JUDGMENT - B.M. SAPRE, J.:---The petitioner Nandkishore Babulal Agarwal, who is the brother of the detenu Girdharlal Babulal Agarwal, has filed this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of detention made in respect of the detenu by the District Magistrate, Kolaba, on 27th November, 1974 under sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) read with Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The Order states that the Detaining Authority is satisfied with respect to the detenu that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, it is necessary to detain him. The detenu was arrested on the date of the detention order itself. On the same day, he was furnished with the grounds of his detention as provided in section 8 of the Act. The grounds furnished are in these words :--- "You are engaged in sale and transport of paddy and rice in contravention of the provisions of the Maharashtra Scheduled Foodgrains (Trade Monopoly) Order, 1972. The following are the instances of your acts contravening the provisions of the Maharashtra Scheduled Foodgrains (Trade Monopoly) Order, 1972. (i) On 7-3-1973, the Tahasildar, Alibag had attached Truck No. BYW/ 880 in which 86 backakis (small bags) of rice were loaded. The said truck is owned by you. While the truck was being taken to the New Rice Mill Poynad for weighment of the rice loaded therein, your driver Shri Devraj Cauda, ran away with the truck, rice and the police constables who were kept in the truck for protection. The driver stopped the truck near village Pali. The police constables sitting in the truck had taken possession of the key of the truck and also took the driver in their custody. In the meantime, you along with Shri M.V. Patil and a few others from your group, arrived on the spot by an Ambassador Car bearing No. 7969 and gave threats to the police constables sitting in the truck, forced them to alight from the truck and forcibly took away the truck and the rice attached by the Tahasildar and given in charge of the police. The key of the truck being not found at its place, you opened the bonnet of the vehicle, connected internal wires and managed to start the truck and escorted it by your car along with your co-workers. Thus, your forcibly took away the truck and rice bags from the police custody. Cases registered at Cr. 24/73 of Poynad Police Station under sections 395, 363, 324, 225, 392 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Cr. No. 25/73 under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 are in progress. (2) On 5-6-1973, the Taluka Office staff searched the house of Shri Shaikh Ali Shaikh Bapu Chhapekar, in Pezari village wherein the following undeclared stock of paddy and rice was found :--- Weight Quintals Kgs. Kolam paddy 26 bags. 18 - 00 Kolam rice 35 bags. 17 - 50 During inquiry Shri Shaikh Ali Shaikh Bapu Chhapekar stated that the portion of the house where it was found had been hired to you and the stock found there belonged to you. (3) On 13-12-1973, twenty-six rice bags weighing 12 quintals and 36 Kgs. were being transported to the Dohen creek for export by country craft, About 20/25 persons including yourself were found on the spot, watching and guiding the labourers engaged for transport. When you saw that the police, along with some officer, were coming to the spot, you ran away towards the village Bhakarwad. This was personally watched by the Tahasildar. After you left the place, the Tahasildar took possession of the unclaimed stock. (4) On 1-11-1974, Motor Car No. MDH 8392 was halted by Police Head Constable Shri H.S. Charat (B. No. 810) near Pen while it was passing via Pen-Bombay Road. A stock of rice weighing five quintals and 84½ Kilos was found in the Car. The owner of the car Shri K.K. Ardesar Suran of Bombay and cleaner Shri Jayant Mahadeo Chadge of Bombay have stated before the police that the stock of rice in question was purchased by them from Shri Girdhar Shet of Poynad and it was being transported to Bombay for use in the house of Shri Ardesar Suran. This Year the societies have been authorised to purchase surplus paddy and rice from the cultivators at market rates so as to make rice available to the consumers at reasonable rates. In addition, the scheme of compulsory procurement from producers is there. This Year the societies have been authorised to purchase surplus paddy and rice from the cultivators at market rates so as to make rice available to the consumers at reasonable rates. In addition, the scheme of compulsory procurement from producers is there. Both these schemes will be affected if you re allowed to be free since surplus paddy and rice will be illegally transported and sold at higher rate by you. This will affect maintenance of supplies of rice which is essential to the community. There is thus need to detain you." The petitioner in his petition bases his challenge to all the grounds generally that all or some of them are non-existent, vague, show non-application of mind or casual indifference on the part of the Detaining Authority, have no nexus with the object of detention, or too remote in point of time, and the Detaining Authority had arrived at its subjective satisfaction on