JUDGMEN f-Respondent Ganpat filed an application on 29-5-1967 under section 36(1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha. Region) Act, 1958, referred to hereinafter as the Tenancy Act, 1958, for being restored to possession of eastern half of field survey number 34/1, admeasuring 12 acres 36 gunthas, assessed to Rs. 16, situated at village Nimbhora, Tahsil Achalpur, district Amravati. 2. It was contended by Ganpat in his application that he was in exclusive possession of the suit field since the year 1953-54. He contended that he alone was cultivating the said field and was a protected lessee thereof. According to him, he became a deemed tenant under section 6 (1) of the Tenancy Act, 1958. Initially petitioner Basant was his co-lessee in the year 1951- 52, but thereafter he gave up cultivation of the field and left the village. Respondent Ganpat, therefore, alone was cultivating the field thereafter. According to respondent Ganpat, in the year 1964-65 Baswant began to cultivate eastern half portion of the field unauthorisedly, and therefore, he has filed the present application under section 36 (1) of the Tenancy Act, 1958. 3. Baswant denied that applicant Ganpat alone is cultivating the suit field since the year 1953-54. According to him, he was in possession of the field as a co-lessee from the year 1951-52 and he has not forcibly entered into the possession of half portion of the field in the year 1964. He contended that he has not taken forcible possession of it. According to him, the application filed by Ganpat under section 36 (1) is not maintainable because he was a co-lessee with Ganpat. 4. The Tenancy Naib-Tahsildar after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that Ganpat alone was the tenant of the field and he was not jointly cultivating the field along with Baswant. He further held that Baswant could not take possession of the half portion of the field, and therefore, the possession taken by him was forcible. In this view of the matter, he allowed the application filed by Ganpat and held that Ganpat is entitled to be restored in possession. 5. Being aggrieved by this order, Baswant filed an appeal before the Sub- Divisional Officer, Achalpur. The Sub-Divisional Officer held that Baswant was a co-lessee, and therefore, set aside the order passed by the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar. 5. Being aggrieved by this order, Baswant filed an appeal before the Sub- Divisional Officer, Achalpur. The Sub-Divisional Officer held that Baswant was a co-lessee, and therefore, set aside the order passed by the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar. Against this order the respondent Ganpat filed a revision application under section 111 of the Tenancy Act before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 6. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal allowed the revision application and held that the right of Baswant as a co-lessee came to an end as soon as he left village Nimbhora in the year 1953-540 and thereafter Ganpat alone was cultivating the field as the sole lessee. The learned Member further held that Baswant was not in possession of the field from 1953-54 onwards and it was in exclusive possession of Ganpat. As he was in exclusive possession of the suit field on 30-12-1958, when the new Tenancy Act came into force, he became the tenant under the new Tenancy Act. According to the learned Member of the Revenue Tribunal, rights of Baswant as a co-lessee came to an end as soon as he left possession of the field in the year 1953-54 and he could not be heard to say that till 1964-65 he was cultivating the field in question as a co-lessee. In view of this, the revision application was allowed and the order directing restoration of possession of eastern portion of the field to Ganpat passed by the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar was restored. Against this order the present writ petition has been filed by Baswant. 7. Shri Belekar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before me that as the petitioner was a co-lessee with Ganpat in the year 1951-52, he became the protected lessee of the suit field. In that capacity he continued to be in the possession of the suit field jointly with Ganpat, and therefore, became a tenant under the Act. He further contended that the landlord took no action against him for termination of his tenancy, and therefore, his right as a co-tenant continued all through. In that capacity he continued to be in the possession of the suit field jointly with Ganpat, and therefore, became a tenant under the Act. He further contended that the landlord took no action against him for termination of his tenancy, and therefore, his right as a co-tenant continued all through. As he was a co-lessee of the field nobody could have taken possession of the property without taking recourse to the provisions of either Berar Regulation of Agricultural Leases Act, referred to hereinafter as the Leases Act, or to the Tenancy Act, 1958 and as no proceedings were instituted against him either under the Leases Act or the Tenancy Act, his right as a co-lessee of the field is still su'1sisting. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel further contended that his possession even in the year 1964 was a legal one and it cannot be termed to be unauthorised. He further contended that the respondent became an owner of the suit field in the year 1961 under section 16, or in the year 1963 under section 49-A of the Tenancy Act. As he" became the owner of the field the application at his instance under section 36 (I) was not maintainable Shri Belekar further argued that the relationship between the parties clearly indicate that possession of one of them was on behalf of another. Therefore, even if it is assumed that Ganpat alone was cultivating the field, his possession will be of his own as well as on behalf of petitioner Baswant and on this count also, according to the learned counsel, it cannot be said that the possession of Baswant is in any way unauthorised. 8. From the evidence of Baswant himself it is quite clear that he left the village in the year 1953-54 and thereafter he does not remember as to when he came to Nimbhora. It was also not possible for him to tell how much money he paid to Ganpat for cultivation of the field. He could no tell as to what crops were reaped in the field and in what year. In substance, therefore, it was not possible for him to tell anything about the cultivation of the suit field after the year 1953-54. He could no tell as to what crops were reaped in the field and in what year. In substance, therefore, it was not possible for him to tell anything about the cultivation of the suit field after the year 1953-54. From the mere relationship between the parties no inference can be drawn that the possession of one was on behalf of another, more so, in view of the evidence of petitioner Baswant himself referred to hereinbefore. It is quite clear from the evidence of Baswant and other oral and documentary evidence on record that respondent Ganpat alone was cultivating the field since the year 1953-54. Therefore, it is not possible for me to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the possession of Ganpat over the suit field was also on behalf of petitioner Baswant. In this view of the matter it cannot be said that the authorities below committed any error in holding that after the year 1953·54 it was respondent Ganpat alone who was cultivating the field exclusively, and therefore, he became the sole tenant of the suit field. 9. If this finding is accepted, then it is quite clear that since the year 1953-54, petitioner Baswant had no concern with the field and it was cultivated exclusively by respondent Ganpat. After Baswant was ousted from the possession of the said field in the year 1953-54 as a co-lessee on his leaving the· village at no time thereafter he claimed possession of the suit field. It is clear from the record that after the year 1953-54 it was respondent Ganpat alone who was recognised as a lessee of the field. No efforts were made by petitioner Baswant to get into possession of the field or to cultivate it, till the year 1964. He had not even filed any proceedings for restoration of the possession of the field either under the Tenancy Act, Leases Act or under common Law. In this view of the matter, in my opinion in the year 1964 when he forcibly cultivated the field he was not a lessee or a tenant, and therefore, hill possession over the suit field was obviously unauthorised. In this view of the matter, in my opinion in the year 1964 when he forcibly cultivated the field he was not a lessee or a tenant, and therefore, hill possession over the suit field was obviously unauthorised. If after his ouster from the field in the year 1953·54 he had not taken any steps within the period of limitation provided by either the Leases Act or the Tenancy Act, in my opinion, the rights, if any, he had as a co· lessee of the field stood extinguished. 10. Section 19 of the Leases Act as well as section 36 of the new Tenancy Act provide a specific period of limitation for filing application for restoration of possession. Section 36 (1) of the Tenancy Act provides a period of 3 years from the date on which right to obtain possession of the land is accrued to the tenant. Such an application can be filed not only against the landlord but against anybody who is in possession. As observed by the Supreme Court in Vallabhai v. Bai Jivi1 : "Section 29 (1) confers a right on a tenant to apply to the Mamlatdar for possession and section 29 (2) gives a right to a landlord to apply to the Mamlatdar to obtain possession of land held by a tenant. In both the cases it is the duty of the Mamlatdar to restore possession to the tenant or to the landlord, as the case may be. It will be noticed that whereas sub-section (2) is confined to an application by a landlord for possession from his tenant, sub-section (1) is not so confined and, therefore, a tenant can apply for possession against anyone including the landlord. But for such an application the condition is that he must be one who is 'entitled to possession' of the land in question 'under any of the provisions of this Act'. But for such an application the condition is that he must be one who is 'entitled to possession' of the land in question 'under any of the provisions of this Act'. Thus, in all cases where a tenant is entitled to possession of land under any of the provisions of the Act, he has a right under section 29 (1) to apply to the Mamlatdar for restoration of possession against anyone including the landlord and it is the duty of the Mamlatdar, if satisfied that the tenant is entitled to such possession under any of the provisions of the Act, to restore possession to him." The provisions of section 29 (1) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 are pari materia to the provisions of section 36 (1) of the Tenancy Act, 1958. 11. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the application filed by Ganpat for restoration of possession was maintainable. Obviously in the year 1964 petitioner Baswant took forcible possession of the suit field, and therefore, Ganpat who was the tenant of the field could have filed an application under section 36 (1) of the Act for restoration of possession. As already observed, within the period of limitation petitioner Baswant has not filed all application for restoration of possession of the suit fie ld when he was ousted from the possession in the year 1953-54, It is no doubt true that the principle incorporated in section 27 of the new Limitation Act or section 28 of the old Limitation Act is not in terms applicable to the present Statute. Although the provisions of section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 do not apply to the suit under the special or local law, yet general principle incorporated in the said section may be applied to such suits. Such a