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1975 DIGILAW 101 (KAR)

STATE OF MYSORE v. P. SHANKARANARAYANA RAO

1975-07-23

K.J.SHETTY

body1975
( 1 ) THIS revision petition under Sec. 115 of the CPC raises a short but an important question, i. e. , whether the Dist Judge who is constituted as an appellate Officer under S. 10 of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of unauthorised occupants) Act, 1961 (called shortly 'the Act'), acts as Court or persona designata. ( 2 ) RESPONDENT 1 is occupying certain public premises at Cubbon Park, bangalore, in which he is running a restaurant. The Headquarters Asst to the Deputy Commr of Bangalore, after enquiry, under the Act, made an order under S. 5 (l) directing the occupant to vacate the said premises 'within 45 days from the date of his order. Against that order, respondent 1 appealed before the Dist Judge under S. 10 of the Act. The Dist judge has allow'd the appeal on the principal ground that the Headquarters asst to the Deputy Commr was not validly appointed, and therefore not a competent, authority to make the order of eviction. ( 3 ) THE, State has challenged the appellate order in this revision petition under S. 115 of the CPC, the maintainability of which is th"1 preliminary question for consideration. ( 4 ) SEC. 115 confers rcvisional power on the High Court. It provides: from the language of the section it is plain that the High Court has no power of revision under the section unless the case has been decided by a " Court subordinate to the High Court. It is therefore necessary to see whether the Dist Judge exercising the powers under S. 10 of the Act is a court subordinate to the High Court. Subordination means not judicial subordination within the purview of Art. 227 of the Constn, but subordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Civil Procedure Code. Section 10 of the Act so far as it is reliant provides : " 10. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the competent officer made in respect of any public premises u s. 5 or S ,7 to an appellate Officer who shall be the Dist Judge having jurisdiction over the area. " (Underlining italics is by me) the section does not provide for preferring an appeal to the Dist Court or Dist Judge, It states that the appeal lies to an appellate Officer who shall be the Dist Judge. " (Underlining italics is by me) the section does not provide for preferring an appeal to the Dist Court or Dist Judge, It states that the appeal lies to an appellate Officer who shall be the Dist Judge. Whether such a Dist Judge while disposing of the appeal is required to function as 'court', or as 'persona de signal a' is the question for decision. ( 5 ) IT is common knowledge that the words 'court' and 'judge' are frequently used in the judgment or orders of the Court and sometimes in the statutes as synonymous and convertible terms. But such terms are not, howler, strictly synonymous. The Judge alone does not necessarily constitute a Court, though he is an indispensible part of the Court, ( 6 ) THE expression 'persona designata' is defined by P. G. Osborn in his law Dictionary, 4th Edn page 253 as : a person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character" the above definition has be,en accepted as correct by the Supreme court in Central Talkies Ltd v. Dwarka Prasad, AIR. 1961 SC. 606, and Ram Chandra v. State of U. P. , AIR. 1966 SC. 1888. Further, in Central talkie's case (1) the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following statement of Schwabe, CJ, in parthasarathi Naidu v. Koreswara Rao. , ILR. 47 Mad. 369, " 'persona designata means persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as 'judge' ' in view of this meaning, it may not be necessary to refer to many other cases cited at th Bar for determining the question raised before me. However, the principles stated by the Supreme Court in Virindar Kumar satyawadi v. State of Punjab, AIR. 1956 SC, 153, shall be born in mind. It was observed at page 157 as follows :" It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declar the rights of parties in definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from quasijudicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court. "it is clear from the above decision, that when the Ad refers to the word 'judge', the legislative intent in using that word should be gathered from a consideration of the object and purpose of the Act and should not be carried away by the use of mere designation. ( 7 ) WITH these principles in mind, let me now examine the provisions of the Act. The Act was passed to provide; for the eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises and for certain incidental matters. S. 11 E incorporated by the Karnataka. Act 32 of 1969 excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises or the recovery of the arrears of rent or damages payable thereon. The Act thus excludes. the, jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the eviction of an unauthorised occupant of any public promises. The Legislature never wanted an elaborate enquiry for evicting the unauthorised occupants. The procedure provided for their eviction under Ss. 4 and 5 is summary. Against such order of eviction made by a competent authority, the appeal lies under S. 10 to an appellate Officer who shall be the Dist Judge. The intention of indicating the term ' an appellate officer' in S. 10 appears to me, is that the Dist Judge must act as an appellate Officer with limited jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal in the manner set out by the provisions of s. 10 itself. It means, he cannot exercise the general power of the District court. The intention of indicating the term ' an appellate officer' in S. 10 appears to me, is that the Dist Judge must act as an appellate Officer with limited jurisdiction to dispose of the appeal in the manner set out by the provisions of s. 10 itself. It means, he cannot exercise the general power of the District court. S. 11 provides that the appellate order shall be final and shall not be called into question in any other application or execution proceedings. The finality attached to the order of the Dist Judge is a further indication that the Judge must act only as a persona designata, and not as Court. ( 8 ) IN the result, I hold that the revision petition is not maintainable and is accordingly dismissed without an order for costs. --- *** --- .