JUDGMENT Mehrotra, J. - This is the defendants' second appeal arising out of a suit for declaration and injunction. The plaintiff sought a declaration that he was the adopted son of one Sita Ram Tewari and was as such in possession over the suit plots. A declaration was further sought that the decree No. 459 of 1958 passed by the court of Munsif West, Ballia was null and void and the defendants did not acquire any right under the said decree. A permanent injunction was claimed seeking to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the suit plots. 2. The brief facts are these: The plaintiff claimed that he was adopted by Sita Ram Tewari on August 2, 1936 after the fulfilment of the necessary ceremonies and that in this connection Sita Ram Tewari also executed a registered deed of adoption dated August 28, 1956. Sita Ram Tewari is alleged to have died on December 28, 1957. It is alleged that he was separate from his collaterals who were all descendants of one Mahipal Tewari. The plaintiff claimed that on Sita Ram's death he came in possession over the suit plots which were separately enjoyed by Sita Ram Tewari during his life time. In the village papers it is alleged that the plaintiff's name was mutated. Sita Ram's mother, Jamuna Kunwar, is alleged to have died much earlier than the institution of the suit. The plaintiff has further alleged that suit No. 459 of 1958 was filed by the defendants against Sita Ram and his mother, Jamuna Kunwar (both of whom were actually dead on the date of the institution of R-23 the suit), on the false allegation that both of them had renounced the world and had become Sanyasis. A fictitious report of service of process was obtained by the defendants in the said suit and an ex parte decree was passed in favour of the defendants therein. The said decree was claimed to be a nullity having been obtained against dead persons and as a result of misrepresentation and fraud. 3. The defendant No. 1 alone contested the suit and against other defendants it proceeded ex parte. Apart from other pleas the following allegations of fact were made in the written statement: (a) The plaintiff was never adopted by Sita Ram. 3. The defendant No. 1 alone contested the suit and against other defendants it proceeded ex parte. Apart from other pleas the following allegations of fact were made in the written statement: (a) The plaintiff was never adopted by Sita Ram. (b) Sita Ram became a Sadhu about 31 to 32 years back and was civilly dead. Her mother, Jamuna Kunwar, renounced the world about 11 to 12 years back and similarly she also had a civil death (c) Both Sita Ram and Jamuna Kunwar were alive on the day when the defendants filed suit No. 459 of 1958 and in fact both of them were said to be alive even during the pendency of the suit (In fact the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, Shri R. Pandey, stated before me that even during the pendency of the appeal in this Court Sita' Ram was alive). (d) The descendants of Mahipal Tewari were joint and not separate and Sita Ram renounced the world in a state of jointness of the family. Hence the defendants became the owners of the suit plots by survivorship. (e) The decree passed in suit No. 459 of 1958 was not passed against dead persons and was not obtained by misrepresentation and fraud. There was proper service of process in the suit. (f) The plaintiff's uncle and next friend, Jalesar Tewari and his father, Sarju Tewari, bore enmity against the defendants and they made several attempts to garb the share of Sita Ram in the properties in question. They got a partition suit filed in 1951 by Jamuna Kunwar. When the defendants joined contest in the said suit, she withdrew the same and renounced the world another partition suit was got filed in 1954 in the name of Sita Ram. Again, when the defendant put in contest, the suit was withdrawn on July 18, 1957. Sarju Tewari got his name recorded over certain suit plots but on the defendant's protest his name was directed to be expunged on March 31, 1958. Sarju Tewari had earlier filed a suit on October 8. 1954 impleading the present defendants and Sita Ram Tewari as the defendants therein. He (Sarju Tewari) obtained an ex parte decree but the same was set aside and when the defendants joined contest the suit was withdrawn. Sarju Tewari had earlier filed a suit on October 8. 1954 impleading the present defendants and Sita Ram Tewari as the defendants therein. He (Sarju Tewari) obtained an ex parte decree but the same was set aside and when the defendants joined contest the suit was withdrawn. (g) When the aforesaid efforts of Sarju Tewari and Jalesar Tewari failed then the instant suit was instituted on the false allegation that the plaintiff was the adopted son of Sita Ram Tewari. 4. After framing the necessary issues, the trial court tried the same. It held that the plaintiff was not the adopted son of Sita Ram; that Sita Ram Tewari and Jamuna Kunwar were not dead when the suit No. 459 of 1958 was instituted and hence the decree which was passed against them was not a nullity but was a valid decree; that the descendants of Mahipal Tewari were not separate but joint; Sita Ram Tewari had left the properties and had abandoned the village a long time back and thus he had renounced the world though he could not be said to have become a San-yasi in view of the lack of proof that the necessary ceremonies were ever performed in this connection. In the result, the trial court dismissed the suit. 5. The plaintiff filed an appeal in the lower appellate court and the latter allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. 