JUDGMENT : This application in revision is directed against the Sub-divisional Magistrate's ORDER :dated 19.7.1971 in case no. 58(0) of 1971 : Tr. 1195 of 1971. The prayer is to quash it. This ORDER :reads thus: "Perused the prosecution report submitted by Supply Inspector and forwarded by the A.D.S.O. Cog. taken under Section 7 E.C. Act under Clause 5(i) of Bihar Licensing ORDER :1963. The case is transferred to Shri R.C. Ram M.M. 1st Class for disposal." It is not disputed that in the transferee court further proceedings in the case have remained stayed consequent to the stay ORDER :of this court dated 6.9.1971. 2. The relevant facts are as follows. The two accused, Bishwanath Prasad and Moosa Prasad, who are said to be brothers, are wholesale dealer of kerosene oil at Sasaram holding licence no. 22/71 of 1971. They run this business as M/s Bishwanath Prasad Moosa Prasad, Sasaram. On 21.6.1971 the complainant Manjul Kumar who is a Supply Inspector at Sasaram, made a surprise check of this firm and found that in the cash memos that they had issued to the three retailers, viz. Bachalal Choudhary, 'Fakirchand Sah and Krishna Bihari Upadhaya in respect of their purchases of 28 tins of kerosene oil the prices charged were more than the quantity actually supplied. This action of their which showed their intentional and fraudulent issue of wrong receipts to those purchasers was in clear violation of condition no. 7 of their licence, and in doing so they made themselves liable to punishment in law on this subject. 3. The Supply Inspector submitted a report in the matter to the Additional District Supply Officer who forwarded the same to the Sub-divisional Magistrate for necessary action. The latter, in his turn, took cognizance of the offence against these persons as per the aforesaid ORDER :dated 19.7.1971 and it is this ORDER :which is sought to be annulled in this revision. 4. Mr. Gorakh Nath Singh, appearing for the petitioners, has assailed the cognizance ORDER :on two grounds; first, the prosecution report as submitted by the complainant in this case purports to be under the Bihar Kerosene Licensing ORDER :, 1963. The Sub-divisional Magistrate also in the impugned cognizance ORDER :has categorised the alleged offence to be under Clause 5(1) of this Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963. The Sub-divisional Magistrate also in the impugned cognizance ORDER :has categorised the alleged offence to be under Clause 5(1) of this Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963. This 1963 ORDER :, however, had been superseded by the Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1965 (issued under Notification No. 12173-SC dated 17th July, 1965). In that situation, according to counsel, the Magistrate's cognizance of such an offence was obviously wrong because there was no such law in existence at the relevant time, i.e., 21.6.1971, when the offence is alleged to have been committed. This glaring defect in the impugned ORDER :is manifestly fatal. Secondly, since this contravention is alleged to be at the hands of a firm, it is imperative on the part of the prosecution to disclose in the complaint petition in what way these accused persons as partners of the firm were responsible for it, and since this has not been done the prosecution against them in view of the provision of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, read with the relevant Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing ORDER :is invalid and the cognizance so taken against them for the same must be set aside. To support this second contention, he has relied upon (1). Tulsi Das Kanoria and others V. State (1970 B.L.J.R. 969, (2) Chhangi Ram Agarwalla and others V. State of Bihar (1971 B.L.J.R. 254) and (3) R. N. Dutta V. State 1971 B.L.J.R. 1005). 5. In (4) R.P. Kapur V. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866) the Supreme Court on the point of quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 561 A of the Code of Criminal Procedure has observed, inherent jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised to quash a proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the same proceeding at an interlocutory stage. One instance cited as an illustration by the Supreme Court in this case where this power could and should be exercised is where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged as in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises. Though in this Supreme Court the question related to the quashing under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court whereas in the instant case the quashing is claimed under Court's revisional power, I think, these very principles should serve as guidelines to resolve the present controversy. 6. In the complaint petition the allegations made are that in course of surprise check of this shop under the proprietorship of these accused persons, the complainant (Supply Inspector) found that though the price of the kerosene oil which had been sold to the three retailers (named above) had been charged in full, but the contents of kerosene oil in those tins were far less in quantity compared to the price charged. This action on the part of the accused persons amounted to their intentionally and fraudulently issuing incorrect cash memos concerning this deal which clearly contravened condition no. 7 of their whole-sale licence. To support the correctness of these allegations names of five witnesses besides the complainant have been cited with indication that others will be given during trial. 