JUDGMENT-Applicant Asgarali is the owner of Municipal House No.8, in Municipal Ward No. 20, in Jingarwadi Mohalla, situated at Akot, tahsil Akot, district Akola. Tukaram Sampat, the original accused No.2, is occupying the said house as a tenant since more than 15 years. It is a three storeyed building and was built up more than 100 years ago. It is the case of the applicant himself that during the incessant rains and floods of 1959, the back portion of the said 3 storeyed building had collapsed and the front portion also became dilapidated. Its walls suffered several cracks and it is in a ruinous and dangerous condition. As the house was in ruinous and dangerous condition and was likely to fall, was dangerous to persons occupying and also to the persons passing by the side of that building, a notice under section 195 of the Mallarasntra Municipalities Act was issued by the Chief Executive Officer requiring the owner and the occupier to pull it down. Such a notice was issued on 5-10-1971 to both the accused Nos. 1 and 2, namely, the owner and the occupier, directing them to pull down the building within 3 days. The notice was not complied with. Hence a prosecution was lunched against both the accused persons under section 299 (b) of the Act. Both the accused persons pleaded not guilty. ; The accused No.1, namely, the owner, admitted that the house was in a ruinous condition and needed to be demolished, His defence was that he could not obey the notice as the accused No.2, the occupier, obstructed and prevented demolition of the house The accused No, 2, the occupier,' has also pleaded that he has no objection to demolish the house, but the accused No, 1 did not allow him to pull down the house. He further contended that only the .third story of the house was dangerous and it was necessary to pull down the ground floor and the first floor. They have also raised certain other defences. 2. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, after recording the evidence recorded a finding of fact that both the accused failed to comply with the notice issued by the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council and therefore held them guilty. They have also raised certain other defences. 2. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, after recording the evidence recorded a finding of fact that both the accused failed to comply with the notice issued by the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council and therefore held them guilty. In this view of the matter he convicted them for an officer punishable under section 299(b) of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, referred to hereinafter as the Act, and each of the accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.51 for the noncompliance of the notice issued by the Chief Officer under section 195 of the Act. Both the accused were given time of 15 days from the date of the order to comply with the said notice and if they failed to comply with the said notice each of the accused was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.5 per day for each continuing offence. 3. Being aggrieved by this order both the accused persons filed two separate appeals before the Sessions Judge. The said appeals were registered as Criminal Appeals Nos. 118 and 119 of 1973 and were disposed of by a common order dated 5-12-1973. Both the appeals were dismissed by the Sessions Judge, Akola. Before the Sessions Judge on behalf of the owner of was not challenged that the building is in ruinous condition and is likely to fall at any time. On behalf of the accused No.2 it seems however an argument was advanced that the building is quite safe and the Chief Officer has erroneously come to the conclusion that it is ruinous or is likely to fall at any time on behalf of the tenant an argument was also advanced alleging collusion between the owner of the house as well a the Chief Officer. However on the basis of the evidence on record the learned Sessions Judge also came to the conclusion that the house is in ruinous and dangerous condition. The learned Sessions Judge further negatived the argument advanced on behalf of the tenant regarding collusion and held that there was no mala fide intention on the part of the Chief Officer in issuing the notice in question. It was then contended before the Sessions Judge that mere noncompliance or disobedience of the notice would not amount to an offence unless the prosecution proves that there was requisite mens rea. It was then contended before the Sessions Judge that mere noncompliance or disobedience of the notice would not amount to an offence unless the prosecution proves that there was requisite mens rea. This argument was also negatived by the Sessions Judge. It was also contended on behalf of the owner that he had taken all steps possible in this behalf and therefore in any case he cannot be convicted for filing the said application were not complied with by the owner. Ultimately therefore agreeing with the appreciation of the evidence as well as the finding recorded by the trial Court and dismissed both the appeals. Against this order of dismissal of appeals by the Sessions Judge the present applicant the owner of the house has filed the present revision application. It is pertinent to note that the accused No.2 tenant has not preferred any revision application against the order passed by the Sessions Judge. 