the basis of material which had not been made known to the detenu in order to enable him to make an effective representation against the order of detention. In regard to the first ground, he has stated that it is no doubt true that truck No. BYW. 880 belongs to the detenu, but on 7th March, 1973, when it is stated to have been attached for the reason that 86 small bags of rice were found loaded in it, the truck had been given on hire by the driver of the detenu and it was the rice of this person which was on the truck. The truck has been registered as a public carrier for hire and the driver manages the work of giving the truck on hire. When the truck was thus accosted, the driver had made a statement that the rice bags found in the truck were of the person who had taken the truck on hire. The petitioner has filed a copy of the statement of the driver recorded by the Tahasildar on 7th March 1973 as an annexure to the petition at Ex. C. The petitioner thus contended that the detenu had nothing to do with the rice bags that were found loaded in the truck on 7th March, 1973. The petitioner has filed a copy of the statement of the driver recorded by the Tahasildar on 7th March 1973 as an annexure to the petition at Ex. C. The petitioner thus contended that the detenu had nothing to do with the rice bags that were found loaded in the truck on 7th March, 1973. The petitioner denied that the detenu arrived on the spot in an Ambassador car bearing No. 7969 and contended that this was a false allegation, inasmuch as the said car was in a workshop known as Narayan Auto Works at Cadell Road, Dadar, on 7th March, 1973 for major repairs and was totally immobilised on that date. The petitioner thus contended that the detenu had absolutely no connection with the bags of rice that were fount loaded in the truck on 7th March, 1973. In respect of the second ground, the petitioner contended that the ground was false and non-existent. In respect of the incident, it was only Shaikh Ali Shaikh Bapu Chhapekar who was prosecuted and the detenu was not prosecuted. The Detaining Authority had failed to ascertain the true state of affairs. It had not referred to in the ground even the fact that the said Chhapekar was prosecuted, much less why the detenu was not prosecuted. The ground did not mention that Chhapekar was convicted and his statement recorded by the trial Magistrate under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the detenu had hired the room was disbelieved by the trial Magistrate. The Detaining Authority had failed to ascertain the true state of facts and this showed complete non-application of mind and an attitude of casual indifference on the part of the Detaining Authority. In respect of the third ground, the petitioner contended that the ground was totally false and non-existent and the allegations contained in the ground were vague. The detenu had nothing to do with the incident. That must be so, otherwise there is no reason why the Tahasildar and the Police Officers should not have lodged a complaint against the detenu. In respect of the fourth ground, the petitioner contended that the ground was totally false and non-existent. The detenu had never sold any quantity of rice to Ardesar. That must be so, otherwise there is no reason why the Tahasildar and the Police Officers should not have lodged a complaint against the detenu. In respect of the fourth ground, the petitioner contended that the ground was totally false and non-existent. The detenu had never sold any quantity of rice to Ardesar. Even if the said Ardesar had stated to Head Constable Gharat that he had purchased ice from Girdhar Shet of Poynad, there are three persons of that name in village Poynad and the reference by Ardesar to Girdhar Shet was not necessarily to the detenu. No further inquiry was made by the Detaining Authority in respect of the incident. The ground thus shows total non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. The District Magistrate filed an affidavit-in-reply to the petition. In respect of the first ground, he stated that although it may be true that the detenu gives his truck No. BYW. 880 on hire to others, yet on the date in question, it was being used by the detenu for his own business of transport of rice. In regard to the presence of the detenu at the spot, in his representation which the detenu had made to Government, he had not stated that his Ambassador car was lying in a garage in Bombay on 7th March, 1973. The District Magistrate produced a copy of the representation made by the detenu to Government as an annexure to his affidavit at Ex. A. Besides, there were several eye-witnesses who had seen the said vehicle on the road on the day in question at the time of the incident. In regard to the second ground, the District Magistrate produced a copy of the record of Summary Case No. 1144 of 1973 filed against Chhapekar in respect of the incident as an annexure to the affidavit at Ex. B. The District Magistrate stated that Chhapekar had stated in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that he had leased out one portion of his house to the detenu and the detenu used to keep his paddy in that portion of the house. It is