J. M. SHETH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge of the City Civil Court Ahmedabad Mr. H. B. Shah dated 7th April 1970 in Review Applications Nos. 71 of 1970 and 72 of 1970 below Ex. I. He has allowed the review applications and set aside the order made by him on 16-1-1970. He has allowed Application No. 275 of 1968 and directed that a decree be passed in terms of the award of the arbitrators and dismissed Application No. 354 of 19690 He has also further passed an order that there will be no order as to costs either in review applications or in Application: No. 273 of 1968 or 354 of 1969. ( 2 ) THE facts leading rise to this appeal briefly stated are as under: The aforesaid review applications had been made for reviewing the orders made in Application No. 273 of 1968 and Application No. 354 of 1969 on 16-1-1970. Application No. 273 of 1968 was filed in the City Civil Court Ahmedabad by the arbitrators for passing a decree in terms of an award under sec. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Ac) Application No. 354 of 1969 was filed by present appellant Ravindra Motilal Shah for setting aside the award made by the arbitrators. Both those applications were heard together and disposed of by a common order on 16-1-1970. ( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 Chinubhai Chimanlal Dalal was a member of the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad. He had a claim against the present appellant Ravindra Motilal Shah in respect of some transactions for the sale and purchase of the shares and stocks in the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad According to respondent No. 1 he had to recover an amount of Rs. 4 621 the appellant. He had filed Civil Suit No. 1883 of 1966 in the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad on 29-6-1966. The present appellant filed an application under sec. 34 of the Act for the stay of the suit. The suit was stayed by the Court by an order dated 21-9-1967. Respondent No. 1 thereafter filed an application with the Secretary of Stock Exchange Ahme- dabad for referring the dispute to the arbitration under the Rules Regu- ations and Bye-laws of the Stock-Exchange on 7-10-1967. 34 of the Act for the stay of the suit. The suit was stayed by the Court by an order dated 21-9-1967. Respondent No. 1 thereafter filed an application with the Secretary of Stock Exchange Ahme- dabad for referring the dispute to the arbitration under the Rules Regu- ations and Bye-laws of the Stock-Exchange on 7-10-1967. Notices to the parties were issued by the Secretary Stock Exchange on 15--12-1967 and the parties appeared before the arbitrators and filed their statements. The arbitrators called upon the parties to appear before them and heard them on 21-12-1967 and made their award thereafter on 20-4-1960. They informed the parties of the making of the award thereafter and filed the application on 17-6-1968 before the Court under sec. 14 of the Act. ( 4 ) AS said earlier the present appellant filed his objections on rec- eipt of notice from the Court by a separate application referred to above. The validity of the award was challenged on two grounds. The first ground was that the last transaction entered into between the parties was dated 13 and the reference was made by the plaintiff on 7-10-1967 and therefore it was patently beyond a period of three years and was clearly barred by law of limitation. That contention was negatived by the Court The second contention was that the arbitrators had entered upon the reference on 15th December 1967 and they were bound to make their award within a period of four months under rule 3 of the First Schedule of the Act and since they have made the award on 20-4-1968 it was beyond a period of four months from their entering upon a reference and therefore an award was made without jurisdiction and therefore it was and void. That contention of his found favour with the learned trial Judge and on that ground the award of the arbitrators was held to be a nullity and was declared to be null and void and the order dated 16 came to be passed as said earlier. ( 5 ) THE present review applications came to be filed by the present respondent No. 1 on the ground that the delay in making the award was not a ground covered under sec. 30 of the Act. ( 5 ) THE present review applications came to be filed by the present respondent No. 1 on the ground that the delay in making the award was not a ground covered under sec. 30 of the Act. Further- more even if there was such a delay in making the award the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act has the power to enlarge the time for making the award. The jurisdiction vested in the Court under sec. 28 of the Act is exercisable suo motu as the said section does not contempl- ate the giving of an application for the enlargement of time. However the applicant could not submit this vital proposition of law on the subject at the hearing of the application before the trial Court. The absence of submission of the aforesaid provision of sec. 28 of the Act on the part of the present respondent No. 1 has resulted into an order dated 16-1-1970 which suffers from a patent error of law and consequently that order should be reviewed. Respondent No. 1 having not pointed out that posi- tion to the Court the order in question has happened to suffer from a patent mistake of law and the said order should therefore be reviewed condoning the delay. ( 6 ) THE learned trial Judge accepted these contentions and found that he had over-looked the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act. If his attention was drawn to the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act he would have without any hesitation condoned the delay and would not have declared the award invalid on the ground held by him in the earlier order. The Court has suo motu powers to enlarge the time. No application of the party is necessary for exercising that power under sec. 28 of the Act. The circumstance that in the relevant bye-law framed by the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad President or the Governing Board having powers to enlarge the time would not come in the way of the powers of the Court. He therefore negatived all the contentions raised on behalf of the present appellant and passed the impugned order. ( 7 ) MR. R. M. Vin appearing for the appellant has contended that the learned trial Judge was not competent to review the impugned order dated 16-1-1970. He therefore negatived all the contentions raised on behalf of the present appellant and passed the impugned order. ( 7 ) MR. R. M. Vin appearing for the appellant has contended that the learned trial Judge was not competent to review the impugned order dated 16-1-1970. This argument of his was based on the ground that the present case was not a case where it could be said that the order was sought to be reviewed on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason as provided in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Code ). Mr. Vin has submitted that it could not be said that there was any error apparent on the face of the record. ( 8 ) MR. Vin has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in HARI VISHNU KAMATH V. AHMAD ISHAQUE A. I. R 1955 SUPREME COURT 233 At page 244 after referring to certain observations made in English decisions and the decision of the Supreme Court in A. I. R 1954 Supreme Court 440 it is observed in para 23:it may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter however is not so Much in the state- ment of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error cease to be mere error and become an error apparent on the face of the record. Learned Counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. AT page 249 in page 38 it is observed: in the result we must hold that in maintaining the election of the first respondent on the basis of the 301 votes which were liable to be rejected under rule 47 (1) (c) the Tribunal was plainly in error. The Chatterjee would have it that this error is one of jurisdiction. AT page 249 in page 38 it is observed: in the result we must hold that in maintaining the election of the first respondent on the basis of the 301 votes which were liable to be rejected under rule 47 (1) (c) the Tribunal was plainly in error. The Chatterjee would have it that this error is one of jurisdiction. We are unable to take this view because the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether on a construction of sec. 100 (2) (c) it could go into the fact of breach of rule 23 and if it committed an error it was an error in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not in the assumption thereof. But the error is manifest on the face of the record and calls for interference in certiorari. ( 9 ) MR. Vin has also invited mt; attention to the decision of Chagla C. J. in S. P. AWATE V. C. P. FERNANDES 60 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 1354. The relevant observations are:the powers of review enjoyed by the High Court are very limited. When a decision is challenged on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the record the error cotemplated must be an error so manifest so clear that no Court would permit such an error to remain on the record. The error must not be an error which could be demonstrated by a process of retiocination. When two views on a question of law are possible and the Court has taken one view the fact that the other view is a more acceptable view would not render the first view an error apparent on the face of the recordthe High Court decided a case on the view of the law that the wages to which a railway servant was entitled was according to the rules in the Railway Code and not according to the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act. In a review applica- tion to the High Court it was contended that the Court should take the view that the Act constitutes social legislation and that legislation must prevail even over a special legislation dealing with a social class of citizens;it was held that the points urged could not be urged on a review application but could be advanced before a High Court in appeal. IN the instant case as found by the learned trial Judge the learned trial Judge over-looked the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act which empowered the Court to enlarge the time even after the award is made. The Advocate appearing for the party concerned also did not point out those relevant provisions of the Act and the mistake came to be committed. The question for consideration is whether such an error can be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record or at any rate it can be said that there is sufficient cause shown for review as indicated by the provisions of Order 47 Rule I of the Code. ( 10 ) MR. S. K. Zaveri appearing for respondent No. 1. has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in K M SHANMUGAM V. THE S. R. V. S. (P) LTD A. I. R. 1963 SUPREME COURT 1626 wherein at page 1630 the decision of the Supreme Court in HARI VISHNU KAMATHS CASE A. I. R. 1955 SUPREME COURT 233 has been referred to and the observations made by Das Gupta J. in SATYANARAYAN V. MALLIKARJUN A. I. R. 1960 SUPREME COURT 137 at p. 141 have been quoted and in that context observed:the learned Judge here lays down the complex nature of the arguments as a test of an apparent error of law. This test also may break for what is complex to one judicial mind may be clear and obvious to another: it depends upon the equipment of a particular Judge. In the ultimate analysis the said concept is comprised of many imponderables: it is not capable of precise definition as no objective criterion can be laid down the apparent nature of the error to a large extent being depend dent upon the subjective element. So too in some cases the boundary between error of law and error of fact is rather thin. . . . . We do not therefore propose to define with any precision the concept of error of law apparent on the face of the record; but it should be left as it has always been done to be decided in each case. . . . . . IT was also pointed out that the order made and the direction issued under sec. We do not therefore propose to define with any precision the concept of error of law apparent on the face of the record; but it should be left as it has always been done to be decided in each case. . . . . . IT was also pointed out that the order made and the direction issued under sec. 43 of the Act cannot obviously add to or substract from the consideration pres- cribed under sec. 47 thereof on the basis of which the tribunal is empowered to issue or refuse to issue a permit as the case may be. It is therefore clear that any direction given under sec. 43-A for the purpose of considering conflicting claims for a permit by applicants can only be to enable the Regional Transport Authority to discharge its duties under sec. 47 of the Act more satisfactorily efficiently and impartially. To put it differently the directions so given cannot enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction of the said tribunal or authority but only afford a reasonable guide for exercising the said jurisdiction. IT was therefore stated that overlooking of those directions would amount to overlooking the provisions of law and that would be an error of law apparent on the face of the record. ( 11 ) MR. Zaveri has also invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in