A. W. R. 271 rejected such an argument. This argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel did not find favour in this Court on an earlier occasion. Seth, J. in Rajendra Shanker Nigam v. State, 1973 A. W. R. 271 rejected such an argument. He held that the inquiry referred to in Rule 49-A, means an inquiry under Rule 55 and the expression an `inquiry is contemplated' would mean that an inquiry under ,Rule 55 is expected, that is the appointing authority has decided that in the circumstances of the case it would proceed to hold an inquiry as provided under Rule 55. The learned Judge finally observed that : "I am accordingly of opinion that merely because serious complaints against a Government servant are received by his appointing authority and it decides to. obtain a report with regard to It from the Vigilance or some other authority it does not necessarily follow that the appointing authority contemplates to hold an inquiry against the Government servant under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Such a report is called for enabling the appointing authority to make up its mind whether or not to initiate regular departmental proceedings." 9. Though this decision of Seth, J. was affirmed by the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 114 of 1973 (State of U. P. v. Rajendra Shanker Nigam), 1973 A. L. J 703 but the Division Bench seems to have taken a view in regard to the scope and contents of Rule 49-A as vesting somewhat wider and larger discretion in the appointing authority to pass an order of suspension than that considered by Seth, J. The Division Bench in State of U. P. v. Rajendra Shanker Nigam, 1973 A. L. J 703 expressed an opinion that normal procedure was indicated by the Note appended to Rule 49-A but if there was any exceptional or compelling circumstance to place the petitioner under suspension, then the normal procedure could be departed from by the appointing authority. 10. 10. The material part of Rule 49-A may be conveniently quoted here .- "49-A(1) A Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority." Note:- "As a rule, suspension should not be resorted to unless the allegations against the Government Servant are so serious that in the event of their being established, they may ordinarily be expected to warrant his dismissal, removal or reduction. Suspension, where deemed necessary should, as far as possible, immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication to the Govt. servant charged." 11. The Division Bench construed clause (1) of Rule 49-A as leaving a discretion with the appointing authority to pass a suspension order when it finds exceptional or compelling circumstances by departing from the normal procedure envisaged by the Note. This is clear from the following observation of the Division Bench :- "As already noticed the existences of power is not to be confused with the limitation, if any, imposed upon its exercise. The Note appended to Rule 49-A specifies the occasion when alone the power of suspension may be exercised normally. Under it, suspension, where deemed necessary, should, as far as possible, immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication to the Government servant charged. This is the normal rule. If the appointing authority exercises the power of suspension at an earlier point of time the burden is upon it to establish that it was not possible to comply with the conditions of the Note." 12. Thus it is implicit in the above extracted from the decision of the Division Bench that the expression `against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated' is capable of a wider meaning than what was given to it by Seth, J. Before us the learned counsel for the contending parties with equal vehemence assailed this view of the Division Bench. Thus it is implicit in the above extracted from the decision of the Division Bench that the expression `against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated' is capable of a wider meaning than what was given to it by Seth, J. Before us the learned counsel for the contending parties with equal vehemence assailed this view of the Division Bench. The learned Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh contended that the Note appended to Rule 49-A, in no way affects the exercise of power by the appointing authority under clause (1) of Rule 49-A and it can pass an order of suspension at the point of time when it finds that the serious allegations reported or accusations levelled if established will entail in the ordinary course the punishment of removal, dismissal or reduction in rank, and considers it expedient to make an informal inquiry for its prima-facie satisfaction that the allegations have substance than the power so exercised by it need not be justified on the basis that such compelling circumstances existed that it was not possible to comply with the conditions of the Note. The learned counsel for the respondent, the Government servant charged, contended that to give certainty to clause. (1) of Rule 49-A with a view to avoid discrimination the construction placed by Seth, J. should be accepted otherwise the appointing authority, that is the departmental officers, may in many cases suspend a Government Servant at the very inception of receiving the complaints of misconduct against him and in the other cases wait till a prima facie case has been made out for holding a departmental inquiry under Rule 55 thus destroying the concept of uniformity in the application of Rule 49-A, which the Note, as a substantive part of the rule aims to achieve. The learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon the recommendations of the Disciplinary proceedings Inquiry Committee which were accepted by the Governor and are contained in Appendix IV to the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the material part of it is reproduced below :-- 1. "Disciplinary proceedings are most often preceded by an investigation of an informal character, and there is a tendency for the investigation stage to be protracted without any definite target by which investigation should he brought to a close. "Disciplinary proceedings are most often preceded by an investigation of an informal character, and there is a tendency for the investigation stage to be protracted without any definite target by which investigation should he brought to a close. To guard against any such tenancy, immediate superior Officer, on whom rests the responsibility for initiating formal proceedings should in all cases decide at the earliest possible moment whether investigation is likely to be so complicated as to require a special investigation agency either of the police or of the department itself, and should throughout the investigation, keep a close watch on its progress to ensure that no undue delay occurs at this stage. 