JUDGMENT : S.K. Jha, J. These three statements of cases have been submitted and reference is made under Section 28 of the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948 (Bihar Act XXXII of 1948), hereinafter referred to as the Act, by which the Commercial Taxes Tribunal, Bihar, Patna, has referred the following four questions of law for decision of this Court: "(i) Whether the ORDER :dated 23.2.66 passed by Sri B.N. Sankar, Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Patna Division was an ORDER :passed in appeal from an ORDER :under Section 27A and was revisable by the Tribunal ? (ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the proceeding for review as sanctioned by the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes by his ORDER :dated 7.2.1964 was barred by time? (iii) Whether Mahanth Satan and Giri as the successor-in-office of Mahanth Harihar Giri was entitled to maintain the review application claiming exemption under Section 8 of the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948 which was not claimed by the Ex-Mahanth himself? (iv) Whether the power of review under Section 27A is circumscribed by the limitations and conditions as contained in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code or can be exercised in all cases where hardship is pleaded ?" 2. These three cases relate to the same assessee with-regard to three years of assessment under the Act, viz., 1359 1360 and 1361 fasli. The facts, shortly stated, giving rise to these cases are these Mahanth Harihar Giri of Bodh Gaya filed returns for the aforesaid years. and was assessed to agricultural income tax under the Act by assessment ORDER :s dated 23rd May 1954, 20th April 1955 and 6th April 1957, respectively, with regard to the three years in question. These assessment ORDER :s are marked Exts. A-1, A-2, and A-3 Mahanth Harihar Giri was succeeded by Mahanth Satanand Giri who was installed on the Gaddi of the Bodh Gaya Math on 27th February, 1958. Mahanth Harihar Giri aforesaid had been assessed for the three years in question as an individual, and he did not claim any deduction under Section 8 of the Act. In the meantime, a dispute was going on between the Bodh Gaya Mahanth and the President of the Hindu Religious Trust Board as to whether the Math in question was a public trust or the properties appertaining to the Math were the personal properties of the Mahanth. In the meantime, a dispute was going on between the Bodh Gaya Mahanth and the President of the Hindu Religious Trust Board as to whether the Math in question was a public trust or the properties appertaining to the Math were the personal properties of the Mahanth. This matter was being agitated by Mahanth Harihar Giri in Title Suit no. 23 of 1951 which was ultimately transferred to this Court on account of certain constitutional matters being involved, and it was registered in this Court as Title Suit no. 129 of 1953. By JUDGMENT : and decree dated 12th March 1955 this Court held that the property of the Both Gaya estate was not the personal property of the Mahanth. Mahanth Harihar Giri thereafter went up in appeal to the Supreme Court where, during the pendency of the appeal, a compromise was entered into between the parties, namely, Mahanth Harihar Giri, the President of the Hindu Religious Trust Board and the State of Bihar. The aforesaid appeal was ultimately disposed of in terms of the compromise by an ORDER :dated 9th September, 1967. One of the main terms of the compromise was that the bulk of the properties of the estate was admitted to be held by Mahanth Harihar Giri as properties belonging to a public trust, but provision was made under the compromise decree to grant the Mahanth a monthly allowance of Rs. 1000/- only in addition to some land left for his personal use as belonging to him in his personal capacity. 3. Mahanth Satan and Giri, who was installed as the successor-in interest of Mahanth Harihar Giri on 27th February, 1958 filed three applications for review of the aforesaid three assessment ORDER :s. Those applications for review were filed on 17th May, 1958 under Section 27A of the Act before the Agricultural Income Tax Officer. By an ORDER :dated 4th July, 1958 the assessing Officer rejected the review applications on the ground that Section 27A of the Act having been brought on the statute book with effect from 1st April, 1954 could not be said to be applicable to the years in question, as they were prior to the date of coming into force of the amending Act. Mahanth Satanand Giri, who shall hereinafter be referred to as the assessee, filed revision applications before the Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax and thereafter to the Board of Revenue, but both the revisional authorities affirmed the ORDER :of the assessing officer. The assessee thereafter filed three writ applications before this Court, which were numbered as Miscellaneous Judicial Cases 310, 311 and 312 of 1960. By a joint JUDGMENT : and ORDER :dated 7th November, 1960 this Court allowed the three writ applications and held that the assessing officer had illegally refused to exercise jurisdiction, and he was accordingly directed to dispose of the review applications in accordance with law. In pursuance of the aforesaid ORDER :of this Court the assessing officer re-opened the assessment in April, 1962 and after hearing the assessee he prepared a draft of the assessment ORDER :s on 7th June, 1963 and sought the sanction of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under Rule 18A of the Bihar Agricultural Income Tax Rules, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The Commissioner having according sanction; the assessing officer ORDER :ed that the draft assessment ORDER :s be submitted to the Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income