GULAM ABBAS V. MULLA ABDUL KADAR 1970 (3) SUPREME COURT CASES 643. At page 646 in para 11 the relevant observations made are:since an important amendment of the law of limitation was totally disregarded by the learned Single Judge a review of his judgment and decision clearly lay as failure to consider an important provision of law materially affecting the result of the suit would be an error of law apparent on the face of the record. I need not dilate on this point as there is one apposite case of the Federal Court dealing with the provisions of Order 47 Rule I of the Code with which we are concerned. In SIR HARI SANKAR PAL V. ANATH NATH MITTER A. I. R. 1949 FEDERAL COURT 106 at pages 110 and 111 the relevant observat- ions made are:that a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. In SIR HARI SANKAR PAL V. ANATH NATH MITTER A. I. R. 1949 FEDERAL COURT 106 at pages 110 and 111 the relevant observat- ions made are:that a decision is erroneous in law is certainly no ground for ordering review. If the Court has decided a point and decided it erroneously the error could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous to it. When however tie Court disposes of a case without adverting to or applying its mind to a provision of law which gives it jurisdiction to act in a particular way that may amount to an error analogous to one apparent on the face of the record sufficient to bring the case within the purview of Order 47 rule 1 Civil P. C. No reference to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33. Civil P. C. occurs in the judgment of the High Court which was delivered on 12th December 1944. After holding that the landlords were entitled to twenty-five these the yearly rent as their share of the compensation money the judgment of the High Court goes on to say that the appellants who had one-third share of the proprietary right vested in them would be entitled to one-third of the total amount which the lessors would get on that computation. It is said then that the proprietors to the extent of the remaining two-thirds share as they have preferred no appeal were not entitled to claim the benefit of this decision. ORDER 41 rule 33 Civil P. C. is a purely enabling provision which enables the appellate Court to exercise certain powers in favour of a party who has not filed the appeal if the circumstances of the case and the interests of justice so requires. ORDER 41 rule 33 Civil P. C. is a purely enabling provision which enables the appellate Court to exercise certain powers in favour of a party who has not filed the appeal if the circumstances of the case and the interests of justice so requires. The powers being discretionary no Court can be compelled to make an order under this rule; but if the appellate Court while it allows the appeal refuses to make any order in favour of a non-appealing party whose position is identically the same as that of the successful appellant without applying its mind to the provisions of Order 41 rule 33 Civil P. C. and without considering whether it should or should not exercise its powers under that rule we do not think that the Court is income- tent to rectify its omission and reconsider the matter if and when it is brought to its notice by way of an application for review. THERE are no materials in the record to show that any point under Order 41 rule 33 Civil P. C. was raised before the learned Judges when they heard the appeal. The judgment at any rate does not throw any light on that point. The application for review has not been printed in the paper book and we cannot ascertain what exactly were the grounds put forward in support of the same The subsequent order made on the application for review is of a summary character and gives no indication of the reasons which induced the learned Judges to reconsider their previous decision. From such materials as we have got we are bound to say that in fact there was an omission on the part of the Court to consider the clear provi- sion of Order 41 rule 33 Civil P. C. when the original judgment was passed; and such omission which appears on the face of the judgment would constitute a such- cient ground analogous to those mentioned in Order 47 rule 1 Civil P. C. and the Court was not incompetent to reconsider the matter if it so desired. IN the instant case neither the Advocate appearing for the party concerned nor the Court had in mind the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act which give the power to the Court to enlarge the time even after the award is made. IN the instant case neither the Advocate appearing for the party concerned nor the Court had in mind the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act which give the power to the Court to enlarge the time even after the award is made. That was pointed out at the time of the review applications and the Court has candidly admitted the aforesaid position and has in terms observed that if the said provisions would have been pointed out it would have no hesitation in enlarging the time in the circumstances of the case. It is therefore evident that such omission which appears on the face of the judgment (earlier orders) would constitute sufficient ground analogous to those mentioned in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code. The review applicat- ions were therefore competent- This submission made by Mr. Vin therefore fails. ( 12 ) THE second submission by Mr. Vin is whether such time can be enlarged by the Court without there being any written application filed by the party concerned. In the submission of Mr. Vin no such time can be extended without any written application filed by the party concerned. In support of his argument Mr. Vin has invited my attention to the rules framed by the Gujarat High Court for regulating the practice and proce- edings relating to the awards and reference to the arbitration in suits and matters instituted in the Ahmedabad City Civil Court. ( 13 ) RULE 1 under the caption Title of Application reads: (A) Save as hereinafter provided all applications affidavits and proceedings under the Act shall be instituted in the matter of the Act and in the matter of the arbitration. (B) Applications under Chapter IV of the Act shall be instituted in the suit or matter in which order of reference is made. (C) Applications under sec. 34 of the Act shall be instituted in the suit which the applicant seeks to have stayed. (D) xxx xxx xxx ( 14 ) CHAPTER IV of the Act deals with Arbitration in Suits. Rule 2 under the caption Mode of application reads: (A) Save as hereinafter provided all applications under the Act shall be made by a verified petition. 34 of the Act shall be instituted in the suit which the applicant seeks to have stayed. (D) xxx xxx xxx ( 14 ) CHAPTER IV of the Act deals with Arbitration in Suits. Rule 2 under the caption Mode of application reads: (A) Save as hereinafter provided all applications under the Act shall be made by a verified petition. (B) xxx xxx xxx (C) Applications for extension of time for an arbitrator or umpire to make his award in any suit or matter filed in Court when not consented to by all parties shall be made by Chamber summonswhen such applications are consented to by all parties they may be made in Chambers by presenting a consent order supported by an affidavit verifying the consent of parties. MR. Vin has learned heavily on clause (c) of rule 2 of these rules and has submitted that an application for extension of time has got to be made and if it is not consented to by all the parties it has to be made by Chamber summons. In the instant case no such application has been made and no such Chamber summons was taken out. ( 15 ) MR. Vin has further invited my attention to rule 35 of the Ahme- dabad City Civil Court Rules which deals with Chamber work. That rule only enumerates the matters the Judge of the City Civil Court can dispose of in Chambers. Clause (w) of it which is material for our purposes refers to applications in all matters arising under the Indian Arbitration Act and generally in the matter of any Act unless otherwise provided in the Act itself or by the rules thereunder or by these rules. This rule only indicates that applications in all matter arising under the Indian Arbitration Act can be disposed of by a Judge of the City Civil Court in chambers. That rule does not assist us in any manner for the decision of the question that is posed in the instant case. The crucial question is whether the powers under sec. 28 of the Act can be exercised by the Court only if the party interested in the award or the arbitrator files an application and not otherwise. ( 16 ) SEC. The crucial question is whether the powers under sec. 28 of the Act can be exercised by the Court only if the party interested in the award or the arbitrator files an application and not otherwise. ( 16 ) SEC. 28 of the Act reads: (1) The Court may if it thinks fit whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not enlarge from time to time the time for making the award. (2) Any provision in an arbitration agreement whereby the arbitrators or umpire may except with the consent of all the parties to the agreement enlarge the time for making the award shall be void and of no effect. A mere glance at the wording of sec. 28 (1) of the Act clearly indicates that it is the Court which can exercise such powers if it thinks fit. It does not state that it is only on the application of the party concerned or an umpire or an arbitrator that such powers can be exercised by the Court It is significant to note that in several section of the Act wherever the legislature intended that such application would have to be given it has made the necessary provisions. ( 17 ) SEC. 8 (2) of the Act refers to making of an application by the party. Sec. 11 of the Act also empowers the Court to remove arbitrators or umpire in the application of any party to a reference Sec. 12 of the Act empowers the Court to appoint persons to fill the vancancies in cases where an umpire or arbitrator is removed or this authority is revoked by the Court. Sec. 20 of the Act refers to an application to be filed in the Court on arbitration agreement. Sec. 21 of the Act refers to an application to be made for order of reference when the parties in the suit agree that any matter in difference between them in the suit be referred to arbitration. Sec. 33 of the Act also refers to the arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application. Sec. 34 of the Act refers to an application to be made for staying of the suit by a party to an arbitration agreement. Sec. 33 of the Act also refers to the arbitration agreement or award to be contested by application. Sec. 34 of the Act refers to an application to be made for staying of the suit by a party to an arbitration agreement. Sec. 38 of the Act refers to an application in regard to disputes as to arbitra- tors remuneration or costs. ( 18 ) IT is thus evident on considering the scheme of the Act that the legislature has referred to moving the Court by an application in certain cases. There is no such provision made in sec. 28 of the Act. It cannot therefore be said that the Court cannot enlarge the time without any application of the party concerned. As said earlier the relevant rules framed by the High Court refer to applications for extension of time for an arbitrator or umpire to make his award in any suit or matter filed in the Court. It does not state that without any application made the Court suo motu has no power to enlarge the time in the exercise of the powers under sec. 28 of the Act. ( 19 ) MR. Vin has invited my attention to the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in SHIVJI POONJA KOTHARI V. RAMJIMAL BABULAL A. I. R. 1931 BOMBAY 125. At page 126 the relevant observations made are:the matter then came on for hearing on 18th November and counsel for the res- pondents apparently asked the Court itself to extend the time if in fact the award was out of time and the order of the learned Judge wasi do enlarge the time for making the award till 1st day of February 1929 and I do further order that the petition be and it is hereby dismissed. NOW there was no substantive application to the learned Judge to extend the timed and the appellants say that they were taken by surprise. RULE 373 of the rules of this Court provides that all applications under the Arbitration Act other than under sec. NOW there was no substantive application to the learned Judge to extend the timed and the appellants say that they were taken by surprise. RULE 373 of the rules of this Court provides that all applications under the Arbitration Act other than under sec. 19 shall be made by petition except as therein after otherwise provided; and rule 377 provides that every petition or a copy thereof shall specify the persons affected thereby and upon whom notice has to be served as thereinafter provided Then rule 378 provides for the service of the notice on persons specified in the petition In my view if an application was to be made to the learned Judge to extend the time for making the award particular as the appli- cation was long after the award had in act been made there ought to have been a substantive application by petition which should have been served on the other side and the matter could then have been argued. AT page 127 in the judgment of Blackwell J. it is observed:then comes the question whether that being the position the respondents were entitled themselves to ash the Judge