LODHA, J.—These are two connected appeals directed against the judgment and decree by the Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur dated 24 9-1966. 2. The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows: One Ganeshlal died leaving behind his widow Smt. Ganga Bai. He had no ton and consequently Smt. Ganga Bai adopted respondent No. 2 Roshanlal to her husband Ganeshlal by a registered adoption deed dated 30-10-1950, a copy of which has been placed on the record and marked Ex. A. 3. Shortly thereafter she executed an agreement to sell the house in question belonging to her husband for Rs. 800/-in favour of appellant Chauthmal and obtained Rs. 200/- in cash as part of the sale price. A copy of this agreement has also been placed on the record and marked Ex. A. 2. It may be relevant to state, here that Chauth Mal was already occupying a part of house i.e. two medis, a covered stair-case and also an open terrace as a tenant of Ganeshlal. However, before the sale deed could be executed, it appears that relations between Smt. Ganga Bai and Roshan Lal got strained, with the result that ignoring the first adoption she adopted respondent No.I Hagami-Lal who was then a minor on 20-1-1954. This adoption was oral and is not evidenced by any writing. On 11.3.51 Roshan Lal executed a sale deed in respect of the house in question in favour of Chauthmal in pursuance of the agreement Ex.A. 2. A copy of this sale deed has also been produced and marked Ex.A. 1. Two days after the execution of the said sale deed Roshanlal and Mohanlal, brother of Hagamilal as guardian defacto of Hagamilal entered into an agreement whereby the dispute as to the adoption of Roshanlal and Hagamilal by Smt. Ganga Bai was amicably settled. Roshan Lal chose to withdraw himself from his adoptive family and accepted Hagamilal as the validly adopted son of Ganeshlal. In order to avoid litigation Mohanlal also agreed on behalf of Hagamilal that Roshanlal would be paid Rs. 1300/- in lieu of giving up his right to the property of Ganeshlal. It was further agreed that the transactions entered into by Roshanlal as the adopted son of Ganeshlal would be recognised and not challenged by Hagamilal. The original agreement entered into between Mohanlal, as guardian of Hagamilal minor and Roshan Lal is marked Ex. 1. 1300/- in lieu of giving up his right to the property of Ganeshlal. It was further agreed that the transactions entered into by Roshanlal as the adopted son of Ganeshlal would be recognised and not challenged by Hagamilal. The original agreement entered into between Mohanlal, as guardian of Hagamilal minor and Roshan Lal is marked Ex. 1. There is no dispute between the parties that this agreement bears the signatures of Mohanlal and Roshanlal. As to what are the implications of this agreement is of course a point of serious dispute and will be dealt with at the proper place. 3. Hagamilal having come up of age, filed a suit on 11.2.1962 in the Court of Munsiff, Rajsamand against Chauth Mal and Roshan Lal praying that the sale deed Ex.A. 1 dated 11.3.1951 executed by Roshan Lal in favour of Chauthmal in respect of the house in dispute may be declared void and ineffective. It was further prayed that the possession may be granted to him of premises already in occupation of Chauth Mal as tenant. This suit was registered Suit No. 281/62. Soon after the institution of this suit, Chauth Mal also filed a suit against Hagamilal, and Roshanlal praying that a decree for possession of the property sold to him by Roshanlal vide Ex.A. 1 may be granted in his favour on payment of Rs. 300/- as the rest of the sale price i. e. Rs. 500/-had already been paid. Chauthmals suit was registered as Suit No. 59/1963. An application was filed by Chauthmal in his suit on 22-1-1965 praying that the proceedings in his suit may be stayed till suit No. 281/62 filed by Hagamilal was decided. To this prayer the defendant also agreed with the result that the trial proceeded in suit No. 281/62 only. 4. After recording the evidence produced by the parties, the learned Munsiff decreed suit No. 281/62 in favour of Hagamilal-plaintiff. It was agreed on behalf of Chauthmal that as a necessary corollary his suit No. 59-1963 was liable to be dismissed and accordingly by his judgment and decree dated 23-12-1965 the learned Munsiff dismissed Chauthmals suit. 5. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees in both the cases Chauthmal filed appeals in the Court of District Judge, Udaipur from where they were transferred to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur for disposal. 5. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees in both the cases Chauthmal filed appeals in the Court of District Judge, Udaipur from where they were transferred to the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur for disposal. The appeal arising out of suit No. 211/62 was registered as Appeal No. 154/65 and that arising out of suit No. 59/63 was registered as Appeal No. 22/66 6. As already stated above, by a single judgment dated 24-9-1966 the learned Senior Civil Judge dismissed both the appeals. Hence these appeal by Chauthmal before this Court. Appeal No. 69/67 is with respect to suit No. 281/62 and Appeal No. 29/67 is with respect to suit No. 58/63. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the courts below have erred in holding that Roshanlals adoption by Smt. Ganga Bai was not valid for want of evidence of giving and taking. He has also argued in this connection that the courts below have erred in upholding Hagamilals adoption by Smt. Ganga Bai. This point, in my opinion, cannot be accepted. No doubt there is registered adoption deed Ex. A 2 in favour of Roshanlal, evidence regarding giving and taking in connection with his adoption is conspicuous by its absence. It is not disputed that giving and taking was essential to validate the adoption, and mere existence of a registered deed of adoption could not fill up the lacuna caused by lack of the ceremony of giving and taking. The best person to support the case of Roshanlals adoption by Smt. Ganga Bai was undoubtedly Roshanlal himself. But even he states that the ceremony of giving and taking did not take place and there is no other evidence in this respect. On the other hand there is over-whelming evidence from the side of Hagamilal which clearly indicates that his natural mother had delegated authority to his elder brother Mohanlal to give him in adoption and that Smt. Ganga Bai took Hagamilal in adoption at the time the ceremony of adoption took place in presence of her relations. No exception can be taken to this evidence and no criticism worth the name has been advanced in respect of it. All that has been argued is that the natural mother of Hagamilal should have physically handed over the boy to Smt. Ganga Bai. This is not essential. No exception can be taken to this evidence and no criticism worth the name has been advanced in respect of it. All that has been argued is that the natural mother of Hagamilal should have physically handed over the boy to Smt. Ganga Bai. This is not essential. It is trite law that the authority of giving the boy in adoption can be delegated by the natural parents. In this state of evidence, the learned Senior Civil Judge was perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that Roshanlals adoption was not proved to be valid whereas Hagamilals adoption is proved to have taken place in accordance with law and I do not see any reason to interfere with that finding. 8. There is yet another aspect of the case. There is no gain-saying the fact that ever since 13.3.51 the agreement took place between Mohanlal and Hagamilal, Roshan Lal completely withdrew from his adoptive family and Hagamilal has been treated to all intents and purposes as the adopted son of Ganeshlal. Even Roshanlal in the course of this litigation has not asserted his right as the adopted son of Ganeshlal. In these circumstances it would be most inequitable and improper to call into question the adoption of Hagamilal at the instance of a stranger viz. Cauthmal, who has nothing to do with the devolution of the property of Ganeshlal, and is only interested in getting the sale made by Roshanlal in his favour declared valid. I am clearly of opinion that the fact of adoption so well established and not challenged by the person concerned viz. Roshanlal cannot be undone at the instance of a stranger like Chauthmal. In the result I hold that Hagamilal is the validly adopted son of Ganeshlal. 9. The next important question is whether sale of the house in question made by Roshanlal vide Ex. A. 1 in favour of Chauthmal is liable to be declared ineffective as against Hagamilal. It is true that since Hagamilal is the adopted son of Ganeshlal and not Roshanlal, Roshanlal had no authority to sell Ganeshlals property and on that reasoning Hagamilal is not bound by the sale made by Roshanlal in respect of the property in question. However, there is an important aspect of the case which does not seem to have been placed before the courts below. However, there is an important aspect of the case which does not seem to have been placed before the courts below. There was a genuine dispute between Hagamilal and Roshanlal as to who was the lawfully adopted son of Ganesh Lal. Mohanlal the de facto guardian of Hagamilal, in order to avoid litigation, entered into an arrangement with Roshanlal (Ex. 7) that the latter would forego all his rights in Ganeshlals property and would not hold himself out as an adopted son of Ganesh Lal, on his agreeing on behalf of the minor Hagamilal not to question certain transactions made by Roshanlal in respect of Ganeshlals property. A reference to Ex. 7 (agreement between Mohanlal and Roshanlal) would show that in the first place Roshan Lal was given Rs. 1300/- for forgoing his claim to the property of Ganeshlal as his adopted son. Then it was agreed that the discharge of mortgage by accepting the mortgage money made by Roshanlal of agricultural land belonging to Ganeshlal in the tank of Swarup Sagar would be considered as a valid discharge. It was further agreed that the amount due to Ganeshlal recovered by Roshanlal from debtors Ghaghu, Phura Kesara of Guda would be also considered as a valid recovery. So also there is mention of other recoveries made by Roshanlal of debts due to Ganeshlal and all those recoveries have been recognised as binding upon Hagamilal. 10. As regards the sale in question it has been mentioned that Roshanlal had already recovered Rs. 500/-, a major part of the sale price, and the balance Rs. 300/-would be received by Hagamilal who would hand over possession of the property in dispute to the vendee Chauthmal and if necessary take proper proceedings against Chauthmal, but that Roshanlal would not be liable to refund Rs 500/- recovered by him. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent Hagamilal, however, submits that this condition clearly meant that Hagamilal would be at liberty to challenge the validity of the sale. It has been also argued on Hagamilals behalf that Hagamilal was a minor at the time when the sale deed Ex. A. 1 was executed by Roshanlal and consequently the sale was void and could not have been ratified by Hagamilal. In support of his contention he has relied upon K. Kamma vs. Y. Appanna (l). 