JUDGMENT S.K. Kaul, J. - This is a defendants' appeal and it arises in somewhat peculiar circumstances. The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent on the ground that defendant Ram Sewak had given loan to the plaintiff and in lieu of interest he had handed over certain Sirdari plots situate in village Lalpur, district Faizabad to Ram Sewak. During the consolidation operations Ram Sewak suggested to the plaintiff that since village Lalpur lay at a distance from his house if plaintiff was able to gave him less area situate in village Pausara, it would serve his purpose. Plots mentioned in list `A', attached with the plaint, were never in possession of any of the defendants Nos. I and 2. Plaintiff had no dealings with defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 had already three Chaks in village Pausara. Legally, a person could no hold more than three chaks in a village. No objections were preferred by defendant No. 2 against the plaintiff in respect of these plots in village Pausara. Ultimately, it was agreed between plaintiff on one hand and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on the other that if plaintiff allowed defendant No. 2 to be declared Sirdar of these plots in village Pausara and admitted him as such, defendant No. 1 would give up his right to claim on the basis of the pronotes and this amount would be deemed to have been paid off. It was, however, further agreed that so long as C. H. Form No. 25 was not distributed a pronote be executed in favour of defendant No. I and that pronote and receipt would remain in custody with defendant No. S. After C. H. Form No. 25 was issued in the name of defendant No. 2, the pronotes and receipts in question would be returned by defendant No. 3 to the plaintiff. This agreement was adhered to by the plaintiff. C. H. Form No. 25 was also distributed. Afterwards, when the plaintiff demanded his pronotes back from defendant No. 3, it transpired that all the three defendants were colluding inter-se and they were bent upon receiving money on the basis of the pronotes as well. On these grounds the suit was filed seeking declaration that it be declared that the pronote executed by plaintiff in favour of defendant No. I for Rs. On these grounds the suit was filed seeking declaration that it be declared that the pronote executed by plaintiff in favour of defendant No. I for Rs. 440/- dated 4-5-1960 as well as pronote executed by plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1 for Rs. 500/- dated 17-6-1960 and another pronote executed by plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1 for Rs. 150/-dated 5-1-1961 were paid off and nothing remained clue on the basis of those pronotes. Suit was contested. The trial court dismissed the suit. Plaintiff there-upon filed an appeal. The learned Civil and Sessions Judge allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff. 2. Feeling aggrieved, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have come up in appeal to this Court. It may be noted that appellant No. 1 was dead and his heirs have been duly brought on record. 3. One of the points urged before me in appeal by the learned counsel, appearing for appellants, was that the relief claimed for should not have been allowed in as much as such a relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (Old Act) was not permissible. It appeans that this very point was also argued before the learned Civil and Sessions Judge but it did not find favour with him. This argument is full of substance. 4. In the following cases it was clearly held that suit for declaration under Section 42 affecting only pecuniary relationship, between the parties to the contract, could not be granted. (1) Nathu Ram v. Mula, A.I.R. 1937 Lahore 25 (2) Dipchand Kundanmal Marwari v. Manakchand Multanmal Marwari, A.I.R. 1939 Nagpur 154. (3) K. P. Ramkrishna Pattar v. K. P. Narayana Pattar, A.I.R. 1939 Madrads 80 (4) Madan Lal v. State of Madhya Bharatt, A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 111 (5) Sripatrao Sadashiv Upre v. Shankarrao Sarnaik, A.I.R. 1930 Bombay 331 In the first case, noted above, a suit was filed for declaration to the effect that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were the principal debtors of defendants Nos. 3 to 6, that the plaintiff was simply a surety, and that in case the debt was realised from the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 were liable to compensate the plaintiff to the extent of the said payment. 1 and 2 were the principal debtors of defendants Nos. 3 to 6, that the plaintiff was simply a surety, and that in case the debt was realised from the plaintiff, defendants 1 and 2 were liable to compensate the plaintiff to the extent of the said payment. This suit was dismissed on the ground that under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act a declaratory relief sought in respect of rights arising out of a contract which would affect only the pecuniary relationship between the parties to the contract could not be decreed. 5. In the second case the suit was filed on the ground that the plaintiffs had proposed to celebrate a ceremony in honour of their grand-father's death in accordance with the custom of their community. They alleged that the defendants had decided to prevent the performance of the ceremony and with that view they had distributed handbills in the town of Malkapur to dissuade the persons invited to the function from accepting the invita-don and also to prevent them from attending it by means of picketting. On these grounds the plaintiff's prayed for a declaration that defendants 1 and 2 had no right to do "picketting" and trouble the plaintiffs and that they should be restrained by an order of injunction from carrying out their object. They also prayed for a decree for damages to the extent of Rs. 100/- on account of the worry caused to them. One of he questions involved was whether under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act such a relief could be granted to the plaintiffs. It was observed that under the aforesaid section relief only could be, granted in such cases where legal character or any right to any property of the plaintiff is denied by the defendant and when there was no such right to any property involved or any legal character was denied, relief as prayed for could not be allowed. 