JUDGMENT B. D. Singh, J: These four applications under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') have been preferred by the different petitioners against the order dated the 25th May, 1970, passed by the Magistrate in different proceedings under section 133 of the Code directing the petitioners to remove encroachment from the foot path at the junction of the straight Mile Road, Water Works Road and Inner Sakchi Market road in Jamshedpur. Opposite Party No.1 is the State of Bihar and Opposite Party No.2 was one S. B. Das, Bazar Master, Tisco Ltd, Jamshedpur, but by order no. 4 dated 2-7-73 three weeks' time was allowed for.' complying with certain requirement, which was not complied with and, therefore, these four -applications stood dismissed on 23-7-73, so far as opposite party no. 2 is concerned. 2. Since common questions of law arose in all these cases, they were ordered to be heard together. They have been so heard today and this judgment will govern all of them. 3. Mr. Lakshmi Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in all the four cases, has assailed the impugned order and raised the following points for consideration by this Court: (i) In the impugned orders the learned Magistrate has not given specification of the lands, encroached by the petitioners, and, therefore, it is not possible for the petitioners to give effect to the operative portion of the order; (ii) The learned Magistrate has committed serious error of jurisdiction by allowing the opposite party to cross-examine the witnesses, examined by the petitioners, contrary to the provisions contained in section 139 A of the Code, which has vitiated the entire proceedings; and, (iii) The notices, which were served on the petitioners under section l39A of the Code, were equally vague since they contained no specification of the lands alleged to have been encroached upon. 4. For the sake of convenience it will be necessary to decide point no. (ii) first, Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in order to find support to his contention relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Munshi Gope V. Ragho Prasad Singh1, where Anwar Ahmad and J. Narain, JJ. were dealing with the provisions contained in sections 133 and 139A (2) of the Code. Learned counsel drew my attention to paragraph 4 thereof at page. were dealing with the provisions contained in sections 133 and 139A (2) of the Code. Learned counsel drew my attention to paragraph 4 thereof at page. 700 where their Lordships, inter alias, observed that so far as this Court was concerned, it had - been consistently held that if the ex parte evidence produced in support of the denial was reliable in the opinion of the Magistrate, he should stay the proceedings unless the matter of the existence of such right had been decided by a civil court. The earliest decision on the point was in Thakur Sao V; Abdul Aziz2, wherein it was held that all that the law required was that the party proceeded against under section 133 should appear before the Magistrate and, if he denied the public right, he should produce some evidence in support of his denial. If this evidence was reliable, the jurisdiction of the Magistrate was ousted. Their Lordships in the case of Thakur Sao laid down: "The section, however, requires evidence and not proof and the only condition is that upon the materials before him the Magistrate shall have no reason to think the evidence false. The Magistrate has no jurisdiction to weigh the evidence and to determine on which side the balance leans." 5. In my opinion, the above observations of their lordships are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. It may be noticed that in that case the party had come to this Court against the preliminary order and not against final order. In the present case the petitioners have come against the final order passed under section 133 of the Code. If the petitioners had any grievance against the order dated the 9th July, 1969, passed by the learned Magistrate allowing the opposite party no. 2 to cross-examine the witnesses, or against the order dated the 30th August, 1969, by which the opposite party no. 2 was asked to adduce evidence, if any, under section 137 of the Code, they ought to have come to this Court but they did not chose to do so, instead, they waited till the final order was passed. 2 to cross-examine the witnesses, or against the order dated the 30th August, 1969, by which the opposite party no. 2 was asked to adduce evidence, if any, under section 137 of the Code, they ought to have come to this Court but they did not chose to do so, instead, they waited till the final order was passed. In my view, the direction allowing the opposite party to cross-examine the witnesses or allowing it to adduce evidence does not go to the root of the jurisdiction vitiating the entire proceedings, therefore, that matter cannot be agitated at this stage in this Court by the petitioners. Reference may be made to the case of Jadunandan Lal V. Rampeyare Sao3, where Manohar Lall, J. was dealing with the provisions contained in section 139A (2) of the Code. His lordship observed that by sub-section (2) of that section it was enjoined that if on enquiry the Magistrate found that there was any reliable evidence in support of such denial, he would stay the proceeding until the matter of the existence of, such right had been decided by a competent civil Court. If, on the other hand, he found that there was no such evidence, he would proceed as laid down in Section 137 or Section 138, as the case might require. Sub-clause (3) again emphasised that a person who has failed to deny the existence of a public right or who having made such denial had failed to adduce reliable evidence in support thereof, should not, in the subsequent proceedings, be permitted to make any such denial, nor should any question in respect of the existence of any such public right be inquired into by any jury. His lordship held, therefore, that he was precluded from considering the question whether the opposite party had acquired by adverse possession any right. That apart, I find from the impugned orders as well as from the order sheet that no evidence was actually adduced by the petitioners during the stage of the proceedings, under sections 137 of the Code. In that view of the, matter I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel under point no. (ii). 6. Now I advert to consider point nos. (i) and (ii), which are inter-related. Therefore, both these points will be considered, together. In that view of the, matter I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned counsel under point no. (ii). 6. Now I advert to consider point nos. (i) and (ii), which are inter-related. Therefore, both these points will be considered, together. Learned counsel under these points have contended that there was no specification regarding the encroached land given either in the notice or in the impugned order. According to learned counsel, in the absence of such a specification, particularly in the impugned order, it is difficult to give effect to it. In order to substantiate his contention he has re1ied on a decision of this Court in Ram Bachan Upadhaya V. State of Bihar4. That case was being considered by me wherein I had held, while dealing with' the provisions of section 133 of the Code that in absence of any finding regarding specification of the alleged encroachment and whether it was old or new, the impugned order could not be sustained, I set aside the order and remanded the case to the learned Magistrate. Mr. K. D. Chatterji, in support of the impugned order, assisted me on these points. He referred to the application dated the 12th September, 1968, filed by the opposite party no. 2 in each of the proceedings, enclosing there with a map prepared on scale by one Mahanty, a Surveyor one of the witnesses examined on behalf of the opposite party. He had surveyed the encroached land and had prepared map which has been exhibited in each of the proceedings. To illustrate his point, he referred to Crimina1 Revision No. 1134 of 1970 wherein the encroached land is 104 sq. fit. in Criminal Revision No. 1135 of 1970 it is 154 sq. fit; in Criminal Revision No. 1136 of 1970 it is 184 sq. fit. and in Criminal Revision No. 1137 of 1970 it is 180 sq.ft. It is well established that even in a case of vagueness if any material is brought on the record of the case, any allegation regarding vagueness made by either party is not entertain-able. The principle of law is that the subject matter of the litigation should be specifically mentioned, which can easily be referred to in any future litigation. According to Mr. K. D. Chatterji, therefore, there is no vagueness in the instant case. The principle of law is that the subject matter of the litigation should be specifically mentioned, which can easily be referred to in any future litigation. According to Mr. K. D. Chatterji, therefore, there is no vagueness in the instant case. Besides that, he referred to the impugned orders wherein at various places the learned Magistrate has referred to the map and on the basis of the map as well as the evidence adduced on behalf of the opposite 'party he came to the conclusion that the petitioners had made encroachment. Therefore, in my opinion, the submission of the learned counsel (Mr. K. D. Chatterji) is well founded. In view of the specification of the encroached lands, as mentioned above, the observation made by me in 1972 B. L. J. R. 402 (supra) is of no avail to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners, as in the instant case, I find that the learned Magistrate has given a finding regarding the lands encroached on the basis of the map and the evidence of Mahanty, which removes the vagueness, if any. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the contention of the learned counsel there under points (i) and (iii) also. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however, pointed out that from the impugned orders there appears to be some confusion because the learned Magistrate has not confined himself only with regard to the encroached lands given in the map in question but he has also referred to some other lands, regarding which direction has been given to the petitioners to remove those encroachments. In that view of the matter I wish to make it clear that the petitioners would remove the encroachment only to' the extent mentioned in the map in question. 8. In the result, all the four applications are dismissed and the impugned orders are upheld with the above modification. Applications dismissed.