6. In brief, the lower appellate court has recorded the following findings: (a) The plaintiff is the adopted son of Sita Ram. (b) Sita Ram Tewari died on December 28, 1957. (c) The plaintiff filed the suit on November 30, 1960 and on that date he was the owner in possession of the suit properties being the sole heir of Sita Ram. (d) Sita Ram Tewari did not renounce the world and continued to be in possession of the suit properties. (e) As the decree in suit No. 459 of 1958 was obtained against Sita Ram, who, in fact, was dead on the date of the institution of the suit, therefore, it was a nullity. Further, it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation and there was no evidence to prove proper service on Sita Ram in the said suit. 7. The defendants have felt aggrieved with the judgment of the lower appellate court and they have filed the instant second appeal in this Court. Further, it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation and there was no evidence to prove proper service on Sita Ram in the said suit. 7. The defendants have felt aggrieved with the judgment of the lower appellate court and they have filed the instant second appeal in this Court. I have heard Sri N. Pandey, learned counsel, for the appellants, in support of the appeal at great length. 8. His main points are these: (1) The lower appellate court's finding that Sita Ram died on December 28, 1957 is a perverse finding. Ex. 23, which purports to be the certified copy of the death extract of Gram Panchayat, Ahiraula, should not have been admitted and relief upon in evidence clue to several infirmities in the said document. For example, no serial number, no book number is given in the said certified copy. No other detail about the deceased is given therein, and the time of death has not been disclosed. Further, Ex. 23 was brought on record in a manner which casts a cloud on its genuineness. From the date of the delivery of the certified copy to the plaintiff it seems that the same was in his possession on the date of issues but it was not filed. The issues were framed on July 31, 1961. Ex. 23 was filed on July 16, 1962 even though it was delivered to the plaintiff on July 31, 1961 as per endorsement on the said certified copy. (2) The lower appellate court's finding that the plaintiff was adopted by Sita Ram is vitiated due to the failure of the said court to take into consideration several aspects touching upon the said controversy which were discussed by the trial court. The lower appellate court touched only one aspect and neglected others. The trial court had given numerous reasons why the plaintiff's version about adoption was not acceptable. The lower appellate court, without examining the said reasons, took into account only one main consideration, namely, the existence of a registered adoption deed and reversed the finding of the trial court. (3) The lower appellate court's observation that there was litigation between Sita Ram and the defendants is incorrect. There was litigation between Sarju Tewari or Jalesar Tewari on the one side and Sita Ram Tewari on the other side. There was no litigation between the defendants and Sita Ram. (3) The lower appellate court's observation that there was litigation between Sita Ram and the defendants is incorrect. There was litigation between Sarju Tewari or Jalesar Tewari on the one side and Sita Ram Tewari on the other side. There was no litigation between the defendants and Sita Ram. (4) The civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as the entirety of the relief claimed could be given by the Revenue Court under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. In this connection reliance Was placed on Parsottam v. Narottam and another, 1970 R.D. 216. and Sugrim v. Saraswati, 1971 R.D. 134=1970 A.L.J. 1145. It was pointed out that the suit was pending in 1961 when Section 391(1) of the IT.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was amended and the suit could not proceed in the civil court due to the said amendment. 9. Sri M.C. Saxena, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, contested the contentions raised on behalf of the defendants-appellants and made the following points: (1) The second appeal is concluded by findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court and on the basis of the law repeatedly laid down by the Supreme Court in various cases such as Kharbuja Kunwar v. Jang Bahadur, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1203. and Sinha Ramanuja v. Ranga Ramanuja, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1720. this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with such findings howsoever grossly erroneous they may be. (2) No witness on behalf of the defendants has come forward to say that Sita Ram's signature on the deed of adoption (Ex. 21) is not genuine. The deed of adoption, therefore, cannot be