Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. He filed a suit before the learned District Munsif of Sirkali for recovery of possession of the suit property after removal of the superstructure thereon and for future profits or in the alternative for recovery of Rs. 662.75 from the fifth defendant with interest thereon at 6% per annum, contending that the suit property which is a site in R.S. No. 233/11 in Sembananiruppu Village, Sirkali, belonged to the fifth defendant Shanmugasundaram Pillai who sold it to him under a registered sale deed dated 4th January 1965, but defendants 1, 2 and 4 who are sawyers by profession trespassed into the house which was in the eastern portion of the property and which was in the possession of Madarsa, the father of the third defendant under a paghuti arrangement with Shanmugasundaram Pillai and which house after the death of Madarsa fell into ruins and remained unoccupied and vacant, that the entire property measuring 9 cents along with the dilapidated house was in the possession of Shanmugasundaram pillai and the third defendant also trespassed into a portion of the property in the middle of April 1965 and put up a thatched shed and when the plaintiff asked them to vacate they did not do so and hence the plaintiff has been constrained to file this suit for recovery of possession of the property or in case the Court finds that the plaintiffs vendor had no title to the suit property or that defendant 1 to 4 had perfected their title to it by adverse possession, to award damages of Rs. 662-75 from the fifth defendant, the said sum representing the sale price paid by the plaintiff to the fifth defendant and the value of stamp papers etc. 2. The defendants 1 to 4 contended that they have been always in possession of the 9 cents which comprise the suit property; and they denied that Madarsa built a house or entered into a paguthi agreement with Shanmugasundaram Pillai and stated that Madarasa was not a tenant anyway and fifth defendant had no right to sell the property to the plaintiff and the sale to the plaintiff was invalid. They further contended that their family has always been living in the house which was their ancestral house and neither the plaintiff nor his predeessor-in-title had any possession of the suit property and the sale by Shanmugasundaram Pillai in favour of the plaintiff was not valid. They further pleaded that if for any reason the Court held that they have failed to prove the plea of adverse possession, they would be entitled to the benefits of Madras Kudiyiruppu (Protection from eviction) Act, 1961. 3. The fifth defendant against whom the alternative relief was prayed for contended that he has been paying kist for the suit land and the patta stands in his name and originally the properties belonged to one Rajangam Pillai to whom the suit property fell in a family partition between him and his brothers and Madarsa was in permissive possession of the site and subsequently Rajangam Pillai sold the property to him, the fifth defendant under a sale deed dated 1st December, 1949 for valuable consideration and after he, the fifth defendant became entitled to the property, defendants 1 to 4 continued to be in permissive possession of the property under him and in the sale proclamation in E.P. 480/61 the suit property has been stated to belong to the fifth defendant and in E.A. 878/61 in the same proceedings Ahamedsa and 6 others who are the heirs of Madarsa have admitted his (fifth defendants) title to the site. 4. The trial Court on an elaborate consideration of the evidence that was adduced by both sides found that the plaintiff bad title to the property and that defendants 1 to 4 had not perfected title to the same by adverse possession. It also found that defendants 1 to 3 were agriculturists or agricultural labourers and are entitled to the benefits of the Madras Occupants of Kudiyiruppu Act 38 of 1961. In view of that finding he held that the plaintiff would be entitled only to the alternative relief prayed for against the fifth defendant, namely, for damages which comprised the sale price paid by the plaintiff to the fifth defendant, the value of stamp papers etc., and decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 662-75 with interest at 6%per annum thereon against the fifth defendant and dismissed the suit as against defendants 1 to 4. 5. 662-75 with interest at 6%per annum thereon against the fifth defendant and dismissed the suit as against defendants 1 to 4. 5. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif denying to him the main relief of possession of the property, the plaintiff appealed to the learned Subordinate Judge of Mayuram, who agreed with the findings of the learned District Munsif with regard to the plaintiffs title to the suit property and with regard to the plea of adverse possession set up by defendants 1 to 4 which was negatived by the trial Court and also agreed with the finding of the trial Court that the defendants are entitled to the benefits under the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1961 and held that since the aforesaid Act has prescribed a separate forum for eviction on the ground of wilful denial of the title of the landlord, even if the defendants have wilfully denied the title of the plaintiff, a decree for recovery of possession cannot be passed for the plaintiff has to move the appropriate forum for such a relief and in that view he dismissed the appeal. 6. Hence the plaintiff has come up on appeal contending that the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff has to move the appropriate forum set up under the Act is not correct and that both the courts below should have, in the circumstances of the case, decreed his suit for the main relief of recovery of possession which he had prayed for in the suit. On behalf of the respondents it is contended by their learned counsel first of all that the first appeal itself was not maintainable and secondly this second appeal before this Court is also not maintainable in view of the fact that the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned District Munsif for the suit had been decreed in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the alternative relief claimed by him. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the respondents has cited before me the decision in Reapudu Patwari v. Abdul Jobhar A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 445. But there the prayer was for any one of two reliefs being granted. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the respondents has cited before me the decision in Reapudu Patwari v. Abdul Jobhar A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 445. But there the prayer was for any one of two reliefs being granted. In the case now before me, the primary relief prayed for was recovery of possession of the property and it was further prayed that in the event of the Court finding that his vendor had no title to convey for recovery of Rs. 602.75 from his vendor the fifth defendant. In fairness the learned counsel for the respondents brought to my notice the decision of the Kerala High Court in Velayudha Nair Gopalan Nair v. Ayyetppan Pillai Madhavan Pillai and others A.I.R. 1964 Ker. 153 where it has been clearly laid down that when the primary relief asked for by a plain-tiff is denied to him and only the alternative relief prayed for by him is granted by the trial Court, the plaintiff can certainly appeal against the denial of the primary relief. I am in respectful agreement with this view of the Kerala High Court which seems to derive support also from the decisions referred to in that judgment. The plaintiff in the case now before me asked as his primary relief the recovery of possession from defendants 1 to 4 on the basis of his purchase of the property from the fifth defendant, but at the same apprehending that his suit may be defeated if the Court found that his predecessor-in-title had no title to the property and that defendants 1 to 4 had prescribed title to the same by adverse possession and to prevent the necessity of his filing another suit against bis vendor, the fifth defendant for recovery of damages he asked for the alternative relief of damages against his vendor the fifth defendant in case the Court held against him on the question of the title of his predecessor and on the plea of adverse possession set up by defendants 1 to 4. Both the Courts below have found the title to be with the plaintiff and have negatived the plea of adverse possession set up by defendants 1 to 4; but the only ground on which the lower Court found that it was unable to grant the primary relief of recovery of possession of the property by the plaintiff from defendants 1 to 4 was the Kudiyiruppu Act, the provisions of which both Courts below interpreted in a particular way and which they thought would bar the Civil Court from granting that relief of recovery of possession and which provisions required the plaintiff to approach the special tribunal constituted under the Act for the grant of that relief Since it was under those circumstances that the alternative relief was asked for and since according to the plaintiff, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to pass, in the circumstances of the case, a decree for possession of the property from defendants 1 to 4 the plaintiff is certainly an aggrieved party and had the right to file an appeal against the judgment and decree in so for as it denied him the primary relief which he asked for. Therefore in my view both the first appeal and this appeal are both maintainable. 7. It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that both the Courts below erred in thinking that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Protection from Eviction) Act barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to grant a decree for eviction of defendants 1 to 4 from the property even though defendants 1 to 4 denied the title of the plaintiff. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff, in as much as in this case defendants 1 to 4 entirely repudiated the plaintiffs contention that he and his predecessor-in-title were in possession of the house and sites in question under a paguthi arrangement entered into by Madarsa with the plaintiffs predecessor-in-title and set up hostile title in themselves to the property, they do not even come under the category of persons under protection of Kudiyiruppu Act and as such will not be entitled to the benefits of that Act and further their mere denial of landlords title would disentitle them from claiming the benefits under the Act. 8. 8. S. 2 of the Act defines a “Kudiyiruppu” as the site of any dwelling house or but occupied, either as tenant or as licensee, by any agriculturist or agricultural labourer and includes such other area adjacent to the dwelling house or hut as may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment of such dwelling house or hut. The words “tenant or licensee” occurring in that definition have to be noted. Those words indicate the nature of the occupation of the person who occupies the kudiyiruppu. The nature of the occupation of the Kudiyiruppu therefore forms an essential part of the definition of a Kudiyiruppu. Consequently unless the occupation is in the character of a tenant or licensee, the person occupying the Kudiyiruppu would not come under the category of a person occupying the Kudiyiruppu in respect of whom alone the provision under S. 3 in which the two grounds on which such persons can be evicted from the Kudiyiruppu are set out. S. 5 says that if a person in occupation of a Kudiyiruppu is to be evicted from the Kudiyiruppu on any of those grounds, an application for eviction has to be filed before the Authorised Officer and S. 11 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in regard to matters which have to be decided by the Authorised Officer. The overall effect is that when any person who is an agriculturist or agricultural labourer is in occupation of a house or site as described in the definition of Kudiyiruppu as a tenant or a licensee and if such person denies the title of the landlord, then the landlord has to file an application for eviction on that ground before the Authorised Officer. It is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that in the case now before me, defendants 1 to 4 on their own contentions were not occupying the house and site in question either as tenants or as licensees and as such they cannot come under the category of persons in occupation of a kudiyiruppu. He has further argued that since defendants 1 to 4 have set up title in themselves to the house and site and do not accept the plaintiff as their landlord, it cannot be said that they are persons in occupation of a kudiyiruppu who are denying the title of the landlord. He has further argued that since defendants 1 to 4 have set up title in themselves to the house and site and do not accept the plaintiff as their landlord, it cannot be said that they are persons in occupation of a kudiyiruppu who are denying the title of the landlord. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that to bring oneself within the ambit of S. 3 it is necessary that that person should acknowledge that he is a tenant but not under this particular landlord but under somebody else and only then it could be said that there is a denial by the tenant of his landlords title so as to invoke S. 3. I am however unable to agree with this general proposition put forward by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. Moreover in this case the concurrent findings of both courts below are that defendants 1 to 4 are heirs of Madarsa who was inducted into the property by the plaintiffs predecessor-in-title under a paguthi arrangement (tenancy) and that finding of fact cannot be challenged in second appeal. Therefore we have to proceed on the basis that defendants 1 to 4 are the heirs of Madarsa and are in occupation of the Kudiyiruppu as heirs of Madarsa who entered into possession of the property under a paguthi arrangement with the plaintiffs predecessor-in-title and as such defendants 1 to 4 would certainly come under the category of persons occupying a kudiyiruppu and since they have denied the title of the plaintiff or his predecessors-in-title they should be deemed to have denied the title of their landlord and consequently they, are liable to be evicted under S. 3 of the Act and under S. 5 of the Act it is the Authorised Officer who has the jurisdiction, to pass an order of eviction against him. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, however; has contended that by their denial of landlords title and by so setting up title in themselves, defendants 1 to 4 have disentitled themselves to the benefits of the Act and as such the Civil Court can order their eviction. In support of this contention he has cited the decision in Chinnamuthu Gounder and others v. P.A.S. Perumal Chettiar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1197; 84 L.W. 5 (S.N.). In support of this contention he has cited the decision in Chinnamuthu Gounder and others v. P.A.S. Perumal Chettiar A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1197; 84 L.W. 5 (S.N.). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the question whether the Civil court had jurisdiction to decree the suit filed by a certain plaintiff for declaration of his title to certain lands and for possession of those lands with arrears of rent and mesne profits and in which suit it was found that the defendants were only under-tenants under leases granted by the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff in the presence of provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. Their Lordships referred to the definition of a cultivating tenant as contained in S. 2(a) and to Ss. 3, 6 and 6A of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act and have explained the clear import of S. 6A. There it was held that since the tenants have wilfully denied the title of their landlord they had become disentitled to the benefits under the Act and consequently the civil court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and there was no question of transferring the suit under S. 6A to the Revenue Divisional Officer. But then the provisions of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act are in many ways dissimilar to the provisions of the Madras Occupants of Kudiyiruppu (Protection from Eviction) Act. In the latter Act it is definitely stipulated in S. 5 that where eviction of the tenant is sought for or any of the two grounds mentioned in S. 3, the forum for granting the relief would be the Authorised Officer. In the face of such an explicit provision in the Act, the learned counsel for the plaintiff cannot, invoking the observations in the aforeside decision, contend that in as much as defendants 1 to 4 have denied the title to the property, they have become disentitled to the benefits under the Kudiyiruppu Act and as such the civil Court has jurisdiction to grant a decree for eviction. It must be noted that in the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. It must be noted that in the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act. S. 3 states that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from a holding at the instance of the landlord whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise; but that was subject to sub-S. (2) which contained various contingencies in which the tenant cannot claim the protection of the Act and one of those contingencies is wilful denial of the title of the landlord to the land. Sub-S. (2) of S. 3 states that sub-S. (1) which says that no cultivating tenant shall be evicted from his holding or any part thereof by or at the instance of the landlord whether in execution of a decree or order of a Court or otherwise, shall not apply to a cultivating tenant; but S. 3 of the Kudiyiruppu Act says that save as otherwise provided in the Act, no person occupying any kudiyiruppu shall be evicted from such kudiyiruppu, and sub-S. (3) states that sub-S. (1) and (2) shall not apply to any person occupying any kudiyiruppu if he has done any act or has been guilty of any negligence which is destructive of, or injurious to, the property belonging to the owner of the kudiyiruppu if he has wilfully denied the title of the owner of the kudiyiruppu. S. 5 states that any owner of kudiyiruppu seeking to evict for any of the reasons mentioned in sub-S. 3 of S3 any person occupying any kudiyiruppu may, whether or not there is an order or decree of court for the eviction of such person, make an application for such eviction to the authorised officer; and S. 11 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Courts in respect of such matters in which the Authorised Officer is empowered by the Act. I, therefore, find that both the courts below have rightly held that to get the relief of decree for possession, the plaintiff has to approach only the Authorised Officer and the Civil Court cannot grant the primary relief of possession prayed for by the plaintiff. Hence this second appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no costs. No leave.