true that the criminal Court had not accepted the plea of Chhapekar, but the Detaining Authority could rely upon the statement of Chhapekar for the purpose of reaching a subjective satisfaction in regard to the detenu. It is true that the criminal Court had not accepted the plea of Chhapekar, but the Detaining Authority could rely upon the statement of Chhapekar for the purpose of reaching a subjective satisfaction in regard to the detenu. Moreover, the Detaining Authority had ample grounds to come to the conclusion that the detenu had taken the promises of Chhapekar on lease. The Detaining Authority had collected and brought before it information from various sources in this behalf. In regard to the third ground, the District Magistrate stated in his affidavit that the Tahasildar was keeping a watch on the movement of the detenu and his colleagues who were known for rice smuggling in poynad area by different transport methods and, therefore, the Tahasildar had clearly identified the detenu as the person involved in the incident, but, because the detenu and his associates had run away, there was no sufficient evidence to lodge a prosecution against them. But there was sufficient material before the Detaining Authority to reach a subjective satisfaction in regard to the activity of the detenu and the need to detain him. In regard to the fourth ground, the District Magistrate stated in his affidavit that on the basis of the statement made by Ardesar, the police had raided the house of the detenu. Ardesar had mentioned the name "Girdhar Shet". Although there may be other persons in village Poynad whose name is Girdhar, yet they are not known as Girdhar Shet. It is only the detenu who is known by that name. Besides, the detenu is the only person in Poynad who is dealing in illegal sale and transport of rice and paddy. The petitioner also filed a rejoinder to the affidavit filed by the District Magistrate. Besides reiterating the earlier position in the petition, in respect of the first ground, he produced the affidavit at Ex. I of Narayan Baburam Bandekar, the owner of the workshop Narayan Auto Works at Cadell Road, Dadar, to the effect that the car bearing Registration No. MBD. 7989 was in his garage from 7th March, 1973 to 18th March, 1973 for major repairs and on 7th March, 1973 it was rendered totally immobilised. In respect of the fourth ground also, the petitioner produced two documents. One of them was the record of Summary Case No. 106 of 1975 (EX. 7989 was in his garage from 7th March, 1973 to 18th March, 1973 for major repairs and on 7th March, 1973 it was rendered totally immobilised. In respect of the fourth ground also, the petitioner produced two documents. One of them was the record of Summary Case No. 106 of 1975 (EX. II) filed against Ardesar and his cleaner Jayant Mahadeo Chadge under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. This was with a view to show that Ardesar in his statement to the Court had not stated that he had purchased the rice from the detenu. On the other hand, he had stated that he had loaded the rice at Dolvi and was taking it to Panvel under bona fide belief that it was not an offence. He, however, did not know the names of the agriculturists from whom he had purchased the rice at Dolvi. The incident, according to the petitioner, thus does not connect the detenu in any way. The other document filed is a certificate given by the Deputy Sarpanch of Poynad Gram Panchayat that there are three persons bearing the name Girdhar Shet in the village (Ex. III). It was the case of the petitioner that after the fourth incident dated 1st November, 1974 no inquiry was made from the detenu and his house was not raided. The District Magistrate in his affidavit stated that on registration of the offence, the police had raided only the house of the detenu. The petitioner in his rejoinder simply stated that he denied that after the said complaint was registered, the police had raided only the house of the detenu. As this was not sufficient denial of the allegation that the house of the detenu was aided, the petitioner filed a fresh affidavit during the course of the hearing of this petition on 4th March, 1975 stating that the house of the detenu was not raided by the police after the complaint was registered. As has been noted, four incidents were mentioned as forming the grounds on which the detention order against the detenu was made. We will leave aside the first ground for the time being and will take up for consideration the second, the third and the fourth grounds. As has been noted, four incidents were mentioned as forming the grounds on which the detention order against the detenu was made. We will leave aside the first ground for the time being and will take up for consideration the second, the third and the fourth grounds. But before we do that, we may state what propositions are now well settled by a series of decisions given the highest Court in the country and which are no longer in dispute. It now settled that an order of detention can be challenged if :--- (a) the grounds are vague; (b) the grounds are irrelevant to the object of detention; (c) the grounds are non-existent or are such that no