said to be a fictitious one. (3) Even though Suresh Tewari, the natural father of the plaintiff, did not sign the deed of adoption (Ex. 21), still, the principle of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be said to be applicable to the present case. The said section lays down as under: "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoptions. (3) Even though Suresh Tewari, the natural father of the plaintiff, did not sign the deed of adoption (Ex. 21), still, the principle of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 can be said to be applicable to the present case. The said section lays down as under: "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoptions. Where ever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved." (4) In connection with the certified copy of the death extract recording the death of Sita Ram on December 26, 1957 (Ex. 23) it has been contended that the same is a perfectly genuine document. In this connection attention was invited to the fact that the trial court by its order dated February 16, 1962, while admitting the said document on record, granted time to the defendants-appellants to file documents in rebuttal by August 4, 1962. However, no documents in rebuttal were filed by the defendants-appellants. If they thought that the certified copy was not a genuine document then they were bound to adduce evidence in rebuttal either by summoning the original register or by obtaining another certified copy of the said extract but the defendants-appellants failed to do so and in the second appeal it is not open to them to question the genuineness of the certified copy. In this connection Section 10.9-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 was relied upon which lays down the mode of proof of the Gaon Sabha record. 10. Having heard learned counsel for both the parties, I am of opinion that this appeal lacks merit and it is concluded by findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court and hence, in the second appeal I have no jurisdiction to interfere. I think the most important aspect of this litigation is this. The defendants-appellants have throughout the course of this litigation asserted that Sita Ram was not dead on the date when the suit (from which this appeal has arisen) was instituted in 1960. I think the most important aspect of this litigation is this. The defendants-appellants have throughout the course of this litigation asserted that Sita Ram was not dead on the date when the suit (from which this appeal has arisen) was instituted in 1960. In fact, the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants emphatically asserted before me that he was alive during the pendency of the second appeal and that, in fact, he filed an affidavit in this appeal in the Civil Misc. Application No 5116 of 1973 dated May 1, 1973. Now, if this be the fact, that the real Sita Ram was not dead when the suit in question was instituted in 1960 nothing was easier than his production in the witness-bax to disprove the version of the plaintiff. The version of the plaintiff in respect of the two material allegations, which were being made by him, namely, (i) that Sita Ram died on December 28, 1957, and (ii) that the plaintiff had been adopted by Sita Ram earlier on Aug. 2, 1956, 11. would have stood disproved if the real Sita Ram would have come forward to deny the said allegations. If there was any difficulty in examining the real Sita Ram in the witness-box, he could be examined on commission, and it cannot be said that as he had renounced the world, therefore, it was not possible to summon him because as stated above, Shri R. Pandey, learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, asserted that Sita Ram had filed an affidavit in this Court a the instant second appeal. I think the failure on the part of the defendant-appellants to examine Sita Ram is fatal to their case. It is true that under Section 107 of the Indian Evidence Act the burden of proving that Sita Ram was dead on the date of the institution of the lit would be initially on the plaintiff. I hold that in the instant case the plaintiff did discharge that initial burden and thereafter the onus of proof shifted on the defendants to prove that the plaintiff's version in this behalf was not correct. I hold that in the instant case the plaintiff did discharge that initial burden and thereafter the onus of proof shifted on the defendants to prove that the plaintiff's version in this behalf was not correct. In particular, when the defendants have throughout maintained that they had good relations with Sita Ram and when it has been their case that Sita Ram filed an affidavit in this Court in the instant second appeal, I cannot understand why Sita Ram was not examined by the defendants in the trial of the suit. I think, if Sita Ram were really alive on the date of the suit, then the defendants must have examined him either in the court or on commission to disprove the plaintiff's case. Indeed, Sita Ram's testimony in such a situation, would have been almost conclusive and the plaintiff's case would have been completely blown off by the examination of Sita Ram on behalf of the defendants. 