4. Shri Oke, the learned counsel for the applicant owner contended before me that from the material on record it is quite clear that the owner has taken all steps for dismantling the house which was in ruinous condition. According to him he had moved the Chief Officer Municipal vide his application dated 18-6-1971. He has also approached the Sub-Divisional Officer in that behalf and thus he did everything hi 'his' power and hence. the disobedience of the notice issued by the Chief Officer was neither wilful nor it could be said that the owner has failed to comply with the notice. According to him, the ingredients of mens rea will have to be proved, before: a person is convicted for an offence under section 195 read with section 299 (b) of the Act. The said ingredients are not expressly or by necessary implication excluded. He further argued that as a matter of fact having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case it was not open for the Chief Officer at all to, have prosecuted the owner for either disobedience or noncompliant of the notice issued by him when it was the owner who had approached be Chief Officer in that behalf. He further argued that as a matter of fact having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case it was not open for the Chief Officer at all to, have prosecuted the owner for either disobedience or noncompliant of the notice issued by him when it was the owner who had approached be Chief Officer in that behalf. He further contended that the application filed by him before the Sub-Divisional Officer should be construed to be an application as contemplated by section 329 of the Act and it cannot be said that either lie had disobeyed the notice or has failed to comply with it. 5. On the other hand, it was contended by Shri V. Mohta the learned council for the Municipal Council that the notice was given both to the owner as well as the occupier. In case the occupier was not willing to permit the owner to comply with the notice, it was open for him to have approached the Executing Magistrate under section 329 of the Act. He failed to do so. Section 329 of the Act contemplates giving of a notice to the occupier by the owner of the property regarding his intention to carry into effect the directions in the notice issued under section 195 by the Chief Officer. Admittedly this has not been done. If section 329 is read with section 325 of the Act it is quite clear that such a notice should have been served as contemplated by the provisions of the said section. This has not been done. Therefore, it is quite clear from the record that the owner has not complied with the provisions of section 329 of the Act and if he has not complied with the said provisions, then he cannot be discharged from any penalties to which he might otherwise have been liable by reason of his default in executing such work. He further contended that it is not necessary for the Municipal Council to prove any mens rea in view of the special provisions of the Act. According ·to him, such an ingredient has been excluded by necessary implication. For this proposition he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in The State of Gujarat v. Acharya Shri Devendraprasadji Pande1 and State of Maharashtra v. Nihalchand2. 6. According ·to him, such an ingredient has been excluded by necessary implication. For this proposition he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in The State of Gujarat v. Acharya Shri Devendraprasadji Pande1 and State of Maharashtra v. Nihalchand2. 6. Whatever contentions might have been raised before the Courts below, it is not disputed before me by the applicant owner of the house that the house is in a dilapidated and ruinous condition and is likely to fall. It is also not, disputed before me that it is dangerous to the persons occupying reasons to it as well as for the persons passing by this building, It is also not disputed that it is dangerous to the structure or place in neighborhood. It was also conceded on behalf of the applicant owner before me that the notice issued by the Chief Officer was legal and was issued by him in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under section 195 of the Act. The only contention raised on behalf of the owner is that having regard to the facts of the present case it cannot be said that either he has failed to comply with the said notice or there was any disobedience on his part of any lawful direction issued by the Chief Officer. 7. For properly understanding the rival contentions raised before me it will be useful to refer to some of the provisions of tile Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. Section 49 of the Act lays down obligatory duties and functions of the Council. It is one of the obligatory duties of the Municipal Council under section 49 (2) (g) of the Act to make necessary provision for securing or removing dangerous buildings or places, and reclaiming unhealthy localities section 195 then confers power upon the Chief Officer in this behalf. Section 195 of the Act reads as under: "195 (1). It is one of the obligatory duties of the Municipal Council under section 49 (2) (g) of the Act to make necessary provision for securing or removing dangerous buildings or places, and reclaiming unhealthy localities section 195 then confers power upon the Chief Officer in this behalf. Section 195 of the Act reads as under: "195 (1). If it shall at any time appear to the Chief Officer that any building or other structure or anything affixed to such building structure is in a ruinous condition or likely to fall, or in any way dangerous to any person occupying, resorting to or passing by such building or structure or any other structure or place in the neighbor-hood thereof, the Chief Officer may, by written notice, require the owner or occupier of such building or structure to pull dawn, secure, remove or repair such building, structure or thing at do one or mar such things and to prevent all causes of danger there-from. (2) The Chief Officer may also if he thinks fit, require the said owner or occupier by the said notice, either forthwith or before proceeding to pull down, secure, remove or repair the said building, structure or thing to set up a proper and sufficient board or fence far the protection of passer-by and other persons, (3) If it appears to the Chief Officer that the danger from a building, structure or thing which is ruinous or about to fall is of hourly imminence, he shall, before giving notice as aforesaid or before the period of notice expires, tense of, take dawn, secure or repair the said structure