ORDER This application arises out of an interim award made and published by the respondent No.1 on March 4, 1972 deciding therein that the respondent No. 2 the Development Officer under the petitioner was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and thus was entitled to present the application under S. 33A of the said Act before the respondent No. 1. 2. The petitioner at all material times had been carrying on General Insurance Business. For the purpose of its business the petitioner employs several kinds of workmen, to wit :-(a) Agents who introduced business and are remunerated by a commission on such business, (b) Development Officers, (c) Inspectors and (4) Organisers. The Development Officers select and introduce insurance agents and guide such agents in the matter of procuring business and also supervise the work of such agents. The remunerations of such Development Officers who are whole time employee of petitioner are fixed on monthly basis subject to the condition that the agents introduced by them should procure business earning such minimum amount of premium, as was fixed by the petitioner. 3. The respondent No.2 was appointed a Development Officer by the petitioner on probation for six months from the date of his joining and was liable to be confirmed on the determination of the merit of his performance. The duties of the respondent No.2 was to recruit, train and control agents in the area of his work, to service business under his jurisdiction and to perform other duties as might be entrusted by the petitioner. The respondent No. 2 was to procure through the agents working under him a premium income of at least Rs. 50,000/- per year on fire, marine, motor and miscellaneous business. The remuneration of the respondent No. 2 was liable to he reviewed periodically but not later than three months and was liable to be revised when so reviewed. The petitioner under the contract of employment had the right to review and alter the terms of appointment if the business position or services of the respondent No. 2 were found to be unsatisfactory. 4. The petitioner under the contract of employment had the right to review and alter the terms of appointment if the business position or services of the respondent No. 2 were found to be unsatisfactory. 4. By an order dated 6th February, 1971 bearing No. 4/43/70 L.R.I the Central Government referred the Industrial Disputes mentioned in the said order of reference a copy whereof is annexed at page 20 of the annexures to the petition between the workmen of the petitioner and petitioner, under S. 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such disputes were in regard to the service condition, scale of pay, dearness allowance, house rent allowance, travelling allowance and medical benefits as claimed by the India General Insurance Field Workers Association or behalf of the inter alia the development officers of the petitioner company. 5. On the ground that the premium income procured by the agents introduced by the respondent No. 1 had fallen below Rs. 50,000/- per annum, the petitioner company reduced total remuneration of the respondent No.2 to Rs. 260/- per month from Rs. 350/- per month On May 13, 1971 the Respondent No. 2 applied to the respondent No.1 under S. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, complaining or the contravention by the petitioner company of S. 33 of the Act by reducing the remuneration of the respondent No. 2 as mention d hereinabove. 6. When the pleadings were filed by the parties the petitioner submitted before the respondent No.1 that the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint made by the respondent No.2 in as much as the respondent No. 2 was not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This preliminary objection was taken by the petitioner company besides their plea on the merits of the question that there had been no contravention of the provisions of S. 33 of the said Act and that no valid reference had been pending before the respondent No. 1 under the above mentioned order dated the 6th February, 1971. 7. The preliminary objection was first tried by the respondent No 1. The respondent No. 2 was examined and one Anil Kanti Ghosh, Development Manager of the petitioner company also deposed before the respondent No.1. By an interim award dated March 4, 1972 mentioned hereinabove. The respondent No.1 overruled the preliminary objection of the petitioner. 7. The preliminary objection was first tried by the respondent No 1. The respondent No. 2 was examined and one Anil Kanti Ghosh, Development Manager of the petitioner company also deposed before the respondent No.1. By an interim award dated March 4, 1972 mentioned hereinabove. The respondent No.1 overruled the preliminary objection of the petitioner. By the instant application the petitioner company seeks to have the said interim award quashed and/or set aside by the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari on the ground that no proceeding had been pending before the respondent No. 1 in as much as the said reference made by the order dated February 6, 1971 was invalid, and that the Ss. 33 or 33A of the said Act does not apply to the second respondent who was not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. The question as to whether the respondent No 2 was a 'workman' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act was considered by the respondent No. 1, and on hearing the evidence adduced by the parties before it, it came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 2 was a workman employed under the petitioner company within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act 1947. 