JUDGMENT : J.B. Mehta, J. The petitioner Transport Manager of the respondent Corporation challenges in this petition the order of the Administrator, dated May 2, 1974 removing the petitioner from service under section 50 (3) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', and in consequence, directing forfeiture of the benefits of gratuity and provident fund assigned profits. The petitioner joined service on April 4, 1947, and after 10 years he was made the Transport Manager on September 1, 1957. In view of the serious charges which were found against the petitioner on a prima facie fact finding enquiry by the Municipal Commissioner, be was suspended pending the enquiry by the order, dated September 23, 1971, pursuant to the Corporation's resolution, dated April 20, 1971 to institute enquiry against the petitioner through a senior judicial officer. This suspension order was challenged before this Court in Special C.A. No. 1718 of 1971 by the petitioner and that petition was dismissed by upholding the suspension order by the order, dated November 16/17, 1972 by a Division Bench consisting of Bhagwati C.J. (as he then was and D.A. Desai J. In that decision it was in terms pointed out that section 50(3) of the Act was a special provision which dealt with the subject of removal as a measure of penalty of the Transport Manager when the statutory minimum of at least half the number of the whole number of councillors voted on that proposal, in contrast with section 56 which dealt with various punishments set out in section 56(2) and which can be imposed on a bare majority of the corporators present and voting at the meeting. This was a special provision only for the removal of this high officer by the requisite half number of the whole number of councillors. Therefore, it was in terms held that looking to this specific provision under section 56(3), a removal from office was the only penalty that can be imposed on the Transport Manager and he could not be inflicted small pin-pricks like censures and other punishments and, therefore, this high post of the Transport Manager was outside the purview of section 56 because of the specific exclusion from that clause of this Transport Manager. In that decision it was further pointed out, while upholding this suspension pending enquiry, that the Corporation had passed this resolution after being satisfied on the fact-finding preliminary enquiry by the Municipal Commissioner himself that there was a prima facie case for instituting this departmental cum-direct enquiry by a senior judicial officer after making all relevant considerations so as to inspire confidence in this enquiry. Thereafter, the retired Chief Justice Shri N.M. Miabhoy was appointed as the enquiry officer in pursuance to this resolution on September 29, 1972. The charge-sheet which was first served on the petitioner on September 30, 1972, was revised after the resolution of the Corporation or January 23, 1973 as per Annexure A. After the completion of the said enquiry which had taken almost 105 sittings a report had been submitted by the enquiry officer on April 29, 1974 to the Administrator because meanwhile the Corporation having been superseded on March 11, 1974, the Administrator was appointed under Section 452 of the Act. The Administrator, after going through the report and having considered the findings of the enquiry officer and having agreed with same and having accepted the said findings which held the petitioner guilty on all the five charges levelled against the petitioner, passed the impugned removal order against him under section 50(3) with immediate effect for the several acts of misconduct mentioned in the aforesaid revised charge-sheet at Annexure A, which were acts of misconduct, neglect of and incapacity for the duties of the office of the Transport Manager. The Administrator further directed that a true copy of the findings recorded by the enquiry officer be sent to the petitioner and which was accordingly served on him. Two further orders were also passed in view of the aforesaid findings directing that no gratuity shall be payable to the petitioner and that in view of the gross acts of neglect of duty and misconduct of which the petitioner was found guilty, the assigned prof its of the provident fund viz, the contribution of the Corporation had been forfeited and it was directed to be paid to the welfare Fund of the Municipal servants. It is this impugned order which has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition. 2. It is this impugned order which has been challenged by the petitioner in this petition. 2. The revised charge-sheet at Annexure A which mentioned five charges categorically states that the petitioner was required to show cause why he should not be dismissed/removed from service on those acts of misconduct, neglect or incapacity in the discharge of his duties of the office of Transport Manager. A list of enclosures of various documents relied against the petitioner for founding the aforesaid charges had been annexed. It was further stated in the said charge-sheet that in order to afford the petitioner an adequate and reasonable opportunity to defend himself at the departmental enquiry Shri Miabhoy had been appointed as enquiry officer and the petitioner was called upon to submit his explanation before the said enquiry officer and that the enquiry would be held by him and the petitioner was asked to lead whatever defence he wanted to lead by availing of that opportunity before the said enquiry officer. Finally, it was stated in the show cause notice as under:- "After receipt of the report of the Inquiry officer, the Municipal Corporation will take necessary decision under section 50 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (Bombay Act LIX of 1949)." 3. In the exhaustive report which has been submitted, the conclusions of the enquiry officer have been summarised in para (L) sub-para (122), and on all these findings, the five charges mentioned the in revised charge-sheet, were held to have been proved in para (LII) sub-para (139). Thereafter in para (LIII) the enquiry officer has mentioned the points that may he considered for imposition of penalty asunder: - "(140) The mandate given to me by the Corporation does not authorise me to record a finding as to what penalty should be proposed to be imposed on Shukla, if all or any of the charges is proved. Therefore, I do not propose to record any finding in this regard. It will be for the Corporation to decide as to what penalty is merited on the basis of its own findings on the various points on which I have recorded my own findings in the case. Therefore, I do not propose to record any finding in this regard. It will be for the Corporation to decide as to what penalty is merited on the basis of its own findings on the various points on which I have recorded my own findings in the case. However, in order that the Corporation's task may be facilitated in reaching its conclusions in this regard also, I propose to make a few observations in regard to the conduct of Shukla at all relevant times i.e. (i) when the crucial events took place on 18-12-70 (ii) when the furore about the issuance of the certificates took place (iii) immediately after such furore took place, and (iv) during the course of the subsequent inquiries held in regard to the above events. (141) In my opinion, the conduct of Shukla at all the above stages must be regarded to be highly reprehensible and most unbecoming of a highly placed officer like the T. M. The only redeeming feature is that there is neither allegation, nor any proof that the above certificates were issued for filthy lucre or for any other form of illegal gratification. However, in my opinion, this does not necessarily mitigate the conduct of issuing certificates containing false recitals, certificates which would have enabled the Ruby to get steel materials worth several lacs issued in its favour and which, in fact, did enable it to get some such materials released for a purpose, which would serve Ruby's private ends and which would not conduce to the benefit of any public undertaking. However, whilst the conduct in issuing the essentiality certificates itself is most reprehensible, the conduct exhibited by Shukla, after the furore, is still more reprehensible and even criminal. On the evidence, there is no doubt that, after the furore, Shukla, instead of owning his misconduct in the issuance of the essentiality certificates, went on a criminal spree to create promiscuously false documentary evidence and making false endorsements on documents already on record and destroying some of them. The documents so created are Exs. 12, 13 and 14, 9, 10 and 11 and those tampered with are various parts of Ex. 15. The documents so created are Exs. 12, 13 and 14, 9, 10 and 11 and those tampered with are various parts of Ex. 15. Not only this, but Shukla in fabricating documents and tampering with them did not show any compunction or suffer form any qualms of conscience in enlishing the aid of a highly placed officer like Trivedi, and even stooped so low as to take the aid of a junior clerk like Modi. Not resting content with this, Shukla, after the commencement of the present inquiry, did not hesitate to make promiscuous allegations against Thacker, Chandrashekhar, and Aswani. Under the circumstances, in my opinion, a light view cannot be taken about the charges proved against Shukla. The dignity and intergrity of a public office must be scrupulously maintained and whilst it would be salutary principle not to hold any charge against any public or statutory authority to be proved, unless the same has been inquired into with the utmost care and caution, in my opinion, once a charge is so proved, and the charge or charges established are on such serious counts as aforesaid, the extreme penalty which the superior