Judgement D. PATHAK, J. :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree D/- 12-4-71 of the learned District Judge Manipur, passed in Civil Appeal Case No. 15 of 1969 confirming the judgment and decree of the learned Munsiff IV, Manipur, passed in Title Suit No. 209/62/ 42/65. 2. The facts for the purpose of this appeal in brief are as follows : 3. One Tomal Devi, who was the sister of plaintiff/respondent and the daughter of defendant/appellant No. 1, was divorced since before 1942 and she was in that state till her death on 9-11-52. She had no issue. The disputed land was acquired on 28-10-1946 under a registered sale deed in the name of Tomal Devi by the plaintiff and he had been in possession of this land for more than 12 years as of right through tenants. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3, who were husband and wife, became the tenants of the plaintiff since 1960. But it was found that defendant No. 1, the father of the plaintiff purported to have transferred the suit land by a sale deed executed on 5-10-1962 in favour of defendants Nos. 2 and 3. The defendants denied all the facts and defendant No. 1 asserts that he is the heir to Tomal Devi and the land in dispute was the self-acquired property of Tomal Devi. 4. The learned Munsiff framed as many as 12 issues and on consideration of facts and law he came to the conclusion in his judgment and decree as stated above that the property in suit was stridhana property and that on her death the property devolved on the plaintiff, her brother, by way of succession in preference to the defendant No. 1, the father. In appeal, the learned lower appellate Court also affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Hence this appeal is preferred before this Court by the appellant-defendants. 5. The substantial questions of law which arise in this appeal and which have been debated at the Bar, are, first, whether the property in dispute was a stridhana as understood in Dayabhaga Law, and, secondly, whether the brother, the plaintiff in the present case, or the father, defendant No. 1 is the preferential heir to succeed to the property of Tomal Devi, who died in 1952. She was divorced from her husband prior to her death. She was divorced from her husband prior to her death. There is no dispute that the parties are governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu Law. The deceased Tomal Devi died prior to the Hindu Succession Act 1956. So the case will be governed by the pre-1956 law of the Dyabhaga school. The suit property having been purchased by Tomal Devi was her absolute property. 6. Mr. Manisana Singh, first submits that the suit property is not a stridhana because Tomal Devi being a divorced woman could not own any stridhana. He submits that Hindu Law does not recognise the status of a divorced woman, far less of her having any stridhana. To this contention the answer is that the original Hindu Law did not envisage a status of a divorced woman, as according to that law a marriage being a sacrament was indissoluble. Further we are not prepared to hold that the rules of Hindu Law are so inelastic as to be capable of application only to such descriptions of states as were known at the time when the rules were first formulated. If the rules of Hindu Law are to be so narrowly construed and applied, it would be impossible to administer them. Therefore, if in a society the status of a divorced woman is recognised by custom then that customary law will be deemed to be incorporated in Hindu Law so far as that society is concerned. In Manipur, it is admitted that by custom divorce is permissible. The learned counsel for the appellants very fairly brought to our notice a Government publication relating to Manipuri customs codified by the Codification Committee constituted by the Government headed by Shri Lakshmi Narain (Chief Judge) as Chairman. Shri L. M. Ibungohal Singh (Judge, Chief Court) and five other members of the Codification Committee. This publication is divided into two parts. The first part deals with Manipuri Hindu Customs; the second part deals with Manipuri Mohammadan customs. In Chapter VI of part I dealing with stridhana or womans property, it is mentioned, inter alia under the heading "(e) Property acquired by mechanical art" at page 20 that "Property acquired by a Hindu female by mechanical art or otherwise by her own exertions during maidenhood, widowhood or Khainaba is stridhana on all fours. In Chapter VI of part I dealing with stridhana or womans property, it is mentioned, inter alia under the heading "(e) Property acquired by mechanical art" at page 20 that "Property acquired by a Hindu female by mechanical art or otherwise by her own exertions during maidenhood, widowhood or Khainaba is stridhana on all fours. But property acquired by such female during coverture is stridhana only when her husband consents to it and not otherwise". In the same Chapter at clause 6, it is mentioned that "If any property or money is earned by an unmarried woman or widow or a Khainaba woman by her own exertions, she is full owner of the same." From the facts found in this case this property was purchased by Tomal Devi after her divorce and therefore it was not within her coverture. The value of the above publication cannot be doubted as it was prepared by Committee constituted by the Government, and there is no dispute about the position in the customary law prevailing in this State in this regard as reported by the Codification Committee (Supra). The suit property was acquired by Tomal Devi during her Khainaba and as such it was her stridhana property under the customary law. In the judgment of the learned appellate court, there is an observation to the effect. "There is no dispute on the point that the property in question was stridhana purchased by Tomal Devi during her lifetime after she was divorced from her husband." 7. Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents drew our attention to Section 123 (2) at page 201 of Mullas Hindu Law (12th Edition) which reads, "Property acquired by a female during maidenhood" or widowhood, though it be acquired by a gift from strangers or by mechanical arts, is her stridhana according to all schools." To this proposition of law according to customary law of Manipuri Hindus, the Khainaba shall have to be read with the maiden or the widow. Therefore, the conclusion is irresistible that the suit property is stridhana. 8. The second submission of Mr. Manisana Singh is that even if the property is held to be stridhana, it being under non-parivashika or non-technical stridhana it should be governed by Mitakshara school. But since the view that we are taking in this case, consideration of this question will not be necessary. 9. 8. The second submission of Mr. Manisana Singh is that even if the property is held to be stridhana, it being under non-parivashika or non-technical stridhana it should be governed by Mitakshara school. But since the view that we are taking in this case, consideration of this question will not be necessary. 