to enlarge the time under sec. 12 Arbitration Act. In my Opinion it was not open to the Judge having regard to rule 373 of the High Court Rules to accede to the oral application made by the respondents at the hearing of the appellants petition. He ought is he had though that the respon- dents should have an opportunity or making an application to have granted them an adjournment to enable them to raise the matter in a proper form by petition which would be duly served upon the other side. Instead or adopting that course the learned Judge dealt with the matter there and then and refused an application by the petitioners counsel for an adjournment to show cause why time should not be ext- ended In my opinion even assuming that the learned Judge could have dealt with the matter in the absence of a petition in that behalf by the respondents the peti- tioners ought to have had an opportunity of placing on affidavit such facts as they deemed necessary to enable the Judge to exercise his discretion on the point of extention of time. They have had no such opportunity and quite apart from the fact that in my opinion a petition by the respondents was necessary I should have thought it necessary to send the matter back to the learned Judge on that ground alone namely that the petitioners had had no opportunity of meeting the point. ( 20 ) IN Rules and Forms of the Bombay High Court (on the original Side) in its Several jurisdiction 1957 corresponding rule appears to be rule 391 which reads: (A) All applications under the Act other than those mentioned in sub-rule (c) herein shall be made by petition and when they are not under secs. 17 20 and 34 of the Act shall be presented to the Sitting Judge in Chambers. (B) Applications under secs. 17 20 and 34 shall be made by motion in open Court in the Arbitration Suit or Matter as the case may be. (C) Applications for extension of time for an arbitrator or umpire to make his award in any Arbitration Suit or Matter when consented to by all parties may be made in Chambers by presenting a consent order supported by an affidavit verifying the consent of parties. IN the instant case as said earlier by me the scheme of the Act clearly indicates that whenever the legislature wanted that the Court should be moved by an application it has made the provisions specifically. So far as sec. 28 of the Act is concerned no such application has been specifically referred to. The Court in my opinion can therefore when it finds that it should act suo motu call enlarge time even without any application as contemplated under these rules referred to by Mr. Vin. . ( 21 ) MR. Vin has invited my attention to the decision of a single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in KASIRAJU LAKSHMIKANTA RAO V. DENDUKURI VENKETESWARLU A. I. R. 1960 ANDHRA PRADESH 576. At page 578 it is observed. . . . BUT in 1945 the Madras High Court has in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 44 of the Arbitration Act 1940 framed Rules which appear in Chapter XIV of the Civil Rules of Practice entitled Rules under the Arbitration Act 1940rules 1 and 2 prescribe the form of applications under the Arbitration Act. . . . BUT in 1945 the Madras High Court has in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 44 of the Arbitration Act 1940 framed Rules which appear in Chapter XIV of the Civil Rules of Practice entitled Rules under the Arbitration Act 1940rules 1 and 2 prescribe the form of applications under the Arbitration Act. Rule 1 provides that all applications and proceedings under the Act shall be headed in the matter of the Act and of the arbitration and save as otherwise provided shall be made by petition. Rule 2 states that every petition shall be in writing signed and verified in the same manner as a pleading under the C. P. C. specifying the name description and place of residence of the petitioner and the respondent and shall contain a statement of the material facts and the nature of the relief prayed for and shall specify the persons liable to be affected thereby. FROM a reading of these Rules it is manifest that such applications have to be made in the form of Original petitions; and as already stated Art. 11 (m) of Schedule II Andhra Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act makes specific provision for payment of Court-fee on all applications filed under the Arbitration Act. Rules 1 and 2 framed under the Arbitration Act require that application should be in writing. Art. 11 (m) of the Court-fees Act prescribes the payment of Court-fee On a combined reading of those provisions it is clear that the mere filing of objections or an oral application will not satisfy the requirements of law. THIS conclusion receives further support from the language of the proviso to sec. 33 which provides that where the Court deems it just and expedient it may set down the application for hearing on other evidence also and may pass such orders for discovery and particulars as it may do in a suit. It will be seen that there is no question of an oral application being set down for hearing. Therefore to give effect to the argument of the learned counsel for the defendent that neither a written application nor the payment of Court-fee on such an application is a pre- requisite for setting aside the award would have the result of rendering all the aforesaid provisions atiose. IT is significant to note that sec. Therefore to give effect to the argument of the learned counsel for the defendent that neither a written application nor the payment of Court-fee on such an application is a pre- requisite for setting aside the award would have the result of rendering all the aforesaid provisions atiose. IT is significant to note that sec. 33 of the Act itself clearly refers to filing of such application. That decision therefore cannot be of much use in deciding the question that is posed before me. ( 22 ) IN SAKALCHAND MOTI V. AMBARAM HARIBHAI A. I. R. 1924 BOMBAY 380 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court after referring to the follo- wing observations made in MONJI PREMJI SET. V. MALIYAKEL KOYASSAN KOYA HAJI (1880) 3 MADRAS 59:we must accept the declaration made by the Subordinate Judge that extensions of the period for the submission of the award were from time to time granted though we may observe that applications for such extensions should ordinarily be in writing and that most certainly orders thereon should be. has in terms observed:it cannot possibly be deduced from those words that an oral application to the Court is void and that any order passed thereon even though in writing as in this case was equally void. ( 23 ) IN MADURA MILLS CO. LTD. V. N. M. S. KRISHNA AYYAR A. I. R. 1937 MADRAS 405 while considering the provisions of sec. 12 of the Old Arbi- tration Act 1899 the High Court observed:sec. 12 Arbitration Act enables the Court to enlarge the time for making an award whether the time for making the award has. expired or not. There is nothing on the section to suggest that the Court should not exercise this power unless it has been expressly asked by a party to do so. So where arbitration proceedings are unduly delayed but the Court thinks fit to refuse leave to the petitioner to revoke the submission there is no other alternative but to extend the time for the making of the award. ( 24 ) IN AMAR NATH V. UGGAR SEN A. I. R. 1949 ALLAHABAD 399 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Wanchoo and Bhargava JJ. has at page 491 observed in para 12:the award filed after the expiry of the prescribed period was not invalid. ( 24 ) IN AMAR NATH V. UGGAR SEN A. I. R. 1949 ALLAHABAD 399 a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court consisting of Wanchoo and Bhargava JJ. has at page 491 observed in para 12:the award filed after the expiry of the prescribed period was not invalid. The application for revocation of the agreement having been rejected the reference remained in force and the arbitrators could proceed with the arbitration. The parties continued to participate in the proceedings and thereby consented to the arbitrators Continuing the proceedings. True there was no formal application made to the Court to extend the time but that by itself could not affect the validity of the award. 99in para 14 it is further observed: the appellants learned counsel next contended that the award was otherwise invalid but we see no force in this contention either. The absence of an application for extension of time was a mere irreqularity. It was not an illegality Applying this test the omission to make a formal application for extension of time was a mere irregularity which the parties had waived by their conduct. Moreover in face of the order dated 23rd December 1943 which the Court had jurisdiction to pass under sec. 28 of the Act the delay in filing the award did not render it invalid. ( 25 ) IN NARSING DAS HIRALAL LTD V. BISANDAYAL SATYANARAIN FIRM A. I. R. 1954 ORISSA 29 a single Judge of the Orissa High Court after referring to the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act has observedit will be noticed that the language of the sub-section (sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28) is very wide and confers full discretion on the Court to enlarge the time limit for making the award at any time. That power can be exercised even though the time for making the award has expired and also even after the award has been made. IT will be useful to compare the provisions of this sub-sec with the corres- ponding provisions of the previous statutory enactments dealing with arbitration. Sec. 12 Indian Arbitration Act 1899 was as follows:the time for making an award may from time to time be enlarged by order of the Court whether the time for making the award has expired or not. Sec. 12 Indian Arbitration Act 1899 was as follows:the time for making an award may from time to time be enlarged by order of the Court whether the time for making the award has expired or not. PARA 8 of Schedule 2 Civil P. C. 1908 was as follows: where the arbitrators or the umpire cannot complete the award within the period specified in the order the Court may if it thinks fit either allow further time and from time to time either before or after the expiration of the period fixed for the making of the award; enlarge such period. IT is true that in Schedule 2 Civil P. C. 1908 no statutory period was fixed for the making of an award as in para 3 of Schedule I Arbitration Act 1940 But it will be noticed that though in sec. 12 Indian Arbitration Act 1899 and para 8 of Sche- dule 2 Civil P. C. 1908 it is expressly stated that the power of the Court to enlarge the time limit may be exercised whether the time for making the award has expired or not it is not further stated that this power can be exercised even after the award has been made. IN sub-sec. (1) of sec 28 however any doubt about the power of the Court to enlarge the time limit even after the award has been made has been set at rest by the use of the following words: whether the award has been made or not. Appa- rentlv those words were inserted with a view to give statutory recognition to the principle of English law decided in the cases referred to therein. THUS on a question of mere construction of sub-sec. (13 of sec. 2. Arbitration Act 1940 and giving due importance to the words whether the award has been made or not deliberately inserted in that sub-section when the law of arbitration was re-enacted in 1940 I must hold that the power of the Court to enlarge the time limit is not limited to any particular stage of the arbitration proceeding and that it can be exer- cised at any time. In the present case the trial Court purported to exercise this power while hearing the petition under secs. 14 and 17 Arbitration Act for the pur- pose of deciding whether the judgment should be given in terms of the award. In the present case the trial Court purported to exercise this power while hearing the petition under secs. 14 and 17 Arbitration Act for the pur- pose of deciding whether the judgment should be given in terms of the award. AT page 31 in para 11 it is observed: it is true that there was no specific prayer by the plaintiffs to the Court for exten- ding the time limit and the Court granted that extension while writing out its judg- ment after considering the entire evidence on record. But sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 does not say that the Court cannot exercise the power conferred by that sub-section suomotu In A. I. R. 1949 Allahabad 399 it was held that the absence of an application for the extension of time was a mere irregularity which may be waived by conduct. ( 26 ) IN my opinion those decisions correctly lay down the position of law that the Court can exercise its power under sec. 28 of the Act even without an application of the party. As said by me earlier the rule relied upon by Mr. Vin only refers to the case when an umpire or an arbitrator moves the Court for enlargement of time. In the instant case the Court has in exercise of its power thought fit to enlarge the time and condoned the delay. It cannot therefore be said that the order of the Court is bad as time has been enlarged without any such written application filed by the party concerned. Submission No. 2 of Mr. Vin therefore fails. ( 27 ) SUBMISSION No. 3 of Mr. Vin was that it was obligatory upon the Judge in case sec. 28 of the Act applied to follow the known pro- cedure as provided in the Arbitration Rules framed for the Ahmedabad City Civil Court by the High Court. I have already referred to rule 35 of the Ahmedabad City Civil Court Rules which refers to the position that applications in all matters arising under the Act can be heard by the Judge in Chambers. That rule has no bearing to the question that is posed before me. In the instant case the arbitrators themselves filed an award in the Court following the procedure prescribed under those rules. Affidavit was also filed. That rule has no bearing to the question that is posed before me. In the instant case the arbitrators themselves filed an award in the Court following the procedure prescribed under those rules. Affidavit was also filed. The Registrar issued notices to the parties con- cerned and thereafter the present appellant filed his objections by making an application which was separately numbered. Arbitrators application for making the award a rule of the Court was also separately numbered. Both the applications were heard together and a common order came. to be passed and the award was held to be null and void only on the ground that it was made beyond the period of four months from the date of the arbitrators entered upon the reference. Submission N9. 