JUDGMENT : S. K. Ray, J. - This appeal is by the Plaintiff filed under Clause (1) of the Letters Patent read with Rule 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 from the order of summary dismissal dated 24-4-1970 passed by Hon?ble Justice B.K. Patra In M.A. No. 67 of 1969. 2. Plaintiff filed M.S. No. 115 of 1966 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack for recovery of about Rs. 20,000/- on the basis of a Purja (pronate) dated 6-10-1957 which had been executed in satisfaction of two earlier Purjas dated 1-1-1954 and 27-10-1954 for sums of Rs. 5,000/- and Rs. 10,000/- respectively. 3. The Defendants raised various pleas including the one that there was no passing of consideration under the suit hand note. The suit was posted to 19-3-1968 for hearing and it was dismissed for default of the Plaintiff in presence of the Defendants with costs. 4. On 17-4-1968, the Plaintiff filed a petition under Order 9 Rule 9 read with Section 151, CPC for restoration of the suit after setting aside the order of dismissal. This application was registered as Misc. Case No. 19 of 1968. The Defendants resisted it and ultimately the said restoration petition was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the Plaintiff filed Misc. Appeal No. 67 of 1969 in this Court which was dismissed summarily by Hon?ble Justice B.K. Patra on 24-4.1970 in the following words: Heard. Dismissed 5. A preliminary point was taken by the counsel for the Respondents regarding the scope of the Letters Patent appeal. It was contended that a Bench hearing a Letters Patent appeal should normally accept the findings of fact arrived at by the learned Single Judge unless strong grounds are made out for differing from him. The scope of Letters Patent appeal has been considered by the Supreme Court and accepted by this Court in the case of Jagabandhu Senapati and Ors. v. Bhagu Senapati and Ors. ILR 1973 Cutt. 553. The following dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. A. sivarama Krishnaya and Ors. The scope of Letters Patent appeal has been considered by the Supreme Court and accepted by this Court in the case of Jagabandhu Senapati and Ors. v. Bhagu Senapati and Ors. ILR 1973 Cutt. 553. The following dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of Alapati Kasi Viswanatham v. A. sivarama Krishnaya and Ors. C.A. No. 232 of 1961-D/I 1-1-1953, has been adopted in the decision of this Court: A Letters Patent appeal from the judgment of a learned Single Judge in a first appeal to the High Court is not exactly equivalent to a second appeal u/s 100 of the CPC and therefore it cannot be held that a Letters Patent appeal of this kind can only lie on a question of law and not otherwise. The matter would have been different if the Letters Patent appeal was from a decision of a learned Single Judge in a second appeal to the High Court. In these circumstances it will be open to the High Court to review even findings of fact in a Letters Patent appeal from a first appeal heard by a learned Single Judge, though generally speaking the Letters Patent Bench would be slow to disturb concurrent findings of fact of the two Courts below. But there is no doubt that in an appropriate case a Letters Patent Bench hearing an appeal from a learned Single Judge of the High Court in a first appeal heard by him is entitled to review even findings of fact. The contention of the Appellant therefore that the Letters Patent Bench was not in law entitled to reverse the concurrent findings of fact must be negatived. There is, therefore no compulsive rule of law that the findings of the Single Judge cannot be reviewed in any circumference. The rule, however, is more appropriate in its application to a case where the Single Judge has rendered a judgment giving his reasons and findings. There is, therefore no compulsive rule of law that the findings of the Single Judge cannot be reviewed in any circumference. The rule, however, is more appropriate in its application to a case where the Single Judge has rendered a judgment giving his reasons and findings. But where the Single Judge heard the appeal ex-parte and summarily dismissed it without disclosing as to what facts were confirmed by him and what reasons played on his mind in confirming the same, it would be an appropriate case for reviewing facts and circumstances appearing on record fully, because there is no other way of finding out if the learned Single Judge confirmed the findings of the trial Court after due consideration of the entire evidence and circumstances on record. We, therefore, proceed to review the evidence and circumstances appearing on the face of the record in this case. 6. The main question for determination is whether the Plaintiff had sufficient cause for his non-appearance on 19-3-1968 when the suit was called out for hearing. In her petition for setting aside the dismissal order she advanced two reasons:-one was her son?s illness which prevented her from corning to the Court on the date of hearing and the second was that she was under the bona-fide impression that until the interlocutory matter which was pending, was disposed of in the first instance, hearing was bound to be adjourned. Evidence and counter evidence with regard to the first cause was adduced by the respective parties. The trial Court disbelieved that reason on a thorough discussion of the oral evidence and we are of opinion that the rejection of that reason is amply justified. If the Plaintiff is to succeed, it must be on the second ground indicated above. 7. To appreciate the second ground, it is necessary to extract a few orders of the trial Court. The relevant orders are extracted here in below: 19-2-1968 Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2. pray for time to adduce evidence. Defendant No. 3 files hazira. Call on 19-3-1968 for hearing when parties to come ready. 