public authority of the officer can give must be imposed on the delinquent. In the present case, that penalty would be removal from the office of the T.M." 4. No evince has been made as regards the enquiry which was held by Shri Miabhoy and the clear challenge of Mr. Daru has been offered only on two grounds - (1) That the petitioner was not given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice in the context with such public office ; (2) In any event, the two consequential orders forfeiting gratuity and the assigned profits of the provident fund were clearly without jurisdiction and without any opportunity of hearing. The relevant provision in section 50(3) of the Act runs as under :- "The Transport Manager shall be removable at any time from office for misconduct or for neglect of or incapacity for duties of his office on the votes of not less than one half of the whole number of councillors." As earlier pointed out, this special provision for the penalty of removal of the Transport Manager from his office for the stated grounds of misconduct, neglect of or incapacity for the duties of his office on the requisite number of votes of not less than one half of the whole number of councillors is silent and does not provide for the procedure which has to be followed and to that extent it is in sharp contrast with the general provision in section 56 (3) from which the Transport Manager had been excluded, as held in the earlier decision of this Court. Section 56(3), however, provides, that no officer or servant shall be reduced to a lower post or removed or dismissed from service under this section unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such reduction, removal or dismissal. Even though this special provision in section 50(3) is silent as to the relevant procedure to be followed, that provision will have to be read consistently with the principles of natural justice and the relevant procedure of a fair enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice would have to be implied, as per the settled legal position, before passing such drastic order of removal from office of this high statutory officer like the Transport Manager who has to be appointed under section 40. In Boolchand v. Kurukshetra University, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 292, even though there was no express provision in the Kurukshetra University Act and/or statute thereunder which dealt with the termination of the tenure of the office of the Vice Chancellor, it was held that the absence of a provision setting up procedure for determining employment of the Vice Chancellor in the Act or the statute or ordinance did not lead to the inference that the tenure of that office was not liable to be determined even if that person was physically decrepit, mentally infirm or grossly immoral. At page 397 it was in terms held that once appointment was made of such a statutory officer under the Act, the decision of the appointing authority to determine the appointment must be based only upon the result of the enquiry held in a manner consistent with the basic concept of justice and fair play. The relevant observations in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269 at page 1271 had been followed by holding that the very nature of such power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person carried the duty to act judicially, which was implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice were ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person was made, the order was a nullity. That was the basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcended the significance of a decision in any particular case. It was, therefore, held that the power to appoint Vice Chancellor had its source in the University Act ; investment of that power carried with it the power to determine the employment but the power was coupled with duty. The power was not to be exercised arbitrarily but only for a good cause i. e. in the interests of the University and only when it was found, after due enquiry held in the manner consistent with the rules of natural justice, that the holder of the office was unfit to continue as Vice Chancellor. The classic decision in Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 A. C. 40 at page 65 was in terms followed by pointing out that such a type of case was the third class contemplated by Lord Reid in which class of case there was an unbroken line of authority to the effect that an officer who had a right to a statutory office could not lawfully be dismissed without first telling him what was alleged against him and hearing his defence or the explanation. Therefore, it was held that the Vice Chancellor's statutory office under that Act could not be terminated without first informing him of what was alleged against him and without giving him an opportunity to make his defence or the explanation. Therefore, it was held that the Vice Chancellor's statutory office under that Act could not be terminated without first informing him of what was alleged against him and without giving him an opportunity to make his defence or the explanation. Even in Jagdish Pande v. Vice Chancellor, Bihar University, A.I.R. 1968 S. C. 353 at page 357 where section 4 provided that the Chancellor would pass the order terminating appointment of a teacher on the recommendation of the Commission and there was no provision made for hearing the teacher before passing such order, their Lordships held that the Commission before making recommendation would have to hear the teacher concerned according to the rules of natural justice. It was in terms held that this was implicit in the section, which provides that the Commission had to make recommendation to the Chancellor on which the Chancellor would pass the necessary orders. Therefore, if the order was passed under section 4 even though on the recommendation of the Commission, but without complying with the principles of natural justice, the order would be bad and would be liable to be struck down. It was in terms held that there was no difficulty in reading section 4 as requiring that the Commission before it makes its recommendation must hear the teacher concerned according to the principles of natural justice because reading the section in that way, which was the only way in which it could be read, the section could be upheld and would not be struck down as violating equality guarantee enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. It should also be borne in mind that the identical question was raised in that decision on the score of violation of the principles of natural justice and their Lordships in terms held at page 358 that, if the Commission had given a due hearing alter giving the show cause notice, the ultimate order passed by the Vice-Chancellor could not be said to suffer from any defect of breach of the principles of natural justice. Even the principles of natural justice, which are to be followed in a fair enquiry in the context of such disciplinary action in accordance with the well-settled practice, are clearly laid down in the decision of Union of India v. T. R. Verma, A.I.R. 1957 S. C. 882 at page 885, where it was held as under : - "Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them." If these relevant principles are followed in a disciplinary enquiry their Lordships held that there would be no violation of the principles of natural justice. Even in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 SC. 150, which has almost obliterated the dividing line between the administrative power and the quasi-judicial power, at page 156, it is in terms pointed out that the aim of the rules of natural justice was to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules could operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made, that is to say, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice had undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past only two rules were recognised but in course of time many more subsidiary rules came to be added to these rules. Till very recently, it was the opinion of the Courts that, unless the authority concerned was required by law under which it functioned to act judicially, there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The two rules included in the past were namely, (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause, and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing-audi-alterem partem. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that was that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that was that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. It was pointed out that an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry might have more far-teaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. Their Lordships in terms followed the ratio in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198, and it was pointed out that the rules of natural justice were not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry was held and the constitution of the Tribunal or the body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint was made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened, the Court had to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just of decision on the facts of that case. At page 154 it was pointed out that the concept of the rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the state were not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence was nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. It is, therefore, in view of this settled line of decisions that we would have to apply the relevant principles of natural justice in the context of this statutory provision in section 50 (3) of the Act, although it is silent as to the relevant procedure which has to be followed before removing the transport Manager. 