3 of Mr. Vin is also therefore not well founded. ( 28 ) SUBMISSION No. 4 made by Mr. Vin was that the extension of time was not a mere formality. It was an exercise of a judicial discretion Mere circumstance that the delay is for five days is immaterial. Court has to apply its mind and issue notice to the other side to show cause why the delay should not be condoned. In the instant case submitted Mr. Vin no such notice was given and no ground was shown for condoning the delay. The order is therefore bad. It is no doubt true that the dis- cretion under sec. 28 of the Act if sec. 28 applies is not to be used arbitrarily. It has to be used judicially. Other party has got to be heard. In the instant case in the review applications grounds were made out for condoning the delay and it was especially pointed out to the Court how the mistake crept in. The provisions of sec. 28 of the Act were earlier overlooked both by the Court and the Advocate concerned. It is signi- ficant to note that in the earlier proceedings the main bone of conten- tion between the parties was as to when this period prescribed will commence. The provisions of sec. 28 of the Act were earlier overlooked both by the Court and the Advocate concerned. It is signi- ficant to note that in the earlier proceedings the main bone of conten- tion between the parties was as to when this period prescribed will commence. ( 29 ) PARA 3 of the First Schedule to the Act which is material for our purposes reads:3 The arbitrators shall make their award within for months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party to the arbitration agreement or within such extended time as the Court may allow. ONE partys contention before the learned trial Judge was that the period of four months should be computed from 21-12-1967 the date the par- ties were heard on arbitrators calling upon them to appear before them and not on 15-12-1967 the date the notices to the parties were issued by the Secretary Stock Exchange Ahmedabad- The Court in the earlier order dated 16-1-1970 found that the time commenced from 15-12-1967 and not from 21-12-1967 and so the award dated 20-4-1968 was not made within a period of four months In the review applications respondent No. 1 prayed for condoning this delay- Notices of the review applications were given to the present appellant and he also filed his written state- ment and after hearing the parties the impugned order has been passed and the delay has been condoned and the time has been extended for making the award by the learned trial Judge. ( 30 ) MR. Vin has invited my attention to the decision of my learned Brother S. H. Sheth J. in ANIRUDDH ASHARAM VYAS V. DEEPAK KANTILAL GHIYA 13 GUJARAT LAW REPORTER 228. It is observed therein:. . . THE very fact that the parties did not consent outside the Court to enlargement of time pre-supposes some controversy between them in the matter of enlargement of time if that is so. it is necessary that the controversy or the dispute relating to the enlargement of time between the parties must be adjudicated upon by the Court when an application is made under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act for the purpose of enlargement of time for making the award. it is necessary that the controversy or the dispute relating to the enlargement of time between the parties must be adjudicated upon by the Court when an application is made under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28 of the Arbitration Act for the purpose of enlargement of time for making the award. In that view of the matter I am of the opinion that the Court cannot on a mere application made by an arbitrator enlarge time without issuing notice to the parties and without hearing them. In this case the trial Court extended time on a bare application made by the arbitrator without issuing notice to the parties and without hearing them. In that view of the matter in my opinion the order made by the trial Court is not in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 28. IT is significant to note that in that case the Court without issuing notice to the parties and without hearing them had passed the impugned order regard- ing enlargement of time and that is why it was held that the order was bad. In the instant case both the sides have been heard and after that this order has been passed. That decision has therefore no application. Further- more that decision does not lay down that the Court can exercise power under sec. 28 of the Act only on the application made by the party con- cerned. It cannot be said in the instant case that the learned trial Judge has condoned the delay and enlarged the time for making the award with- out any application of mind as has been suggested by Mr. Vin. The Court has stated in clearest terms that in these provisions of sec. 28 of the Act had been pointed out to it at the time of earlier order passed by it it would have no hesitation in enlarging the time and condoning the delay in the circumstances of the case. The real bone of contention was as to the date when the period of four months prescribed commenced. It is not only the case of delay of five days but the delay is on account of a mistake as to when the period will commence. The real bone of contention was as to the date when the period of four months prescribed commenced. It is not only the case of delay of five days but the delay is on account of a mistake as to when the period will commence. The learned trial Judge in the circumstances of the case was fully justified in condoning the delay and in extending the time for making the award. His order will not be a bad order if the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act can be availed of. ( 31 ) THE important and interesting question that requires consideration and remains to be considered is whether in view of the provisions of sec. 46 of the Act and on account of the existence of the bye-laws made by this Stock Exchange Ahmedabad the powers of the Court under sec. 28 of the Act are taken away. There is a controversy between the parties as to whether the said bye-laws have the force of law meaning thereby whether those bye-laws are statutory bye-laws Furthermore whether the provisions contained therein would over-ride the provisions of the Act and further more whether there are any provisions in the bye-laws which are inconsi- stent with the provisions of the Act in this behalf. 42 Sec. 46 of the Act reads: the provisions of this Act except sub-sec. (1) of sec 6 and secs. 7 12 36 and 37 shall apply to every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other enactment were an arbitration agreement except in so far as this Act is inco- nsistent with that other enactment or with any rules made thereunder: ( 32 ) IN the instant case are not concerned with sub-sec. (1) of sec. 6 and secs. 7 12 36 and 37 of the Act. We are concerned with the provisions contained in sec. 28 of the Act. The question therefore that this for consideration is whether the arbitration referred to in the relevant bye- law made by the Ahmedabad Stock Exchange Association can be said to be a statutory arbitration. If it is a statutory arbitration whether there are any provisions contained therein which are inconsistent with the provisions contained in sec. 28 of the Act with which we are concerned. If it is a statutory arbitration whether there are any provisions contained therein which are inconsistent with the provisions contained in sec. 28 of the Act with which we are concerned. ( 33 ) THIS sec. 46 of the Act deals with those statutory arbitrations where the statute itself is looked upon as an arbitration agreement. This sec. further lays down that its provisions apply only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the other enactment or with the rules made thereunder. Thus where an Act and the Rules made thereunder are a complete Code so far as arbitration in matters relating to a particular party as for instance co-operative societies are concerned the provisions of this Act cannot be made applicable. ( 34 ) IN NANDA KISHORE GOSWAMI V. BALLY CO-OPERATIVE CREDIT SOCIETY LTD. a Division Bench-of the Calcutta High Court had to deal with rule 22 of the Rules framed under sec. 43 of the Co-operative Societies Act 1912 Looking to the entire scheme of the Act at page 256 the relevant observations made are:the whole scheme of these provisions is to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court throughout the arbitration proceedings and the application to the Civil Court is necessary only for the purposes of enforcing the award which has been given the same force and effect as the decree of a Civil Court. In our opinion the machinery and the procedure indicated by these provisions are totally inconsistent with the provisions contained in Chapter 2 Arbitration Act. The Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator in a proceeding under rule 22 as framed under sec. 43 Co- operative Societies Act as it can certainly do under sec 8 Arbitration Act nor can it remove an arbitrator as can be done under sec. 11. the whole tiling has got to be done without any intervention of the Court The Court cannot modify an award as laid down in sec. 15 Arbitration Act nor is there any necessity of filing an award in Court as is contemplated by sec. 14 and we are definitely of opinion that it is not necessary to have a judgment and award as indicated in sec. 17 Arbi- tration Act. 15 Arbitration Act nor is there any necessity of filing an award in Court as is contemplated by sec. 14 and we are definitely of opinion that it is not necessary to have a judgment and award as indicated in sec. 17 Arbi- tration Act. If there is no necessity for filing the award Article 178 Limitation Act can obviously have no application and the amended provision regarding limitation as it occurs in schedule 4 Arbitration Act is also inapplicable. IN the instant case it is an admitted position that such an award given by an arbitrator has to be filed in the Court and if the Court makes it a rule of the Court that award can be enforced. It is also significant to note that in the earlier proceedings the period of four months for making the award was suggested on the basis of para 3 of Schedule I to the Act. It is only at this stage in this appeal against the order passed in the review applications Mr. Vin has urged that the period of four months is suggested in view of the relevant bye-law of the Stock Exchange Asso- ciation and it is the President or the governing board that has been given power to extend the period of giving the award and consequently the powers of the Court are taken away in view of the provisions of sec. 46 of the Act. I have referred to the aforesaid Calcutta decision only for the purpose of emphasising that there is no such self-contained code and the said bye-laws do not say that the award passed by an arbitrator is to be enforced as a decree of the Court without filing the award in the Court as required under sec. 14 of the Act to make it a rule of the Court. ( 35 ) IT is necessary at this stage to refer to the material provisions of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956 (which will be hereinafter referred to as the Regulation Act ). Contract has been defined in sec. 2 as under: (A) contract means a contract for or relating to the purchase or sale of securities. In sec. 2 (e) prescribed has been defined as under: (E) prescribed means prescribed by rules made under this Act. In sec. Contract has been defined in sec. 2 as under: (A) contract means a contract for or relating to the purchase or sale of securities. In sec. 2 (e) prescribed has been defined as under: (E) prescribed means prescribed by rules made under this Act. In sec. 2 (f) recognised stock exchange has been defined as under: (F) recognised stock exchange means a stock exchange which is for the time being recognised by the Central Government under sec. 4. Sec. 2 (g) defines rules as under: (G) rules with reference to the rules relating in general to the constitution and management of a stock exchange includes in the case of a stock exchange which is an incorporated association its memorandum and articles of association. SEC. 2 (j) defines stock exchange as under: (j) stock exchange means any body