or take such steps or cause such work to be executed as may be required to arrest the danger. (4) Any expenses incurred by the Chief Officer under sub-section (3) shall be paid by the owner at occupier of the structure and shall be recoverable in the same manner as an amount due an account of a property tax." Section 327 of the Act then makes a provision regarding fixing of a reasonable time for doing particular act. (4) Any expenses incurred by the Chief Officer under sub-section (3) shall be paid by the owner at occupier of the structure and shall be recoverable in the same manner as an amount due an account of a property tax." Section 327 of the Act then makes a provision regarding fixing of a reasonable time for doing particular act. The said section reads as under: "Where any notice, order or requisition under this Act requires any act to be done far which no times fixed by or under this Act, such requisition shall fix a reasonable time far doing the same ", Section 328 confers a power upon the Municipal Council to execute works in default of owner or occupier. Provisions of sub-sections (1) of section 328 of the Act are as under: "328 (1) Where by or under this Act, any person is required to execute any work or do. anything and default is made in the execution of such work or the doing of such thing the Council, whether any penalty is or is not provided far such default may cause such work to" be executed; and the expenses thereby incurred shall, unless otherwise expressly provided in this Act, be paid to the Council by the person by wham such work ought to have been executed, as shall be recoverable in the same manner as an amount claimed an account of a property tax, either in one sum by instilments, as the Council may been fit Provided that- (a) except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, a notice shall be issued to such person requiting him to execute such work or to do such thing; , (b) Where any drainage scheme or water works scheme has been commenced by any Council, it shall be lawful for the council, with prejudice its powers under section 202 or of other provision of this Act, to make a special agreement with the owner of any building or land as to the manner in which the drainage or water-connection thereof shall be carried out, and the pecuniary or other assistance if any which the Council shall render and any payment agreed upon by the owner shall be recovered in accordance with the terms of such agreement or fn default, in the manner described in sub-section (2) and (3); (C) where an order or requisition has been passed. under sub-section (1) of section 175, section 183, sub-section (4) or (12) of section 189, or under sections 200, 202, 207 or 208 or where permission has given under section 204 or where an arrangement has been made under proviso (b) of this sub-section the Council may without prejudice to any other powers under this Act of it thinks fit declare any expense incurred by the Council in the executing of such order or in the carrying out of such requisition permission or arrangement to be improvement expenses. Improvement expenses shall by a charge upon the premises or land and shall be levied in such instalments as the Council may decide including interest at the rater of seven and a half per cent. per annum and shall be recoverable in the manner described in sub-section (2) and (3).” Then comes section 329 which is as under :- "329-If the occupier of any building or land prevents the owner thereof from carrying into effect in respect of such building or land, any of the provisions of this Act, after notice of his intention so to carry them into effect has been given by the owner to such occupier, any Executive Magistrate upon proof thereof, and upon application of the owner, may make an order in writing requiring such occupier to permit the owner to execute all such works, with respect to such building or land as may be necessary for carrying into effect the provisions of this Act, and may also, if he thinks fit, order the occupier to pay to the owner the costs relating to such' application or order; and if, after the expiration of eight days from the date of the order such occupier continues to refuse to permit such owner to execute any such work, such occupier shall, one conviction, for every day during which he so continues to refuse, be punished with fine which may extend to fifty rupees and every such owner, during the continuance of such refusal, shall be discharged from any penalties to which he might otherwise have become liable by reason of his default in executing such works. It is not disputed before me that a notice was issued under section 195 of the Act requiring both the owner as well as the occupier to pull down the building. It is not disputed before me that a notice was issued under section 195 of the Act requiring both the owner as well as the occupier to pull down the building. Such a notice was received both by the owner as well as the occupier. It is also clear from the record that the owner and the occupier both have failed to comply with the said direction incorporated in the notice issued by the Chief Officer. However, it is contended by the owner, the applicant- before me, that it cannot be said that there was any wilful or intentional non-compliance with the lawful direction given by the Chief Officer. It was strenuously" contended by Shri Oke that unless it is proved by the prosecution that there was as intentional disobedience or failure to comply with the directions, a person cannot be convicted for an offence under section 195 read with section 299 (b) of the Act. It is not possible for me to accept this contention. 