JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This writ petition is directed against the judgment of the Board of Revenue dismissing a suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, filed by the petitioner for the ejectment of Pyare Khan, respondent No. 4. 2. The dispute relates to plot No. 370-A, area 1 bigha 13 biswas, in village Maulanagar, situate with the limits of the Bareilly Municipality. It appears that on 20th April, 1952, the Assistant Special Manager, Court of Wards, of the estate of Rani Mahalaxmi Bai, Bareilly, executed a patta of the disputed plot in favour of the petitioner. It appears that the Evacuee Department were of the opinion that Rafiq Ahmad and Shafiq Ahmad were in possession of this plot for more than three years. They became hereditary tenants under Section 180 (2) of the U. P. Tenancy Act. These persons migrated to Pakistan. The plot became evacuee property. It was subsequently treated as having been acquired under Section 12 of the Displaced Perms (Compensation and Rehabilitation) let, 1954. Acting under Section 20 of the Act of 1954, the Managing Officer put up this plot for auction on 1st June, 1956. Pyare Khan, respondent No. 4, was declared to be the highest bidder. When the petitioner came to know of these proceedings, filed an objection before the Assistant Custodian under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. He claimed that he was the tenant of the plot. The alleged evacuees had no interest in it. The Assistant Custodian dismissed the objection on 29th November, 1956. The petitioner went up in appeal. The Deputy Custodian, Lucknow, on 20th February, 1958, set aside the order and remanded the case for decision again. The Assistant Custodian again rejected the petitioners objection on 12th August, 1959. The petitioner went up in appeal. The Deputy Custodian, Lucknow, by his order dated 24th August, 1960, allowed the appeal. He held that the alleged evacuees had no right or interest in the land in dispute. The property was not an evacuee property and could not vest in the Custodian under U. P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949. He directed that plot No. 370-A (area 1 bigha 13 biswas) be released as non-evacuee property. 3. During the pendency of this appeal the petitioner, on 10th September, 1959, moved the Assistant Custodian, Bareilly, for staying further proceedings. The property was not an evacuee property and could not vest in the Custodian under U. P. Ordinance No. 1 of 1949. He directed that plot No. 370-A (area 1 bigha 13 biswas) be released as non-evacuee property. 3. During the pendency of this appeal the petitioner, on 10th September, 1959, moved the Assistant Custodian, Bareilly, for staying further proceedings. The Assistant Custodian granted to the petitioner ten days time to bring a stay order from the appellate court. The appellate court granted a stay order on 17th September, 1959, a copy of which was filed by the petitioner before the Assistant Custodian on 18th September, 1959. That very day the Assistant Custodian gave possession of the plot to Pyare Khan, respondent No. 4. 4. The petitioner moved the Assistant Custodian for restitution and delivery back of possession of the plot in dispute on the ground that the appellate court had released the property as non-evacuee property. The Assistant Custodian, however, did not pass any order for restitution. The matter seems to have been referred to the Central Government, which directed that instead of delivery of possession compensation be paid to the petitioner. In 1962, the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Lucknow, directed payment of compensation in lieu of plot No. 370-A. On 12th September, 1963, the Managing Officer asked the petitioner to take compensation. The petitioner, however, served upon the Custodian authorities a notice under Section 80, C.P.C. and ultimately filed the present suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for possession. The Judicial Officer decreed the suit, which decree was, however, set aside on appeal. The plaintiff went up to the Board of Revenue in second appeal. The Board held that the suit was barred by Section 27 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. It was held that once the property was declared as evacuee property under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, the provisions of the latter Act would apply. Section 27 of the said Act barred the regular courts from questioning any order passed under that Act. The second appeal was dismissed. 6. Section 27 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, provides as follows :- "27. Section 27 of the said Act barred the regular courts from questioning any order passed under that Act. The second appeal was dismissed. 6. Section 27 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, provides as follows :- "27. Finality of orders: Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or authority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding". 7. In the present case, the Managing Officer passed an order for the sale of this property under Section 20. He also issued a sale certificate. The petitioner is not calling in question the order for sale or the issuance of the sale certificate. His case is that since the Deputy Custodian had held that the plot in dispute was not evacuee property and had released it as non-evacuee property, the sale was without jurisdiction and void, because it was ordered on the basis that the property was evacuee property. Section 20 authorises the Managing Officer to transfer any property with n the compensation pool. Under Section 14 the compensation pool consists, inter alia, of all evacuee property acquired under Section 12. Section 12 authorises the Central Government to acquire any evacuee property. There is no power in the Central Government to acquire property which is not evacuee property, and certainly not property which has been declared to be non-evacuee and released as such, Since the property was not evacuee property, it could not at all be acquired and so could not form part of the compensation pool, and, therefore, the Managing Officer had no power to transfer it-Since all these proceedings were void ab initio, it was not necessary to get them set aside. Since the alleged acquisition by the Central Government under Sec 12 as well as the auction sale by the Managing Officer was done long prior to the order of the Deputy Custodian holding that the property was non-evacuee property and releasing it as such, the effect of the latter order was in law to nullify the effect of the proceedings for sale. That being the legal position, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to call in question those proceedings or orders. 8. In Dr. That being the legal position, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to call in question those proceedings or orders. 