7. Under the Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1963, issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, a wholesale dealer's licence under that ORDER :was to be issued in Form III. Under condition no.7 of this licence the licensee was required to issue to every purchaser of kerosene a correct receipt or invoice, as the case may be, giving his own name, trading name, address and licence number, as well as the name, address and licence number of the customer, the date of sale, the quantity sold, the rate at which sold and the total price charged. This condition also required the wholesale licensee to keep a duplicate of the receipt/invoice to be available for inspection by the licensing authority or any other officer authorised by him or the State Government in this behalf. Under Clause 5 of this 1963 ORDER :, the grant of this licence was to be subject to the conditions specified therein. This condition also required the wholesale licensee to keep a duplicate of the receipt/invoice to be available for inspection by the licensing authority or any other officer authorised by him or the State Government in this behalf. Under Clause 5 of this 1963 ORDER :, the grant of this licence was to be subject to the conditions specified therein. This 1963 Licensing ORDER :was later superseded by the aforesaid Bihar Kerosene Dealers' Licensing ORDER :, 1965. Under this 1965 ORDER :the aforesaid provisions regarding the grant of licence to wholesaler in the scheduled form subject to the conditions specified therein were fully retained. According to this 1965 ORDER :this licence is required to be issued to wholesaler in Form V and condition no. 8 of this Form V is verbatim reproduction of the aforesaid condition no.7 in Form III of 1963 ORDER :. Learned petitioners counsel has given out that the petitioners' wholesale licence no. 22/71 of 1971 has been issued under this 1965 ORDER :in the prescribed form V. 8. On these facts it can be seen that under condition no.8 of the aforesaid licence no. 22/71 they are mandated to issue to every purchaser of kerosene a correct receipt containing the prescribed details including the quantity sold, rate at which sold and the total price charged. A violation of this condition on the part of the wholesale dealer is an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 9. In the light of above position of law on this point, the mere fact that in the complaint petition the complainant made mention of the relevant provision of the above 1963 ORDER :which, as shown above, had been replaced by the above 1965 ORDER :and the Sub-divisional Magistrate also referred to that 1963 ORDER :while taking cognizance in the case cannot, I think, make this cognizance vitiated and void, a view canvassed for the petitioners. It was not incumbent for the complainant to mention the provisions of law under which the act alleged was an offence. It was not incumbent for the complainant to mention the provisions of law under which the act alleged was an offence. All that he had to state in that behalf was to state the facts constituting the offence so, if the complainant took upon himself to mention the provision of law of his own conception which is found to be wrong in view of that law having been already superseded, that cannot, I think, be made a valid ground to ask this Court to quash the cognizance taken on that complaint. Similarly, the mere reference of that superseded 1963 ORDER :by the Magistrate in his cognizance ORDER :, which might be due to his lack of knowledge of the latest statutory ORDER :on the subject i.e., 1965 ORDER :, could not introduce any illegality on that account in the cognizance to make it invalid. From what has been said above it would be manifest that at the time of this alleged occurrence there did exist a law in the shape of this 1965 ORDER :read with the relevant provisions of the Essential Commodities Act which made it an offence. In such a situation, its mere wrong reference in the complaint and consequently in the cognizance could not, I think, make that cognizance invalid and void. This must be distinguished from a case of no law on the subject at that time in which case there would have been sense in the argument that there being no law to make this matter an offence the Magistrate could not take cognizance, as above, because even if there was such an incident it did not come within the mischief of law to be punishable. 10. In the light of above facts, I have, therefore, no doubt in my mind that notwithstanding such wrong reference in the cognizance ORDER :of the law on the subject it did not introduce any illegality in it. At the worst this is to be treated as a case of mistaken reference on Magistrate's part either due to inadvertence or lack of knowledge of the correct law on the point. In either case, it is not so material. 11. As regards petitioners' second contention, I find myself equally unable to agree to it. At the worst this is to be treated as a case of mistaken reference on Magistrate's part either due to inadvertence or lack of knowledge of the correct law on the point. In either case, it is not so material. 11. As regards petitioners' second contention, I find myself equally unable to agree to it. Reading the allegation as made in the complaint petition in the light of the law in this behalf, as mentioned above, it cannot be said that even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety they do not constitute the offence alleged. On the facts pleaded in the petition of complaint they would appear to make out a prima facie offence in the matter. The question whether the case so alleged is true or false is a matter of subsequent consideration during trial on the materials brought before court. At this preliminary stage the only question to be considered is whether on their basis any prima facie case is made out and as already observed, it is done so. 12. When on these allegations a prima facie offence is made out, I find no sufficient justification to think in terms of quashing the cognizance so taken merely on the ground that there is no specific assertion in the complaint that these accused are in charge and responsible for the conduct of the business of this firm. Regard being had to the fact that they are. its proprietors and its licence stands in their names they can well be taken to be