view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Dindayal v. Rajaram2. In that case the property in question was held under the tenancy rights and in that context the question was considered by the Supreme Court. Such a view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Dindayal v. Rajaram2. In that case the property in question was held under the tenancy rights and in that context the question was considered by the Supreme Court. In para 10 of the said decision while dealing with such a contention it was observed by the Supreme Court: "It was urged on behalf of the appellants that in view of the principle underlying section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which principle is not confined to suits and applications for which limitation is prescribed under that Act, but is of general application, the plaintiffs' right to the suit properties must be held to have been extinguished. In other words, the contention was that in view of the aforementioned provisions, the plaintiffs had not merely lost their right to sue for possession of the suit properties, their right in the properties itself had been extinguished. It is well settled that the principle underlying section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (same as section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963) is of general application. It is not confined to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act." Such a view has also been taken by the Lahore High Court in Kartar Singh v. Kharkha3 and Gokal v. Haria4. After referring to the decisions of the various High Courts, the Lahore High Court observed as under: "It is urged that there is no express provision to this effect in (Punjab) Act 1 of 1920, and that section 28, Limitation Act 9 of 1908, applies only to cases governed by that Act, and not to cases for which the period of limitation is provided in Local or Special Laws. It is true section.28 does not in terms apply to cases under such Acts, but the principle underlying it is of general application and has been applied to cases governed by Local Laws: See 21 All. 204(1), 11 I. C. 465 (2), 60 I. C. 165 (3), 1933 Pat. 6 (4), 1927 Nag. 401 (5), 109 I. C. 401 (6), 109 I. C 403 (7) and 11 M. I. A. 345 at 360 (8). 204(1), 11 I. C. 465 (2), 60 I. C. 165 (3), 1933 Pat. 6 (4), 1927 Nag. 401 (5), 109 I. C. 401 (6), 109 I. C 403 (7) and 11 M. I. A. 345 at 360 (8). In these cases to none of which section 28, Limitation Act; expressly applied, it was held that if a party who had been out of possession for the number of years given to him by the law of limitation from bringing a suit for possession and whose claim had therefore become barred by time, should again get into possession, he was no remitted to his old title, on the principle that there was no remitter to a right for which the party had no remedy by action at all’.” This principle will aptly apply to the present case also. In the present case after petitioner Baswant left the village in the year 1953-54, Ganpat alone was recognised as the lessee of the field and he was in exclusive possession thereof. Therefore, Ganpat alone became exclusive lessee of the whole field and the right of the petitioner as a co-lessee came to an end after the period of limitation prescribed by the Special Acts or General Law of limitation. From the record it is, however, clear that respondent Ganpat alone was recognised as a lessee for practically all purposes even by the landlord. Thus if petitioner Baswant wanted to claim the possession of the property by virtue of his right as a co-lessee he could have taken steps either under the Special Act or under common law by filing a civil suit for restoration of possession and having failed to do so, in my opinion, the rights, if any, in favour of petitioner Baswant stood extinguished after the period of limitation. 12. In the year 1964 when Baswant forcibly entered into the possession of the portion of the suit field, he had no pre-existing right as a lessee on that date, nor he was remitted to his old right, because there can be no remitter to a right for which party had no remedy by action at law. Therefore his possession of the suit field in the year 1964 was unauthorised. Therefore his possession of the suit field in the year 1964 was unauthorised. In this view of the matter, the application filed by respondent Ganpat against Baswant under section 36 (1) of the Tenancy Act, 1958 was maintainable and was rightly allowed by the Tenancy Naib Tahsildar as well as the Revenue Tribunal. 13. However, it was contended by Shri Belekar that as respondent Ganpat became the owner of the suit field in the year 1961 by virtue of the provisions of section 46 of the 1958 Act, or in the year 1963 by virtue of section 49-A of the said Act, his application under section 36 (1) of the 1958 Act was not maintainable as he was not the tenant of the suit field, but was owner thereof. Section 36 (1) of the Tenancy Act, 1958 reads as under: "36 (1) A tenant or an agricultural labourer or artisan entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house or site used for any allied pursuit under any of the provisions of this Act or as a result of eviction in contravention of sub-section (2) may apply in writing for such possession to the Tahsildar. The application shall be made in such form as may be prescribed and within a period of three years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land, dwelling house or site is deemed to have accrued to the tenant, agricultural labourer of artisan, as the case may be." Therefore, it is contended by Shri Belekar that a tenant alone has a right to file an application under section 36 (1) and as respondent Ganpat has ceased to be a tenant of the suit field on the date of the application the application itself was not maintainable. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Madhukar v. Gajanan5. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Madhukar v. Gajanan5. After referring to the provisions of section 36 (1) and section 49-A of the Tenancy Act, 1958 it was observed by this Court in the said decision as under: "Section 49-A declares a right in favour of the person who is a person to be the deemed full owner of the land and it further says that this right has to be worked out in the manner indicated by sub sections (4) to (14), 14-A and (15) of section 43, section 44, sub sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of section 45, and of sections 47 and 48 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. These provisions apply mutatis mutand is to the transfer of ownership of land under sub-section (6) of section 49-A. Therefore, it is clear that all the procedure is very well contemplated and must be taken to be incorporated In the body of section 49-A itself. Under sub-section (8) of section 43 provision is made for certification as to the purchase and a form is prescribed by the rule. It is only on deposit of the purchase price as required by sub-section (8), the certificate can be issued. The law declares that such certificate shall be the conclusive evidence of purchase. Sub-section (11) of section 43 requires the tenant holding the land to pay the rent due and his liability to pay such rent is not affected subject, however, that as may be indicated by the provisions of section 47 wherein such payments are to be deducted from the ultimate price that may be fixed. It is of interest that though there is unequivocal declaration by the legislature in favour of the tenant that he will be deemed to be the full owner on 1-4-1963 provided he satisfies all the conditions thereof till the stage a certificate of purchase is granted as the conclusive evidence of ownership, he is all the white referred to in the entire statute as the tenant. It is this phraseology which is indicative that though the tenant has become the deemed full owner for the purpose of the Act it cannot be accepted that the remedy available under section 36 (1) is immediately lost to him, for such purposes be is still treated to be the tenant on the land. It is this phraseology which is indicative that though the tenant has become the deemed full owner for the purpose of the Act it cannot be accepted that the remedy available under section 36 (1) is immediately lost to him, for such purposes be is still treated to be the tenant on the land. Thus viewed, even the provisions of sections 43, 44, 47 and 48 which all use the phraseology 'the tenant'. Section 36 (1) being remedial thus would include a person who has acquired right because of section 49-A to be on the land as deemed owner and take all steps to complete statutory purchase. No doubt, this would be giving a wider meaning to the term 'tenant' but it is permissible course to give such a meaning because of the context and the object of section 36 (1) itself. It was argued at one stage that such deemed owners should have the remedy only under section 120 of the Act and it cannot be said that they have no remedy. Such an argument would be available provided the person does not answer the legislative term 'tenant'. Once it is answered by saying that till the final certificate which is the conclusive evidence of purchase is issued, the person, who is the deemed owner, continues to be the tenant for the purpose of section 36 (1) he must be able to protect his possession by applying against anyone including his landlord. There is intrinsic evidence also in the phraseology of sub-section (1) of section 36 itself, in that the words are "the tenant entitled to possession of any land," As indicated earlier, the scheme of statutory ownership is that 'a tenant on the land' is deemed to be the owner thereof but still the full ownership or the conclusive evidence is yet to be worked out. That phrase emphasises the entitlement of possession of the land and not the person. That being the position, it must be held that though the submission, which is made at this stage and is no doubt apparently ingenious one, still cannot be accepted, for, it would involve a tenant in useless litigation and his valuable rights pending purchase proceedings would be jeopardised. That being the position, it must be held that though the submission, which is made at this stage and is no doubt apparently ingenious one, still cannot be accepted, for, it would involve a tenant in useless litigation and his valuable rights pending purchase proceedings would be jeopardised. To sub-serve the very scheme remedy under section 36 (1) of the Act must be available to him." Section 36 (2) of the Act provides protection to the tenants, and section 36 (1) ...... provides for the remedy in the cases of wrongful eviction. Section 36 (1) of the Act expressly provides for the belief being granted to an evicted tenant by way of restoration of possession. It is well settled that a remedial provision should be construed liberally so as to afford utmost relief. Such a provision should be read broadly and the words of such a remedial provision should be construed liberally so that the relief contemplated by it, will not be denied to the persons intended to be relieved. As the wording of the section clearly indicate, the said provision expressly confer a right upon a tenant, who is dispossessed, to seek relief by way of restoration of possession. In this context, it will include in its ambit any person who had at any time been a tenant. Therefore, the phraseology used in the section will include an ex-tenant, if the relief claimed by him is based on his right as a tenant. 14. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the present application filed by respondent Ganpat to seek remedy under section 36 (1) of the Tenancy Act, 1958 against petitioner Baswant, who was in possession of the portion of the suit field unauthorisedly, was perfectly legal and the authorities below were right in allowing the said application. 15. In the result, therefore, the petition fails and is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.