12. Now coming to the points raised on behalf of the defendants-appellants, I do not think that Ex. 23, which is the certified copy of the death extract relating to the death of Sita Ram, can be discarded at the stage of the second appeal. Under Section 15(e) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act it is one of the compulsory duties of a Gaon Panchayat to register births, deaths and marriages. Similarly, clause (p) of Section 15 of the said Act lays down that the maintenance of such records relating to cattle census, population census and other statistics as may be prescribed is a compulsory duty of a Gaon Panchayat Rule 63 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules gives the list of registers and records which are bound to be maintained by a Gaon Panchayat and the period of their retention is also given in the said rule. Clause (xi) in the rule shows that birth, death and marriage registers are to be permanently retained. Form-D, framed under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules, is the form in which the birth and death register is to be maintained and Ex. 23 is a certified copy of an extract from such register. Rule 73 of the said Rules lays down: "Copies of documents and fees thereof. Form-D, framed under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules, is the form in which the birth and death register is to be maintained and Ex. 23 is a certified copy of an extract from such register. Rule 73 of the said Rules lays down: "Copies of documents and fees thereof. Until the records of a Gaon Panchayat have been consigned applications for copies of the records of Gaon Panchayat shall be made to the Pradhan of the Gaon Panchayat and for purposes of the rates of copying fees and the manner of granting such copies, the procedure laid down in rules 107 to 111 shall be followed." 13. It is thus clear that Ex. 23 is the certified copy of a public document and was, therefore, admissible to prove the entry in the said document. I uphold the objection of Shri K.C. Saxena that if it is sought to be shown that the certified copy is not a genuine one either because there was certain defects or incompleteness in the certified copy issued or, if it is sought to be proved that the alleged certified copy is really a fictitious document and that there is a complete absence of any entry in the original register of which the certified copy purports to be a true copy, then ail these objections have to be raised and canvassed at the trial stage and it is too late for a party to raise such an objection at the appellate stage. The defendants-appellants, if they thought that Ex. 23 was not a genuine document, could have established their contention either by summoning the original register from the Collectorate or they could have obtained another certified copy which according to them would have been the real true copy of the disputed entry in the birth and death register. It is true that since they were alleging that Sita Ram was not dead, therefore, they obviously could not obtain a certified copy of any entry in the birth and death register because basically their allegation is that there was no such entry about the alleged death of Sita Ram in the birth and death register. However, in such a situation they could have certainly summoned the original register to show the utterly fictitious nature of Ex. 23 which had been filed by the plaintiff. However, in such a situation they could have certainly summoned the original register to show the utterly fictitious nature of Ex. 23 which had been filed by the plaintiff. The mere fact that the certified copy on record does not disclose certain details regarding serial number or book number does not seem to be very material. If the defendants-appellants had raised their objection at the trial stage, then the plaintiff could certainly produce another certified copy without the said infirmities which are now being pointed out by the defendants-appellants. In this connection the observation of the Privy Council in Gopal Das v. Thakur Ji, A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 83. may be reproduced: "The endorsement" admitted against the plaintiffs is in the form generally employed "by the trial judge under Order XIII, Rule 4 for documents tendered by the defendants just as the plaintiffs' documents are marked 'admitted against the defendants'. The endorsement means that the document is admitted in evidence as proved. Where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. A party cannot lie by until the case comes before a court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. A strictly formal proof might or might not have been forthcoming had it been insisted on at the trial." 14. In an earlier case decided by it in Padman v. Hanwant, A.I.R. 1915 P.C. 111. the Privy Council repelled a somewhat similar objection though not identical which was raised by the appellants in respect of a certified copy of a will. Their Lordships observed: "The defendants have now appealed to His Majesty-in-Council, and the case has been argued on their behalf in great detail. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar's Office being put in evidence. It was urged in the course of the argument that a registered copy of the will of 1898 was admitted in evidence without sufficient foundation being laid for its admission. No objection, however, appears to have been taken in the first court against the copy obtained from the Registrar's Office being put in evidence. Had such objection been made at the time, the District Judge who tried the case in the first instance would probably have seen that the deficiency was supplied. Their Lordships think that there is no substance in the present contention." 15. Therefore, I hold that Ex. 23 has been properly admitted and relied upon by the lower appellate court. 16. So far as the second objection of Shri R. Pandey, learned counsel for the defendants-appellants, is concerned, it is true that the discussion in the judgment of the lower appellate court regarding the controversy about the plaintiff's adoption is not so exhaustive as one might wish to be. However, the said court has discussed the oral evidence and has held that the statements of the three witnesses of the plaintiff in this respect are more reliable. The said witnesses are Ram Chandra Dubey (P.W. 1), Chandra Deep Pandey (P.W. 4) and Jalesar Tewari (P.W. 5). The said court has given reasons why it was placing reliance upon their testimony and the reason why the trial court was not justified in discarding their statements. Thereafter, the lower appellate court, relying upon the law laid down by this Court in B. Chaubey v. M.M. Chaube, 1964 A.L.J. 749 held that the deed of adoption (Ex. 21) was a very good piece of evidence to prove the plaintiff's case. I do not think that strictly the lower appellate court was justified in thinking that the observations in B. Chaubey v. M.M. Chaube, 1964 A.L.J. 749. relied upon by it were applicable to the instant case inasmuch as there is no admission of the Defendants in the adoption deed. In B. Chaubey v. M.M. Chaube, 1964 A.L.J. 749. the adoptive father had made such an admission in the deed of adoption but wanted to prove that the deed was not a genuine one and not binding upon him. In B. Chaubey v. M.M. Chaube, 1964 A.L.J. 749. the adoptive father had made such an admission in the deed of adoption but wanted to prove that the deed was not a genuine one and not binding upon him. In the instant case we do not have any such admission of the defendants and, therefore, strictly, as I have stated earlier, the authority of B. Chaubey v. M.M. Chaube, 1964 A.L.J. 749. is not attracted. However apart from the said case, I think the lower appellate court was entitled to place great reliance upon Ex. 21 which happened to be a registered deed of adoption executed by Sita Ram. The defendant's allegation is that the said deed was executed by some one who merely impersonated as Sita Ram and the real Sita Ram had not executed the document. Such an allegation, as emphasised by me earlier, could have been easily substantiated by the production of Sita Ram to deny the execution of the document and his alleged thumb-impression thereon. However, neither the alleged real Sita Ram was examined by the defendants-appellants nor any witness on their behalf had the courage to say that the alleged thumb-impression of Sita Ram on the said document was not a genuine one. I, therefore, do not think that the lower appellate court was unjustified in placing a great deal of reliance on the deed of adoption. But it has to be emphasised that the said court has not merely relied upon the said deed in support of his finding that Sita Ram had adopted the plaintiff. As shown above, the lower appellate court has discussed and relied upon the oral evidence also in this connection. I do not think that the judgment of the lower appellate court can be said to be vitiated merely on the ground that some aspects which had been discussed by the trial court have not been specifically referred to by the lower appellate court in its judgment. It is not the law that the lower appellate court must allude to each and every aspect which has been referred to in the trial court's judgment. It is not the law that the lower appellate court must allude to each and every aspect which has been referred to in the trial court's judgment. Order 41, R. 31 requires that the judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state (a) the points for determination, (b) the decision thereon, (c) the reasons for the decision, and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 17. It is not the requirement that every aspect examined by the trial court, however, minor it may be, must be specifically considered and decided by the lower appellate court in the latters judgment. In Bisheshwar Ray Choudhari v. Abdul Dewan, A.I.R. 1947 Cal. 328. it has been laid down: "It may be true to say that he (the Presiding Officer of the lower appellate court) has not considered every single circumstance or other piece of evidence on which the Munsif relied on coming to the opposite conclusion, but I cannot agree that the judgment is not satisfactory, though it is one of reversal." 18. In Shashi Kumari Devi v. Dhirendra Kishore Roy, A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 248. the Division Bench laid down: "It cannot be said that a judgment of reversal is not a proper judgment merely because all the reasons given by the original court are not discussed. If the reasons given by the appellate court are so cogent as to justify the finding, no discussion of other less convincing reasons is necessary. Consequently, in such a case omission to discuss all the reasons given by the original court is perfectly justified." 