8. It cannot be disputed that section 195 of the Act is enacted for the benefit of general public. It contemplates safety of the citizens, who are occupying the buildings as well as the safety of the citizen' who are either residing in the neighbourhood or are passing by such buildings. Therefore, it is the safety of the citizens in general which is contemplated by section 195 of the Act. As to whether in these circumstances the requirement of mens rea is a· necessary ingredient of an offence or not has been considered by tire Supreme Court in The State of Gujarat v. Acharya Shri Devendraprasadj; (cit. supra). In- para.10 of the judgment it was observed by the Supreme Court as under : "The question whether a crime can be to have been committed without tile necessary mens rea has led to considerable controversy. The broad principles accepted by courts in this country as well as in England are: Where an offence is created by a statute, however, comprehensive and unqualified the language of the statute, it is Usually undorstood as silently requiring that the element of mens rea should be important into the definition of the crime, unless a contrary intention is expressed or implied. In other words, the plain words of the statute are read subject to a presumption which may be rebutted, that the general rule of law that no crime can be committed unless there is mens rea has not been ousted by the particular enactment. The mens rea means same blameworthy mental condition whether constituted by knowledge or intention or otherwise. But this rule has several exceptions, as observed by Lord Evershed in Lim Chin Aik v. The Queen3: "Where the subject-matter of the statute is the regulation for the public welfare of a particular activity-statutes regulating the sale of food and drink are to be found among the earliest examples it can be and frequently has been inferred that the legislature intended that such activities should be carried out under conditions of strict liability. The presumption is that the statute or statutory, instrument can be effectively enforced only if those in charge of the relevant activities are made resposible, for seeing that they are complied with, When such a presumption is to be inferred, it displaced the ordinary presumption of mens rea.” 11. As long back as 1895 Wright J. observed in Sherras v. De Rutzen4: "There is, a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or knowledge of the wrongfulness of, the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is Hable to be displaced either by the word~ of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals and both must be considered." 12 It is further observed 'therein that the principal classes of exceptions may perhaps be reduced to three. One is a class of acts which are not criminal in any real sense, but are acts which in the public interest are prohibited under a penaly. Another class comprehends some, and perhaps all, public nuisances. Lastly, there may be cases in which, although the proceeding is criminal in form, it is really only a summary mode enforcing a civil right. But, except in such cases as these, there must in general be guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant, or of some one whom he has put in his place to act for him, generally, or in the particular matter, in order to constitute an offence, The present case, our opinion, falls within the first category mentioned above. But, except in such cases as these, there must in general be guilty knowledge on the part of the defendant, or of some one whom he has put in his place to act for him, generally, or in the particular matter, in order to constitute an offence, The present case, our opinion, falls within the first category mentioned above. Section 35 (I) deals with a quasi criminal act." Ultimately in para. 14 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed: "Section 35 (1) of the Act creates a quasi-criminal offence. It is a regulatory provision. It is enacted with a view to safeguard the interest of the public regarding trust money. The offence in question is punishable only with fine. The conviction under that does not carry any stimga. The language, of the, provision appears to make its contravention an absolute liability. , Under these circumstances, we think the offence mentioned in that sections an absolute one. Consequently we cannot read into it the requirement of mens rea." 9. After referring to the previous decision of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarai v. Kansara Manilal5, this Court in State of Maharshtra v. Nihalchand while construing the provisions of tile Factories Act and the Rules made there-under held: "It is further clear from this decision of the Supreme Court that it is not necessary in those matters that a mens rea must always be established. The provisions of the Act and particularly rule 4 of the Rules is a regulatory provision. It is enacted with a view to safeguard the interest of the public. The language of section 92 of the Act makes its contravention an absolute liability. Therefore, in my opinion the requirement of mens rea cannot be read in the said section. I am fortified in the view which I have taken by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court State of Gujarat v. Acharya Shri Devendra prasadji. A similar view seems to have been taken by the Madras High Court in In re S. Seshadrinath Sarma,". Similar view has been taken by tile Supreme Court in P. K. Tejani v. M. R. Dange6. While, dealing with the provisions of Food Adulteration Act, the Supreme, Court observed: "Nothing more than the actus reus is needed where regulation of private activity in vulnerable areas like public health is intended. Similar view has been taken by tile Supreme Court in P. K. Tejani v. M. R. Dange6. While, dealing with the provisions of Food Adulteration Act, the Supreme, Court observed: "Nothing more than the actus reus is needed where regulation of private activity in vulnerable areas like public health is intended. In the words of Lord Wright In MacLeod v. Buchanan7 "intention to commit a breach of statute need not be shown. The breach in fact is enough: Social defence reasonably overpowers individual freedom to injure in special situations of strict liability." If the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965 and particularly