8 Mr. Ginwala appearing on behalf of the petitioner drew my attention to the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. etc. appellants v. The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association and & ors etc. in Civil Appeal No. 1477 and 1478 of 1970 before the Supreme Court ( AIR 1971 SC 922 ). Mr. Ginwala relied on the observation of the Supreme Court appearing at paragraph 5 of the said judgment at pages 927-28 of the said report. 9. The said observation were made in the context of a decision of the Tribunal in the case of May & Baker India (I) Ltd v. Their Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678 . Mr. Ginwala relied on the observation of the Supreme Court appearing at paragraph 5 of the said judgment at pages 927-28 of the said report. 9. The said observation were made in the context of a decision of the Tribunal in the case of May & Baker India (I) Ltd v. Their Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678 . The Supreme Court observed that the decision of the Tribunal that an employee in an industry was as workman under the Act because he was not employed in a supervisory capacity was a narrow view of the definition of the workman in S. 2(s) of the Act In the said case, the Supreme Court held that the said employee was not a workman inasmuch as he was not obliged to do under the contract of employment any clerical or manual work. But the said decision of the Supreme Court was based on the definition of the workman in S. 2(s) of the Act as it stood at the relevant time. The said S. 2(s) was subsequently amended in 1956 and now reads as follows: "Section 2(s) "Workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline Act, 1934; or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a person; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity: or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature," 10. Mr. Mr. Ginwalla further relied on the finding of the Supreme Court in the said case at the end of paragraph 36 of the said judgment appearing at p 942 of the said Report to the effect that the District Sales Representative was not a 'workman' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act inasmuch as his work was neither manual nor clerical nor technical nor supervisory. Mr. Ginwalla submitted that in the instant case the facts are almost similar to the case of District Sales Representative and the Development Officer cannot be said to be a 'workman' also within the meaning of the said Act. Mr. Ginwalla also relied on the case reported in AIR 1960 Madras p, 288 as well as AIR 1968 Supreme Court p. 1186, The State of Madhya Pradesh & ors. appellant v. Sardar D.K. Jadav). Mr. Ginwall on the basis of the said decision submitted that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was dependent upon a preliminary finding or-fact as to whether the respondent No.2 was a 'workman' or not. In such a case the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution was entitled to decide independently whether the finding of the Tribunal was correct or not. The said principle was enunciated by Farewell, L.J. in Re. v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, 1910(2) K.B. p. 859 at p. 879 to the following words, to wit: "The existence of the provisional list is a condition precedent to their jurisdiction to hear and determine and as the claimant is entitled to require them to hear and determine, they cannot refuse to take the steps necessary to give rise to such jurisdiction, if they do, their refusal may be called question in the High Court. No Tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide on the question of the existence of extent of such jurisdiction, such question is always subject to review by the High Court, which does not permit the inferior tribunal either to usurp, a jurisdiction which it does not possess, whether at all or to the extent claimed, or to refuse to exercise a jurisdiction which it has and ought to exercise, Subjection in this respect to the High Court is a necessary and inseparable incident to all tribunals of limited jurisdiction; for, the existence of the limit necessitates an authority to determine and enforce if it is a contradiction in terms to create a tribunal with limited jurisdiction and unlimited power to determine such limit at its own will and pleasure such a tribunal would be autocratic, not limited and it is immaterial whether the decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact, a Court with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is the ward of Chepe". The principle was restated in White and Collins v. Minister of Health, 1939(2) K.B. 838. 