Tax for approval, as the income involved in each of the three years exceeded Rs. 50,000. The matter remained pending for some time, and on 31st July 1965 the assessee received a notice from the assessing officer calling upon him to show cause as to why his applications for review should not be dismissed. The assessee having been heard, by an ORDER :dated 21st September 1965, the assessing officer rejected the applications for review, holding that they were barred by the period of limitation prescribed under Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. These ORDER :s of the assessing officer have been marked Exts. B-1 to B-3. The assessee thereafter preferred petitions labeling them as revisions before the Deputy Commissioner, who treated the applications as being actually appeals but finally dismissed those appeals by his ORDER :dated 23rd February, 1966 (Ext. D) on the ground that the conditions laid down in ORDER :47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not fulfilled and as such there was no scope for reviewing the previous assessment ORDER :s. The Deputy Commissioner, however, while disposing of the assessees petitions of revision did not apply his mind to the question of limitation. D) on the ground that the conditions laid down in ORDER :47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not fulfilled and as such there was no scope for reviewing the previous assessment ORDER :s. The Deputy Commissioner, however, while disposing of the assessees petitions of revision did not apply his mind to the question of limitation. Being aggrieved by the ORDER :s passed by the Deputy Commissioner the assessee filed three revision applications before the Commercial Taxes Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the review applications were not barred by time, nor did the provisions of ORDER :47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to the provision of review as contained in Section 27A of the Act. The Tribunal, therefore, disposed of the three applications by remanding the review application to the assessing officer for their disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the directions given in the Tribunal's ORDER :(Ext. F). 4. I shall now deal with each of the questions referred to this Court seriatim. Question no. (1): The learned standing counsel I appearing for the Revenue contended that the ORDER :passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 23rd February 1966 could not be held to be an ORDER :passed in an appeal from an ORDER :under Section 27A of the Act and, therefore, it was not revisable in its turn by the Tribunal Learned counsel submitted that in ORDER :to correctly appreciate this contention the provision6 of Section 27A have to be read with the provisions contained in Section 25 (1) of the Act and Rule 16 of the Rules. Thus read together, it was submitted that an ORDER :rejecting an application for review could not be held to be an ORDER :of review so as to come within the ambit of the appellate ORDER :mentioned in Section 25 (1) read with Rule 16. In ORDER :to appreciate this contention on behalf of the Revenue, I think it worth while to refer to some of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. In ORDER :to appreciate this contention on behalf of the Revenue, I think it worth while to refer to some of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Section 27A reads as follows: "Subject to such rules as may be prescribed, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, any ORDER :, passed under this Act or the rules - made thereunder, may be reviewed by the officer or authority passing it or by his or its successor-in-office." Section 25 (1) reads thus : "Any assessee objecting to the amount of income assessed or rate at which he is assessed or denying his liability to be assessed under this Act or objecting to any ORDER :against him under Section 21, 27A, 36 or 41 made by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer, may appeal to the prescribed authority against the assessment or against such ORDER : Provided that no appeal shall be entertained by the prescribed authority unless it is satisfied that twelve and a half per centum of the tax assessed has been paid." It will thus be seen that so far as the provision of review under Section 27A is concerned, it is only subject to the restriction that may be prescribed by and under the rules duly framed under Section 53 of the Act. The only relevant rule with regard to this provision of review which has been framed is Rule 18A : "(1) Where the Commissioner or any other officer or authority reviews any ORDER :, under Section 27A, he or it shall record the reasons in writing for doing so. (2) Save with the previous sanction of the Commissioner obtained in writing, no ORDER :, passed by any officer or authority below the rank of Commissioner, shall be reviewed more than twelve months after the date of the passing of the ORDER :(which is) sought to be reviewed. (3) No officer or authority below the rank of Commissioner shall review any ORDER :which has been passed by any of his or its predecessors-in office, except with the previous sanction of the Commissioner." Any application for review, therefore, which may be filed before the officer or authority for reviewing an ORDER :passed by him or it or by his or its successor-in-office has to be disposed of within the framework of Section 27A and in accordance with and subject to the restrictions imposed by Rule 18A. An application for review may be dismissed or it may be allowed. In my view, it does not make any difference in law between cases where applications for review are dismissed on the ground of limitation and those where final ORDER :s are passed on the merits, holding that no case for review has been made out. Nor, for that matter, is there any distinction in so far as the nature of the ORDER :is concerned between an ORDER :rejecting an application for review and then allowing such prayer. In either case it will be an ORDER :under Section 27A of the Act. Turning now to the language of Section 25(1) of the Act, any assessee objecting to any ORDER :against him under Section 27A made by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer may appeal to the prescribed authority. On the express language of Section 25(1), I do not find myself persuaded to accept the argument of the learned standing counsel that an ORDER :rejecting an application for review will not be governed by the words "objecting to any ORDER :against him under Section. 