19. I am in respectful agreement with the proposition laid down in the Calcutta cases. However, the matter stands concluded by the verdict of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra Aiyyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 302. where it has been laid down: "We must, therefore, hold that Mr. Chatterji is not right in contending that because the judgment of the lower appellate court was not as elaborate as that of the trial judge or because some of the reasons given by the trial judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate court, the High Court was entitled to interfere with the conclusions of the lower appellate court." 20. The said pronouncement was made by the Supreme Court with express reference to Section 100, C.P.C. and the Supreme Court distinguished the judgment of the Privy Council in Rani Hemanta Kumar Devi v. Maharaj Jagadin dranatha Bahadur Roy, 16 M.L.J. 272. where the latter court laid down that it is a better that the appellate court, whenever it reverses the judgment of the lower court, comes into close quarter with the judgment of the lower court and meets the reasoning therein. Referring to these observations of the Privy Council, the Supreme Court said: - "These observations, however, do not assist us in determining the scope of Section 100. They were made in an appeal which went before the Privy Council against the decision of the High Court when the Appellate Bench was dealing with the First Appeal filed against the decision of the judge of the first instance. The High Court had reversed the decision of the first court, and in considering the propriety or correctness of the said reversing judgment, the Privy Council observed that the appellate judgment did not come into close quarters with the judgment which it reversed. It would thus be seen that what the Privy Council has said about the requirements of a proper appellate judgment, cannot assist Mr. Chatterji in contending that if a proper judgment is not written by the lower court in dealing with questions of fact, its conclusions on facts can be challenged under Section 100. That question must be considered in the light of Section 100 alone." 21. I think the law cannot be very rigidly laid down inasmuch as it will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the lower court's failure to consider a particular point or aspect touched upon in the trial court's judgment is such in its magnitude that the entire judgment of the lower appellate court stands vitiated on that ground. It will depend upon the nature and significance of the material which has been omitted to be considered by the lower appellate court and, therefore, one cannot afford to be very rigid or inflexible in this respect, One must have a sense of proportion in these matters. It will depend upon the nature and significance of the material which has been omitted to be considered by the lower appellate court and, therefore, one cannot afford to be very rigid or inflexible in this respect, One must have a sense of proportion in these matters. Looking to the facts and circumstances in the instant appeal, I do not think that the lower appellate court has failed to consider any such decisive piece of evidence or material which could be said to tilt the balance in favour of the defendant-appellants. I, therefore, reject the second contention raised on behalf of the defendant-appellants. 22. So far as the third contention of Sri; R. Pandey is concerned, again I do not think really anything material turns on it. It has not been very clearly shown to me that the statement in the lower appellate court's judgment that there was litigation between Sita Ram and the defendants is incorrect. However, even if such a minor inaccuracy be there, it cannot be said that the judgment of the lower appellate court is fit to be reversed on that ground. 23. Now, I come to the last contention raised by Shri R. Pandey, namely, that the civil courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit. This contention is based on Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. As is well-known, the said section has been amended from time to time. And is the latest Full Bench decision of our Court reported in Thakur Shyam Singh v. Indra Pal Singh, 1973 A.L.J. 193 a full history of the legislative amendments of this section has been set out. It is not necessary to unfold the entire historical background of such amendments for the purposes of deciding the contention raised on behalf of the defendants-appellants Section 331 originally stood as under: "331. (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II shall notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof. (2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal, shall lie from an order passed under any of the suits mentioned in column 3 of the schedule aforesaid. (2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal, shall lie from an order passed under any of the suits mentioned in column 3 of the schedule aforesaid. (3) An appeal shall lie from the final order passed by a court mentioned in column 4 in the proceedings mentioned in column 3 to the court or authority mentioned in column 5 thereof. (4) A second appeal shall lie from the final order passed in an appeal under sub-section (3) to the authority if any mentioned against it in column 6 of the Schedule aforesaid." 