11. The next else relied on by Mr. Ginwalla was the case of Baldev Singh Indian Explosives Ltd. & ors, 76 CWN 342. In the said case a Division Bench of this Court presided over by P.B. Mukharji, C.J. observed that where the jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended upon the existence of certain facts the writ Court was entitled to weigh and appraise evidence to find out if the facts existed to enable the Tribunal to assume jurisdiction in the matter, Thus, the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was entitled to weigh and appraise the evidence adduced before the Tribunal by the parties to determine whether the jurisdictional fact was rightly decided by the Tribunal For if. the Tribunal went wrong on a jurisdictional question, even if the same be only questions of fact, the High Court was entitled to set aside the decision of the Tribunal if it came to a different conclusion independently on the basis of the evidence adduced before the Tribunal In the said case however, it should be noted that although the appellant was doing supervisory work of a technical nature and the powers vested in him under the, contract of employment required him mainly to do managerial work, the appellant was held to come within the clause (iv) of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Dispu1es Act and thus, was held not to be 'workman' within the definition of that term in the said Act. 12. In AIR 1967 SC 408 (Andhra Scientific Company Ltd Appellant v. A. Seshagiri Rao & anr) however it was held that when a Labour Court had, on a consideration of the evidence, come to the conclusion on the basis of the functions that were actually being performed by an employee that he came within the definition of “workman”, in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the High Court would not interfere under Article 226 except in cases where there was a clear error on the face of the record. The observations of the Supreme Court on this point appear in paragraph 7 of the said judgment appearing at p.410 of the said Report. In the case reported in AIR 1967 SC 948 , Hindusthan Antibiotics Ltd. v. The Workman and vice versa it was observed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 37 of the said judgment appearing at p. 963 of the said Report, inter alia, as follows: “The definition of ‘workmen’ in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act excludes thereform any person who is employed mainly in a managerial and/or administrative capacity or who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per mensem, he would be a workman on the ground that his work was predominantly managerial and administrative in nature. It has come to that conclusion on a construction of the various duties allotted to the Foreman. The finding is of fact and therefore, must be accepted. 13. 500/- per mensem, he would be a workman on the ground that his work was predominantly managerial and administrative in nature. It has come to that conclusion on a construction of the various duties allotted to the Foreman. The finding is of fact and therefore, must be accepted. 13. In AIR 1967 SC 678 (supra) the Supreme Court held that the main work of an employee was to canvass sales as representatives and the employee was not a ‘workman’ under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the amendment of the said section in 1956. The criterion for finding whether an employee was a workman or not was the nature of the work that the employee was required to do under the contract of employment. Of the same effect also is the decision in AIR 1961 Madras 194 P.A.S. Press Trust, petitioner v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Madras & anr, respondents. 14. The question whether or not an employee is a “workman” is dependent upon the nature of the work done by him. The designation is not a sure guide in the matter. The main either on is whether the work of the employee is mainly clerical or manual. The exercise of the directional or supervisory powers by the employee is not conclusive. That is a question of fact and will depend upon the nature of the industry, type of work in which he is engaged, the organisationl set up of the particular unit of the industry and like factors. In prem Sagar v. Standerd Vaccuam Oil Co. Madras, (1964) 1 LLJ 47 the Supreme Court laid down certain tests although no exhaustive, in deciding the question as to whether the appellant was a ‘workman’ 15. The relevant factors for arriving at a decision on the question as to whether an employee was a “workman” or not, according to the Supreme Court are:- (1) Whether the employee has power to operate on the Bank account. (2) Could he make payment to third parties enter into an agreement with him on behalf of the employer? (3) Was he entitled to represent the employer to the world at large in regard to the dealings of the employer with strangers? (4) Had he had authority to supervise the: work of the clerks employed in the establishment? (5) Had he had control and charge of the correspondence? (3) Was he entitled to represent the employer to the world at large in regard to the dealings of the employer with strangers? (4) Had he had authority to supervise the: work of the clerks employed in the establishment? (5) Had he had control and charge of the correspondence? (6) Could he make commitment on behalf of the employer? (7) Could he grant leave to the members of the staff and hold disciplinary proceeding against them? (8) Had he the power to appoint members of the staff or punish them? According to the Supreme Court the aforesaid tests and similar other test were relevant in determining the quest on as to whether an employee was a workman or was employee in a managerial capacity. 