provisions of section 195 are read in this context, it is quite clear that the acts and omissions contemplated by section 195 of the Act arc acts which in the public interest are required to be carried out and a penalty is provided for its disobedience or non-compliance. It contemplates removal or demolition or buildings or structures which can safely be termed as public nuisance or dangers us to tire public. Although the proceedings are criminal in form, it is really a summary mode of enforcing obligatory duty imposed upon the Municipal Council under the Acting the interest of general public Section 299 (b) of the Act makes disobedience or failure to comply with the direction incorporated in the notice as an absolute liability. It is enacted with a view to safeguar4 interest of the general public and in this view of the matter, in my opinion, requirement of mens rea cannot be read in the said section when a person ill prosecuted for disobedience or non compliance with a lawful direction issued by the Chief Officer of the Municipal council under section 195 of the Act. 10. Both the Courts below have found that both the accused person have failed to comply with the directions issued by the Chief Officer vide his notice dated 5-10-1971. In substance a finding has been recorded by both the Courts that both the accused persons were trying to shift the liability upon each other and thereby they have failed to comply with the directions issued in the laid notice and in substance disobeyed it. In substance a finding has been recorded by both the Courts that both the accused persons were trying to shift the liability upon each other and thereby they have failed to comply with the directions issued in the laid notice and in substance disobeyed it. However, it is contended by Shri Oke, on behalf of the owner that when the landlord himself has approached the Municipal Council in this behalf and he could not comply with the directions incorporated in the notice issued by the Chief Officer because the occupier obstructed him from pulling down the building, it cannot be said that there was either disobedience or non-compliance on his part. Such a contention could not be accepted having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 11. It is an established principle of law that when a Statute enjoins upon a person to do a particular thing in a particular way, then it is his duty to do the same in the way provided by the said Statute. Section 329 of the Act makes a provision for taking proceedings by an owner for carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. It was open for him to have served a notice of his intention to carry out the directions given by the Chief Officer in the notice issued by him under section 195 of the Act by serving a notice upon the occupier. Obviously this has not been done. The alleged application filed by the owner before the Sub-Divisional Officer could not be constructed to be Proceedings under section 329 of the Act, because he has not complied With .the requirements of the said section. In this view of the matter, the landlord cannot be discharged from any penalties to which he might otherwise become liable because of his default in complying with the directions give in the said notice. If the owner wanted to absolve himself from any of the liabilities arising out of the incompliance with the directions incorporated in the said notice, the only course open to him was to institute proceedings under section 329 of the Act. If the owner wanted to absolve himself from any of the liabilities arising out of the incompliance with the directions incorporated in the said notice, the only course open to him was to institute proceedings under section 329 of the Act. As a matter of fact to do away with such a defence the said provision seems to have been made by the legislature the instant case, the applicant before this Court has not taken recourse to the said proceedings and therefore on the finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below, in my opinion, both the Courts below were right in coming to the conclusion that the applicant-owner has also failed to comply with the lawful direction given by the Chief Officer. 12. However, it was contended by, Shri Oke that the owner had taken all steps to pull down the building. He, has also made a statement that he has approached the Taluq Magistrate under section 329 of the Act after the judgment was delivered by the Sessions Judge in appeal. According to him, the Chief Officer of the Municipal Council not put in any appearance in the said proceedings, nor the Municipal Council is taking any steps for pulling down the building. In this context it was contended by Shri Mobta that after having issued a notice under section 195 of the Act, the Chief Officer became functus officio, as he has no power, authority or jurisdiction to pull down the building. 13. In my opinion this contention raised by Shri Mohta is not correct. Section 328 of the Act makes a specific provision empowering the Council to execute any work or do anything in case of default. After the said provision was brought to his notice, Shri Mohta as well as the learned counsel fur the applicant and the State conceded before me that it is open for the Municipal Council to pull down the said house which is ruinous and is likely to fall down, by taking recourse to the provisions of section 328 of the Act. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the Municipal Council is powerless to take action in this behalf. 14. In the result, therefore, the revision application fails and is dismissed. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the Municipal Council is powerless to take action in this behalf. 14. In the result, therefore, the revision application fails and is dismissed. At this stage Shri Oke, the learned counsel for the applicant, orally prayed for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The prayer of Shri Oke is rejected. Revision application dismissed.