of individuals whether incorporated or not constituted for the purpose of assisting regulating or controlling the business of buying selling or dealing in securities. ( 36 ) SEC. 3 of the Regulation Act deals with application for recogni- tion of stock exchanges. Sub-sec. (2) of it indicates that every application made under sub-sec. (1) shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a copy of the bye-laws of the stock exchange for the regulation and control of contracts It is therefore evident that when any stock exchange which is desirous of being recognised for the purposes of the said Act makes an application for that purpose the application is required to be accompanied by a copy of the bye-laws. ( 37 ) SEC. 4 of the Regulation Act further indicates that the Central Government has to satisfy itself after making inquiry as may be necessary in this behalf and after obtaining such further information if ally as it may require that the rules and bye-laws of a stock exchange applying for registration are in conformity with such conditions as may be prescribed with a view to ensure fair dealing and to protect investors Mr. Vin is right in his submission that these bye-laws have to be confirmed to a parti- cular pattern prescribed. But the requisite conditions are prescribed with a view to ensure fair dealing and to protect the investors. Vin is right in his submission that these bye-laws have to be confirmed to a parti- cular pattern prescribed. But the requisite conditions are prescribed with a view to ensure fair dealing and to protect the investors. There is nothing in that section or in any of the provisions of the Regulation Act itself that such disputes as have arisen in the instant case between the appellant and respondent No. 1 shall be referred to arbitration. No doubt sec. 9 of the Regulation Act empowers any recognised stock exchange to make bye-laws for the regulation and control of contracts subject to the previous approval of the Central Government. Sub-clause (n) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 9 in terms states:9 In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such bye-laws may provide for (N) the method and procedure for the settlement of claims or disputes including settlement by arbitration. IT cannot be deduced from these provisions that there is statutory arbitration. This section empowers any recognised stock exchange to make bye-laws for the regulation and control of contracts and in particular such bye-laws may also provide for the method and procedure for the settlement of claims or disputes including settlement by arbitration. Sub-sec. (3) of sec. 9 of the Regulation Act reads: (3) The bye-laws made under this section may- (a) specify the bye-laws the contravention of which shall make a contract entered into otherwise than in accordance with the bye-laws void under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14; (B) provide that the contravention of any of the bye-laws shall render the mem- ber concerned liable to one or more of the following punishments namely : (I) fine (ii) expulsion from membership; (iii) suspension from membership for a specified period; (iv) any other penalty of a like nature not involving the payment of money. IT thus indicates that the penalty is provided for the contravention of any of the bye-laws made against a member. Further it is provided that the bye-laws made under this section may specify the bye-laws the contravent- ion of which shall make a contract entered into otherwise than in accordance with the bye-laws void under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14. Sub-sec. (4) of it deals with publication of such bye-laws in the Official Gazette. ( 38 ) SEC. Further it is provided that the bye-laws made under this section may specify the bye-laws the contravent- ion of which shall make a contract entered into otherwise than in accordance with the bye-laws void under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 14. Sub-sec. (4) of it deals with publication of such bye-laws in the Official Gazette. ( 38 ) SEC. 14 of the Regulation Act reads: (1) Any contract entered into in any State or area specified in the notification under sec. 13 which is in contravention of any of the bye-laws specified in that behalf under clause (a) of sub-sec (3) of sec. 9 shall be void- (I) as respects the rights of any member of a recognised stock exchange who has entered into such contract in contravention of any such bye-law and also (ii) as respects the rights of any other person who has knowingly participated in the transaction entailing such contravention (2) Nothing in sub sec. (1) shall be construed to effect the right of any person other than a member of the recognised stock exchange to enforce any such contract or to recover any sum under or in respect of such contract if such person had no knowledge that the transaction was in contravention of any of the bye-laws specified in clause (a) of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 9. IT is significant to note at this stage that there is no provisions in this Regulation Act itself that the dispute regarding such contracts shall have to be referred to arbitration. Sec. 30 of the Regulation Act empowers the Central Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the object of this Act (Regulation Act) and such rules in exercise of the powers have been framed by the Central Government and those rules are known as ;the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Rules 1957 In those rules also no such provision is made. ( 39 ) I will now consider the bye-laws made by the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad. ( 39 ) I will now consider the bye-laws made by the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad. Bye-law No. 226 which is at page 225 of the book-The Stock Exchange Rules Bye-laws and Regulations 1957 Ahmedabad-reads:226 (a) All contracts made by a member for or with a non-member for the purchase or sale of securities in which dealings are permitted on the Exchange shall in all cases be deemed made subject to the Rules Bye-laws Regulations and Usages of the Exchange which shall be a part of the terms and conditions of all such contracts and they shall be subject to the exercise by the Governing Board and the President of the powers with respect thereto vested in it or him by the Rules Bye- laws and Regulations of the Exchange. THIS will only mean that all such contracts shall be deemed to be made subject to the Rules Bye-laws Regulations and Usages of the Exchange and they should form a part of the terms and conditions of all such contracts. ( 40 ) UNDER the caption Arbitration other than between members at page 235 Bye-law No. 248 reads: 248 All claims (whether admitted or not) differences and disputes between a member and a non-member or non-members (the terms non-member and non- members shall include a remisier authorised clerk or employee or any other person with whom the member shares brokerage) arising out of or in relation to dealings transactions and contracts made subject to the Rules Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange or with reference to anything incidental thereto or in pursuance thereof or relating to their construction fulfilment or validity or relating to the rights obligations and liabilities of remisiers authorised clerks employees or any other persons with whom the member shares brokerage in relation to such dealings transactions and contracts shall be referred to and decided by arbitration as provided in the Rules Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange. ( 41 ) BYE-LAW No. 254 reads:the arbitrators shall make their award within four months after entering on the reference or after having been called upon to act by notice in writing from any party or within such extended time as the arbitrators may fix with the consent of the parties to the reference or as the Governing Board or the President may allow. Bye-law No. 259 deals with the filing of an award in the Court. Bye-law No. 259 deals with the filing of an award in the Court. Bye-law No. 261 on which considerable emphasis has been laid by Mr. Vin reads: 261 The Governing Board or the President may if deemed fit whether the time for making the award has expired or not and whether the award has been made or not extended from time to time the time for making the award by a period not exceeding one month at a time from the due date or extended due date of the award. BYE-LAW No. 263 reads: 263 The fees to be paid the forms to be used and the procedure to be followed in connection with a reference to arbitration under these Bye-laws and Regulations shall be such as are prescribed in the relative Regulation (Regulation 15) or such other as the Governing Board may from time to time prescribe in addition thereto or in modification in substitution thereof. SUCH Regulation 15. framed under Bye-law No. 263 which deals with Arbitration other than between members finds place at page 451 and 452 of this book. Regulation No. 15- 3 deals with nomination and notice of appointment. Regulation No. 15. 13 which deals with extension of time for making award reads:15. 13 The arbitrators or umpire may from time to time apply (Form No. 11) to the Governing Board or the President for extension of time for making the award. It prescribes the procedure for moving the Governing Board or the President by the arbitrators or umpire for extension of time for making the award. This book deals with Arbitration between members at page 247 and onwards. Bye-law No. 288 reads:all claims complaints differences and disputes between members arising out of or in relation to any bargains dealings transactions or contracts made subject to the Rules Bye-laws and Regulations of the Exchange or with reference to anything incidental thereto or anything to be done in pursuance thereof and any question or dispute whether such bargains dealings transactions or contracts have been entered into or not shall he subject to arbitration and referred to the Arbitration Committee as provided in these Bye-laws and Regulations. IN the instant. case we are not concerned with the arbitration between members. IN the instant. case we are not concerned with the arbitration between members. This bye-law in terms states that such disputes between members shall be subject to arbitration and referred to the Arbitration Committee as provided in these Bye-laws and Regulations. In case of arbitration other than between members the party concerned has to appo- int an arbitrator. In case of dispute between members the dispute has to be referred to the Arbitration Committee. ( 42 ) THESE are the material provisions which have to be borne in mind for understanding the scheme of these bye-laws and the distinction in case of arbitration between members and in case of arbitration other than between members. Mr. Vin has submitted that even though the Regulation Act does not contain any provision that such disputes have got to be referred to arbitration in view of the relevant provisions of the bye-laws referred to above such contracts are subject to such bye- laws and the material bye-law states that the matter has to be referred to arbitration. It will be nontheless a statutory arbitration. In my opinion this argument is not well-founded. It cannot be said to be a statutory arbitration. In view of the Provisions of the bye-laws in such cases it is to be deemed that in the contract there is such an agreement to refer the matter to arbitration as these contracts are deemed to be subject to such rules regulations and bye-laws. ( 43 ) MR. Vin in support of his submission in this behalf has laid considerable emphasis on the decision of Kania. J. (as he then was) in SHIVCHANDRAI JHUNJHUNWALLA V. MUSSAMAT PANNO BIBI 45 BOMBAY LAW REPORTER 392. The second contention raised before Kania J. was that the Chairman of the East India Cotton Association Ltd. Bombay had no jurisdiction to extend the time without the consent of the parties in view of the provisions contained in sec. 28 of the Act. It has been observed Kania J. THE bye-laws framed under the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act 1932 by virtue of sec. 4 (1) read with secs. 5 and 6 are statutory bye-laws and are therefore excepted from the operation of the Indian Arbitration Act. 1940. ACCORDINGLY the last para of bye-law 38-A of the East India Cotton Association bye-laws empowering the Chairman of the Association to extend the time for making an award is valid. 