9. The next submission of Mr. Manisana Singh is that in Dayabhaga law there is no mention of the devolution of property of a divorced woman. We have already observed above that in old Hindu Law the institution of divorce was unknown. But in Manipur, according to custom, such institution is recognised. Therefore, in such a case, her status will have to be taken as that of a maiden or a widow. In the Government publication of Manipuri Customs as referred to above in clause 12 of Chapter VI of Part I, it is mentioned. "As for inheritance regarding stridhana property when the woman possessing it dies intestate, there appears to be no difference between it and her other property. This equally applies to both movable and immovable property irrespective of the source of the same." In the same Chapter, in a questionnaire, question No. 9, it was posed, "What is the rule of inheritence when a woman possesses of stridhana property dies intestate?" The answer given by Bhagabata Acharyya was "(1) Unmarried daughters are the heirs in equal shares. (2) In their absence the married daughters inherit in equal shares. (3) In the absence of daughters, the sons get the property in equal shares." This order of succession is almost in the line of the Dayabhaga order of succession regarding devolution of stridhana property. In Dayabhaga law, for the purpose of inheritence, stridhana is divided into four classes, viz. (1) Sulka, (2) Yautuka, (3) Anvadheyaka and (4) Ayautuka. In case of sulka, the brother is the preferential heir to the father; in case of Yautuka, if the propositus died having been married in the approved form on failure of other heirs mentioned in the text, the brother is the preferential heir to the father. In this case, there is nothing on record to show that Tomal Devi was not married in the approved form. In case of Anvadheyaka, the father is preferred to the brother, and in case of Ayautuka, the brother is the preferential heir to the father. In this case, there is nothing on record to show that Tomal Devi was not married in the approved form. In case of Anvadheyaka, the father is preferred to the brother, and in case of Ayautuka, the brother is the preferential heir to the father. This undisputed legal position is stated clearly in Sections 154, 155, 156 and 157 of Mullas Hindu Law 12th Edn. But, as in Manipur, the status of Khainaba is recognised according to custom, her status is to be recognised as that of a maiden, as her status of married woman is not there. Now, if the intestate is treated as a maiden then according to the devolution of maidens stridhana property which is the same in all the schools, the uterine brother is the preferential heir to her stridhana before the father as mentioned in Section 145 of Mullas Hindu Law 12th Edn. That there is no difference in all the schools as regards succession to maidens stridhana property is also mentioned at page 741 of Maynes Hindu Law 11th Edn. The only text upon the subject is one which is variously ascribed to Baudhayana and to Narada is cited at the same page at Maynes Hindu Law which reads. "The wealth of a deceased damsel let the uterine brothers themselves take. On failure of them, it shall belong to her mother, or if she be dead to her father." We have already noticed that according to the Manipuri custom, the order of succession regarding stridhans property is (1) unmarried daughters (2) married daughters, (3) sons and in the absence of these heirs the property will devolve on the brother according to the general principles of Hindu Law, in preference to the father. 10. Mr. Manisana Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that a uterine brother means a brother of the same mother but by different fathers and his further argument is that it cannot mean a whole brother i. e. a brother of same father and same mother. In our opinion, this argument is not sound. Because, what is meant by uterine brother being related to the propositus is that both of them are born of the same mother. In this case the plaintiff and Tomal Devi are by the same mother and same father. In our opinion, this argument is not sound. Because, what is meant by uterine brother being related to the propositus is that both of them are born of the same mother. In this case the plaintiff and Tomal Devi are by the same mother and same father. Therefore, we are of opinion that as they are born of the same mother, the plaintiff will be a uterine brother in relation to the propositus. The expression uterine brother has been translated from the original Sankrit word "Sodara". It means male issue born of the same womb and Sodara is a female issue born of the same womb. Indeed, in original texts "Sodara" and "Bhatri" are interchangeably used because in those days remarriage of a woman was unknown. Now, in a society where remarriage is recognised by custom in order to succeed to the stridhana of an intestate sister, the brother must be a "Sodara", that is, of the same mother irrespective of their fathers being different. Therefore, the term uterine brother does not exclude a whole brother. The express use of the term "Sodara" (uterine brother) is in consonance with the principle of affinity and to impliedly exclude the half brother, i. e., brother by same father but different mother. 11. Mr. Manisanas last argument is that if the Khainabas stridhana property is allowed to be devolved as in the case of a maidens property, in case she dies leaving behind her children then such children would be excluded from inheritence. But we are of opinion that such contingency would not arise because if such children are present then according to the general principle of succession applicable to all the schools of Hindu Law and also according to the customary law of Manipur, they would succeed to the Khainabas property, i. e., their mothers property and on such eventuality there would not be any question of the brother succeeding to her property. In this case, Tomal devi died intestate without leaving any child. Hence the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed to her stridhana property. 12. In view of the conclusion that we have reached in this case, we are not called upon to express any opinion on some of the authorities cited at the Bar. 13. In this case, Tomal devi died intestate without leaving any child. Hence the plaintiff will be entitled to succeed to her stridhana property. 12. In view of the conclusion that we have reached in this case, we are not called upon to express any opinion on some of the authorities cited at the Bar. 13. On the reasoning stated above, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff is the preferential heir to succeed to the stridhana of Tomal Devi. Therefore, the father defendant No. 1, had no right of transferring the property by a sale deed and as such the sale deed is not binding on the plaintiff. Accordingly, the appeal fails. The suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff. In the circumstances however, we make no order as to costs. BAHARUL ISLAM, J. :-I agree, agree. Appeal dismissed.