rational person will act on those grounds to detain a person; (d) the grounds are so remote in time or are not proximate enough to lead to the conclusion that there is a necessity to detain the detenu on the date of the order. It is also settled that if the grounds show a total non-application of mind or a casual attitude on the part of the Detaining Authority, or show a dull casualness or casual indifference in passing the order of detention, even then the order of detention can be set aside.. It is further settled that if the order of detention is based on a ground not disclosed to the detenu and the detenu thereby had no opportunity to make an effective representation against his detention, the order is liable to be struck down. It is finally settled that if any one of the several grounds upon which the order of detention is based is found to be bad for any reason, then even if the other grounds are not open to challenge, still the detention order becomes bad. With these preliminary observations, we will consider the second, the third and the fourth grounds. The second ground is that in the house Shaikh Alli Shaikh Bapu Chhapekar in Pozari village, certain quantity of paddy and rice was found. This in itself does not connect the detenu with the incident. But the further fact relied upon is that during the inquiry Shaikh Ali Shaikh Bapu Chhapekar had stated that the portion of his house where paddy and rice were found had been hired to he detenu and the stock found there belonged to the detenu. This in itself does not connect the detenu with the incident. But the further fact relied upon is that during the inquiry Shaikh Ali Shaikh Bapu Chhapekar had stated that the portion of his house where paddy and rice were found had been hired to he detenu and the stock found there belonged to the detenu. It is to be noted that the ground is not that as a result of the finding of paddy and rice in the house of Chhapekar, an independent inquiry was made and in that inquiry it had come out that the detenu had come out that the detenu had taken on hire a portion of the house of Chhapekar and the stock found in the portion of the house of Chhapekar belonged to the detenu and the stock of paddy and rice was stored by him. The only fact relied upon is the statement which Chhapekar had made that the portion of the house where the stock of paddy and rice was found had been hired by the detenu and the stock belonged to he detenu. The grievance of the petitioner is that this ground was non-existent, that is, no statement during the inquiry had been made by Chhapekar, as stated in the ground, and it was on the basis of some other material that the Detaining Authority had arrived at its subjective satisfaction and that material had been kept back from the detenu disabling him from making an effective representation against his detention. Now, if there were an inquiry with Chhapekar in which he had really made a statement that the portion of the house where the stock of paddy and rice was found had been hired to the detenu and the stock found there belonged to the detenu, then, in the ordinary course, the detenu would have been prosecuted. Of course, Chhapekar also could possibly be prosecuted on the ground that it was his house and the stock of paddy and rice was found in his house. But it could not be imagined that on the basis of the statement which Chhapekar had made, it would be only Chhapekar who would be prosecuted and the detenu would not be prosecuted. The fact that it was only Chhapekar who was prosecuted shows that no statement must have been made by Chhapekar, as alleged. But it could not be imagined that on the basis of the statement which Chhapekar had made, it would be only Chhapekar who would be prosecuted and the detenu would not be prosecuted. The fact that it was only Chhapekar who was prosecuted shows that no statement must have been made by Chhapekar, as alleged. Chhapekar alone was prosecuted, because it was in his house that paddy and rice were found. It may be that when Chhapekar was prosecuted, in his statement under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he had stated that he had leased out one portion of his house to the detenu, that the detenu used to keep his paddy and rice in his house and that the paddy seized belonged to the detenu. But it is not what Chhapekar had stated during the trial that was relied upon by the Detaining Authority. What the Detaining Authority had relied upon was the statement alleged to have been made by Chhapekar during the inquiry. But the possibility of that statement being made by Chhapekar is ruled out from the fact that, ordinarily, had Chhapekar really made that statement, there could be no reason for not prosecuting the detenu when the authority had thought of prosecuting Chhapekar. In this view of the matter, it was for the District Magistrate to explain why Chhapekar was prosecuted and why the detenu was not prosecuted. Not only was this not explained, but there was even no reference to the prosecution of Chhapekar at all in the ground. There is reason to believe that the District Magistrate was influenced by some other material in reaching his subjective satisfaction than the