JUDGMENT : 1. This application under Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") by eight petitioners who were second party in 145 proceeding is directed against the final ORDER :, dated the 31st July, 1972, passed by the Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code declaring possession of the disputed land in favour of the first party, i.e., the sole opposite party Chamari Mian. The disputed land measures about 43 decimals in village Gaddar within police-station Gawan in the district of Hazaribagh (now in the district of Giridih). 2. In ORDER :to dispose of the present application, learned counsel for the petitioners has raised a short point for consideration by this Court. He has submitted that, in an earlier proceeding under Section 145 of the Code which related to various other lands, including the subject matter of the present proceeding, the parties were the same as in the present proceeding. The earlier proceeding was decided by the Magistrate by his final ORDER :, dated the 12th of August, 1957. In the said proceeding, the present subject matter of the land, including various other lands, was declared to be in possession of the petitioners of the present proceeding. In the earlier proceeding, the petitioners of the present proceeding were the members of the first party. Against the final ORDER :of the earlier proceeding, dated the 12th of August, 1957, the aggrieved party had come up to this Court in Criminal Reference No. 73 of 1958 wherein Kanhaiya Singh, J. was pleased to affirm the ORDER :of the Magistrate, dated the 12th of August, 1957. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the Magistrate who had passed the impugned ORDER :had no jurisdiction in view of the above circumstances to initiate fresh proceeding with regard to the same subject matter. In ORDER :to find support to his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon various decisions of this Court. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the Magistrate who had passed the impugned ORDER :had no jurisdiction in view of the above circumstances to initiate fresh proceeding with regard to the same subject matter. In ORDER :to find support to his contention, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon various decisions of this Court. Reference may be made to the case of (1) Raghunandan Pandey V. Kishin Mohan Singh and others (A.I.R. 1922 Patna 210) where Jwala Prasad, J. held that, when under Clause 3, proceedings under Clause 1 of Section 145 were published by affixing at a conspicuous place or near the subject matter in dispute and thus sufficient notice was given to persons interested in the subject-matter in dispute to come forward and be made parties to the proceedings the proceedings were binding upon the whole world. As far as the Magistrate was concerned, the question of possession was thus set at rest once-for all and thereafter he should maintain the ORDER :by taking action under Section 107 and 144 as the case might be against persons interfering with the possession of the party declared by the Magistrate to be in possession. The above observation was also followed by another JUDGMENT : of this Court by Wort, J. in the case of (2) Jainath Pati V. Ramlakhan Prasad and others (A.I.R. 1929 Patna 505) Where his Lordship observed that intention of the legislature in enacting this provision was that the ORDER :made by the Magistrate should have reference rather to the subject-matter of the dispute than to the persons who were engaged therein, that was to say that, once the declaration had been made as regards possession of the land, it was without using the word in strict technical sense binding upon all persons interested therein. As mentioned earlier, A.I.R. 1922 Patna 210 was relied on. 3. The above submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is also supported by a Bench decision of this Court in the case of (3) Ambika Thakur and others V. Emperor (A.I.R. 1939 Patna 611) where Mohammad Noor and Dhavle, JJ, had occasion to deal with the similar situation arising out of an ORDER :- passed under Section 145 of the Code. Their Lordships observed that, though an ORDER :under Section 145 conferred no title, the fact of possession remained and the person in possession could only be evicted by a person who could prove a better title to possession himself. The possession of the party which succeeded in proceedings under Section 145 could not be put an end to by the unsuccessful party by mere violence or surreptitious invasion. Hence, even if the unsuccessful parties under Section 145 were able on some occasions either surreptitiously or forcibly to cultivate the lands in possession of successful party, these would be no more than isolated acts of trespass and offences punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, but not acts amounting to the dispossession of the other side, and constituting the Juridical possession of the offenders, unless the other side refrained from asserting their possession for a sufficiently long period and gave up the protection of the ORDER :under Section 145 in their favour. The whole object of Section 145 was to stop a breach of the peace by deciding which party was to remain on the land and which party was to seek his remedy in the Civil Court. Breaches of the peace would continue, and the object of the legislature would be frustrated if the party who had, on the finding that he was not in possession, been forbidden to disturb the possession of the successful party until eviction in the due course of law, was allowed to interfere with the possession of the successful party and to plead once more that whatever the ORDER :might have been, he was still in possession or had been able to regain possession by force, and thus either compel the successful party to go to the Civil Court or to force a Magistrate to proceed again under Section 145. 4. In my view, on the observations of the various decisions referred to above, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is well founded. 4. In my view, on the observations of the various decisions referred to above, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is well founded. However, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the opposite party, referred a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of (4) Haripado Mazumdar and others v. Dhani Ahmad Sarkar and others (A.I.R. 1935 Calcutta 494) where Guha and Bartley, JJ, while dealing with the provisions contained in Section 145 of the Code, observed that an ORDER :made in a previous proceeding under Section 145 of the Code did not and could not legally bar the initiation of a fresh proceeding if there were reasonable grounds for such initiation as contemplated by law, learned counsel for the opposite party submitted that the learned Magistrate had relied upon the above observation of the Calcutta High Court. It is true that the decision of the Calcutta, High Court runs counter to the decision of this Court, including the Bench decision in (3) A.I.R. 1939 Patna 611 (Supra). But, in my opinion, the learned Magistrate has erred in giving preference to the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court over Bench decision of this Court. Reference may be made to the case of (5) Mahadeo Prasad Singh and others v. Jagarnath Prasad and others (A.I.R., 1934 Patna 173) where Courtney Terrell, C.J. and Kulwant Sahay, J. observed that the decision of a Division Bench of a High Court was binding not only on the Subordinate Courts but also on the other Division Benches of that court so long as that decision was not overruled by a Full Bench of that High Court or on appeal by Privy Council Therefore, in my opinion, the impugned ORDER :passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be sustained. 5. In the result, the application is allowed and the ORDER :of the learned Magistrate is set aside If the Magistrate finds that there still a breach of the peace between the parties is continuing, he would take appropriate steps for safeguarding the possession of the petitioners by taking steps under Section 107 or 144 of the Code prohibiting the opposite party from going to the land unless it is decided otherwise by a competent Civil Court. Application allowed