8-3-1968 Defendant No. 2 files two petitions. One is to advance the date. Another is directing the Plaintiff to produce all the relevant papers relating to the suit from 1-1-1954. Copy served. Objections be filed on 19-3-1968. pray for time to adduce evidence. Defendant No. 3 files hazira. Call on 19-3-1968 for hearing when parties to come ready. 8-3-1968 Defendant No. 2 files two petitions. One is to advance the date. Another is directing the Plaintiff to produce all the relevant papers relating to the suit from 1-1-1954. Copy served. Objections be filed on 19-3-1968. 9-3-1968 As per D.J. memo No. 70 (2) dated 8-3-1968 the suit is transferred to the file of 1st Addl. Sub Judge for disposal. 9-3-1968 Received by transfer from the file of the Sub Judge, Cuttack. Register. Put up on the date fixed. 19-3-1969 Defendant No. 2 files hazira. Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 file separate petitions praying for time. Plaintiff files another petition for time to file objection to the petition filed by Defendant No. 2 for production of paper. Petition for time for hearing of the suit is rejected. Parties to get ready at once. Later Defendant files hazira. Plaintiff takes no steps and 19-3-1968 is absent on calls. It is already 4.15 p.m. The suit dismissed for default of the Plaintiff in the presence of Defendant with costs. It is clear from the above extracts that the Defendant No. 2 filed two petitions on 8-3-1968 and after serving copies of them on the Plaintiff?s lawyer, moved them that very day in consequence of which order dated 8-3-1908 was passed. There is no indication in that order that the Defendant No. 2 gave notice to the Plaintiff?s lawyer of his intention to move his petitions that day. These petitions of Defendant No. 2 were moved apparently ex-parte in direct breach of the directions of this Court issued to all subordinate Courts in its G.L. No. 2 of 1953 dated 18-2-1953, which condemned the practice of filing and moving petitions on dates not fixed In the suit without intimating the other side of the intention to move them on such an schedule dates as irregular and unjust. The Plaintiff, apparently, was not aware that the Defendant No. 2 moved his two petitions on 8-3-1968 and knowledge of the order passed on 8-3-1908 cannot be imputed to the Plaintiff until 19-3-1968 the date fixed for hearing of the suit. What the Court did by passing the order dated 8-3-1968 was essentially to postpone the hearing of the suit until after the disposal of the two petitions filed by Defendant No. 2. What the Court did by passing the order dated 8-3-1968 was essentially to postpone the hearing of the suit until after the disposal of the two petitions filed by Defendant No. 2. One was to advance the date of hearing and that petition obviously became infructuous as it was also posted to 19-3-1968. The other petition was to call upon the Plaintiff to produce some documents relevant to the suit. In adjourning the petition to 19-3-1968 and directing the Plaintiff to file his objections thereto, the Court introduced an element of uncertainly as to the actual trial taking place on 19-3-1968. The more reasonable inference from this order is that the hearing of the suit was to be postponed until the matter of production of documents by the Plaintiff was finally disposed of. The Plaintiff cannot be blamed if she entertained this impression as directly flowing from the wording of the order dated 8-3-1968 of which she became aware only on 19-3-1968. Any other impression was not possible to envisage, because if the petition calling upon the Plaintiff to produce documents was allowed, time was bound to be granted for such production. This probably was the intention of the Court which passed the order dated 8-3-1968, but by 19-3-1968 the case had been transferred to the Court of 1st Additional Subordinate Judge. On 19-3-1968 the Plaintiff applied for time to file objection to Defendant No. 2?s petition for production of documents as she become cognizant of the order dated 8-3-1968 for the first time on 19th March and also applied for adjournment of hearing of the suit. In both these petitions she averred that the suit was posted to 19th March for production of documents. That was her understanding of the order dated 8-3-1968 in view of the nature of Defendant No. 2?s petition for production of documents. The Defendant No. 2 likewise filed an application for time on the ground inter alia, that as the Plaintiff had not produced the documents called for he could not be ready. It is clear that both parties were under the impression that by reason of the order dated 8-3-1968 the suit hearing was to be consequentially adjourned. The Defendant No. 2 likewise filed an application for time on the ground inter alia, that as the Plaintiff had not produced the documents called for he could not be ready. It is clear that both parties were under the impression that by reason of the order dated 8-3-1968 the suit hearing was to be consequentially adjourned. That appears to be the ostensible intention of the Court passing that order but the transferee Court failed to grasp that intention and mechanically rejected time petitions and called upon the parties to get ready at once. The order of the transferee Court rejecting petition for time regarding hearing of the suit and yet passing no order regarding the petition for time to file objections on the Defendant No. 2?s petition resulted in two conflicting orders being operative at the same time and thereby creating a baffling situation of suspense and uncertainty. It was not just and fair to keep the parties in suspense as to whether the interlocutory matter was to be dealt with at all or not and then to insist that the parties should get ready for trial. The extracted orders show that having regard to the very nature of Defendant No. 