2. When the investigation (if any) has been completed, and it has been decided to undertake formal disciplinary proceedings the following time-schedule should be observed as closely as possible in dealing with big and complicated cases : (a) The charge or charges should be handed over to the charged officer within 15 days from the date of taking the decision to start formal proceedings. (At the same time a decision should be taken whether the Officer should be placed under suspension pending inquiry). (b) The charged Government servant's written statement of defence should ordinarily be required to be submitted within a period of a fortnight and in no case should a period of more than a month be allowed for the purpose. (c) The inquiry, including oral examination of the witnesses, should be completed within a month of the submission of the written statement. (d) The report of the Inquiry Officer, where he is not himself the punishing authority, should be submitted as expeditiously as possible and ordinarily within a fortnight of the closing of the inquiry" 13. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that these instructions were issued in January, 1953 much before Rule 49-A with all its clauses and the Note, as it stands at present, was introduced as substantive part of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. What appears now as clause (1) with its first proviso together with the Note appended at the end of clause (6) as at present was the whole Rule 49-A prior to 1958. Clauses (2) to (6) were not there. What appears now as clause (1) with its first proviso together with the Note appended at the end of clause (6) as at present was the whole Rule 49-A prior to 1958. Clauses (2) to (6) were not there. The Note appears to have been appended to Rule 49-A as it then was in order to make effective the recommendations of the Disciplinary Proceedings Inquiry Committee as accepted by the Governor of Uttar Pradesh. The Note sit remains an intrinsic part of Rule 49-A as it stands now. There is no dispute that the Note was introduced by the rule making body does not merely represent the departmental practice. 14. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent appears to be well founded that the contents of the Note ought to be given full effect in construing the material provisions of Rule 49-A. When the Note is taken into consideration then the meaning of the word `Inquiry' used in clause (1) becomes clear, which means the departmental inquiry as envisaged by Rule 55, as held by Seth, J. The instructions given by the Government as extracted above show that the disciplinary proceedings are most often preceded by an investigation of an informal character and the immediate superior officer on whom the responsibility for initiating formal proceedings lay is directed to complete the investigation as soon as possible without undue delay occurring at any stage. When the investigation, if any, has been completed and it has been decided to undertake formal disciplinary proceedings, a time schedule has to be observed, The charge or charges should be handed over to the charged officer within 15 days from the date of taking the decision to start formal proceedings and it is at the same time that a decision should be taken whether the Officer be placed under suspension pending inquiry. Thus the word `Inquiry' means nothing but the formal disciplinary proceeding and not the investigation of an informal character which most often precedes the initiation of formal disciplinary proceeding envisaged by Rule 55. When the appointing authority takes a decision to start formal proceedings, then within 15 days of taking that decision charge or charges should he handed over to the charged officer. Thus there is a time lag of 15 days permitted between taking the decision to start formal proceedings and the service of charges on -the charged Officer. When the appointing authority takes a decision to start formal proceedings, then within 15 days of taking that decision charge or charges should he handed over to the charged officer. Thus there is a time lag of 15 days permitted between taking the decision to start formal proceedings and the service of charges on -the charged Officer. The direction given by the Governor envisages that at the time when a decision is taken by the appointing authority to start formal proceedings it must also simultaneously decide whether the Officer should be placed under suspension pending the inquiry. It is at this stage that it can be said that an inquiry is contemplated against the conduct of the Government servant. The only meaning that can be given to the phrase against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated, occurring in clause, (1) of Rule 49-A, would he against whose conduct an inquiry under Rule 55 is to be initiated"; That will be when a decision has been taken on the basis of the material collected on preliminary investigation and the appointing authority is prima-facie satisfied that they have substance and the starting of, formal proceedings would be justified. At any print of time prior to the taking of such a decision it could not be said that an inquiry under Rule 55 was contemplated. 