5. The context which has to be borne in mind is clearly of removal as a penal measure as held in the earlier decision of this Court which would clearly stigmatise the officer concerned by putting a blot on his record and which would involve serious consequences of loss of this statutory office. 5. The context which has to be borne in mind is clearly of removal as a penal measure as held in the earlier decision of this Court which would clearly stigmatise the officer concerned by putting a blot on his record and which would involve serious consequences of loss of this statutory office. Looking to the gravity of this decision which has to be reached under section 50(3), the very nature of this power would make it implicit that the duty will have to be exercised justly and fairly and in accordance with the principles of natural justice only after a fair enquiry, in accordance with those four principles of natural justice which were enunciated in Varma's case. It has also to be borne in mind that this is a Corporation employment of an authority which falls within the definition of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution and it has, therefore, equality guarantee of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. After the decision in Sirsi Municipality v. C.K.F. Tellies, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 855 at page 857 it is now well-settled that the employment of such local authorities created under the statute where there is such implication of public employment has to be distinguished from private employment as in pure cases of master and servant because in such cases where a State or public authority dismisses an employee in violation of the mandatory procedural requirements of the statute or principles of natural justice or on grounds which are not sanctioned or supported by the statute, the Courts would exercise jurisdiction to declare the act of dismissal to be a nullity. At page 859 it was pointed out that this statutory provision or the principles of natural justice would limit the power of dismissal and, therefore, when the limit is disregarded the dismissal would have to be held to be invalid and that is the material difference between such employment under statutory bodies with such implication of public employment and private employment. It was also pointed out that where there is a statutory status or the statute spelt out security of status, where the statutory post would be terminable only on the specified ground, the dismissal would be clearly equally ultra vires. It was also pointed out that where there is a statutory status or the statute spelt out security of status, where the statutory post would be terminable only on the specified ground, the dismissal would be clearly equally ultra vires. In the concurring judgment of His Lordship Beg J. it was in terms held at page 861 that the principles applicable to the relation of a private master and servant, unregulated by statute, could not apply similarly to the case of a public statutory body exercising powers of punishment fettered or limited by statute and relevant rules of procedure express or implied because of the principles of natural justice in such cases, and the decision in violation of these statutory limitations or fetters would be legally void decision. 6. The principle of giving an opportunity before imposing punishment was pointed out to be a principle of universal jurisprudence and, therefore, it was held at page 862 in the concurring judgment of his Lordship Beg J. that in such cases of third category in the classic decision of Ridge v. Baldwin, of dismissal from office where there is something against the man, the decision must be arrived at quasi-judicially about a wrong done by a servant. That elementary and basic procedural safeguard flowed from an implied rule of natural justice. Even in the recent decision in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331, at page 1341, it has been in terms held as per the consistent trend of decision that whenever a man's rights were affected by decision taken under statutory powers, the Court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice and compliance with rules and regulations imposed by statute. In the context of such authority which it would be a state within the meaning of Article 12, it was in terms held that such a decision in violation of the implied or express statutory fetters or of the principles of natural justice, would be invalid with the result that the servant would continue unaffected thereby in service. In the context of such authority which it would be a state within the meaning of Article 12, it was in terms held that such a decision in violation of the implied or express statutory fetters or of the principles of natural justice, would be invalid with the result that the servant would continue unaffected thereby in service. In view of this settled legal position, the decision of removal of such a statutory officer of the Corporation would attract all the remedies of administrative law and, therefore, in order that such a decision can be challenged by the remedy of writ petition at administrative law it would have to be a reasoned order and implication of a reasoned order would have to be made consistently with the administrative law. Therefore, the implication as per the settled legal position would be that such a decision of removal from office by way of a penal measure would have to be taken after an enquiry as per the aforesaid principles of natural justice and after passing a reasoned order, which would be capable of being challenged by a writ petition by way of remedy under the administrative law. 7. Mr. Daru, however, wanted to equate this statutory officer or such cases where there was such implication of public employment with Government service and he wanted to press in aid the doctrine of the wider reasonable opportunity principle, as envisaged in the constitutional protection of the earlier section 240(3) or Article 311(2) of the Constitution as laid down in Lal's Case, 1948 P.C. 121 at page 126 or in Khemchand's case, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 300. The reasonable opportunity which must be implied in accordance with the principles of natural justice, according to Mr. The reasonable opportunity which must be implied in accordance with the principles of natural justice, according to Mr. Daru must be of the same amplitude as has to be given to comply with the constitutional mandate of Article 311(2) and therefore, the second show cause notice is a must at the stage when the authority reaches the tentative conclusion of guilt and proposes this particular punishment because it is only at that stage that the punishment which was hypothetical on the grounds which would be established at the enquiry becomes an actual reality and it is only at that stage that the competent authority under section 50(3) really opposes to exercise this statutory power under section 50(3) of removing the Transport Manager for the various statutory grounds proved against him. Mr. Daru relied in support on the very context of this provision where the power was given to a corporate body consisting of more than 100 councillors, who would have to take the assistance and aid of some enquiry agency for arriving at just and fair decision. In such a context as the councillors would be ordinary laymen, they would have to act on the report and recommendations of the enquiry officer, and if they are influenced by such a report by taking into account the assessment and recommendation as to penalty made by the enquiry officer, after wading through the entire evidence led before him, the only relevant opportunity that the delinquent would have would be at the stage when the enquiry officer reaches a tentative conclusion that the charges are established against the delinquent. Therefore, it is only at that stage that not only a copy of the report must be supplied to the delinquent but he must be given a specific show cause notice and it is only when such a proposal is made that the delinquent would be having the real opportunity to present his case before the real deciding authority viz. the Corporation Councillors meeting for this specific purpose. Therefore, even though there may be a full enquiry by following all those principles of natural justice enumerated in Varma's case before the enquiry officer, Mr. the Corporation Councillors meeting for this specific purpose. Therefore, even though there may be a full enquiry by following all those principles of natural justice enumerated in Varma's case before the enquiry officer, Mr. Daru argued that the opportunity would never be a reasonable opportunity unless at the stage when the findings of misconduct arrived at by the enquiry officer are tentatively accepted and removal is proposed, thus real opportunity to show cause is given to the delinquent, by supplying him with a copy of the report in question which is the prejudicial material sought to be relied upon and used against the delinquent by the Councillors of the Corporation or the Administrator in the present case. 8. Finally, Mr. Daru also invoked the settled principle in G. Nageshwar Rao v. A.P.B.R. Corporation, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 308 at page 327 that if one person heard and another decided, the personal hearing becomes an empty formality. Such a divided responsibility was destructive of the concept of judicial hearing as it defeated the very object of personal hearing. Personal hearing enabled the authority concerned to watch the demeanour of the witnesses and clear up his doubts during the course of the arguments, and the party appearing to persuade the authority by personal argument to accept his point of view and, therefore, if hearing was given by the enquiry officer, unless the deciding authority gave a right to be heard to the delinquent whether by personal hearing or at least by a representation so as to enable him to present his case, the procedure would clearly offend the basic principle of the settled judicial procedure, when there was a duty to act judicially in accordance with the principles of natural justice in such a context of dismissal from statutory office by way of a penal measure. 