12. So far as interpretation of Cl. A. 1 was executed by Roshanlal and consequently the sale was void and could not have been ratified by Hagamilal. In support of his contention he has relied upon K. Kamma vs. Y. Appanna (l). 12. So far as interpretation of Cl. (5) pertaining to the sale in question contained in the agreement Ex.7 is concerned, I am of opinion, that it clearly meant that Hagamilal would be entitled to recover the balance price Rs. 300/- and that for that he would have to sue Chauthmal. There is no mention in this clause that this sale made by Chauthmal would be considered as unauthorised and not binding on Hagamilal. P.W. 3 Hagami Lal has admitted that the portion A to B which refers to Cl. (5) of Ex. 7 pertaining to the sale in question is correct, and he has also admitted that he has not challenged the other transactions made by Roshanlal in respect of the property of Ganeshlal described in Ex. 7. He has further stated that he is bound by the averments contained in Ex. 7. Mohanlal P. W. 8 has also stated in the course of cross-examination that what has been stated in the agreement Ex 7 with respect to sale of the house to Chauthmal was accepted by him. Thus on the basis of the averments in Cl. (5) of Ex. 7 coupled with the statement of Hagamilal and his brother Mohanlal who acted as his guardian defacto at the relevant time, I am led to believe that it was not the intention of any of the parties to the agreement to challenge the sale in question made by Roshanlal and all that was settled was that the balance of the sale price Rs. 300/- would be taken by Hagamilal from Chauthmal. 13. The question then is whether Hagamilal is bound by this condition? In K. Kamamma vs. Y. Appanna (l) it was held that where sale by a de facto guardian of minors property is invalid being hit by sec. 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianships Act and the sale is later on ratified by either the natural guardian or title-holder, such subsequent gratification does not validate the sale which initially was void in law. In support of this view the learned counsel referred to Rajlakshmi vs. Ramachandran (2) and D. Gurumurthy vs. Raghu Podhan(3). 14. 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianships Act and the sale is later on ratified by either the natural guardian or title-holder, such subsequent gratification does not validate the sale which initially was void in law. In support of this view the learned counsel referred to Rajlakshmi vs. Ramachandran (2) and D. Gurumurthy vs. Raghu Podhan(3). 14. It may, however, be pointed out that the agreement Ex. 7 in the present case is not hit by sec. 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianships Act, as it was made before the said Act came into force. It appears to me that the agreement Ex. 7 was made for the benefit of the minor and Mohanlal his guardian de facto in his prudence thought it fit that by entering into the said agreement the minor would be greatly benefited. The act of Mohanlal in making the agreement as de facto guardian of the minor Hagamilal therefore cannot be said to be against his interest or void ab initio. 15. It is true that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply to minors and still less the court will hold a minor estopped by the acts and omissions of others. There is, however, another principle that a minor is not entitled to repudiate an agreement and yet retain the advantage derived by him under it. General principles of equity seem incompatible with such a position. If the respondents contention is accepted, it would result in the minors accepting that part of the agreement which is beneficial to him and repudiating the rest which he considers not beneficial to his interest. It is a sound dictum of law that one cannot appropriate and reprobate at the same time. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be, in my opinion, highly inequitable to allow Hagamilal to take all the advantages under the agreement Ex 7 and yet repudiate the particular clause which pertains to the sale of the house in question, to the detriment of the appellant Chauthmal, by allowing him to challenge the sale. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to hold that Hagamilal is not entitled to get the sale in question declared ineffective. The inevitable result of this finding is that Hagamilals suit is liable to be dismissed and that of Chauthmal entitled to be decreed. 16. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to hold that Hagamilal is not entitled to get the sale in question declared ineffective. The inevitable result of this finding is that Hagamilals suit is liable to be dismissed and that of Chauthmal entitled to be decreed. 16. Accordingly, I allow both the appeals, set aside the judgments and decrees by the courts below and dismiss Hagamilals suit No. 281/62 and decree Chauthmals suit No. 59/63, and direct that Chauthmal shall be delivered possession of the property in dispute on payment of Rs. 300/-. The amount of Rs. 300/- shall be deposited in the trial court within 2 months from to day. In case Chauthmal fails to deposit the amount within the prescribed period his suit shall stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents prays for leave to appeal under sec. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Looking to the important question of law involved in the case, I certify it to be a fit one for appeal.