Judgement PATHAK, C. J.:- By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has challenged the order of the Executive Committee of the Khasi Hills District Council, approved by the District Council, by which the petitioner has been removed from the office of Syiem of Langrin Syiemship. 2. This case has a chequered career. The facts of the case are as follows:- Petitioner U. Doley Singh was nominated as Syiem of Langrin Syiemship and took over charge of the Syiemship on 2-8-1948. By an application dated 28-3-1955 U. Zibon Roy Myntri and others filed a petition before the Chief Executive Member, District Council, making some allegations of misappropriation of money of the Syiemship against the petitioner. Similarly, one U Ron Singh filed another application on 9-5-1956 bringing in some charges against the petitioner. The Executive Committee of the District Council made an enquiry into those charges levelled against the petitioner through Mr. Pyngrope, the then Assistant Revenue Officer who held an elaborate enquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner and submitted a report to the executive Committee on 12-6-1957 stating that the allegations made against the petitioner were baseless and maliciously engineered to oust the petitioner from Syiemship. The Secretary, Executive Committee, informed the petitioner on 18-5-1958 that the District Council had decided to hold a referendum to ascertain the views of the people as to whether they wanted the petitioner as the Syiem of the Elaka or not. The petitioner moved the High Court in Civil Rule No. 14 of 1959 against the order of holding the referendum. But the High Court dismissed the application and, accordingly the referendum was held in Langrin Syiemship on 12-3-1960 and on 16-3-1960 the petitioner was asked to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of Syiem of Langrin Syiemship. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 18-4-1960 and the Executive Committee of the District Council submitted a report on 29-7-1960 to the District Council recommending removal of the petitioner. The District Council endorsed the action of the Executive Committee for removal of the petitioner and the Executive Committee by its Purwana dated 25-8-1960 asked the petitioner to appear before the Executive Committee on 16-9-1960. The District Council endorsed the action of the Executive Committee for removal of the petitioner and the Executive Committee by its Purwana dated 25-8-1960 asked the petitioner to appear before the Executive Committee on 16-9-1960. The petitioner submitted his explanation before the Executive Committee of the District Council on 16-9-1960 and the Executive Member Incharge of Rural Administration, District Council, passed the order on 16-9-1960 removing the petitioner from the office. The petitioner then filed an application before the High Court against that order of removal and the High Court by its order dated 27-4-1961 in Civil Rule No. 131 of 1960 (Assam) quashed the order of removal on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, leaving the Executive Committee at liberty to take appropriate measures afresh. Thereafter a referendum was held and in that referendum, it is found from Annexure `A to the petition, the petitioner got 220 votes whereas 150 votes were against the petitioner. One U Marily Singh Thongai submitted an application on 28-4-1967 for removal of the petitioner before the Executive Committee which rejected the petition by order dated 11-9-1967. Thereafter on 24-2-1969 U Marily Singh Thongai along with others filed another application making some allegations against the petitioner. The petitioner was asked to show cause against that allegation by Memo dated 27-3-1969 and the petitioner filed his explanation on 16-4-1969. Thereafter the Executive Committee registered a case against the petitioner, and heard him. The Chief Executive Member passed orders for holding a referendum to ascertain the wishes of the people as to whether they wanted the petitioner as the Syiem. Against this order of the Chief Executive Member the petitioner again moved the High Court which rejected the petition. Thereafter on 21-12-1970 the Executive Committee issued a notice for holding a referendum by counting of heads on 21-1-1971 at village Phlangiloin. The petitioner objected to the holding of the referendum at village Phlangiloin and prayed for two other centres for counting of heads. But the Executive Committee rejected his petition without giving him any hearing as alleged. Accordingly the referendum was held on 21-1-1971. Before holding the referendum the Executive Committee prepared a list of voters which was finally accepted. The petitioner objected to the holding of the referendum at village Phlangiloin and prayed for two other centres for counting of heads. But the Executive Committee rejected his petition without giving him any hearing as alleged. Accordingly the referendum was held on 21-1-1971. Before holding the referendum the Executive Committee prepared a list of voters which was finally accepted. It is found that in the referendum held altogether 493 persons took part in voting out of which 10 were found to have no right of voting, 210 persons voted in favour of the petitioner and 283 persons voted against him. Out of the 210 votes cast in favour of the petitioner, 9 votes were rejected and out of the 283 votes cast against the petitioner, 1 vote was rejected Thus 201 persons voted for the petitioner and 282 persons voted against him. It may be stated here that the electoral