one alleged in the ground which, for the reasons already stated, was non-existent. In the affidavit filed by the Detaining Authority it has been stated : there are ample grounds for the authorities to come to the conclusion that the detenu had definitely taken these premises on lease and further the authority concerned has to formulate its grounds on the basis of the information collected and brought before it from various sources. But in ground No. 2, the particulars or the facts, or which the conclusion of the Detaining Authority was based that the premises in question had been taken on lease by the detenu, were not given. But in ground No. 2, the particulars or the facts, or which the conclusion of the Detaining Authority was based that the premises in question had been taken on lease by the detenu, were not given. The detenu had thus no opportunity to make an effective representation against the ground in the absence of the material particulars. The order of detention based on ground No. 2 is, therefore, liable to be struck down for two reasons: that the material on the basis of which the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was reached was non-existent and the material on which the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority could be said to have been based was not disclosed to the detenu disabling him from making an effective representation against the order of detention. It has also been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the detention order on ground No. 2 is also liable to be struck down on the ground of remoteness in point of time. But we do not propose to examine this ground, because we are satisfied that the order of detention is liable to be struck down for the other two reasons, which we have mentioned above. Mr. M. B. Kotwal, the learned Public Prosecutor on behalf of the respondents, submitted that merely because the criminal Court had not accepted the statement of Chhapekar under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure about his having leased out a portion of his house to the detenu, it cannot be said that the Detaining Authority had no material before it for coming to the conclusion that the portion of the house where the stock of paddy and rice was found had been hired to the detenu and the stock found in the house belonged to the detenu. The Detaining Authority could still rely upon the statement of Chhapekar even if the criminal Court had not accepted it. One need not have any quarrel with the above proposition. We have already pointed out that ground No. 2 doe not state that the Detaining Authority had relied upon the statement of Chhapekar made at the trial. It was relying upon some statement of Chhapekar which he is said to have made during the inquiry. One need not have any quarrel with the above proposition. We have already pointed out that ground No. 2 doe not state that the Detaining Authority had relied upon the statement of Chhapekar made at the trial. It was relying upon some statement of Chhapekar which he is said to have made during the inquiry. It is also natural to expect that on the undeclared stock of paddy and rice being found in the house, the authorities which had discovered this would make an inquiry as to whose stock it was. We have already pointed out that had Chhapekar really stated at that time that the stock belonged to the detenu and the portion of the house where it was found was hired by the detenu, if the authorities had decided to launch a prosecution in respect of the incident, they could not have dropped the detenu. They may or may not have prosecuted Chhapekar, if they were satisfied with his explanation that he had nothing to do with the stock or that he had no knowledge that the stock was kept in the house. But if the statement attributed to Chhapekar was really there, non-prosecution of the detenu in the absence of any explanation can lead to the only natural conclusion that no material was available with the authorities at that time that the detenu was in any way concerned with the stock of paddy and rice discovered in the house of Chhapekar. It is for this reason that we have held that ground No. 2 was non-existent, because there could have been no statement by Chhapekar that he had leased out a portion of his house, where the stock was found, to the detenu and the stock found belonged to the detenu. Mr. Kotwal also pointed out certain decisions of the Supreme Court and urged that if the incident mentioned in ground No. 2 constituted an offence for which the detenu could be tried in a Court of law, that would not be a bar to passing the detention order. One can have no quarrel with this proposition also. The fact of the non-prosecution of the detenu was examined by us only to show that the second ground was non-existent and for no other purpose. One can have no quarrel with this proposition also. The fact of the non-prosecution of the detenu was examined by us only to show that the second ground was non-existent and for no other purpose. It was neither the argument before us on behalf of the petitioner nor are we ourselves laying down a proposition that because the incident mentioned in ground No. 2 constituted an