15. Though the verb `contemplate' has many meanings and has somewhat an ambiguous import, yet it has to be given a definite meaning in the context in which it has been used in harmony with the scheme laid down in the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules pertaining to conduct and discipline of the Government servant who fail within the rule making power of the Governor under Art. 309 of the Constitution. With great respect the meaning given by Seth, J. in Rajendra Shanker Nigam v. State of U. P., 1973 A. W. R. 271 appears to be correct, that is to have in view an inquiry under Rule 55 or to hold an inquiry under Rule 55. This stage would not he reached unless the appointing authority decides in the circumstances of the case that it will proceed to hold an inquiry under Rule 55. This stage would not he reached unless the appointing authority decides in the circumstances of the case that it will proceed to hold an inquiry under Rule 55. Viewed in this light and the directions of the Governor as given in para 2 of the Appendix IV, quoted -above, the substance of which is contained in the Note, the phrase "suspension, where deemed necessary should, as far as possible, immediately precede the framing of charges and their communication to the Government servant charged" occurring in the Note will mean where it is decided to suspend a Government servant pending a formal inquiry under Rule 55 the order of suspension as far as possible be passed immediately preceding the framing of the charges and their communication. By the use of the words as far as possible' an intention is manifest that when the appointing authority considering the prevailing circumstances finds some practical difficulties, it may not take a decision to suspend a Government servant at the point of time immediately preceding the framing of charges and their communication to the Government servant charged and may defer the decision to suspend to a later date. The Note does not permit the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant before it decides to initiate a formal inquiry under Rule 55 against The Government servant. The Note fixes the earliest point of time for the exercise of the power of suspension. The phrase "as far as possible" cannot be construed as leaving a power with the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant at a point of time earlier then the earliest point of time fixed by the Note. 16. The first part of the Note which says "as a rule suspension should not be resorted to unless the allegations against the Government servant are so serious that in the event of their being established they may ordinarily be expected to warrant his dismissal, removal or reduction" shows that only in cases where major punishments, that is dismissal, removal or reduction, can be imposed on the basis of the nature of the allegations against the Government servant that he may be suspended. Whether the seriousness of the allegations warrant in the ordinary course his dismissal, removal or reduction will certainly depend on the content's of those allegations. Whether the seriousness of the allegations warrant in the ordinary course his dismissal, removal or reduction will certainly depend on the content's of those allegations. In as much as under clause (I) of Rule 49A the power of suspension can be exercised only when a decision has been taken to start an inquiry under Rule 55 as held by us what is envisaged by the Note in its first part is that when on preliminary investigation such material has been collected which has substance to justify the departmental proceedings and it is expected that on the evidence brought before the inquiry Officer such misconduct on the part of the Government servant will be established which in normal course would justify the infliction of either of the major punishments-dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, then the power of suspension be resorted to. The expression `as a rule', occurring in the beginning of the Note, implies that that is always the rule to be observed. The word `allegations' used in first part of the Note do not mean the allegations contained in the complaint received against a Government servant but would mean the allegations having substance revealed by the investigation of an informal nature. The same conclusion would be reached if the provisions of rule 55-B are examined. When only minor penalties are decided to be imposed, like censure or stoppage at an efficiency bar even framing of formal charge or calling for explanation of the Government servant is dispensed with. Where other minor penalties are to be imposed, then only formal proceedings embodying the statement of the Offence or fault are to be drawn up, explanation of the person concerned obtained and the the reason for punishment recorded. In this case also no formal charge need be framed and communicated to the person charged. Thus where minor punishments are to be imposed no formal inquiry as envisaged under Rule 55 is required. It is only in a case where prima-facie material justifies the imposition of major penalties that charges are to be framed. The major penalties cannot be inflicted unless the requirement of Rule 55 has been complied with. It is the framing of the charge or charges and their communication to the Government servant charged which initiates or marks the start of the formal departmental proceedings under Rule 55. The major penalties cannot be inflicted unless the requirement of Rule 55 has been complied with. It is the framing of the charge or charges and their communication to the Government servant charged which initiates or marks the start of the formal departmental proceedings under Rule 55. Since the suspension of a Government servant is not envisaged under the rules unless in the ordinary course on the charge framed it is expected that major Punishment could be imposed, the suspension is to be resorted to either when an inquiry under Rule 55 is contemplated or is proceeding against a Government servant under that rule. The exercise of power of suspension thus is circumscribed under the scheme of the rules and it is to be resorted to at a point of time and under circumstances indicated therein. The exercise of power is not unbounded depending on the sweet will of the appointing authority. It is difficult, therefore, to accept the contention of the learned Chief Standing Counsel as his contention tends to confer on the appointing authority a power to be