9. The whole assumption made by Mr. Daru of equating the Corporation employees with the State employees who have the constitutional protection under Article 311(2) is wholly unfounded. Their Lordships took the abundant precaution to make it clear even in the latest Sukhdeo Singh's decision AIR 1975 S.C. 1331 at page 1348 that the effect of that decision including those employees of such local authorities or other authorities which fall within the meaning of "State" under Article 12, was not to make these employees Government employees. The second assumption which Mr. The second assumption which Mr. Daru makes is equally fallacious that the reasonable opportunity which was interpreted in this only class of Government servants in Lal's case and Khemchand's case, because of the statutory protection as of the constitutional mandate and because of their categorical statutory right had been granted on such principles of natural justice. In the present case, the content of "reason able opportunity" being not by way of such constitutional mandate and the implication which we have to make in section 50(3) is only of a procedure of a fair enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, there would be no such basis for invoking any analogy of the Government servants who have the aforesaid constitutional protection of section 240(3) in the old days or now under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In such case, as earlier pointed out, the fair enquiry has to be only as per the four minimum principles of natural justice which would have to be implied in all such disciplinary action cases even when persons who are holding statutory office as laid down in Verma's case. Such a reading was not done even in Jha's case even when such statutory reading had to be done not only in consonance with the principles of natural justice but also to make the faction consistent with the equality guarantee enshrined in Article 14, their Lordships refused to hold any breach of the principles of natural justice, if a fair enquiry was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice before the Commission had recommended the final action which was taken by the Chancellor in that case. 4th September 1975 10. Besides, in a series of decisions their Lordships have cleared up this misconception on the basis of which Mr. Daru's argument proceeds for claiming a double opportunity by a show cause notice at two stages so as to avail of another enquiry as per the aforesaid principles of natural justice has been gone through before the enquiry officer in the presence of the delinquent. The first such decision is in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198 which was in the context of a disciplinary enquiry in connection with the misconduct of an examinee which had been entrusted under the relevant statutory rules to an outsider as the Principal's son who was the examinee in question. The first such decision is in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 198 which was in the context of a disciplinary enquiry in connection with the misconduct of an examinee which had been entrusted under the relevant statutory rules to an outsider as the Principal's son who was the examinee in question. The relevant rules 5 which was for guidance in fact provided that on the report of the enquiry officer the Vice Chancellor after consultation with the sub committee on discipline should take a provisional decision which should be communicated to the concerned student who should be called upon to show cause against the provisional decision and after receiving his representation, if any, to the Vice Chancellor who passed the appropriate final order. Their Lordships made the salutary pronouncement to clear out the aforesaid misconception as under: "There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that Article that every disciplinary proceedings must consists of two enquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law, from that it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available to the person proceeded against or that another enquiry should be held thereafter." Their Lordships even dealt with the decision of the House of Lords in General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the united Kingdom v. Spackman, 1943 (2) All. E.R. 337, which was so vehemently pressed in aid by Mr. Daru and argued that that decision being on the special wording of section 29 of the Medical Act 1858, which provided due enquiry had no bearing on the question under consideration when the matter had to be examined from the point of view of rules of natural justice only and not by any other statutory provision making provision for a much larger ambit or reasonable opportunity as under the constitutional protection guaranteed under Article 311(2). Their Lordships pointed out that the rules of natural justice would undoutedly have to be observed in any proceeding even for a domestic tribunal but the principles of natural justice to be complied would depend upon the circumstances of each case and the question whether the requirement of natural justice had been met by the procedure adopted would depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case and on the constitution of the tribunal and the rules under which it functions. This decision not only explains the principles of natural justice which have to be followed in a disciplinary inquiry but it further categorically answers the query raised by Mr. Daru as to before whom this reasonable opportunity has to be given in such cases, by in terms holding that this fair enquiry by giving this reasonable opportunity to present the case to the delinquent has to be before the enquiry officer who has, of course, to be an impartial person. Once such a full enquiry is held as per the principles of natural justice set out in this decision, there would be no question of breach of principles of natural justice by violation of the Audit Alteram Partem rule. That is why their Lordships had emphasised this aspect by even observing that even if the concerned delinquent felt any difficulty in making the representation without looking into the report of the enquiry officer, he could very well ask for a copy of that report. That itself suggests that the supply of a copy of the report is not a mandatory requirement owing from the principles of natural justice so as to result in an administrative fault vitiating the decision. In Shadi Lal v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1124, their Lordships first explained the difference between the scope of the reasonable opportunity in the two relevant statutory rules 7 and 8. Rule 7 which was for major penalties under the Punjab Civil Service punishment and Appeal Rules, 1952, had been necessitated by the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the constitution and had to be read in the light of that constitutional mandate, while rule 8 which was for minor penalties was held not to contemplate anything more than the adequate opportunity of making a representation. After disposing of the question of the content of the statutory provision, their Lordships elaborately examined the question from the angle of the principles of natural justice. In that context at page 1129 their Lordships fully set out the aforesaid salutary observations already made in Suresh Koshy's case along with the salutary warning given in the concluding para by clearing out the misconception prevailing in certain quarters on the analogy of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Thereafter at pages 1129 and 1130, their Lordships considered the material question as to whether such principles or natural justice were violated in so far as the delinquent had no opportunity of making a representation on the preliminary report of the Treasury Officer which had been taken into consideration without showing it to the delinquent. Their Lordships pointed out that the aforesaid report contained not a single instance more than that was already found in the allegations as it merely set out evidence in support of those allegations. Therefore, non-supply of such a report could not have in any manner prejudiced the delinquent. Thereafter their Lordships made the pertinent observations as under: - "If before the Treasury Officer had sent the report he had associated the appellant in the enquiry he held it would not have been necessary to give him a copy of the report he sent. If the report had contained any material extraneous to the charges against the appellant, or anything in addition to what is found in the original allegations against him then only he could be said to have been prejudiced." Another decision in B. Surinder Singh Kanada v. Government of the Federation of Malaya, A.I.R. 1969 SC. 198, SC 1962 A.C. 3227 was considered where the report of the preliminary enquiry was highly prejudicial report and so it was held to have prejudiced the delinquent and the inquiry was held not to be a fair inquiry. There was no such question of prejudice in such a case before their Lordships. Therefore, it was observed that the application of the principles of natural justice was not a question of observance of a formula or a mere technicality. In essence it was meant to assure, that the party concerned had an opportunity of being heard, the principle of audi alterem partem. Therefore, it was observed that the application of the principles of natural