24. Certain amendments were effected by the U.P. Amending Act 37 of 1958. It is not necessary here to notice the amendments brought about by the said amendment. However, in 1961 by he U.P. Land Laws (Second Amendment) Act, XVIII of 1961, certain amendments were effected in Section 331 which are relevant. At the end of sub-section (1) the following words were added: "or of a suit, application or proceedings based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application." 25. And further an Explanation was added to sub-section (1) after the proviso (which had been added by the aforesaid Amendment Act, 37 of 1958). This Explanation reads as under: "Explanation: If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court, it is immaterial that the relief asked for from the civil court may not be identical to that which the revenue court could have granted." 26. The learned counsel's contention is that he entirety of the relief, which the plaintiff claimed in the civil suit, could be obtained by him in a declaratory, suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. His contention is that in view of the amendments effected in 1961 in Section 331, what became important was the substance of the relief and not the form in which it was claimed by the plaintiff. If the cause of action is such that the revenue court could grant the desired relief then it does not matter that the relief, which is being asked for in the civil suit, is not identically worded. If the cause of action is such that the revenue court could grant the desired relief then it does not matter that the relief, which is being asked for in the civil suit, is not identically worded. The learned counsel's submission is that it is not the injunction which is the real relief which is being claimed in the suit and also the declaration which is being ought for by the plaintiff in respect of his adoption is again not the real relief. What in reality he is seeking to get is a declaration that he is the Bhumidhar of the suit plots and, therefore it is really a suit of the nature contemplated under Section 229-B. Without entering into the controversy as to whether the entirety of the relief which the plaintiff claimed in the instant suit could or could not be granted by the revenue court in a suit under Section 229-B it has to be recalled that in Himmat Singh v. Channoo Lal, 1964 A.L.J. 994. it has been laid down that the amendments effected in 1961 in Section 331 did not affect the pending suits. It was observed: "It appears to me that Section 331, as originally enacted, created a bar against the cognizance by the said court of such suits only as were mentioned in column 3 of Schedule II of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the jurisdiction of the civil court in regard to suits which were not enumerated therein was not ousted either expressly or by implication. In suits belonging to the latter category and instituted before the amendment in Section 331 the nature of the suits and the reliefs claimed therein had to be taken as they were, for deciding whether they lay in the revenue court and whether the reliefs claimed could be obtained there. The section in its unamended form did not require or permit any enquiry into the true object of a suit, the real cause of action and the necessity or the superfluity of the particular relief claimed. The suit had to be taken as such and the question had to be asked whether such a suit could have been filed in the revenue court. The suit had to be taken as such and the question had to be asked whether such a suit could have been filed in the revenue court. If the answer was in the negative the suit was cognisable by the civil court and the jurisdiction of the civil court could not be said to be barred because a suit on the same cause of action could be filed in the revenue court in some other form by claiming some other relief or by omitting to claim the relief asked for." 27. In the instant case, the suit was filed in 1960, i.e. prior to the amendments effected in 1961 in Section 331 of the U.P. Act I of 1951. That is one aspect of the matter. However, there is another aspect also. In 1969 by the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, No. IV of 1969, sub-section (1-A) was inserted in Section 331. The said sub-section states: - "(1-A) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), an objection that a court mentioned in column 4 of Schedule II, or, as the case may be, a civil court, which had no jurisdiction with respect to the suit, application or proceedings, exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by any appellate or revisional court unless the objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 28. In the aforementioned Full Bench case of our Court in Thakur Dhyan Singh's case it has been laid down that "It debars a litigant from raising the question of jurisdiction either of the civil or of the revenue court in an appeal or revisional court unless the two conditions mentioned in it are satisfied." 