exercised on the basis of the subjectivity and not objectivity which Rule 49-A intends to achieve. For the above reasons it is also not possible to accept the view of the Division Bench in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rajendra Shanker Nigam, 1973 A. L. J. 703 that if there are compelling and exceptional circumstances the power of suspension can he exercised even before deciding to hold a departmental inquiry under Rule 55 against a Government servant for that will again leave the matter to the subjective satisfaction of the appointing authority and to call upon it to justify the exercise of its power by establishing the existence of `compelling and exceptional circumstances' will hardly be of any benefit to the Government servant against whom the power of suspension is exercised. Even a review by a Court of law in this regard will hardly be an adequate safeguard against discrimination as the concept of `compelling and exceptional circumstances' being elusive in its import and somewhat ephemeral in its content will introduce uncertainty in the situation which Rule 49-A with the Note appended aims to avoid. 17. At this stage now certain decisions of the Supreme Court cited at the bar be noticed. 17. At this stage now certain decisions of the Supreme Court cited at the bar be noticed. In the case of Govinda Menon v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1967 S. C. 1275 the Supreme Court while considering the language of Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 held that the word charges in Rule 7(1) has to be given a wider meaning as denoting the accusations and imputations against the member of the service and rejected the argument that the word `charges' in the said rule be given the same meaning as the word `charges' occurring in Rule 5(2) as it was found that the language of Rule 7(1) was different. Rule 7(l) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 is as follows: 7(1) If having regard to the nature of the charges and circumstances in any case the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the service against whom such proceedings are started that Government may - (a) If the member of the service is serving under it pass an order placing him under suspension, or..............." 18. The language of the relevant Rule 49-A of the U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, as discussed above, is entirely different and bears no resemblance with Rule 7(1) of the All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. No benefit, therefore, can be derived by the learned Chief Standing counsel from this decision of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that the word `allegations' occurring in clause (1) of Rule 49-A should mean imputations or accusations against the Government servant contained in any complaint received against him and the appointing authority even at that stage considering the seriousness of the accusation can decide to suspend him. 19. The learned Chief Standing Counsel then cited the case of Union. of India, Ministry of Home Affairs v Taraknath Ghosh, A.I.R. 1971 S. C. 823 and on the basis of that decision contended that the respondent cannot have any grievance on the score that there being only allegations against him which has not crystallised into definite charges the order of suspension could not be made unless it was decided to start a departmental proceeding under Rule 55. The learned Chief Standing counsel placed reliance on the following observations at the end of para 8 at page 827 :-- "Whether it is necessary or desirable to place the Officer under suspension even before definite charges had been framed would depend upon the circumstances of the case and the view which is taken by the Government concerned." From para 9 of the reported judgment the following passage was cited : "In principle we can see no difference between the position of an Officer against whom definite charges had been framed to which he is required to put in his written statement and a situation where on receipt of allegations of grave misconduct against him the Government is of opinion that it would not be proper to allow the officer concerned to function in the ordinary way." 20. The submission was that on general principles the appointing authority as the employer being entitled to appoint, and remove a public servant would' also have the power to suspend him pending inquiry into his conduct and the power of suspension envisaged under Rule 49-A ought to be construed in a manner so as to preserve the general power of the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant as explained by the Supreme Court in the case cited. It would be noticed that in Taraknath Ghosh's A.I.R. 1971 S. C. 823 case the Supreme Court was considering Rule 7(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 which is quite different in language from Rule 49-A of the U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Moreover, in a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P. R. Nayak v. Union of India A. I. R 1972 S. G. 554 the Supreme Court again had occasion to consider the validity of the suspension order passed against a member of All India Service. In this case relying upon Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules it was contended on behalf of the suspended Government servant that the language of Rule 3 was clear and unambiguous and it was not permissible on plain reading of sub-rule (1) to order the appellant's suspension merely because there were some accusations and imputations against him which called for an inquiry. Rule 3(1) of the Ail India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 which replaced Rule 7(1) of idle All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955 may conveniently be quoted here for reference :- 3. Suspension During Disciplinary Proceedings : (1) "If, having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case, the Government which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the service against whom such proceedings are started that Government may - (a) If the member of the Government is serving under it pass an order placing him under