justice was not a question of observance of a formula or a mere technicality. In essence it was meant to assure, that the party concerned had an opportunity of being heard, the principle of audi alterem partem. Whether in any particular case it had been violated would depend on the facts and circumstances of that case. Their Lordships then observed that it was not to be considered that unless all the procedure of Courts were observed it would mean failure to observe the principles of natural justice. Their Lordships negatived the challenge on the score of the violation of the principles of natural justice after reiterating the aforesaid observations in Suresh Koshi's case, and cleared out the aforesaid misconception. This decision also not only clears the aforesaid misconception but reiterates the principles of natural justice. Even in a case of preliminary report which had been taken into consideration, the supply of a copy of it was held not to be necessary, if the delinquent was associated with such preliminary inquiry or if the report did not contain any additional allegation or the material extraneous to the charge or anything in addition to what was found in the original allegations. It is only in such cases that the report would be a prejudicial report and, therefore, if it results in prejudice, its non-supply to the delinquent would vitiate the enquiry The underlying principle being of audi alteram partem, it is obvious that the enquiry would not be a completed enquiry if additional charges are added, or if additional material extraneous to the allegations is sought to be added in the report. It would be such special facts which would prolong the enquiry by requiring further opportunity to be given if such additional charge or additional material is sought to be used against the delinquent. It would be such special facts which would prolong the enquiry by requiring further opportunity to be given if such additional charge or additional material is sought to be used against the delinquent. Even as regards the preliminary inquiry report on the basis of which the enquiry is held before the enquiry officer, this is the settled legal position and there would be all the more reason to apply this ratio to cases where the final report is submitted by the enquiry officer after the delinquent is fully associated with that enquiry and the report is confined only to the allegations made against the delinquent in the charge-sheet or the show cause notice in question and no extraneous material to the said charges and nothing in addition to what is found in the original allegations has been set out in the enquiry report. There would be no question of any violation of principles of natural justice or any prejudice whatever as per the aforesaid settled legal position, as in fact, as laid down by their Lordships, there would be no necessity to give a copy of the said report to the delinquent as a part of the mandatory obligation of the principles of natural justice. 11. In S.S. Rly. Co. v. Workers Union, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 513, even in the context where the standing orders were sought to be modified under the Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act by the competent authority by insertion of a relevant clause 4 requiring a second show cause notice at the stage when the decision of suitable punishment was to be made, their Lordships made pertinent observations reiterating the aforesaid principles at page 523 as under : - "As regard a the modification requiring a second show cause notice, neither the ordinary law of the land nor the industrial law requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of the decisions give by Courts or the Tribunals such a second show cause notice in case of removal has never been demanded or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Article 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that Article. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Article 311. Even that has now been removed by the recent amendment of that Article. To import such a requirement from Article 311 in industrial matters does not appear to be either necessary or proper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view there is no justification of any principle for such equation. Besides, such a requirement would necessarily prolong disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in as short a time as possible. In our view, it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the ground of reasonableness or fairness and should, therefore, be set aside." These decisions in this trial complete the whole picture by in terms holding that such a requirement of a second show cause notice is only in the class of Government servants who have constitutional protection of Art.311 and even that had been removed by the 15th Amendment and, therefore, if such a requirement was imported qua other employees, it would be equating them with civil servants and on no rational principle such a equation was justified as it would unnecessarily prolong the disciplinary enquiry. In the light of this completely settled legal position, we must reject this contention of Mr. Daru for equation with civil servants by employing any such condition of reasonable opportunity to be heard which is guaranteed under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India only to civil servants in the present context, when implication has to be done only by invoking the principles of natural justice or to make a procedural provision fair and reasonable one to meet the challenge of Articles 14 and 16. 12. Even the alternative limb of Mr. Daru's argument on the score of divided responsibility could not enable us to invoke this doctrine of second show cause notice at the stage when the misconduct has been found to have been established by the enquiry officer. In Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Chief Justice of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 285 at page 291, their Lordships in terms held that such a contention proceeded on a complete misapprehension of the nature of the power. In Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Chief Justice of Calcutta, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 285 at page 291, their Lordships in terms held that such a contention proceeded on a complete misapprehension of the nature of the power. In that case, the Chief Justice had the power to dismiss the concerned delinquent and he had delegated it to another Judge to enquire into the charges and it was argued that the Chief Justice himself had to decide and, therefore, it was not competent to him to delegate such an enquiry and he should have made the enquiry himself. Their Lordships pointed out that the exercise of power to appoint or dismiss the concerned officer was the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power and, therefore, the ratio in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board, 1953 (2) QB 18 at page 40 that no judicial tribunal could delegate its functions unless it was enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication would not apply. The power was clearly administrative power and it was nonetheless so by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards had to precede the exercise thereof. It was pointed out that it was well recognised that a statutory functionary exercising such a power could not be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent official for enquiry and report. That was the ordinary made of exercise of any administrative power. What could not be delegated except where the law specifically so provided was the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power. That is how the ratio in the House of Lords in Board of Education v. Rice, 1911 A.C. 179 at p. 182 was considered where it was held that a functionary who had to decide an administrative matter of the nature involved in that case could obtain the material on which be was to act in such manner as might be feasible and convenient, provided only the affected party "has a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant and prejudicial material." Therefore, the contention that the delegation of the enquiry amounted to delegation of the decisive power was held to be without any substance. It is in the same context that this broader principle is stated as settled proposition in Naraindas v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1232 at page 1245 in the following words : - "Now we do not dispute the general proposition that when a power or function is given by the statute to a corporate body and no provision is made in the statute as to how such power or function shall be exercised, the corporate body can by a resolution passed at a general meeting devise its own mode of exercising such power or function, such as authorising one or more of the members to exercise it on behalf of the Board." In the context of such corporate bodies where such large number of councillors have to take a decision, the decision would be an institutional decision in any such disciplinary enquiry, and even though it has to be leached after a fair enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, which must be implied in such a context, the nature of the power exercised, being an administrative power, must not be forgotten, although 'he decision is preceded by such enquiry which simulates the same standards of a fair and just inquiry. In such a context no delegation of the power is involved because the institution is free to take aid and assistance of its own smaller body or even its officers or in a fit case such outsider agency for holding a just enquiry in accordance with the principles of natural justice, as already explained in Verma's case. That is why in the Union of India v. P.K. Roy, A.I.R. 1968 SC 850, at