29. The two conditions mentioned in the said sub-section are, firstly, that the objection to the court's jurisdiction must have been taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, secondly, there must have been a consequent failure of justice on account of the trial taking place in the wrong court. It has not been shown to me as to how the defendants-appellants were prejudiced by the trial of the suit in the civil court. It has not been shown to me as to how the defendants-appellants were prejudiced by the trial of the suit in the civil court. I am not satisfied that there has been a failure of justice on account of the trial in the civil court. Therefore, even though the first condition laid down in the said sub-section has been satisfied in this case, the second condition remains unfulfilled. Therefore, in the second appeal, I cannot entertain the objection which has been raised by the defendants-appellants on the question of jurisdiction. Sub-section (1-A), which has been inserted in Section 331, is an most identical with Section 11 of the U.P. Suits Valuations Act and Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act lays down as under: - "11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure (99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in Maharashtra, an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate court which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an Appellate Court unless- (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues were first framed and recorded, or in the lower Appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court, or (b) the Appellate Court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued, and that the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has pre-judicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (all of sub-section (1), but the Appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned in clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself, it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the Appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it, it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal, or frames and refers issues for trial, or requires additional evidence to be taken, it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of this section with respect to an Appellate Court shall, so far as they can be made applicable apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - in Maharashtra) or other enactment for the time being in force. (5) This section shall come into force on the first day of July, 1887." Section 21 of the C.P.C. lays down, as under: "21. No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice." 30. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, A.I.R 1954 S.C. 34. dealing with the said two provisions of law it has been laid down: "The principle that underlies Section 11, Suits Valuation Act, 1887, is that a decree passed by a Court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or under-valuation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on over-valuation or under-valuation, should be dealt, with under that section and not otherwise. The same principle has been adopted in Section 21, Civil P.C., with reference to the objections relating to territorial jurisdiction. The same principle has been adopted in Section 21, Civil P.C., with reference to the objections relating to territorial jurisdiction. The policy underlying Section 21 and Section 99, C.P.C. and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a Court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate Court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The words 'unless the over-valuation or under-valuation thereof has pre-judicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits' in Section 11 clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are liable to be interfered with in an appellate Court, not in all cases as is mentioned in the section results and that the prejudice contemplated by the section is something different from the fact of the appeal having been heard in a forum which would not have been competent to hear it on a correct valuation of the suit as ultimately determined. The prejudice on the merits contemplated by Section 11 must be directly attributable to over-valuation or under-valuation. An error in a finding of fact reached on a consideration of the evidence cannot possibly be said to have been caused by overvaluation or under-valuation. Mere errors in the conclusions on the points for determination cannot, therefore, be held to be prejudice within the meaning of that section. Further, an appellate Court has no power under Section 11, S.V. Act, to rehear the appeal and to consider whether the findings of fact recorded by the lower Court are correct." 31. The two cases which have been relied upon at the Bar, namely Parsottam v. Narottam, 1970 R.D. 216 and Suqrim v. Saraswati, 1971 R.D. 134 = 1970 A.L.J. 1145 do not seem to be relevant in deciding the controversy. 32. In the result, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.