4 (1) read with secs. 5 and 6 are statutory bye-laws and are therefore excepted from the operation of the Indian Arbitration Act. 1940. ACCORDINGLY the last para of bye-law 38-A of the East India Cotton Association bye-laws empowering the Chairman of the Association to extend the time for making an award is valid. IN the body of the judgment the relevant observations made at page 393 and 394 and relied upon by Mr. Vin are:in support of the second ground it was argued that sec. 28 of the Indian Arbitra- tion Act (X of 1940) will be applicable and any provision in the arbitration agreement giving power to the arbitrator or umpire except with the consent of the parties to enlarge time for making the award is void. By the first part of that section the Court is empowered to enlarge the time for making the award whether the time originally fixed had expired or not. It is pointed out that in this case time was not extended by the Court and the application of the umpire to the Chairman of the Association to extend time was without jurisdiction. On the other hand sec. 46 of the Indian Arbitration Act is relevant. Under that section provisions of the Arbit- ration Act in so far as they are inconsistent with another Act or with rules made thereunder are considered inapplicable. Having regard to this section it is necessary to consider the effect of the bye-laws of the Association and the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act under which the bye-laws have been framed. Under sec. 4 of that Act (Bombay IV of 1932) a cotton association will be recognised provided it complies with certain regulations. Sub-sec. (7) of that section provides that the East India Cotton Association Ltd. is a recognised cotton association and the articles and bye- laws of the said ass ociation shall so far as they relate to matters for which bye-laws may be made under the provisions of secs. 5 and 6 be deemed to be bye-laws of a recognised cotton association. Under sec. 6 the Board of Directors subject to the sanction of the Governor-in-Council is authorised to make from time to time bye-laws for the regulation and control of transactions in cotton and without prejudice to the generality of the principle sub-sec. 5 and 6 be deemed to be bye-laws of a recognised cotton association. Under sec. 6 the Board of Directors subject to the sanction of the Governor-in-Council is authorised to make from time to time bye-laws for the regulation and control of transactions in cotton and without prejudice to the generality of the principle sub-sec. (2) clause (g) empowers the Board to frame bye-laws providing for the terms conditions and incidents of contracts and the form of such contracts as are in writing. IN the present case the original contracting parties were both members of the Association. It is clear that the bye-laws framed under sec. 6 would be statutory by reason of the provisions of sec. 4 (7) of the said Act. IT will be profitable at this stage to refer to sub-sec. (7) of sec. 4 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act 1932 It reads: (7) It is hereby declared that the East India Cotton Association Limited is a recog- nised cotton association for the purposes and subject to the provisions of this Act and the articles and bye-laws of the said Association shall so far as they relate to matters for which bye-laws may be made under the provisions of secs. 5 and 6 be deemed to be bye-laws of a recognised cotton association. IT is thus evident that by that sub-section the East India Cotton Associ- ation Limited was taken to be a recognised cotton association for the purposes and subject to the provisions of that Act and the articles and bye-laws of the said Association were deemed to be the bye-laws of a recognised cotton association. Furthermore sub-sec. (2) of sec. 5 of that Act which is material for our purposes reads:bye-LAWS made added to varied or rescinded under sub-sec. (1) shall be laid before each of the Chambers of the Provincial Legislature at the session hereof next follow- ing and shall be liable to be modified or rescinded by a resolution in which both Chambers concur. If any bye-law is so modified or rescinded the Provincial Government may sanction such modified bye-law and re-publish the same accordingly or may sanction such rescissionin the bye-laws in question there is no such provision requiring the bye- laws to be placed before the legislature. If any bye-law is so modified or rescinded the Provincial Government may sanction such modified bye-law and re-publish the same accordingly or may sanction such rescissionin the bye-laws in question there is no such provision requiring the bye- laws to be placed before the legislature. No doubt control has been kept with the Central Government and the Central Government can suggestmodifications and after consulting the Government body such modific- ations can be made at the instance of the Central Government. ( 44 ) IT is further observed at page 394 by Kania J. in the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court:one of the conditions of the contracts which is settled by the Board of Directors with the sanction of the Governor-in-Council as required by sec. 6 is that there shall be compulory arbitration. If so it seems to me that within the meaning of sec. 46 of the Indian Arbitration Act such special provisions as are contained in the bye-laws framed by the East India Cotton Association Ltd. are operative irs spite of the provisions of the Arbitration Act. It is not disputed that the action of the umpire in requesting the Chairman to extend time was according to the bye- Bye-law 38-A (last paragraph) provides as follows:the umpire shall make his award within ten days from the date of his appointment unless the time is extended by the Chairman. It may be noted that if this bye-law is inapplicable it must be conceded also that the bye-law which limits the time within which the arbitrators and the umpire had to make the award should also be considered inapplicable and if the time fixed by the Arbitration Act alone was taken into consideration for deciding whether the award of the umpire was within time it seems that the award is still within time. On the second point therefore it seems that the bye-laws framed under the Cotton Contracts Act by virtue of sec. 4 (7) read with secs. 5 and 6 are statutory bye-laws and therefore are excepted from the operation of the Arbitration Act. ( 45 ) IF we now refer to the material provisions of the Bombay Cotton Act 1932 which was the subject-matter of consideration in that case sec. 4 (7) read with secs. 5 and 6 are statutory bye-laws and therefore are excepted from the operation of the Arbitration Act. ( 45 ) IF we now refer to the material provisions of the Bombay Cotton Act 1932 which was the subject-matter of consideration in that case sec. 4 deals with recognition and a cotton association desirous of being recognised for the purpose of that Act has to submit bye--laws for the regulation and control of transactions in cotton to the Provincial Government. Sec. 5 (1) empowers a recognised cotton association to make bye-laws providing for (a) the constitution of the Board of Directors (b) the powers and duties of the Board of Directors and the-manner in which its business has to be conducted. . Sec. 6 empowers the Board of Directors subject to the sanction of the Provincial Government to make and from time to time add to vary or rescind bye-laws for the regu- lation and control of transactions in cotton. Clause (j) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6 provides for the settlement of claims and disputes by arbitration and appeals against awards. Sec. 8 which is material for our purposes and which deals with void contracts reads: (1) Save as hereinafter provided in this Act. any contract (whether either party thereto is a member of a recognised cotton association or not) which is entered into after the date on which this Act comes into operation and which is not in accordance with the bye-laws of any recognised cotton association shall be void. IT is thus evident that there is material difference between the wording of sec. 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act and sec. 4 of the Regulation Act. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 8 of the Bombay Cotton Contracts Act reads: (2) No claim shall be allowed in any Court for the recovery of any commission brokerage fee or reward in respect of any such contract. IN my opinion in view of the different provisions contained in these two Act it would not be proper to reach the conclusion in regard to the bye- laws in question on the basis of the bye-laws framed by the East India Cotton Association Ltd. Apart from that it is significant to note that in the aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court Kania J. had not to deal with the question regarding powers of the Court. The question was whether the power under the bye-law given to the Governing Body or the Chairman who had exercised the jurisdiction to enlarge the time would be without jurisdiction in view of the provisions of sec. 28 of the Act. In the bye-laws in question there are no provisions which say that the powers of the Court are taken away. There are no provisions which could be said to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. Even if sec. 46 of the Act had application there is nothing in the bye-laws which could be said to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act so that the provisions contained in sec. 28 of the Act giving power to the Court to extend time even after the award is made can be said to have been taken away. ( 46 ) MR. S. K. Zaveri appearing for respondent No. 1 has urged the bye- laws in question cannot be said to be statutory bye-laws. His submission is that to give the character of subordinate legislation it must have been delegated by the legislative body to have authority of person to legislate to that extent. The Regulation Act does not give that authority. The bye laws in question pertain to the business. No doubt some control is kept by the Central Government. Bye-laws have to be confirmed to a particular pattern meaning thereby that the bye-laws will have to be consistent with the provisions of the Act. That by itself will not mean submitted Mr. Zaveri that these bye-laws are the statutory bye-laws. Mr. Zaveri has submitted that the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad was not a creature of statute. It was not a statutory body. bye-laws therefore framed by it even though the Act empowers by sec. 9 such associations to frame bye-laws which may contain the provisions providing for settlement of disputes by arbitration these bye-laws cannot be said to be statutory bye-laws having the force of law. ( 47 ) IN support of his submission Mr. Zaveri has invited my attention to the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in SUKADEV SINGH V. BHAGATRAM SARDARSINGH RAGHUVANSHI (1975) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 421. ( 47 ) IN support of his submission Mr. Zaveri has invited my attention to the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in SUKADEV SINGH V. BHAGATRAM SARDARSINGH RAGHUVANSHI (1975) 1 SUPREME COURT CASES 421. After referring to the provisions of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act 1959 provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act 1956 and provisions of Industrial Finance Corporation Act 1948 at pages 432 and 433 the observations made regarding subordinate legislation are as under:subordinate legislation is made by a person or body by virtue of the powers con- ferred by a statute. Bye-laws are made in the main by local authorities or similar bodies or by statutory or other undertakings for regulating the conduct of persons within their areas or resorting to their undertakings. Regulations may determine the class of cases in which the exercise of the statutory power by any such authority constitutes the making of statutory rules. THE words rules and regulations are used in an Act to limit the power of the statutory authority. The powers of statutory bodies are derived controlled and rest- ricted by the statutes which create them and the rules and regulations framed there- under. Any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of the restrictions placed on their powers is ultra vires. The reason is that it goes to the root of the power of such corporations and the declaration of nullity is the only relief that is granted to the aggrieved party. IN England subordinate legislation has if validly made the full force and effect of a statute but it differs from a statute in that its validity whether as respects form or substance is normally open to challenge in the Courts. SUBORDINATE legislation has if validly made the full force and effect of a statute. That is so whether or not the statute under which it is made provides expressly that it is to have effect as if enacted therein. If an instrument made in the exercise of delegated powers directs or forbids the doing of a particular thing the result of a breach thereof is in the absence of provision to the contrary the same as if the command or prohibition had been contained in the enabling statute itself. If an instrument made in the exercise of delegated powers directs or forbids the doing of a particular thing the result of a breach thereof is in the absence of provision to the contrary the same as if the command or prohibition had been contained in the enabling statute itself. Similarly if such an instrument authorises or requires the doing of any act the principles to be applied in determining whether a person injured by the act has any right of action in respect of the injury are not different from those applicable whether damage results from an act done under the direct authority of statute RE. LANGLOIS AND BIDEN (1891) I Q. B. 349 AND KRUSE V. JOHNSON (1898) 2 Q. B. 91. THE authority of a statutory body or public administrative body or agency ordina- rily includes the power to make or adopt rules and regulations with respect to matters within the province of such body provided such rules and regulations are not inconsistent with the relevant law. The rules and regulations comprise those actions of the statutory or public bodies in which the legislative element predomi nates. These statutory bodies cannot use the power to make rules and regulations to enlarge the powers beyond scope intended by the legislature. Rules and regulations made by reason of the specific power conferred on the statute to make rules and regulations establish the pattern of conduct to be followed. Rules are duly made relative to the subject-matter on which the statutory bodies act subordinate to the terms of the statute under which they are promulgated. Regulations are in aid of the enforcement of the provisions of the statute. Rules and regulations have been distinguished from orders or determination of statutory bodies in the sense that the orders or determination are actions in which there is more of the judicial function and which deal with a particular present situation. Rules and regulations on the other hand are actions ill which the legislative element predominates. AT page 438 in para 33 it is observed: there is no substantial difference between a rule and a regulation inasmuch as both are subordinate legislation under powers ccnferred by the statute. A regulation framed under a statute applies uniform treatment to every one or to all members of some group or class. AT page 438 in para 33 it is observed: there is no substantial difference between a rule and a regulation inasmuch as both are subordinate legislation under powers ccnferred by the statute. A regulation framed under a statute applies uniform treatment to every one or to all members of some group or class. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission the Life Insurance Corporation and very finance Corporation are all required by the statute to frame regulations inter alia for the purpose of the duties and conduct and conditions of service of officers and other employees. These regulations impose obligation on the statutory authorities. The statutory authorities cannot deviate from the conditions of service. Any deviation will be enforced by legal sanction of declaration by Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules and regulations. The existence of rules and regulations under statute is to ensure regular conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct as a standard The statutory regulations in the cases under consideration give the em- ployees a statutory status and impose restriction on the employer and the employee with no option to vary the conditions. IT is significant to note that in the instant case sec. 9 of the Regulation Act only enables and empowers a recognised stock exchange to make bye- laws which may provide for referring such disputes to arbitration. It is not obligatory upon it to frame a bye-law that such disputes shall be referred to arbitration. In my opinion in the instant case it is not necessary to finally decide whether these bye-laws have the statutory force as con- tended by Mr. Vin as in the instant case there is no question of any statutory arbitration as observed by me earlier. Furthermore there are no inconsistent provisions in the Regulation Act or the bye-laws framed indicating that the Court will not have such powers to enlarge the time for making of an award. ( 48 ) RUSSELL on the Law of Arbitration 18 edition by Anthony Walton at page 8 under the caption Particular Exclusions makes the following statement:the Act applies to arbitration under other statutes only except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other Act or with any rules or procedure authorised or recognised thereby. ( 48 ) RUSSELL on the Law of Arbitration 18 edition by Anthony Walton at page 8 under the caption Particular Exclusions makes the following statement:the Act applies to arbitration under other statutes only except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other Act or with any rules or procedure authorised or recognised thereby. ( 49 ) IT will be profitable at this stage to refer to that relevant section of the English Arbitration Act 1950 Sec. 13 of it deals with the power of the Court to extend time for making award. It reads: (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of section twenty-two of this Act and anything to the contrary in the arbitration agreement an arbitrator or umpire shall have power to make an award at any time. (2) The time if any limited for making an award whether under this Act or otherwise. may from time to time be enlarged by order of the High Court or a Judge thereof whether that time has expired or not. SEC. 31 of it deals with Application of Part I to statutory arbitration. It reads: (1) Subject to the provisions of section thirty-three of this Act this part of this Act except the provisions thereof specified in sub-sec. (2) of this section shall apply to every arbitration under any other Act (whether passed before or after the com- mencement of this Act) as if the arbitration were pursuant to an arbitration agreement and as if that other Act were an arbitration agreement except in so far as this Act is inconsistent with that other Act or with any rules or procedure authorised or recognised thereby. In our Act this latter expression or procedure authorised or recognised thereby is absent. ( 50 ) REVERTING back to the statement made by learned Author Russell at page 8 it is stated:modern statutes commonly contain an express exclusion if not of the whole Arbit- ration Act at least of particular sections. In addition exclusion may be implied where the inconsistency is clear; but the Arbitration Act is not to be regarded as inconsi- stent with another statute merely because it adds something to the provisions of that other statute. In addition exclusion may be implied where the inconsistency is clear; but the Arbitration Act is not to be regarded as inconsi- stent with another statute merely because it adds something to the provisions of that other statute. The appellants were accordingly constrained to argue that whenever the provisions of the Arbitration Act are found to add to the enactments of any other statute regulating arbitrations they are in the sense of the exception inconsistent with it. To hold that the legislature intended to attach that meaning to the word inconsistent would be to defeat the object of the leading enactment in sec. 24. In my opinion the object of the legislature was to add to the remedies open to the parties under a statutory arbitration; and the sole purpose of the exception was to prevent the application of the powers conferred upon the Court by the Act of 1889 to arbitrations under any statute whose provisions either expressly or by reasonable implication excluded the exercise of such Powers. IT is further observed at page 9: the Act may be excluded by rules authorised or recognised by another Act; but mere general authority for the making of Regulations as to arbitration under a statute does not import authority to make a Regulation excluding the Act. ( 51 ) IN KNOWLES and SONS LIMITED V. BOLTON CORPORATION (1900) 2 QUEENS BENCH DIVISION 253 the Court of Appeal has observed:sec. 180 sub-sec. (9) of the Public Health Act 1875 which enacts the time for making an award by arbitrators or an umpire under that Act shall not in any case be extended beyond the period of two months from the date of the submission to arbitration or the date of the reference of the matters to the umpire respectively deals only with the power of the arbitrators or umpire to extend the time and does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. Under sec- 9 of the Arbitration Act 1889 the Court or a Judge has jurisdiction to extend the time for making an award under the Public Health Act 1875 although the time for making the award-has expiredtherein also sec. 24 of the Arbitration Act 1889 which was similar to sec. Under sec- 9 of the Arbitration Act 1889 the Court or a Judge has jurisdiction to extend the time for making an award under the Public Health Act 1875 although the time for making the award-has expiredtherein also sec. 24 of the Arbitration Act 1889 which was similar to sec. 31 of the English Arbitration Act 1950 was sought to be relied upon and it was held that the Court had jurisdiction to enlarge the time for making the award even though the time for making the award had elapsed before the application was made at chambers and the award had been in fact made. It was argued:. . . BY reason of sec. 180 sub-sec. (9) of the Public Health Act a fetter is imposed upon the power of the Court or a Judge and that they have not as extensive a jurisdiction as they would otherwise have. But upon consideration of that sub-section I do not find that the Court is in any way fettered; there is no allusion made in it to the Court or a Judge. When that Act was passed the jurisdiction of the Court or a Judge in these matters must be taken to have been known to the legislature and there is no mention made of their jurisdiction in that section. Reading through sec. 180 I find that in all its numerous sub-sections it is dealing with arbitrators and umpires and with no one else; and when we come to sub-sec. (9) the legisla- ture enacts that The time for making an award by arbitrators under this Act shall not in any case be extended beyond the period of two months from the date of the submission; that clearly means that the time cannot be extended by the arbitrators. ( 52 ) IN The TABERNACLE PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY V. JOHN KNIGHT 1892 APPEAL CASES 298 at pages 301 and 302 it is observed:the later statute makes the provision which I have first referred to apply to every arbitration under any Act passed before or after the commencement of the Act itself (1889) and only excepts from its operation any Act inconsistent with the Act regulating the arbitration or with any rules or procedure authorised or recognised by that Act. IF the two provisions may stand together I am unable to follow the argument that the one Act is inconsistent with the other and the whole argument depends upon the word inconsistent in the later statute. It is obvious to inquire Where is the inconsistency if both may stand together and both operate without either interfering with the other ?it explains as to when one provision can be said to be inconsistent with the provision of another Act. ( 53 ) IN R. and W. PAUL LIMITED V. THE WHEAT COMMISSION 1937 APPEAL CASES 139 the Privy Council has observed:by sec. 5 sub--sec. (1) the Wheat Commission are empowered to make bye-laws for giving effect to the provisions of the Act. By sub-sec. (2): Without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-sec (1) sub-laws made under this section shall in particular provide for the final determination by arbitration of disputes arising as to such matters as may be specified in the bye-lawspurporting to act under this section the Wheat Commission made a bye-law numbered 20 providing that Any dispute arising between the Wheat Commission and any other person as to whether any substance is flour shall be referred to arbitration as therein provided and the decision of the referee as to the matter in dispute shall be final and conclusive. The following provisions shall have effect in relation to any reference under this bye-law :- The Arbitration Act 1889 shall not apply. . . AT page 153 it is observed: i should mention that under sec. 5 sub-sec. (1) all bye-laws require to be approved by an order of the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Secretaries of state concerned with agriculture in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively acting jointly and that under sec. 18 sub-sec. (1) all bye-laws require to be laid before Parliament and if either House within the prescribed time resolves that any bye-law be annulled it shall forthwith be void. It is understood that this procedure was duly observed and that no objection was taken to bye-law No. 20. BOTH Roche J. and all the learned Judges in the Court of Appeal unanimously found the bye-law in question to be ultra vires of the Wheat Commission. It is understood that this procedure was duly observed and that no objection was taken to bye-law No. 20. BOTH Roche J. and all the learned Judges in the Court of Appeal unanimously found the bye-law in question to be ultra vires of the Wheat Commission. They agree in affirming the general principle that the subject cannot be deprived of his right to resort to the Courts of law of his country except by express enactment and they find in the statute no words expressly ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts or expressly authorizing the Wheat Commission to frame bye-laws which shall have this effect. THEIR Lordships of the Privy Council examined the question from another view point and observed at page 154:. . . THE Arbitration Act is a statute of general application and it confers a valuable and important right to resort to the Courts of law. To exclude its operation from an arbitration is to deprive the parties to the arbitration of the rights which the Act confers. When a public general statute provides for the reference of disputes to arbitration it is to be presumed that it intends them to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the general law as to arbitrations with all the attendant rights which the general law confers. I do not think that when Parliament enacts by one statute that disputes under it are to be referred to arbitration it can be presumed to have empowered by implication the abrogation of another statute which it has enacted for the conduct of arbitrations. Rather the contrary. If this is intended express words to that effect are in my opinion essential and there are here no such express words. I am accordingly of opinion