Judgment This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Keshav Pandey, a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Bihar Police Force, is directed against an order, dated the 17th August 1972 (annexure "6" to the writ application), passed by the Inspector-General of Police, Bihar (respondent no.2) and against the order, dated the 11th September, 1974 (annexure "9") passed in appeal by the State, of Bihar (respondent no. 1) and communicated to the petitioner by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Patna. 2. In order to appreciate the point involved in this application, it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. The petitioner was appointed as a literate Constable on the 4th August, 1937, to which post he was confirmed some time in the year 1938. He was promoted as Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police in the year 1939 to which post he was confirmed in the year 1942. He was promoted as a Sub-Inspector of Police in 1947 and was confirmed as such in the year 1951. On the 9th December, 1964, he was placed under suspension due to 14 charges levelled against him. A true copy of those charges has been marked as annexure "1" to the writ application. This led to an enquiry against the petitioner. The enquiring officer submitted his report on the 5th January, 1968 (Vide annexure "2"). Out of the 14 charges, the enquiring officer found the petitioner guilty only of charge no.8 (2), whereupon the Superintendent of Police, Gaya, who was the punishing authority, imposed a punishment of one ,"Black Mark" against the petitioner by his order, dated the 9th April, 1968 (Vide annexure "3"). Consequently, the petitioner was restored to his original post of Sub-Inspector and the suspension order passed against him was withdrawn with one 'Black Mark" as mentioned above. The petitioner has stated in his application, that his pay for the period 9th December, 1964 to 9th April, 1968 was initially withheld. On the 4th November, 1971, the petitioner was asked by the then Additional Inspector General of Police, Shree S.Q. Rizvi, to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service in relation to charge nos. 5 and 10 (Vide annexure "4"). The petitioner showed cause on the 19th January, 1972. On the 4th November, 1971, the petitioner was asked by the then Additional Inspector General of Police, Shree S.Q. Rizvi, to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service in relation to charge nos. 5 and 10 (Vide annexure "4"). The petitioner showed cause on the 19th January, 1972. Thereafter, on the 17th April, 1972, the petitioner again received a notice to show cause (annexure "5") issued by Shree R.N. Roy, the then Inspector-General of Police, in respect of charge no. 6. In this case also the petitioner submitted his show cause on the 22nd May, 1972. Subsequently, on the 17th August, 1972, Shree R.N. Roy passed one of the impugned orders (annexure "6") for compulsory retirement of the petitioner. On the 27th August, 1972, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Chief Minister, true copy of the memorandum of appeal is annexure "7" to the writ application. On the 19th September, 1972, an order was passed in the appeal for stay of the operation of the order contained in annexure "6", A copy of the stay order is annexure "8" to the writ application. The appeal was, however, dismissed by an order passed on the 11th September, 1974 (Vide annexure "9"). 3. On behalf of the respondents a counter-affidavit was filed on the 21st November, 1974 supporting the impugned orders. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has assailed the impugned orders and has raised the following points for consideration by this Court :- (i) The exercise of the power by the then Inspector General of Police under rule 853 of the Bihar and Orissa Police Manual is beyond his jurisdiction and is also arbitrary; (ii) the third proviso to rule 853 is ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as it does not contain any guideline; (iii) the Inspector-General has not given any reasons as to why he had differed from the findings of the enquiring officer as well as the punishing authority, the Superintendent of Police, Gaya in the impugned order contained in annexure "6" and (iv) the appellate order contained in annexure "9" is had because it is not a speaking order. 5. In our opinion, it would be necessary, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, to deal with point no. 5. In our opinion, it would be necessary, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, to deal with point no. (1) alone Learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to rule 824 of the Bihar and Orissa Police "Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"), which describes and enumerates the departmental punishments. It will be noticed that in the said rule 'compulsory retirement' does not find place. No doubt, there are 'dismissal' and 'removal' but specially compulsory retirement is not mentioned therein. In our view, 'dismissal' and 'removal' will not include, even by implication, 'compulsory retirement'. In the present case, by reference to the impugned orders (annexures "6" and "9"), it is apparent that particularly the order contained in annexure "6" was passed by way of punishment. Rule 853 of the Manual, under which the impugned order contained in annexure "6" is purported to have been passed, under the third proviso, says- . "provided further that the Inspector-General may call for the proceeding in any case even when no appeal lies and pass such order as he may deem fit. A Deputy Inspector-General may call for and refer any proceedings to the Inspector-General for orders." Under this proviso, therefore, the order could have been passed by the Inspector-General only in consonance with the punishments contemplated under rule 824 of the Manual. If 'compulsory retirement' is not one of the punishments enumerated in rule 824, the Inspector-General could not have passed the impugned order, nor he could have exercised his jurisdiction under the third provision to rule 853. Mr. K.P. Verma, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, contended that 'compulsory retirement' simpliciter is not a punishment, and in the instant case also this order was not passed by way of punishment. He drew our attention to the words "and pass such order as he may deem fit" occurring in the third proviso to rule 853. He, therefore, submitted that the Inspector-General had ample jurisdiction to pass the order according to his discretion on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case. In our opinion, this, submission of the learned Government Advocate cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the third proviso has to be read along with the provisions contained in rule 824 of Manual. In our opinion, this, submission of the learned Government Advocate cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the third proviso has to be read along with the provisions contained in rule 824 of Manual. The discretion has to be exercised by the Inspector-General within the limitation prescribed by the rule-making authorities under rule 824; he could not have gone beyond that. Moreover, in the instant case, we are of the opinion that the impugned order contained in annexure "6" is obviously by way of punishment. 6. In the result, the application and the impugned orders contained in annexures "6" and "9" to the writ application are quashed. In the circumstances, however, there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.