2?s petition for production of documents which had been fixed to that date inviting objections and for disposal, trial of suit before such disposal could not be conceived of. There was every justification for the Plaintiff to think that the trial of the suit on 19-3-1968 was out of question as adjournment was bound to be granted as a matter of course even though the petition for production of documents was allowed by rejecting her petition for time to file objections and that it was no longer necessary for her to remain in Court or to get ready for the trial of the suit. That was a bona fide impression of the Plaintiff following logically from the order dated 8-3-1908 that since the interlocutory matter had not been finally disposed of on 19-3-1968, the trial of the suit was bound to be adjourned as, otherwise, the pending interlocutory matter will automatically become infructuous, a result which the Court never intended at any time. That was a bona fide impression of the Plaintiff following logically from the order dated 8-3-1908 that since the interlocutory matter had not been finally disposed of on 19-3-1968, the trial of the suit was bound to be adjourned as, otherwise, the pending interlocutory matter will automatically become infructuous, a result which the Court never intended at any time. For the aforesaid reasons, we are satisfied that there was sufficient cause for her non-appearance when later on at 4.15 p.m., the fag end of that day, the Subordinate Judge called on the suit for hearing and dismissed it on account of the Plaintiff?s lion-appearance. It appears to us that the Additional Subordinate Judge acted mechanically without application of his mind to the prior orders and their import. The Defendant No. 2 also appears to have taken advantage of the Court?s attitude, obviously thinking that he would lose nothing at that time of the day by filing a hazira, and filed one. The Courts are expected to be circumspect in dealing with suits, and their orders must be logical, consistent and clear and should nut be passed in such manner and in such circumstances as to create confusion in the minds of the parties. If one Court dealing with the suit earlier has taken a particular stand in regard to an interlocutory matter the transferee Court should act consistently with the stand of his predecessor. If the transferee Court wanted to deviate, he could do so only after giving sufficient opportunity to the parties to be heard on the matter; In the instant case, the trial Judge took up this suit of high valuation at the far end of the day and dismissed it for default being completely oblivious of the prior order of his predecessor dated 8-3-1968 and pendency of matter arising out of Defendant No. 2?s petition for production of documents, and, the pleadings of the parties. In the written statement the Defendants having admitted the execution of suit (sic) certain presumptions arise u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which have a bearing on the question of right to begin and consequently, the trial Judge should have considered the effect of such statutory presumptions before dismissing the suit with costs. In the written statement the Defendants having admitted the execution of suit (sic) certain presumptions arise u/s 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which have a bearing on the question of right to begin and consequently, the trial Judge should have considered the effect of such statutory presumptions before dismissing the suit with costs. This omission on the part of the trial Judge reassures us that he did not peruse the previous orders of his predecessor-in-office to understand the justification of the Plaintiff?s prayer; for time and hastily and mechanically rejected in and dismissed the suit. He, indeed, thereby, disposed of a case but did not dispense justice. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Plaintiff has been able to show sufficient cause for her non-appearance at 4.15 p.m. on 19-3-1968 when the suit was called on for hearing and dismissed on that account. It is contended by the Respondents that this aspect of the case was not canvassed before the Single Judge nor has it been stated as a ground either in memorandum of appeal of M.A. No. 67 of 1969 or in memo of appeal of this letters patent appeal. This objection is not tenable. We cannot say what was or was not argued before the learned Single Judge, but this was expressly taken as a ground for non-appearance in the original petition for restoration and both the Courts below have missed these apparent aspects in the case, primarily because they focussed their attention only on the ground of illness of the Plaintiff?s son. Since the present ground had been taken from the very beginning and no external evidence was necessary to buttress it, we think it just and proper to entertain this point in this appeal and we also find, for reasons recorded above, that this is a point of substance. 8. In result, this appeal is allowed, the decisions of the Single Judge as also of the trial Court are set aside and the petition under Order 9 Rule 9 is allowed, the order of dismissal is set aside and the suit is directed to be restored to file. The trial Court shall first of all dispose of the matter regarding production of documents raised in one of the two petitions filed by Defendant No. 2 on 8-3-1968 finally, the other one having become infructuous, and thereafter proceed to trial. The trial Court shall first of all dispose of the matter regarding production of documents raised in one of the two petitions filed by Defendant No. 2 on 8-3-1968 finally, the other one having become infructuous, and thereafter proceed to trial. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, there would be no order for costs of this Court. P.K. Mohanti, J. 9. I agree. Final Result : Allowed