that the Wheat Commission exceeded their powers when they made a bye-law that every dispute as to whether any subs- tance is flour should be determined by an arbitration to which the Arbitration Act should not apply. ( 54 ) IN my opinion on examining the relevant provisions of the Regulation Act as well as the provisions of the bye-laws framed by the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad it cannot be said that there is statutory arbitration. A recognised association has been empowered to make bye-laws which inter alia may provide for settlement of such disputes by arbitration. ( 54 ) IN my opinion on examining the relevant provisions of the Regulation Act as well as the provisions of the bye-laws framed by the Stock Exchange Ahmedabad it cannot be said that there is statutory arbitration. A recognised association has been empowered to make bye-laws which inter alia may provide for settlement of such disputes by arbitration. It does not mean that there are any provisions in these bye-laws themselves which indicate in any manner that the powers of the Court to enlarge time even after the award is in fact made for making the award are in any manner curtailed. The provisions under the bye-laws only refer to the authority or person which/who can extend the time even after making of the award It is not necessary in the instant case as said by me earlier to decide whether these bye-laws are statutory bye-laws and have the force of law. Suffice it to say that the learned trial Judge has rightly reached the conclusion that these powers vested in the Court under sec. 28 of the Act are not taken away and the Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay for making the award and extend the time for making the award even after the award has been made. As said earlier by me these bye-laws do not contain a complete Code as was the case in the aforesaid Calcutta decision. In the instant case for enforce ment of the award the award has to be filed in the Court and has to be made a rule of the Court. The Court? when making an order under secs. 14 and 17 of the Act if it finds fit to enlarge the time for making the award is empowered to enlarge it and that has been done in the instant case and in my opinion it has been rightly done. ( 55 ) COMING to the last submission of Mr. Vin that in view of the provisions of sec. 17 of the Act it was first necessary to give a judg- ment on the basis of an award and it is only after that intervening step is taken a decree can be drawn up on the basis of that judgment. In the instant case submitted Mr. Vin that in view of the provisions of sec. 17 of the Act it was first necessary to give a judg- ment on the basis of an award and it is only after that intervening step is taken a decree can be drawn up on the basis of that judgment. In the instant case submitted Mr. Vin in the review applications at the time of allowing the review applications after extending the time for making the award the Court has straightway passed a decree making the award a rule of the Court. Prescribed procedure under the Ahmedabad City Civil Court Rules 1961 in that behalf which in his submission is a mandatory procedure has not been complied with. Mr. Vin has invited my attention to clause (w) of rule 35 of the Ahmedabad City Civil Court Rules which enumerates the matters that may be disposed of by a Judge of Chambers. That clause (w) indicates that applications in all matters arising under the Indian Arbitration Act and generally in the matter of any Act unless otherwise provided in the Act itself or by the rules thereunder or by these rules may be disposed of by a Judge in Cham- bers. He has also invited my attention to rule 9 of the Rules under Arbitration Act 1940 framed by the High Court to be applicable in such matters instituted in the Ahmedabad City Civil Court. It reads:an application for judgment in terms of an award shall be made by motion and Shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Registrar that no application has been made to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the Award or if made that has been disallowed. NO such notice of motion was taken out submitted Mr. Vin and conse- quently the order is bad. ( 56 ) IT is significant to note that in the instant case it was the arbitrators who moved the City Civil Court for filing of an award under sec. 14 of the Act. That application was supported by an affidavit as per the procedure prescribed. Thereafter notice was issued to the parties interested. The present petitioner filed objections. One of his objections was found to be untenable and another was found to be tenable and the award was declared to be invalid. 14 of the Act. That application was supported by an affidavit as per the procedure prescribed. Thereafter notice was issued to the parties interested. The present petitioner filed objections. One of his objections was found to be untenable and another was found to be tenable and the award was declared to be invalid. It is thereafter that the present review applications had been filed and the Court passed the impugned order. ( 57 ) SEC. 17 of the Act on which considerable emphasis has been laid by Mr. Vin reads:where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set aside the award the Court shall after the time for making an application to set aside the award has expired or such an application having been made after refusing it proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the Judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of or not otherwise in accordance with the award. IN the instant case as said earlier the award has been held to be in- valid in the earlier proceedings as the award given four months after the Arbitrators had entered upon the reference. In these review applications the Court found that the Court would have extended time in case it was pointed out to the Court that under sec. 28 of the Act the Court had powers to extend the time. Parties were heard on that point and in the review applications also ground was made out and after hearing the parties the Court passed the impugned order. It was on this ground alone that the award was earlier declared to be invalid. I therefore find that the trial Court has not committed any error of law which would justify the interference from this Court in straightway passing a decree for the award. ( 58 ) MR. Vin has invited ms attention to the decision of a Division bench of the Allahabad High Court in AMOD KUMAR VERMA V. HARI PRASAD BURMAN A. I. R. 1958 ALLAHABAD 720. It is observed therein:where an application of one of the parties under sec. ( 58 ) MR. Vin has invited ms attention to the decision of a Division bench of the Allahabad High Court in AMOD KUMAR VERMA V. HARI PRASAD BURMAN A. I. R. 1958 ALLAHABAD 720. It is observed therein:where an application of one of the parties under sec. 14 has been dismissed with the consent of the party and the orders have become final and the party through review application expressly seeks a decree on the award he cannot apart from the doctrine of res judicata contained in sec. 11 Civil P. C. be allowed to apply again for a decree. If he cannot apply for a decree again he certainly cannot get a decree on somebody elses application. It is immaterial that the first application was dismissed with his consent. Court cannot even pass a decree suo motu after having refused to pass it in previous proceedings. IT is significant to note that the aforesaid observations were made in the context that in an earlier proceeding an application of one of the parties under sec. 14 of the Act had been dismissed. No doubt with the consent and that order had become final. In the instant case these very orders passed in the earlier proceedings in which an award had been held to be invalid on the aforesaid ground were sought to be reviewed. It is not that any application for filing of an award under sec. 14 of the Act had been dismissed and that order had become final. In paras 5 and 6 at page 723 it is observed:the award can be enforced only through a decree passed under sec. 17 so long as there is no decree passed on its basis the appellants are not aggrieved by its mere existence. In view of the statements made by counsel of the appellants we did not think it necessary to hear them at this stage on the question whether the award was fit to be set aside or not; we heard them only on the question whether the decree would be passed on its basis. WE have heard Shri Jagdish Swarup appearing for the respondent Hari Prasad and I am satisfied that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. WE have heard Shri Jagdish Swarup appearing for the respondent Hari Prasad and I am satisfied that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree. For the reasons that I shall give presently I am of the view that a decree on the basis of an award can be made only under sec. 17 that the provisions of sec. 17 can be applied only in a proceeding started with an application under sec. 14 and that in a procee- ding started under sec. 33 when no proceeding started under sec. 14 is pending no decree can be passed and the only order that can be passed is one refusing to set aside the award. EVEN apart from the question of jurisdiction I am of the view that the trial Court had no justification to pass the decree without any prayer for the same by any of the parties to the arbitration agreement without the question whether a decree could be passed or not being discussed or considered without hearing the appellant on the question and in spite of the dismissal of the suits of Gopal Lal and Hari Prasad under sec. 14chapter II of the Arbitration Act lays down the provisions dealing with arbitration without; intervention of a Court. When the arbitrators have made their award they are required by sec. 14 (t) to sign it and to give notice to the parties of the making and signing it. Under sub-sec. (2) they are required at the request of any party or at the direction of the Court and upon payment of their fees and charges to cause the award or a signed copy of it to be filed in the Court whereupon the Court has to give notice to the parties of the filing. THIS decision has no application whatsoever. It is significant to note that at page 727 in paras 14 15 and 16 the relevant observations made are:the learned Judges followed the decision in the case of Balwant Singh A. I. R. 1944 Allahabad 188 and observed that sec. 17 does not require that whenever a Court passes an order refusing to set aside the award it must pass a decree on the basis of the award. I respectfully differ from the contrary view taken in the case of Lachmi Prasad A. I. R. 1948 Patna 171. 17 does not require that whenever a Court passes an order refusing to set aside the award it must pass a decree on the basis of the award. I respectfully differ from the contrary view taken in the case of Lachmi Prasad A. I. R. 1948 Patna 171. I do not understand how an Application under sec. 33 can be treated as an application under sec. 14 for the filing of the award merely because it is within the prescribed period of limitation. WHETHER an application is under one provision or another depends upon its contents and not upon whether it is within the period of limitation prescribed for an application under one provision or the other. RIGHTLY or wrongly the applications of Gopal Lal and Hari Prasad under sec. 14 had been dismissed and the orders have become final Hari Prasad expressly sought a decree on the basis of the award through his review application and it was rejected. There must be an end to litigation and apart from the doctrine of res judicata contained in sec. 11 C. P. C. Hari Prasad could not be allowed to apply again for a decree. If he could not apply for a decree he certainly could not get a decree on some-body elses application. IT is immaterial that his application was dismissed with his consent. Even if he had withdrawn his application he would have been estopped from bringing a second application. In any case it was unsound on the part of the trial Court to pass a decree suo motu after having refused to pass it in a previous proceeding. THERE is no judgment pronounced by the trial Court. It has only passed an order refusing to set aside the award and at once passed a decree. The decree is null and void in the absence of a judgment. After refusing to set aside the award the trial Court ought to have pronounced a judgment on the merits of the disputes between the parties as settled by the award. THESE observations made in para 16 at page 727 cannot be pressed into service in the instant case. In the instant case as said earlier an applica- tion for filing an award had been made. THESE observations made in para 16 at page 727 cannot be pressed into service in the instant case. In the instant case as said earlier an applica- tion for filing an award had been made. At that stage the award was held to be invalid it having been given by the arbitrators more than four months after they entered upon the reference. In the review applications the Court in exercise of its powers under sec. 28 of the Act has extended that period. The Court was therefore fully justified in passing a decree by making the award a rule of the Court. This last submission made by Mr. Vin therefore also fails. The result is that the appeal fails. ( 59 ) THE appeal is dismissed. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case each party is ordered to bear its own costs in this appeal. .