suspension, or......." 21. While discussing the merits of the contention raised before it the Supreme Court reviewed its previous decisions in Govinda Menon's and Tarakanath Ghosh's cases. The decision in Govinda Menon's case was `distinguished on facts as there the order of suspension was passed, after a preliminary inquiry had been held and disciplinary proceedings initiated. As to Taraknalh Ghosh's case it was observed :- "But he that as it may, we find ourselves in all respects unable to agree with the view taken in Taruk-path Ghosh's case." 22. In para 18 of the judgment at page 562 the Supreme Court appears to have taken the view that the power of suspension must be conferred by a rule and did not recognise any inherent or implied power of suspension vesting in the appointing authority. The learned Chief Standing counsel, however, urged relying on certain observations in P. R. Nayak's case that it turned on the definite and unambiguous language of Rule 3 of All India Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1969 which did not confer any power of suspension in contemplation of a disciplinary inquiry and since under Rule 49-A suspension can he ordered when an inquiry is contemplated; nothing decided. in P. R. Nayak's case can be of any benefit to the respondent. That may be so. But this decision of the Supreme Court at least demolishes the contention that some general power vests in the appointing authority to suspend a Government servant. Indeed the learned counsel for the respondent did not so much rely on P.R. Nayak's case in support of his contention but cited it to show that the decision in Taraknath Ghosh's case was dissented from. Indeed the learned counsel for the respondent did not so much rely on P.R. Nayak's case in support of his contention but cited it to show that the decision in Taraknath Ghosh's case was dissented from. In fact in none of the three cases noticed by us above the Supreme Court had occasion to consider Rule 49-A of the U. P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The decision of the Supreme Court turned on the language of the rules which fell for consideration before it in the three cases. 23. Had clause (1) of Rule 49-A stood alone without the Note, perhaps it could have been argued with some amount of felicity that when on serious accusations and imputations having been made against a Government servant the appointing authority decides to hold a fact finding inquiry for its prima-facie satisfaction as to the substance of the allegations constituting the imputations or accusations a power of suspension could be exercised at that stage but the Note appended to that rule which, is held above, a substantive part of the rule, clearly indicates that the inquiry contemplated in clause (1) of that rule is not the preliminary fact finding inquiry but it is the inquiry under Rule 55. This conclusion is fortified by the Appendix IV to the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 24. There is yet another reason for not accepting the argument of the learned Chief Standing Counsel. If a preliminary fact finding inquiry started on the basis of serious allegations which if established may, in ordinary course, entail infliction of major punishment on the Government servant is the inquiry contemplated under Rule 49-A, then the suspension order would last only upto the conclusion of that inquiry as clause (1) lays down that a Government servant against whose conduct an inquiry is contemplated or is proceeding may be placed under suspension pending the conclusion of the inquiry in the discretion of the appointing authority. Neither it has been argued nor could be argued by the Chief Standing Counsel that if after the preliminary fact finding inquiry the appointing authority is satisfied that a regular inquiry under Rule 55 be instituted then a second suspension order will be passed as the first one passed would terminate on the conclusion of the preliminary inquiry. This is not contemplated by the rule. This is not contemplated by the rule. Obviously the word `inquiry' occurring, of in Rule 49-A(1) cannot be construed as covering both inquiries, viz. the preliminary fact finding inquiry as well as the formal inquiry under Rule 55. 25. Coming to the facts of the case, it is clear that the suspension order was passed. by the Governor, the appointing authority, on the basis of the letter of the Additional Registrar of the High Court wherein it was stated that Sri Bhargava did not appear to be an honest and straight Officer and the matter was entrusted to the vigilance Bureau of the Court for making a secret inquiry against Sri Bhargava and the report was to be sent to the Government as soon as it was received. Another factor which seems to have influenced the Government as revealed by the counter affidavit for passing the order of suspension was that certain reports from Intelligence were received by the Department, which were referred to the High Court for getting a further inquiry made from the Vigilance Cell of the High Court. It was at this stage that the suspension order was passed. It is clear that the investigation of an informal nature or an informal inquiry was still continuing when the order of suspension was passed. The informal inquiry had not come to an end. All the material which came to light after the completion of the informal inquiry on the basis of which a decision could be taken as to the seriousness of the allegations deserving of major punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank in the ordinary course was not before the Governor when the impugned order of suspension was passed. f he Governor as an appointing authority, therefore, had no occasion to apply his mind and to decide to proceed with a formal inquiry under Rule 55. The order of suspension passed was, therefore, in violation of Rule 49-A and thus void. It could not be sustained on the basis of the subsequent developments culminating in sending the case of the petitioner to the Administrative Tribunal. The suspension order being ab initio void could not be revived. 26. The Special Appeal is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is here by dismissed with costs.