roll prepared by the Executive Committee and finally accepted after disposing of the objections, shows the total number of electors as 645. Thereafter a notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be removed from the office of Syiemship. The petitioner showed cause and the Executive Committee came to the decision that the petitioner should be removed from his office and the matter was placed before the District Council. The District Council, however, did not accept the recommendation of the Executive Committee and after long deliberation remanded the matter of removal of the petitioner to the Executive Committee for reconsideration in the light of the discussion in the meeting of the District Council. Thereafter the Executive Committee reconsidered the matter and decided removal of the petitioner from the office of Syiemship and submitted the case for approval before the District Council which approved the decision of the Executive Committee removing the petitioner from the office of Syiem of Langrin Syiemship by resolution dated 22-11-1971. In this writ petition the said order of removal dated 22-11-1971 has been challenged. 3. At this stage it will be convenient to notice the relevant provisions for appointment and removal of a Syiem. 4. Section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, as amended by the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) (Amendment) Act 1968, reads as follows:- "3. 4. Section 3 of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, as amended by the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) (Amendment) Act 1968, reads as follows:- "3. Nomination and appointment of Chiefs and Headmen:- (1) Subject to the approval of the District Council, the Executive Committee may make Rules governing the nomination and appointment of Chiefs and Headmen: Provided that separate Rules may be made for each Elaka. (2) Pending making of such Rules all nominations and appointment of Chiefs and Headmen shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be in accordance with the existing customs prevailing in the Elaka concerned and duly approved by the Executive Committee, the decision of which is final." 5. The learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, submits that no rules have been framed under Section 3 of the Act and that being the position the appointment will be regulated by the existing custom prevalent in the Elaka concerned and duly approved by the Executive Committee. 6. The relevant provision of Section 6 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act of 1968, reads as follows:- "6. Removal and Suspension of Chiefs.- The Chief may be removed from office or suspended by the Executive Committee if in its opinion- (a) xxxx xxxx or (i) he has lost the confidence of the majority of the Electors or of the people of the Eiaka; xxx Provided that every such case shall be placed before the Council in its next Session: Provided further that no Chief shall be removed from office or punished with suspension unless he is given an opportunity of being heard: xxxxxxxx" In the instant case, it is common case that the petitioner has been removed under Section 6 (i) of the Act. The question that arises for determination is whether the petitioner has lost the confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka. 7. The present case deals with the Syiemship of Langrin. At page 74 of the Book "The Khasis" by Major P. R. T. Gurdon, we find the following passage: "In Langrin there are, as in Maharam and Nobosohpoh, two main branches of the Siem family, i. e. the "Black" and the "White" Siems. 7. The present case deals with the Syiemship of Langrin. At page 74 of the Book "The Khasis" by Major P. R. T. Gurdon, we find the following passage: "In Langrin there are, as in Maharam and Nobosohpoh, two main branches of the Siem family, i. e. the "Black" and the "White" Siems. Here there is no special electoral body; all the adults of the State have the right to vote at the election of a Siem." At page 69 of the same book, we find the following passage: "A further step towards the recognition of the public will in the nomination of a Siem has been the introduction of popular elections, at which all the adult males vote. Such popular elections were very greatly due to the views held by Colonel Bivar, who was Deputy Commissioner of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills from 1865 to 1877. These elections have been, in many States, an innovation which is hardly in accord with public sentiment, and in many cases the voters have done no more than confirm the selection of a special electoral body. It is, however, clear that the idea of popular elections is not one with which the people are unfamiliar, e. g. in Langrin State, where all the adult males customarily vote at an election of a Siem." 8. In the Report on succession to Siemships in the Khasi States by D. Herbert, Deputy Commissioner, Khasi and Jaintia Hills, we find the discussion of Langrin State at page 41. At page 43 we find the following passage: "The custom of the Langrin State in appointing the Siems is different from that of other Khasi States. The State Durbar consists of all the adult males of the State, and they are all entitled to vote in the election of their Siems. The result is that, on a vacancy occurring in the Siemship, a general election should be held." 9. From the above discussion it is found that the Siem of Langrin Syiemship is elected by the adult males of the Langrin State. The result is that, on a vacancy occurring