16. In Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. v. Seshariri Rao & Anr (1961) 2 LLJ 117 , the High Court in deciding whether Seshagiri Rao was 'Workman' or not considered the functions allotted to him as Stores Manager and observed as follows :- to wit "We are of opinion that even on the assumption that the functions assigned to and exercised by the respondent No. 1 as Stores Manager are not entirely lacking in the elements of initiative, command and control, they are essentially supervisory in character. Under the office order dated December 31, 1949 he had to be in charge of the maintenance of general stores packing and despatching, stock, account and effective check over them and in charge of stock requisitions. His functions being supervisory in character and in as much as he was on the material date not receiving a salary of more than Rs. 500/-, respondent No. 2 would be a 'workman' within the meaning of proviso (iv) of S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But even assuming that the functions assigned to and exercised by him as Stores Manager were not entirely lacking in the elements of initiative command and control these functions were essentially supervisory in character. 17. As mentioned hereinbefore the respondent No. 2 examined himself before the respondent No. 1. According to him his duty was to select agents and recommended them to the petitioner. He also trained agents and told them how to contact parties and convince them of the of insurance. He was to inspect the performance of work by agents. Agents also used to take his help when a party proposed to insure. According to him his duty was to select agents and recommended them to the petitioner. He also trained agents and told them how to contact parties and convince them of the of insurance. He was to inspect the performance of work by agents. Agents also used to take his help when a party proposed to insure. When an agent reported that he could not tackle a party the deponent would go and deal with the case. When a party filed a claim with the Insurance Company the deponent had to service the same. By "Service" the deponent meant that he was to advise the party or the procedure for filing a claim and after the party filed the claim the deponent would accompany the surveyor visiting the locality to a survey and assess the loss or damage. 18. When a claim is small the deponent would assess the claim. The development manager supervise the work of the Development Officers while the Development Officers supervise the work of the agent under his control. Anil Kanti Ghosh the Development Manger of the Insurance Company since February 1, 1969 was called by the Insurance Company before the respondent No. 1. According to him the condition of service in regard to the employee as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment was se out in he letter of appointment issued to Respondent No. 2. According to this deponent, Development Officers have to attend their office every day during office hours. The Development Officers may have to visit the house of the agent and supervise the business which an agent proposes for introduction to the company. 19. The volume of the activity of the agent according to the deponent was to be controlled by the Development Officer by supervising their work. It appears from the evidence adduced before the respondent No. 1 that the respondent No. 2 was employed mainly in a supervisory capacity to guide, control and co-ordinate the work of agents under his charge with the object of ensuring procurement of business to the company yielding an annual premium income of at least Rs. 50,000/-. From the evidence on record, it appears, that the main function of the Development Officer is to select a band of agents to work under him to procure business for the company, train them up and supervise and control their work. 50,000/-. From the evidence on record, it appears, that the main function of the Development Officer is to select a band of agents to work under him to procure business for the company, train them up and supervise and control their work. It is also one of the functions of Development Officer to service the claims if any of the insured introduced to the company by the agent under his charge. Incidental to such work may also fall on the Development Officer the work of persuading a not too willing party to insure whom the agent can not tackle. 20. Thus the functions of Development Officers can not be said to be promoting sales of Insurance Policy and in that respect the function is different from those of districts sales representatives of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. Ltd. as noted in the above-mentioned case reported in AIR 1971 SC 922 . Admittedly the respondent No. 2’s remuneration was less than Rs. 500/-. 12. For the above-mentioned reasons I am of the opinion that Sachindra Nath Bose was and is a "workman" as defined in S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The impugned interim award can not in my opinion said to be tainted with any error apparent on the face of the records. This application therefore must fail, and is dismissed The Rule nisi is discharged. Each party however, shall pay and bear his or its costs of and incidental to this application. Rule discharged.