27A". If the intention of the Legislature were to confer a right of appeal on an assessee only in cases where a review had actually been made and that too to the prejudice and detriment of the assessee, then the language of Section 25(1) would not have conferred such an absolute substantive right of appeal on the assessee whose objection to any ORDER :against him was made appeal-able under Section 25(1). Nor, for that matter, do the provisions of Section 23(1) conferring substantive right of appeal on the assessee put such a right to any limitation or restriction that may be imposed by the rules, for otherwise the language of Section 25(1) also should have been “subject to such rules as may be prescribed" The learned standing counsel, rather vehemently, urged that a clue to the true intention of the Legislature in enacting Section 25(1) may be drawn from the language of Rule 16. Rule 16 of the Rules reads thus: "An appeal preferred by an assessee under Section 25 against an ORDER :of assessment or penalty or both made by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer, shall lie :- (a) to the Assistant Commissioner, where the total agricultural income assessed does not exceed Rs. Rule 16 of the Rules reads thus: "An appeal preferred by an assessee under Section 25 against an ORDER :of assessment or penalty or both made by the Agricultural Income Tax Officer, shall lie :- (a) to the Assistant Commissioner, where the total agricultural income assessed does not exceed Rs. 50,000 and the officer passed the ORDER :is not an Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes appointed or empowered to act as Agricultural Income Tax Officer under Section 18 of the Act; (b) to the Deputy Commissioner, in other cases." It was submitted that having regard to the language of Rule 16 appeals could be filed under Section 25(1) only against an ORDER :of assessment or penalty or both. ORDER :s passed under any of the sections enumerated in Section 25(1), if they did not fall within the term "ORDER :of assessment or penalty "or both", should be held to be outside the purview of Section 25(1), only more so, it was contended, because no forum for any appeal of such a nature was provided or prescribed under Rule 16. It is true that, apparently, the language of Rule 16 seems to be a little unhappy. But the whole question is whether the substantive right conferred under Section 25(1) on an assessee can be in any way curtailed by the language of the subordinate legislation, viz., the rulemaking authority. In that context, it will be relevant also to refer to Section 53 (2)(i) of the Act which lays down that rules may prescribe the authority to whom appeals may be preferred under Section 25(1). The Legislature, therefore, was merely delegating the rule-making authority the power to prescribe the forum for appeals to be filed under Section 25 (1), subject to certain periods of limitation with which we are not concerned and also to prescribe the manner of filing such appeals which too is beyond the scope of the subject-matter at hand. Can the language of Rule 16, therefore, be so construed as to, in any way, restrict or curtail the substantive right of appeal given to the assessee under the Act? The answer must clearly be in the negative, for it is a well settled principle that a substantive right of appeal conferred by an Act cannot be curtailed or restricted in any manner unauthorised by the Act by rule-making authority. The answer must clearly be in the negative, for it is a well settled principle that a substantive right of appeal conferred by an Act cannot be curtailed or restricted in any manner unauthorised by the Act by rule-making authority. Such a power, though not conferred, if exercised by the subordinate legislative authority, would render its action ultra vires. Therefore, I shall examine whether Rule 16 can be so interpreted as to indicate merely the forum of appeal and not in any way adversely affecting or restricting the right of appeal conferred on the assessee by the Act itself. 5. Mr. K.D. Chatterji, learned counsel for the assessee, submitted that in view of the express language of Section 25(1) the words "an ORDER :of assessment" must, adopting the rule of harmonious construction, mean an ORDER :affecting the assessment or an ORDER :in respect of the assessment, etc. In my view, "an ORDER :of assessment" referred to in Rule 16 must mean, in view of the language of Section 25 (1), an ORDER :in respect of assessment, for to hold otherwise would be not only acting contrary to the rule of harmonious construction but also to put such a construction upon the rule as will render it ultra vires. There is always the presumption of constitutionality in favour of any statutory rule, and - even if for the purpose of upholding the validity of the rules words capable of more than one interpretation are construed in a particular manner by even reading into the language something which may have been inadvertently left out of it on account of unskilful draftmanship, the