in the Siemship, a general election should be held." 9. From the above discussion it is found that the Siem of Langrin Syiemship is elected by the adult males of the Langrin State. That is the custom of election of the Syiem of Langrin Syiemship and under Section 3 of the Act the election of the Syiem of Langrin Syiemship is to be held according to this custom and this custom is also found to have been approved by the Executive Committee, since it has prepared an electoral roll before the referendum in question was held. 10. Mr. D.C. Goswami, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that on a proper interpretation of S.6 (i) of the Act in the instant case the petitioner cannot be said to have lost the confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka and that being the position, the impugned order of the Executive Committee and the District Council approving the same being against the provisions of Section 6 (i) of the Act or being not in accordance with the provisions of section 6 (i), is liable to be quashed. The submission of the learned counsel is that in the referendum 282 persons voted against the petitioner for his removal, but the total number of electors is admittedly 645, as would appear from the electoral roll prepared and accepted by the Executive Committee. 282 votes, the learned counsel submits, do not represent the majority of the total votes numbering 645. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that when clause (i) of Section 6 speaks of losing confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka, it means losing confidence of the majority of the total electors or total number of people of the Elaka entitled to vote. In the instant case, the Executive Committee has prepared a list of eligible voters and the number is 645 and that being the position, the petitioner has not lost the confidence of the majority of the total electors when 282 votes only have cast their votes expressing lack of confidence in the petitioner. 11. Mr. In the instant case, the Executive Committee has prepared a list of eligible voters and the number is 645 and that being the position, the petitioner has not lost the confidence of the majority of the total electors when 282 votes only have cast their votes expressing lack of confidence in the petitioner. 11. Mr. N.M. Lahiri, the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya, appearing on behalf of the respondents, submits on the other hand, that losing confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka means losing confidence of the majority of the electors present in the meeting or Durbar called for the purpose. In support of his submission the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to a decision of this Court in Edwingson Bareh v. Henry Cotton, reported in AIR 1965 Assam and Nagaland 49, wherein Rule 22 (1) of the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Council) Rules, 1951 has been interpreted. Rule 22 (1) of the said Rules reads as follows:- "22 (1) The Executive Committee shall be collectively responsible to the District Council and may be removed on a vote of no confidence passed by a majority of the members of the District Council at a meeting specially convened for the purpose." This Court in its decision in AIR 1965 Assam and Nagaland 49 (supra) has interpreted the expression "the majority of the members of the District Council" as meaning the majority of the total members of the District Council. It has been observed in that decision as follows:- "The contention of Dr. Medhi for the opposite parties is that the no confidence motion could be passed by the majority of the members present at the meeting. The question centres round the interpretation of rule 22 (1) of the Rules. If the interpretation put by the counsel for the opposite parties is accepted, then the words `a majority of the members present will have to be inserted in place of the words `a majority of the members of the District Council in the rule. The language in our opinion, is clear and unless the resolution is passed by a majority of the members of the District Council, it cannot be said that it has been validly passed. Dr. The language in our opinion, is clear and unless the resolution is passed by a majority of the members of the District Council, it cannot be said that it has been validly passed. Dr. Medhi contends that if the framers of the rule intended that it has to be passed by a majority of the members of the District Council, then the language would have been as "the majority of the total number of members of the District Council". As we have already indicated, the use of the words "a majority of the members of the District Council" clearly implies that it is not to be passed by a simple majority of the members present at the meeting. In the rules, it would appear that wherever the framers of the rules have intended that a resolution should be passed by the majority or certain percentage of the members present, they have used that expression clearly such as in rule No. 71 (2), which provides that if the Chairman is of opinion that the motion is in order, he shall read the motion to the Council and shall request those members who are in favour of leave being granted to rise in their places and, if not less one fourth of the members present rise accordingly, the Chairman shall, intimate that leave is granted and that the motion will be taken on such day, not being more than two days and not less than twenty four hours from the time at which leave is asked for as he may appoint. Reliance