prima facie in charge and responsible for its business. It is to be noticed that in the revision petition there seems no such case on their behalf that they are its sleeping partners or dummy proprietors whereas actually its business is conducted by some one else and he is responsible for it. If and when any such contention is raised on their side during trial to secure acquittal the trial court will necessarily have to go into it on merit and take decision as warranted. Its determination will, however, be a question of fact which cannot be taken up and decided at this early stage. If and when any such contention is raised on their side during trial to secure acquittal the trial court will necessarily have to go into it on merit and take decision as warranted. Its determination will, however, be a question of fact which cannot be taken up and decided at this early stage. Object of this Section 10(1) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, appears to be enabling authorising, in the case of contravention by a company which includes a firm, prosecution of every person who was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business. As I have already observed, on the face of it these accused as licensee proprietors of this firm have to be regarded as in charge and responsible for its business unless proved otherwise. 13. In views of the above discussions, I am not convinced of the soundness of this argument of the petitioners that since the complaint lacks any specific statement that these accused, even though they are proprietors and partners of this firm, are in charge and not prima facie liable for the alleged offence and so the cognizance against them is basically bad and must be struck down. 14. The above authorities cited by the petitioners, would not appear to be quite helpful to have this quashing done. In two of them (1971 B.L.J.R. 1005 and 1970 B.L.J.R. 969) the prosecution was for nonpayment of the price of sugarcane supplied which they were liable to pay as the producer of the sugar factory, namely, "occupier". That nonpayment on their part was alleged to be a violation of the relevant provision of the Sugarcane (Central) ORDER :s as issued in that behalf under the Essential Commodities Act. In the first, prosecution related to the Managing Directors and Manager of that Sugar Factory (Sitalpore Sugar Works Ltd.). In the other, the complaint was against the Director and the Central Manager of concerned factory (North Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd.) As a perusal of these decisions will show, the reasons which had generally weighed with the learned Judges to quash the cognizance therein were that they were not alleged to be directly in charge of those payments and that those Directors resided at places far away from the factory premises. In the case of the Manager's prosecution of the Sitalpore Sugar Works, since his petition was withdrawn his cognizance was allowed to stand. 15. In the third case, i.e. (3) 1971 B.L.J.R. 254, 7 persons who were all described as "Parties of M/s Kanhaiyalal Shankarlal wholesale foodgrains dealer of Jhaira" were being prosecuted for detection of irregularities in their accounts during check of its stock register of foodgrains for a certain period. This was a complaint regarding violation of a certain condition of the licence as granted under the Foodgrains Dealers' Licensing ORDER :concerned. Learned Judge quashed the cognizance in that case for the reasons that in the complaint petition simply the names of partners of the first were mentioned without showing that a certain partner was the managing partner or manager or entrusted with the business of the first and was responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business, on that omission it was held that all the partners could not be proceeded against for any such violation of the rules. According to petitioners counsel, this ruling, which is in all fours with the present case, must apply to it and applying that principle the instant prosecution must be set aside. It is, however, difficult to uphold this stand. In the instant case as already observed, the two accused have been described in the complaint petition to be the proprietors of the firm. There is also nothing in the revision petition to assert that they are not incharge or responsible for the conduct of this business and it is somebody else on their behalf who is in its charge and conducts it. In the revision petition the grievance made in this behalf is that in the complaint petition it has not been disclosed who is the managing partner of this firm and who deals with it; so also the complaint has not been filed against the managing partner. One of the two accused, Moosa Prasad, has been alleged in the revision to be a minor boy of 13 years. This is, however, a question of fact to be decided on the evidence for which the appropriate stage is the trial. One of the two accused, Moosa Prasad, has been alleged in the revision to be a minor boy of 13 years. This is, however, a question of fact to be decided on the evidence for which the appropriate stage is the trial. As I have already noted, the question as to whether these accused as the proprietors and partners of this firm are in charge or responsible for the conduct of this business or not, if and when raised during trial, will require decision on merit at that stage. At present, they would prima facie appear to be associated with the conduct of business as its proprietors and partners. 16. In view of what I have said above, I am unable to discover any illegality in the cognizance so taken on the complaint which, as stated above, on the allegations made, make out prima facie offence. In such a circumstance, there seems no valid reason to interfere with the impugned cognizance and the subsequent proceeding. I am therefore unable to find much substance in this application. It is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed