JUDGMENT The petitioner Mahamaya Talkies purchased the above Cinema by a conveyance dated July 25, 1973. The petitioner paid the municipal dues in September 1973 and obtained a licence from the District Magistrate Dinhata on or about September 11, 1973. The petitioner applied to the defendant no.1 Eastern India Motion Pictures Association Limited for membership as an exhibitor by filling up the membership application form and paid a sum of Rs. 2001- for one years fees for such membership. The petitioner started exhibiting films on and from October l, 1973. On the basis of such application the petitioner's name appeared as a provisional member in the list of members of the defendant no.1 which was published for its members on October 30, 1973. On November 13, 1973 the application of the petitioner for membership of the above Association was considered by the Executive Committee of the defendant no.1. The Committee thereupon unanimous]y held that" in view of the High Court's order as duly intimated by Messrs. S.C. Roy Chowdhury & Co. it was not possible for the Committee to entertain the application for membership of M/s. Mahamaya Talkies, Dinhata, at this stage. 2. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the defendant no, 1, in utter violation of the bye-laws of the Association and in contravention of the rules of natural justice purported to terminate the petitioner's membership without even allowing the petitioner to explain its position in relation to the purchase of the said Cinema house and thereby prevented the petitioner from carrying on business as an exhibitor of films. The petitioner further contends that upon enquires the petitioner has come to learn that one Parimal Sarkar, a member of the defendant no. 3 Banishree Pictures who have a claim against the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff in respect of the cinema house, had a hand in the matter of cancellation of the membership. The said Parimal Sarkar happens to be an influential member of the said Association and in fact a Vice-president of the said Association for the year 1973-74. The petitioner also contends that as a result of the action taken by the Association the business of the petitioner has totally stopped and would continue to remain so until the membership facilities would be extended once again to the petitioner. The nature of the business is such that no non-member gets the facility to procure good films. The petitioner also contends that as a result of the action taken by the Association the business of the petitioner has totally stopped and would continue to remain so until the membership facilities would be extended once again to the petitioner. The nature of the business is such that no non-member gets the facility to procure good films. The petitioner by its letter asked for holding a meeting so that the petitioner might represent its views upon notice to the said solicitors M/s. S. C. Roy Chowdhury & Co. at whose instance this action had been taken, to remove any doubt, as to the title, which might have been present in the mind of the persons in authority and control of the defendant no.1. In spite of the said demand for natural justice the defendant no.1 by its letter dated January 21, 1974 denied justice by replying as follows: "Since we have been advised that the Hon'ble High Court has appointed Sri S. Brahmachari, Advocate as Receiver of Messrs. Lakshmi Talkies Dinhata and since the matter is pending before the Court we are unable to extend your provisional membership which please note." 3. The petitioner, accordingly, prayed for an order of injunction restraining the defendant no.1 from giving effect or any further effect to the said order dated November 29, 1973 passed by the said executive committee of the defendant no.1 till the disposal of the suit. 4. It is necessary at this stage to deal with certain facts which are the subject matter of the suit No. 74 of 1973 (Banishree Pictures v. Sachindra Nath Mukherjee). The defendant No.2 Sachindra Nath Mukherjee, at all material time, was an owner of the cinema house at Dinhata known as Luxmi Talkies. Banishree Pictures: the defendant no. 3 herein entered into certain agreements with Sachindra Nath Mukherjee 'whereby large sums of money became due and owing from Sachindra Nath Mukherjee to Banishree Pictures. Sachindra Nath Mukherjee sold the cinema house in favour of the plaintiff. Thereafter Banishree Pictures filed the said suit being suit No. 74 of 1973 against Sachindra Nath Mukherjee and obtained an ad-interim order of injunction restraining the said Sachindra Nath Mukherjee, his servants and agents from transferring and/or encumbering the cinema house known as Luxmi Talkies at Dinhata in the District of Cooch-Behar. That ad• interim order was obtained on August 14, 1973. That ad• interim order was obtained on August 14, 1973. Messrs S. C. Roy Chowdhury & Co. were acting as the solicitors for Banishree Pictures in the said suit. Mahamaya Talkies the plaintiff in this suit was not made a party therein. The suit was filed on the basis that Sachindra Nath Mukherjee was still the owner thereof and the ad-interim order was also passed in that suit on such basis. This Court appointed a Receiver at the instance of Banishree Pictures but when the receiver went to take possession he was told about the said transfer and thereupon the receiver came back and Banishree Pictures made an application for contempt of Court against the partners of Mahamaya Talkies for having obstructed the receiver in taking possession in terms of the Court's order. The matter was heard at length and the Rule Nisi granted by this Court was discharged and the application was dismissed because the Court was, prima facie, satisfied on the basis of documents produced that the said transfer took police prior to the date of the ad-interim order of injunction. 5. It appears that the solicitors for Banishree Pictures having come to know that the petitioner Mahamaya Talkies had applied for membership of the defendant no.1, by letters intimated about the said ad-interim order of injunction passed by the High Court and also of the appointment of a receiver and of the contempt proceedings from time to time. The defendant No.1 had all along been acting on the basis of such information received from the said solicitors and did not think it fit to give any opportunity to the petitioner to explain the position before taking this drastic action. 6. The matter has assumed some importance because of the fact that without the membership of the defendant no.1, no exhibitor can carryon the business of exhibiting films in its cinema house for want of suitable films. The result is that since the membership had not been allowed to be continued, the petitioner had to close down its cinema business altogether. 7. The minute book of the meetings of the defendant no. I was produced at the hearing and it appears therefrom that at the relevant meeting immediately before this agenda was taken up for consideration by the executive committee, the said Parimal Kumar Sarkar left the meeting place and that was recorded in the said minute book. 7. The minute book of the meetings of the defendant no. I was produced at the hearing and it appears therefrom that at the relevant meeting immediately before this agenda was taken up for consideration by the executive committee, the said Parimal Kumar Sarkar left the meeting place and that was recorded in the said minute book. It is surprising that an Association like this should take such a firm decision which has the effect of depriving one in carrying on his business without giving a hearing to the aggrieved candidate just on certain information’s received by it. All that as asked for was that a hearing might take place so that the position could be explained before the petitioner's right to carryon its business would be virtually taken away by such a resolution. 8. It is contended that there is nothing known as provisional membership in the Articles of Association and in the Rules and bye-laws of the defendant no.1 and accordingly the question of expulsion from membership cannot arise Be that as it may, the fact remains that the said Association had recognised the petitioner as a provisional member and granted many facilities and had also accepted the fees -for one year's membership. It had allowed the petitioner's name to be published and circulated amongst its members as a provisional member. Infact, beside the petitioner it would appear from the said published list that there were many who had been shown as provisional members. Such facilities were granted to such provisional members including the petitioner obviously with the idea, and on the basis, that pending the decision of the executive committee the petitioner would obtain such facilities excepting of course matters like participating or voting and some other matters in connection with the said Association. Then again, considering the importance of such membership the defendent no. 1 under article 12 of its Articles of Association has provided that generally no application for membership would be refused if certain conditions would be fulfilled. In other words, there is no unfettered discretion on the part of the executive committee to refuse to elect a candidate for admission as a member of the Association if the conditions for membership would be complied with by the candidate. Here the petitioner produces the conveyance by which it purchased the said cinema house. In other words, there is no unfettered discretion on the part of the executive committee to refuse to elect a candidate for admission as a member of the Association if the conditions for membership would be complied with by the candidate. Here the petitioner produces the conveyance by which it purchased the said cinema house. Moreover, the petitioner has produced the permanent licence issued by the proper authorities for running the cinema house. The Association had no grievance with regard to such documents. The only grievance that has been put forward by the Association and on which it has acted is about certain Court proceedings in which the title of the petitioner was challenged by the said Banishree pictures. Such Court proceedings had nothing to do with Mahamaya Talkies and no order had been passed against the petitioner. The contempt matter has terminated in' favour of the petitioner and accordingly, prima facie, there might not possibly have any objection on the part of the executive committee, on that score, if the executive committee had given a hearing to the petitioner. 9. In the case of Edwards v. Society of Graphical and Allied Trades, reported in L.R. (1971) 1 Ch. D. 354 the question of a similar nature came to be considered by the Court of Appeal in England. There the question of a temporary member of a trade union was considered. At page 376 Lord Denning M.R. observed: "I do not think this trade union, or any other trade union, can give itself by its rules an unfettered discretion to expel a man or to withdraw his membership. The reason lies in the man'£ right to work. This is now fully recognised by law. It is a right which is of special importance when a trade union operates a "closed shop" or "100 per cent membership": for that means that no man can become employed or remain in employment with a firm unless he is a member of the union. If his union card is withdrawn, he has to leave the employment. He is deprived of his livelihood. The courts of this country will not allow so great a power to be exercised arbitrarily or capaciously or with unfair discriminations neither in the making of rules, nor in the enforcement of them. The law has means at its disposal..... If his union card is withdrawn, he has to leave the employment. He is deprived of his livelihood. The courts of this country will not allow so great a power to be exercised arbitrarily or capaciously or with unfair discriminations neither in the making of rules, nor in the enforcement of them. The law has means at its disposal..... Thus if the union should make a rule' purporting to give itself uncontrolled discretion to expel a member without hearing him, that rule would be bad. No union can stipulate for a power to expel a man unheard see Faramus v. Film Artistes Association (1964) A.C. 925, 947, per Lord Pearce. And the union cannot get round it by calling him a "temporary member". A temporary member is just as much a member of the union as a full member. He pays his dues just the same: and he is entitled to equal protection by the law. The union has no right to expel a temporary member arbitrarily any more than it has a right so to expel a full member. To call him a "temporary member" is only a covert way of claiming to exclude him at their discretion: and, as such, it cannot be allowed." 10. 1 do not see why this principle should not be applied to this ease in relation to this Association as well It is true that the membership is still provisional but considering the question that the Articles do not provide for such right being conferred on the executive committee to disallow a candidate to be a member or to discontinue his provisional membership and also considering the question that the continuance of the business of the petitioner is dependent on the membership of this Association, I think the executive committee has exceeded its jurisdiction by taking such a drastic action without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to come and explain the position. In my opinion, under such circumstances, the Court should com forward to protect the interest of the petitioner by granting the interlocutory relief as prayed for. Moreover, if this interlocutory relief is granted no harm or prejudice would be caused to anybody but the same would ensure for the benefit of the petitioner. In my opinion, under such circumstances, the Court should com forward to protect the interest of the petitioner by granting the interlocutory relief as prayed for. Moreover, if this interlocutory relief is granted no harm or prejudice would be caused to anybody but the same would ensure for the benefit of the petitioner. The Court has to take into consideration the fact that the title of the petitioner has not been challenged by the transferor but by a creditor of the transferor in a proceeding in which the petitioner is not a party. It was contended on behalf of Banishree' Pictures that the transfer had been effected in favour of one of the partners of the transferor firm viz., Luxmi Talkies and as such the transaction entered into by and between Sachindra Nath Mukherjee and Mahamaya Talkies was a benami transaction and the transfer was colourable and sham. I think, I should observe that these are matters which are not directly involved in the matter of au application for membership of the defendant no.1 by the petitioner and in any event, this Court is not called upon to go into those questions at this stage. 11. I, accordingly, make an order for injunction restraining the defendant no. I from giving any further effect to the said order and/or decision of the executive committee dated November 28, 1973 (wrongly mentioned as November 29, 1973 in the petition and in the prayer) till the disposal of this suit. I expedite the suit in the manner as follows: Written statement is' to be filed within a fortnight after the Easter holidays. Cross orders for discovery within a week thereafter. Inspection forthwith thereafter and the.........Suit is to appear at the top of the appropriate "prospective list 2 months hence. Liberty to the parties to apply for early date.