is then placed on rule 25 which reads as follows: "Save as otherwise provided in the Constitution and in these rules, all questions at any sitting of a District Council shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the members present and voting other than the Chairman, or person acting as such...... " This clause only says that a simple majority of the members present can pass a resolution only if it is not otherwise provided in the Constitution and in these rules. In our opinion rule 22 (1) deals with passing of a no confidence resolution against the Executive Committee and Rule 25 is subject to the provision of the rule 22 (1). In rule 25 also the framers of the rules have used the words "a majority of the votes of the members present and voting". In our opinion rule 22 (1) deals with passing of a no confidence resolution against the Executive Committee and Rule 25 is subject to the provision of the rule 22 (1). In rule 25 also the framers of the rules have used the words "a majority of the votes of the members present and voting". Those words are absent in rule 22 (1)". 12. The above decision of this Court was given in Civil Rule No. 177 of 1963 on 5-2-1964 : (AIR 1965 Assam 49). The United Khasi Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act was enacted for the first time in 1959. Thereafter in 1969 the Act was amended by the Amendment Act of 1968 (Act I of 1969). In the original Act of 1959, Clause (b) of Section 6 was as follows:- "6. Removal and suspension of Chiefs:- The Chief may be removed from office or suspended by the Executive Committee if in its opinion:- xxx xxxx (b) he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or the people of his Elaka." In the Amendment Act of 1968, clause (b) of Section 6 has been described as clause (i) and the same language has been retained. So, when this amendment in 1969 was made the District Council was quite aware of the interpretation of this Court given to Rule 22 (1) of the Rules in 1964. Since the language of clause (i) of the amended Section 6 is exactly same as that of clause (b) of Section 6 of the original Act, it can be safely presumed that the intention of the legislature is that the expression `losing of the confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka means losing of the confidence of the majority of the total electors or the total people of the Elaka entitled to vote. Following the reasons given in this courts decision reported in AIR 1965 Assam and Nagaland 49 (supra), we hold that in order to remove or suspend a Chief under clause (i) of Section 6 of the Act, as it was in 1969, it must be established that Chief has lost the confidence of the majority of the total electors or of the total people of the Elaka entitled to vote. In the instant case, the electors of Langrin Syiemship are by customary law the adult males of the Langrin State and following that custom an electoral roll has been prepared by the Executive Committee itself including all the adult males of the Langrin State, and after inviting objections and disposal thereof, the Executive Committee has accepted that electoral roll, wherein we find the total number of electors as 645. Admittedly, at the referendum held only 282 persons voted against the petitioner who was the Syiem. 13. Under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act a Syiem is appointed. It is submitted by the learned Advocate General that no rules have been framed under Section 4. Considering the provisions of election and appointment of the Chiefs and Headmen in the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, as amended, it is found that this appointment is a mixture of nomination or election by the electors and appointment by the Executive Committee subject to approval of the District Council. So, the removal of the Chief is like recalling an elected member by the electors and removal of an officer from the office under the District Council. That being so, we are inclined to hold that the expression `losing the confidence of the majority of the electors or of the people of the Elaka in clause (i) of Section 6 of the Act means losing of the confidence of the total electors or of the total people of the Elaka entitled to vote. Hence we find that in the instant case the petitioner cannot be said to have lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka entitled to vote, as contemplated under clause (i) of Section 6 which may invite his removal from the office. So, the order passed by the Executive Committee, which has been approved by the District Council, is not in conformity with clause (i) of Section 6 of the Act. 14. So, the order passed by the Executive Committee, which has been approved by the District Council, is not in conformity with clause (i) of Section 6 of the Act. 14. The learned Advocate General also submits that under Section 6 of the Act a Chief may be removed from the office or suspended by the Executive Committee if in its opinion the Chief had lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka, and, therefore, it is a matter of subjective opinion formed by the Executive Committee and approved by the District Council. It is submitted that on ultimate analysis the removal of a Chief depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the District Council and, therefore, the action based on the subjective satisfaction of the District Council is not reviewable by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission the learned Advocate General has referred to an unreported decision of this Court in Civil Rule No. 407 of 1961 decided on 18-5-1962. We have perused the judgment in Civil Rule No. 407 of 1961, wherein the following observations appear: "In the present case, the District Council has formed an opinion on the facts before it that the petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of his appointment and has further come to the conclusion that he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors. The opinion of the Executive Committee is not examinable by this Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The only limitation on the powers of the (Chief) Executive Committee is that before the Chief is removed he should be given an opportunity of being heard." 