6. In the third case plaintiff brought a suit claiming firstly, that the first defendant be compelled "To receive the amount due by the plaintiff for the sixth drawing after declaring that the plaintiff has right to pay subscriptions and secondly, that the first defendant do give to the plaintiff the due receipt for the sixth drawing. 6. In the third case plaintiff brought a suit claiming firstly, that the first defendant be compelled "To receive the amount due by the plaintiff for the sixth drawing after declaring that the plaintiff has right to pay subscriptions and secondly, that the first defendant do give to the plaintiff the due receipt for the sixth drawing. It was observed at page 83 "but we have not been referred to any case in which any of the High Courts in India has given a declaratory relief in respect of rights arising out of a contract which would affect only the pecuniary relationship between the parties to the contract and we do not think that there are exceptional circumstances in this case to take it out of the ordinary rule." 7. In the fourth case plaintiff alleged that on 14-8-1948 the Congress Committee of Basoda entered into an agreement with the State of Madhya Bharat for the sale and distribution on behalf of the Government, of foodgrains at Basoda that according to the agreement the Congress Committee was made responsible for crediting into Government treasury proceeds of the sale of food grains after,deducting the necessary expenses incurred in distribution and sale of the food grains that on these terms the Congress Committee carried on the work of the sale and distribution of food grains from 14-8-1948 upto 7-10-1948 and that on this latter date the Committee also submitted to the Government an account of the that contrary to the terms of the aforesaid agreement the State of Madhya Bharat was now holding the plaintiff personally responsible for the sale and distribution of food grains and was demanding from him a certain amount as due on account of the undertaking. On these pleas the plaintiff claimed reliefs firstly of a declaration that according to the contract between the Congress Committee, Basoda and the State, the plaintiff was not personally responsible for payment of any amount due on account of the sale and distribution of food grains and secondly, an injunction restraining the State for ever from recovering any amount on account of the above undertaking. Implications of Secs. 42 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act (Old Act) were considered in that case. Implications of Secs. 42 and 56 of the Specific Relief Act (Old Act) were considered in that case. It was held that a suit for declaration that under a certain contract the plaintiff is not liable is not a suit for declaration that he is entitled to a legal character or to any right as to any property. Consequently, no such relief and declaration could be given. As regards injunction also it was held that such a relief could not be granted. 8. In the last case, plaintiff prayed for a declaration that the defendant was liable to pay him such monies which the plaintiff as the defendant's guarantor was liable to pay under or in respect of a decree. It was held on a consideration of various rulings quoted therein that since the present case was in respect of alleged rights arising out of contract, such rights could not be granted under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act in a declaratory suit. 9. It was urged before me by the learned counsel for the respondents that the learned Civil and Sessions Judge found that plaintiff had performed his part of the agreement and, therefore, on equitable consideration he should get this relief. This argument does not appeal to me. (I) 1093 R. D. 117 (I) 1950 A. L. J. 713 no doubt, cited on behalf of the respondents before the learned Civil and Sessions judge were considered, but these rulings were on different point altogether. Those rulings were where suit had been filed for possession of certain plots by a person who wanted possession back on the ground that the defendant had no right to retain possession because either the agreement, under which the defendant was retaining possession was void in law or that he had no right to retain the land. The defence was the plaintiff himself had delivered possession and had derived benefit. If, therefore, defendant was to give up land in equity plaintiff must he asked to return the benefit that he had derived. Those equitable principles cannot be made applicable in the case before me. Here the suit is for declaration as noted above. It is not a case where the defendant was suing for recovery of loan. If, therefore, defendant was to give up land in equity plaintiff must he asked to return the benefit that he had derived. Those equitable principles cannot be made applicable in the case before me. Here the suit is for declaration as noted above. It is not a case where the defendant was suing for recovery of loan. Had such a suit been filed, it may have been open to the present plaintiff to take this plea that by virtue of an agreement on the basis of which he had handed over plots, the pronotes should have been taken to have been satisfied. Under the circumstances, the rulings quoted by the learned Civil and Sessions Judge are of no avail. 10. As a result of the discussion, I find that this appeal must be allowed. 11. The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the learned Civil and Sessions Judge, Faizabad, are set aside. The suit is dismissed. In the circumstances, I make costs easy throughout.