page 857-858, even in the context of preparation of gradation list, this entire question was elaborately considered after following the aforesaid decisions, in Pradyat Kumar's case and in the case of Board of Education v. Rice. Their Lordships in terms held that if the administrative authority named in the statute had and retained in its hands general control over the activities of the person to whom it had entrusted in part the exercise of its statutory power and the control exercised by the administrative authority was of a substantial degree, there was in the eye of law no "delegation" at all and the maxim 'delegatus non potest delegare' did not apply. In other words, if a statutory authority empowered a delegate to undertake preparatory work and to take an initial decision in matters entrusted to it but retained in its own hands the power to approve or disapprove the decision after it had been taken, the decision would be held to have been validly made if the degree of control maintained by the authority was close enough for the decision to be regarded as the authority's own. It was further in terms observed :- ".....Normally speaking we should have thought that one opportunity for making a representation against the preliminary list published would have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of law. But the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket or a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the theme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case." That is why it was held that there was a special circumstance in that case because the settled principle for preparation of the gradation list was sought to be departed from and another principle was sought to be adopted and, therefore, it was held that the concerned servants were entitled to have a second opportunity to make a representation with regard to the proposed gradation list on the basis of this new proposal before the final gradation list was published. This decision, therefore, completely answers Mr. Daru's objection that even in such institutional decisions where the exercise of an administrative power and the aid is taken of other agency for the preliminary work of an initial decision so long as the ultimate decision rests with the competent authority and the control is maintained by approving or disapproving this initial decision, there is no delegation involved. Daru's objection that even in such institutional decisions where the exercise of an administrative power and the aid is taken of other agency for the preliminary work of an initial decision so long as the ultimate decision rests with the competent authority and the control is maintained by approving or disapproving this initial decision, there is no delegation involved. The volume of work entrusted to such an institution is so great that if necessary they must obtain material vicariously through their official or duly authorised agencies and, therefore, it must be held that they are properly discharging their statutory duties if they leave this collection of material or even of initial decision to the other agency which is an impartial agency which associates the delinquent and makes a final report on the basis of which the ultimate decision is reached by such institution. There would be neither the delegation in any relevant sense of the term nor any violation of the principles of natural justice in such a case, if the official or the agency appointed has duly associated the delinquent in the enquiry and has held fair enquiry as per the aforesaid settled principles. Even the ancillary limb of Mr. Daru's argument would not survive as it is based on Nageshwar Roy's decision, A.I.R. 1959 S. C. 308 at page 327, as this ratio would be applicable to those cases where there is a right of personal beating and so that safeguard would become an empty formality if one person heard and the other decided. That decision could only apply on the assumption that there is a right of personal beating which must be implied on the principles of natural justice after a full and fair enquiry has been completed by the enquiry officer and the report is duly submitted to the Corporation. All these are misconceived assumptions on the assumed equation with the Government servants but Mr. Daru could not ask us to read into section 50(3) such wider content of reasonable opportunity as is guaranteed under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India after the tentative conclusion of the guilt is reached on the report of the enquiry officer. 13. Mr. All these are misconceived assumptions on the assumed equation with the Government servants but Mr. Daru could not ask us to read into section 50(3) such wider content of reasonable opportunity as is guaranteed under Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India after the tentative conclusion of the guilt is reached on the report of the enquiry officer. 13. Mr. Daru, therefore, finally addressed us on the general principle that natural justice principles can never be embodied in any straight-jacket formula and, if they were flexible principles, their content should be found by considering all the relevant factors. The content of these natural principles which he wanted to be considered in this context was of four requirements : - (1) A second show cause notice after the tentative conclusion was reached on the report of the enquiry officer, (2) supply of a copy of such report, (3) a right of personal hearing, or in any event, (4) a tight of making representation at the subsequent stage. It is true that the context of the power is dismissal or removal from office by way of a penal measure on the statutory grounds of misconduct or neglect or incapacity for the duty of high office of Transport Manager. It is the very width of this power, involving such serious consequences as removal of a statutory office and the penal consequences, with stigma on the career of such high public official that makes it implicit that this power has to be exercised after following the procedure of a fair enquiry consistently with the principles of natural justice. The person in whom the power is vested is a Corporation institution itself as it has to be exercised on votes of rot less than half the number of councillors. It is not the bare majority of members present who must have voted for the proposal as in the case of section 56, but this statutory majority which has been specially provided by way of a safeguard to this high public official. Even so, the nature of the power remains an administrative rower of the disciplinary action against the Corporation officer. Even so, the nature of the power remains an administrative rower of the disciplinary action against the Corporation officer. In Verma's decision, which was in the context of a Government servant who had tight to hold a public office as per constitutional guarantee, their Lordships categorically laid down only those four principles for making enquiry a fair enquiry consistent with the principles of natural justice. Mr. Daru, therefore, could not advance the very same ground for any further implication into this provisions on the score that the context is of dismissal from office by way of a penal measure of such high public official. Even the context of the power being vested in the requisite statutory majority of councillors would not enable us to make any such further implication. The decision being institutional decision, as earlier pointed out, the Corporation would have by way of necessity to take aid and assistance even till the stage of enquiry and initial decision by way of enquiry and report along with the recommendations, if any of such enquiry officer or such enquiry agency. The principles of natural justice would be sufficiently complied with if such enquiry is entrusted to an impartial officer or agency and the delinquent is personally associated with such enquiry at all stages in accordance with the aforesaid four principles laid down in P. K. Roy's decision. Normally in such cases there would be no necessity of any further show cause notice except on the very special cases so long as the enquiry report is confined to the allegations already made in the show cause notices served on the delinquent and is not based on any further ground or material extraneous to the allegations made against the delinquent. It is only in those rare special cases where additional grounds which are sought to be relied on or instances other than those mentioned in the allegations already made or if further extraneous material other than those allegations are sought to be relied upon that the enquiry would become again incomplete and audi alteram partem principle would be again attracted so as to necessitate further opportunity to show cause against the new ground or new material other than the allegations made, with a right of fresh representation or hearing, as the case may be. Therefore, as per this settled legal position considering all the factors, normally, once the enquiry has been fairly held, as per the principles explained in Verma's case, and the enquiry report is confined only to the allegations made in the charge-sheet or the show cause notice initially served on the delinquent, without any other extraneous material, there is no principle of natural justice which would require any further show cause notice to be served on the delinquent after the enquiry report is received. There is no such second stage contemplated under the principles of natural justice as of the tentative conclusion being first reached, so as to necessitate the second show cause notice before the imposition of punishment. It would be all the more so in the present case, where the statutory context is also of only a single punishment of removal under section 50(3), where the delinquent would know from the outset the penalty which would be imposed, if the charge under the section was established against him. Besides, it must be borne in mind that though the audi alteram partem area ends, in such cases the administrative law however implies a further safeguard of a reasoned order of the competent authority so that the administrative remedy of challenging the order as ultra vires in the context of such public employments or statutory officers can be availed of. There could however be no further implication on the score of principles of natural justice as contended by Mr. Daru, in view of the aforesaid settled legal position. 