Court will adopt and adhere to such a construction, as Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) at page 228 has said. "Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. "Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Lord Reid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the draftsman in doing his revision rather than a deliberate attempt to introduce an irrational rule: "the canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution." And again : "....the courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a statute or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is repugnancy or something which is opposed to good senses” Thus in the case of Adler V. George [(1964) 2 Q.B. 7], "in the vicinity of" was construed to mean "in or in the vicinity of". It is also well-settled that where the sense of the statute demands it or where there seems to have been an obvious mistake in drafting, the Court would be prepared to substitute another word or phrase for that which actually appears in the text of the Act. Such a principle would apply with greater force when rules are being construed to fit in with the scheme and object of the Act. The scope of Section 25(1) being so wide, the true construction of Rule 16 must, in my view, be that an appeal preferred by an assessee against an ORDER :in respect of or in relation to assessment or penalty may be preferred before, the Assistant Commissioner in cases where the income does not exceed Rs. 50,000 and to the Deputy Commissioner in other cases. Rule 16, so construed, offers no difficulty in holding that the ORDER :passed by the assessing officer rejecting the review applications as being barred by limitation was an ORDER :under Section 27A which was expressly appeal-able, in view of the provisions of Section 25 (1) of the Act. There was no impediment in Rule 16 so as to curtail or restrict the meaning of Section 25(1). There was no impediment in Rule 16 so as to curtail or restrict the meaning of Section 25(1). Merely labeling an appeal as a petition of revision will not also make any difference, for it is well-settled that where an appeal lies and an application is wrongly labelled as a petition of revision, subject to any formality that may be prescribed, a revision may be treated as an appeal or an appeal as a revision. The answer to the first question, therefore, in my view, must be in the affirmative. 6. Question no. (ii) : With regard to the question of limitation, it was argued by the learned standing counsel that there being no provision in the Act or the Rules prescribing any time within which an ORDER :of review can be passed or an application for review may be filed, the residuary Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, should be held to such cases. This question also must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department for two good reasons. Firstly, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd., V. Gopal Bhiva (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 752), it is well-settled that Article 181 of the Limitation Act applies only to applications which are made under the Code of Civil Procedure, and so its extension to applications made under other statutory provisions would be clearly erroneous. That case has subsequently been followed both by this Court and the Supreme Court itself on a number of occasions. Secondly, this Court had on an earlier occasion to consider the question of limitation in so far as review was concerned under similar provisions of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947. (See Commissioner of Commercial Taxes; Bihar V. Messrs Ashoka Marketing Ltd. : 1973 P.L.J.R. 477). It was held in that case that Section 24(5) of that Act read with Rule 39 of the Bihar Sales Tax Rules, 1949, nowhere prescribed any period of limitation for the purpose of reviewing an ORDER :. The language of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and the rules framed thereunder and those of the present Act and the Rules ale practically identical. The language of the Bihar Sales Tax Act and the rules framed thereunder and those of the present Act and the Rules ale practically identical. It Must, therefore, be held that so far as the Act and the Rules are concerned there is no period of limitation for purposes of review, and the provisions of Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908; cannot be brought in aid to import any period of limitation. The second question is thus answered in the negative. 7. Question no. (iii)-The argument on behalf of the Revenue so far as this question was concerned was that Mahanth Harihar Giri had filed returns for the years in question. He had not claimed any exemption in his returns, and assessment ORDER :s had been duly passed against him. Mahanth Satanand Giri could not be treated as an assessee in place of Mahanth Harihar Giri nor could he as such an assessee claim any exemption under Section 8 of the Act, only more so, since he could not be permitted to amend the returns originally filed by Mahanth Harihar Giri, as assessment ORDER :s had already been passed thereon. This argument, in my view, is wholly misconceived. Section 2(e) of the Act defines an 'assessee' as meaning a person by whom agricultural income tax is payable, and a person under Section 2(m) means any individual in any capacity recognised by law. Under Section 23, the legal representative of a person is liable to payout of the estate of his predecessor-in-interest the agricultural income tax assesseed or payable by such person. Satanand Giri must, therefore, be held to be an assessee in the meaning of Section 2(e). Then remains the question as to whether being the legal representative of Mahanth Harihar Giri he could, after the assessment ORDER :s were passed, file applications for review, claiming exemption of charitable or religious trusts under Section 8. The argument that a relief under Section 8 with regard to the charitable or religious trusts, the income of which is exempted from the liability of agricultural income tax, cannot be given unless the original return filed were themselves amended is again devoid of substance. The argument that a relief under Section 8 with regard to the charitable or religious trusts, the income of which is exempted from the liability of agricultural income tax, cannot be given unless the original return filed were themselves amended is again devoid of substance. Section 19, which is the provision for filing of returns of agricultural income- nowhere makes a condition precedent that an assessee cannot get a relief by way of exemption under Section 8 unless such a specific claim had been made in the return. The moment facts on record establish that the assessee is a trustee and the trust under which he holds is a trust created before 12th October, 1938 for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, any income applied towards that purpose or nature shall be exempt from the total agricultural income of such assessee. The status of the assessee qua property, the income of which is being sought to be assessed to tax and the application by such an assessee are the only two prerequisites for the exemption to be granted under Section 8. Once, therefore, it is found by the assessing authorities that certain items of income, although returned and included in total agricultural income of an assessee, were truly in respect of properties held by the assessee as a trustee for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, exemption has to be granted under Section 8. As the legal representative of Mahanth Harihar Giri, therefore, the assessee was not precluded from setting forth a claim of exemption in respect of the items of income as may be found to be covered by the provisions of Section 8. The answer to question no. (iii), therefore, must be in the affirmative. 8. Question no. (iv) - I have already reproduced above the provisions of Section 27A of the Act and Rule 18A of the Rules. The question is as to whether from the language of Section 27A, apart from any restriction that may be attracted in view of the provisions of Rule 18A, no further restriction is imposed by the statute itself. Once the provisions of Rule 18A are applied, I do not think I shall be justified in holding that the provisions of Section 27A must also be further subjected to the restrictions or limitations provided in ORDER :47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once the provisions of Rule 18A are applied, I do not think I shall be justified in holding that the provisions of Section 27A must also be further subjected to the restrictions or limitations provided in ORDER :47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are dealing with a taxing statute. Under a statute certain rights have been conferred on the assessee and certain corresponding powers and obligations given or imposed upon the reviewing officer or authority. Unless the statute expressly so provides, the right of an assessee arising from the unqualified language of such a taxing statute cannot be curtailed with reference to any other statutory provision, for it is a well-settled principle of construction of taxing statutes that if two construction be possible, then statutes being penal in nature cannot be so construed as to affect the rights of an assessee adversely. The Tribunal has tome to the conclusion, I think, rightly, that the language of Section 27A is so wide that whenever it is necessary so to do, in ORDER :to prevent any miscarriage of justice or in ORDER :to redress any failure of justice the power may be exercised. Reliance was placed by the learned standing counsel on a Bench decision of this Court in (2) Bibi Nazma Khatoon V. R.P. Sinha (A.I.R. 1954 Patna 43) for the purpose of contending that where the term 'review' has been used and no further qualification has been laid down in the statute itself the conditions and limitations prescribed under ORDER :47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure must also apply in such cases of review, as the term is one of art understood in legal parlance as being governed by the aforesaid provisions of the Code. In the case of (2) Bibi Nazma Khatoon, this Court was dealing with the provisions of Section 26 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and the question was whether in the absence of any fresh material or error apparent on the face of the record a successor-in-office of a Custodian could review an ORDER :of his predecessor-in-office and that too without issuing any notice to the person to whose prejudice such a review ORDER :was purported to be passed. This Court held, firstly, that there were no materials on record to justify any ORDER :of review passed to the prejudice of the petitioners in that case and it was further held that the ORDER :was wholly without jurisdiction, as it was contrary to the principle embodied in the maxim 'audi alterum partem'. The facts of that case and the statutory provisions are quite distinct from those in the instant case. I would, therefore, answer the first part of question no. (iv) in the negative and the second part in the affirmative and hold that the power of review under Section 27A is not circumscribed by the limitations and conditions as contained in the Revisions of the Civil Procedure Code and it can be exercised in all cases of hardship. 9. In the result, therefore, all the questions referred must be answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. There will, however, be no ORDER :as to costs. Applications dismissed.