15. This case is, however, distinguishable on facts. The subjective opinion of the Executive Committee and the action in pursuance thereof for removal and suspension of a Chief must be formed and taken on the basis of the provisions laid down in Section 6 itself of the Act. If the subjective opinion cannot be said to have been formed on any ground or grounds enumerated under Section 6 of the Act such a subjective opinion will be, in our opinion, without jurisdiction and as such invalid and liable to be quashed in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the subjective opinion cannot be said to have been formed on any ground or grounds enumerated under Section 6 of the Act such a subjective opinion will be, in our opinion, without jurisdiction and as such invalid and liable to be quashed in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. The jurisdiction for removal and suspension of a Chief arises out of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act and if any action for removal and suspension is taken without complying with the provisions of Section 6, that action will be clearly reviewable in a Writ Petition. 16. In Civil Rule No. 407 of 1961 (Assam) this Court found that the District Council had formed the opinion on the facts before it that the petitioner violated the terms and conditions of his appointment, which is clause (a) of Section 6 at the relevant time. It was not disputed in that case that the Chief violated some terms and conditions of his appointment. In the instant case, the opinion of the Executive Committee has been formed on the basis that the Chief has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka. But this opinion has been formed on a wrong interpretation of clause (i) of Section 6 of the Act. From the language of Section 6 it is quite clear that the subjective opinion that can be formed by the Executive Committee, must comply with the requirements of Section 6, otherwise the opinion or the action by the Executive Committee in pursuance thereof and the approval accorded by the District Council cannot be sustained in law. If the Executive Committee arrives at the subjective opinion, without any materials to form it or on erroneous interpretation of Section 6, such an opinion, even though stated to be subjective, cannot be sustained in law and certainly may be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. 17. The learned Advocate General also presses into service the decision of this Court in Civil Rule No. 739 of 1969 (U Span Suchiang v. Jowai Autonomous District Council) reported in AIR 1971 Assam and Nagaland, 109 and refers to paragraph 6 of the report wherein the following passage occurs: "Since section 6 has not been challenged, we will assume the section to be valid and operative in the case of the petitioner. This section therefore empowers the Executive Committee to take action for removal and suspension of a Chief under certain conditions. The Executive Committee has to form its opinion. How the Executive Committee will arrive at its opinion is not provided in the Act. It will be therefore open to the Executive Committee to devise its own procedure to ascertain the public opinion about the loss of confidence in the Dolloi. Such a discretion cannot be fettered in any way unless it can be shown to be against any provisions of law or custom or palpably and flagrantly so unjust that it may perhaps be termed mala fide to call for interference." The learned Advocate General submits that there is no allegation of mala fide in the instant case and relying on the decision of this Court in the above case, he submits that the discretion of the Executive Committee and, for the matter of that, of the District Council cannot be fettered by any outside consideration. We are, however, unable to accept this submission on the basis of the observation of this Court in the above case. The Executive Committee may devise its own procedure to ascertain the public opinion about losing of the confidence of majority of the electors or people of the Elaka entitled to vote by the Chief. There is no dispute about that. The public opinion may be ascertained either by holding referendum or in any other manner that may be found suitable by the Executive Committee. But in ascertaining the majority, the majority of the total electors or of the total people of the Elaka entitled to vote must be taken into consideration. Otherwise, that will go against the provisions of Section 6 of the Act itself. We find that the above decision of this Court also does not assist the respondents. 18. In the result, we set aside the impugned order of removal of the petitioner from the office of Syiem of Langrin Syiemship. 19. The petition is accordingly allowed and the Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. D. M. SEN, J.:- I agree. Petition allowed.