14. As regards the question of supply of the copy of the enquiry report, this question has been raised by Mr. Daru proceeding on the aforesaid misconception by way of an analogy of the Government servant. It is true that in the State of Gujarat v. R.C. Teredesai, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1294, and in the State of Maharashtra v. B.A. Joshi, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1302, at page 1304, their Lordships have in terms held so far as the Government servants are concerned, that the enquiry report along with the evidence recorded constitute material on which the Government had ultimately to act, as that was the only purpose of the enquiry held by the competent officer and the report made as a result of the said enquiry. It has been held that the question whether reasonable opportunity has or has not been afforded to the Government servant must depend on the facts of each case, but it would be in very rare cases indeed in which it could be said that the Government servant is not prejudiced by the non-supply of the report of the enquiry officer. The ratio of this decision is completely in the constitutional context of Article 311 (2) where the opportunity to show cause has to be given at that second stage after this tentative conclusion is reached on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer. That opportunity would be illusory and the constitutional right would be frustrated if this report which became the material on which the Government had to act in the subsequent stage was not supplied to the delinquent. The audi alteram partem rule was, therefore, clearly held to be violated because the audi alteram regime came to be further extended in view of this constitutional mandate of second opportunity at the stage after the tentative conclusion was reached. The said question could never arise in cases other than this special class of Government servants who have constitutional protection of Article 311 in their favour. Mr. Daru, therefore, vehemently argued that their Lordships having in terms held the enquiry report to be a material on which the competent authority has to ultimately act, and even as per the principles laid down in Verma's case, such prejudicial material roust be supplied to the delinquent as it would be surely influencing the decision of the competent authority. This argument is based on the same aforesaid misconception. The ratio is clearly applicable to those cases where the subsequent stage opportunity has to be given to the delinquent. In the subsequent stage opportunity question does not arise in these cases, after a fair enquiry is completed by the enquiry officer, there would be no question of supplying a copy of the enquiry report so as to constitute any administrative fault which would vitiate the entire enquiry. In the subsequent stage opportunity question does not arise in these cases, after a fair enquiry is completed by the enquiry officer, there would be no question of supplying a copy of the enquiry report so as to constitute any administrative fault which would vitiate the entire enquiry. It is true that the enquiry report would be fairly assessing the relevant evidence and would be giving reasons for reaching a particular finding of misconduct and recommending even the penalty, and therefore, this assessment of evidence of penalty recommendation would surely be taken into account by the Corporation when the decision of removal is sought to be taken. However, the argument of Mr. Daru that the enquiry report is per se a fresh material, for which an opportunity to controvert the same if not given to the delinquent by supply of a copy of the report would constitute an administrative fault by way of violation of the principles of natural justice is wholly untenable. As earlier pointed out, except in the solitary class of Government servants who have constitutional mandate of Article 311(2), the supply of the report would not be necessary, when it is confined only to the allegations made in the charge-sheet or the show cause notice initially served on the delinquent and does not introduce any other extraneous material than those allegations so as to constitute any fresh material. That is why in Varma's case, the ratio is so categorical of fair enquiry principles which have to be observed in the enquiry before the impartial enquiry officer and such enquiry stage having been once completed, it is not vitiated by any further fault by introducing a fresh ground or other extraneous material than the Allegations originally served on the delinquent, the audi alteram partem area completely ends at that stage. Thereafter, the only safeguard that is implied even in such statutory public offices or public employment is, as earlier stated, only in the realm of reasoned order of the competent authority, so that the order can be challenged as ultra vires by availing of the remedy of administrative law. Thereafter, the only safeguard that is implied even in such statutory public offices or public employment is, as earlier stated, only in the realm of reasoned order of the competent authority, so that the order can be challenged as ultra vires by availing of the remedy of administrative law. Therefore, if the Corporation is not required under any such constitutional or statutory provision like Article 311 (2) to reach first a tentative decision inviting other representations in the matter of punishment and the normal requirement in such cases would be of only one show cause notice as earlier painted out, there would be no such administrative fault or contravention of the principles of natural justice because a copy of the enquiry report is not supplied to the delinquent for the rimple reason that the delinquent was completely associated with the enquiry. More so, it would be the reason when the delinquent has not even asked for any such report on the ground that it would come in the way of his making a fair representation. In such a case where the report is confined to the very same allegations and the delinquent had his full say even by such elaborate arguments before such enquiry officer of such high judicial status like the retired Chief Justice, it is obvious that the whole thing would be clearly an empty formality. In Kesav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 389 at page 393, their Lordships held that after the classic decision in Ridge v. Baldwin. 1964 A.C. 40, it was too late to contend that the principles of natural justice need not apply to administrative orders or proceedings. The concept of natural justice could not be put into a strait jacket and so it was futile to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that had to be kept in mind in all cases was that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. The only essential point that had to be kept in mind in all cases was that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. The classic proposition of Tucker, L. J. in Russel v. Duke of Nor fork, 1949 (1) A.E.R. 109, was as under:- "The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal, is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth." At page 397 their Lordship, held that, where an enquiry was already held under the Industrial Development Act, then before taking a final decision and taking over of the undertaking under section 18A of that Act merely because formal notice to show cause why their undertaking could not be taken over or that it had not been furnished with the copy of that report had been held to be an insistence on an empty formality because really the Mills had made a representation they could possibly make against the proposed take over and the blunt fact remained that the mills did not have necessary resources to do so. Finally, at page 398 their Lordships examined the principles of natural justice in connection with such enquiry reports and pointed out at page 399 that it was not possible to lay down any general principle on the question as to whether the report of an investigating body or of an inspector appointed by an administrative authority should be made available to the person concerned in any given case before the authority took a decision upon that report. The answer to that question also must always depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. It was not at all unlikely that there might be certain cases that unless the report was given the party concerned could not make any effective representation about the action that the Government took or proposed to take on the basis of that report. Whether the report should be furnished or not must, therefore depend in every individual case on the merits of that case. However, in so far as the Kesav Mills case was concerned non-disclosure of the report of the Investigating Committee had not caused any prejudice to the appellants in that case. Whether the report should be furnished or not must, therefore depend in every individual case on the merits of that case. However, in so far as the Kesav Mills case was concerned non-disclosure of the report of the Investigating Committee had not caused any prejudice to the appellants in that case. In the present case also we have earlier stated that if the enquiry report was not confined to the original allegations and added further allegations or took into account further extraneous material than the original allegations or if the delinquent was not associated with the inquiry resulting in such prejudicial report, different considerations would be applicable and not only further right of representation but right to have a copy of the prejudicial report supplied might arise because the enquiry stage would then continue. As regards the last requirement also, the legal position is now well settled after the decision in Union of India v. Joyti Prakash, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1093 at page 1103. Their Lordships in terms pointed out that it is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice that a personal hearing must be given to a party likely to be affected by the order. Except in a proceeding in Courts, a mere denial of an opportunity of making an oral representation will not, without more, vitiate the proceedings. A party likely to be affected by the decision is entitled to know the evidence against him and to have an opportunity of making a representation. He, however, cannot claim that without persona hearing the order is invalid. Therefore there is no such right of personal hearing after the enquiry is duly completed as per the principles laid down in Verma's case and the enquiry report is made, for the simple reason that the party affected by the decision fully know the evidence against him which had been relied upon in the enquiry report and which he had an ample opportunity to meet with by not only making a representation but by leading evidence in his favour and by having his full say before the enquiry officer. Therefore, if the final order is made without affording the delinquent any further opportunity of personal hearing, the order can never be said to be suffering from administrative fault or in violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, if the final order is made without affording the delinquent any further opportunity of personal hearing, the order can never be said to be suffering from administrative fault or in violation of the principles of natural justice. So far as the opportunity of fresh representation after the enquiry report is concerned, we have already explained the true legal position by pointing out the exceptional cases in the special category, where because the enquiry report is not confined to the original allegations in the show cause notice or the charge-sheet initially served on the delinquent or where the extraneous materials other than the original allegations are taken into account, a question may arise of further representation or an opportunity of presenting the case on which new grounds or additional material are sought to be relied upon. However, merely because the enquiry report has been submitted, with or without penalty recommendations, which has been taken into consideration by the competent authority, that by itself does not give rise to an opportunity of making a fresh representation, which if denied would result in violation of any principle of natural justice. This would be completely an empty formality and could never be introduced by process of implication unless it is held to be mandatory as per the Constitutional mandate, because it would unduly prolong such disciplinary proceeding and would completely defeat the very purpose of such statutory provision like the one embodied in section 50(3) of the Act. 15. Coming to the facts of the present case, Mr. Daru had not a word of challenge against the enquiry held by Shri Miabhoy as it had almost become a regular trial involving about 105 sittings. The report of the said enquiry is completely exhaustive and it had summarised the conclusions that all the five charges had been proved against the delinquent. The delinquent had issued two essentiality certificates, Exs. 22 and 20 to TISCO and HINCO, containing false particulars in breach of his statutory duties. It had enabled the Ruby Company to get steel material worth several lacs issued in t hair favour as it enabled them to get the material released for a purpose which would serve Ruby's private ends and would not conduce to the benefit of any public undertaking. The delinquent had been further held to have removed office copy of Exs. It had enabled the Ruby Company to get steel material worth several lacs issued in t hair favour as it enabled them to get the material released for a purpose which would serve Ruby's private ends and would not conduce to the benefit of any public undertaking. The delinquent had been further held to have removed office copy of Exs. 20 and 22 and substituted other office copies bearing the same date and number of the office copies and thereafter his conduct had been almost criminal as had made false documents, exs. 12, 13, 14, 19, 10 and 11 making false endorsements thereon and had tempered Ex. 15. In view of these findings, even though the enquiry was not authorised to record a finding as to what penalty should be imposed, if any on the five charges that were proved, he made a recommendation in the aforesaid para 141 of the report which we have already set out at the outset recommending extreme penalty of removal from services of the Transport Manager. This enquiry report is, therefore, completely confined to the allegations which are found in the original revised charge-sheet initially served on the delinquent and Mr. Daru has no grievance that any extraneous material other than those allegations have been taken into account while summarising these findings or making those recommendations as to penalty. All the attendant circumstances have been fully emphasised in this report and the delinquent being associated with this enquiry at all stages in this protracted trial lasting 105 sittings with the aid of his advocates, he had full opportunity to present his case. Even the show cause notice made it clear at the outset that in order to afford the delinquent an adequate and responsible opportunity to defend himself, enquiry officer Shri Miabhoy had been appointed and so he was asked to submit his explanation before the enquiry officer in respect of all the charges and he was in terms asked to lead all his defences by availing of this full opportunity before this enquiry officer of high standing so that the delinquent would have no room left for any grievance about the impartiality of the enquiry. It was further stated in the said charge-sheet that after receipt of the report of the enquiry officer, the Corporation would take necessary decision under section 50. It was further stated in the said charge-sheet that after receipt of the report of the enquiry officer, the Corporation would take necessary decision under section 50. In sipte of this intimation the delinquent had never cared even to ask for a copy of the report if he at all thought that he would either be prejudiced by the said report. The delinquent had already been associated with the fact-finding enquiry where prima facie case was held to be entablished by the Municipal Commissioner, it is only for inspiring public confidence and to be fair and completely just to the petitioner that the Corporation had left this enquiry in this particular case to such retired Chief Justice. Even there the delinquent had full and complete enquiry simulating judicial standards and, therefore, the delinquent has not a word of challenge in this petition, except on the technical scope of a second show cause notice at subsequent stage, on the aforesaid misconception of equation with the Government servants who have such constitutional guarantee under Article 311(2). The recommendation of penalty in such cases of the only possible penalty under sec. 50 (3) by the enquiry officer is merely incidental and having been based only on what transpired at the enquiry in the presence of the delinquent on the basis of the material which he has controverted, there can be no question of any prejudice, if that recommendation is also considered by the Corporation while arriving at the decision of removal under section 50(3). After such gross charges had been proved at the enquiry, each of which was of such substantial misdemeanour as to justify removal, the delinquent must have rightly felt that it was no use to ask for any copy of the report. The principle of any further enquiry being a completely empty formality was all the more in applicable in such a case, where no question of any prejudice could ever arise, and, therefore, we do not find any ground made out by Mr. Daru to make out any case of administrative fault or violation of principles of natural justice so far as the present removal order against the delinquent is concerned. 16. So far as the other two consequential orders are concerned, Mr. Daru to make out any case of administrative fault or violation of principles of natural justice so far as the present removal order against the delinquent is concerned. 16. So far as the other two consequential orders are concerned, Mr. Nanavati fairly conceded that the petitioner having not been heard regarding these two other orders of forfeiture of gratuity and of the assigned profits of the provident fund which entailed such serious consequences to the petitioner, the consequential orders must be quashed giving a fresh opportunity to the Corporation to pass fresh orders in accordance with law after giving proper hearing to the petitioner. 17. In the result this petition is allowed only partially by maintaining the order of removal and quashing only the two consequential orders of forfeiture of gratuity and assigned profits of the provident fund Leave granted to the Corporation to take fresh proceedings in accordance with law, if any, in that behalf. Rule is accordingly partially made absolute with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Petition partially allowed.