8. In Dr. Zafar Ali v. Assistant Custodian, AIR 1967 SC 106 the Supreme Court held that Sec 12 provides for acquisition of evacuee property and thereupon the right, title or interest of any evacuee in the evacuee property extinguishes. The Court held that this section does not affect the right of persons who are not evacuees. On a parity of reasoning the various proceedings taka under the Act of 1954 would not affect the petitioner's right or interest because the property was not evacuee property. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Basant Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 994 where it was held that after a property has been acquired under Section 12, the right, title or interest as evacuees ceased and the property no longer remained evacuee property and it could only be dealt with under the provisions of that Act. This case does not deal with the situation where the property is not an evacuee property at all. It is not applicable to the present case. 10. For the respondents reliance was placed upon Mani Lal v. Ganga Prasad, AIR 1951 All 832 . That case relates to the effect of sale by civil courts of general Jurisdiction, under the Code of Civil Procedure and the application of Section 144, C.P.C. to it. No such situation arises in the present case. 11. The plaintiff has asked for possession on the ground that the possession of the respondent was without any title or interest. 12. It was submitted that the Managing Officer had, after the issuance of the sale certificate put respondent No. 4 in actual possession. The suit cannot be decreed without this order being called in question. 13. The plaintiffs case was that the possession was given to respondent No. 4 on 18th September, 1959, after he had filed the stay order granted by the appellate court. This plea was upheld by the trial court. After discussing the evidence it found that the defendant No. 3 did not put defendant No. 1 in possession according to law, or if put in possession he was put in possession after the stay order. This finding has not been set aside by the first or the second appellate court. This plea was upheld by the trial court. After discussing the evidence it found that the defendant No. 3 did not put defendant No. 1 in possession according to law, or if put in possession he was put in possession after the stay order. This finding has not been set aside by the first or the second appellate court. The position therefore, is that the act of putting the auction purchaser in possession was done after the appellate court had passed a stay order. This action was wholly without jurisdiction and void and could not be characterised as an order passed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The case is not one of calling in quest on such an order, but of ignoring this void action. Section 27 does not, in my opinion, extend to such situations. 14. It was also argued on behalf of the respondents that the plaintiff cannot be given relief without setting aside the order of the Central Government passed under Section 20-B. That provision lays down that where any person is entitled to the restoration of any property by virtue of an order made by the Custodian-General under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, or by the Competent Officer, or the appellate officer under the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1951, and the Central Government is of the opinion that it is not expedient or practicable to restore the whole or any part of that property to that person by reason of the property or any part thereof being in occupation of a displaced person or otherwise, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Acts or this Act, it shall be lawful for the Central Government either to transfer some other property or to pay compensation. This provision applies where the Custodian-General passes an order under Section 27 which entities a person to restoration of any property. In the present case the Custodian-General never passed any order under Section 27. The order releasing the property as non-evacuee property was passed by the Deputy Custodian in an appeal filed under Section 24 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. In the present case the Custodian-General never passed any order under Section 27. The order releasing the property as non-evacuee property was passed by the Deputy Custodian in an appeal filed under Section 24 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. In view of the explicit language of Section 20-B of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act reference to an order made by the Custodian-General under Section 27 could not possibly be read as including an order passed by the Deputy Custodian under Section 24. Since no order had been passed under Section 27, there was no occasion for the Central Government to express an opinion whether compensation should be paid to the petitioner. Those proceedings were wholly void in so far as the plot in dispute is concerned. 15. It was also suggested that the present suit will be barred by Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. This provision says:- "46. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts barred in certain matters.- Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right or interest in, any property is or is not evacuee property; or (b) (omitted) (c) to question the legality of any action taken by Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act; or (d) in respect of any matter which the Custodian-General or Custodian is empowered by or under this Apt, to determine. 16. Evidently clauses (a) and (c) are not applicable. Clause (d) bars a suit in respect of any matter which the Custodian-General or Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine. In this connection my attention was invited to Rule 37 of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Central) Rules, under which restitution can be given by the Custodian in cases where property taken into possession as evacuee property was subsequently declared by the Custodian to be non-evacuee property. The Custodian is empowered to take such action, including use of force, as will place the parties in the same position in which they were on the date of possession. This rule does not empower the Custodian-General or Custodian to "determine" any matter. It is a procedural rule, empowering them to effect restitution without examining or determining any question or matter. This rule does not empower the Custodian-General or Custodian to "determine" any matter. It is a procedural rule, empowering them to effect restitution without examining or determining any question or matter. In the present case the plaintiff approached the Custodian for restitution, but the Custodian refused to act. Such inaction could not be determination of any matter within meaning of clause (d) of Section 46 so as to bar the present suit. This provision is, in my opinion, not applicable. 17. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed, the judgments of the Additional Commissioner and the Board of Revenue are set aside and the order of the Assistant Collector first class decreeing the suit is restored with costs.