offence for which the detenu could be tried, it was not proper to pass an order of detention. Mr. Kotwal next argued that the statements in the affidavit of the District Magistrate: There are ample grounds for the authorities to come to the conclusion that the detenu had definitely taken these premises on lease and again, the authority concerned has to formulate its grounds on the basis of the information collected and brought before it from various sources were only evidentiary details and not the basic fact or material which had influenced the Detaining Authority in reaching its subjective satisfaction. Mr. Kotwal relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court in support of his argument. It may, however, be noted that what is stated in ground No. 2 is not the fact that the portion of the house where the stock of undeclared paddy and rice was found had been leased to the detenu and the stock found there belonged to him. What was stated was that Chhapekar had made such a statement. Had it been stated in the ground as a fact that the portion of the house where the stock of undeclared paddy and rice was found had been leased to the detenu and the stock found there belonged to him, perhaps, there would have been some basis for urging that the statements made in the affidavit of the District Magistrate were only evidential details and not the basic fact or material which had influenced the Detaining Authority. As we have pointed out, thee could not be any statement by Chhapekar during the inquiry that the portion of the house where the stock of paddy and rice was found had been hired to the detenu and the stock found there belonged to him. As we have pointed out, thee could not be any statement by Chhapekar during the inquiry that the portion of the house where the stock of paddy and rice was found had been hired to the detenu and the stock found there belonged to him. If this were so, what has been stated in the affidavit of the District Magistrate could not be considered as mere evidential details, because there was no basic fact or material in the ground of which these could be evidential details. It is also difficult to hold that what the Detaining Authority had mentioned in the affidavit was no more than evidential details and did not constitute the basic fact or material which had influenced the Detaining Authority and which evidential details need not have been disclosed to the detenu. Relying upon the decision (State of Bombay v. Atma Ram)1, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 157. Mr. Kotwal has urged that ground No. 2 clearly mentions that the portion of the house where the undeclared stock of paddy and rice was found had been taken on lease by the detenu and the stock found there belonged to the detenu. This was the material on which the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was based. It was only the source of the material that was mentioned in the affidavit which it was not obligatory on the part of the Detaining Authority to disclose to the detenu. The dictum in Atma Rams case that grounds contemplated by Article 22(5) of the Constitution are nothing but "conclusion of facts and not complete recital of facts" and what the Detaining Authority is required to communicate to the detenu are only its conclusions of facts, was considered by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in (Prabhu Dayal v. District Magistrate, Kamrun)2, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 183. There, it was held that the requirement of Article 22(5) will not be satisfied unless the detenu is given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention and that no opportunity to make the representation can be effective unless the detenu is furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds of detention. There, it was held that the requirement of Article 22(5) will not be satisfied unless the detenu is given the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the detention and that no opportunity to make the representation can be effective unless the detenu is furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds of detention. In (Motilal v. State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1509, also it was held, relying upon an earlier decision of the Court, that a person detained is entitled, in addition to the right to have the ground of his detention communicated to him, to a further right to have particular as full and adequate as the circumstances permit furnished to him as to enable him to make representation against the order of detention. In the case of (Vakil Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir)4, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2337, relied upon by Mr. Kotwal, it has been held that the grounds must contain the pith and substance of primary facts but not subsidiary facts of evidential details. The statement in the affidavit of the District Magistrate that the Detaining Authority had ample grounds to come to the conclusion that the detenu had taken the premises of Chhapekar on lease and further that this information had been collected and brought before the Detaining Authority from various sources, cannot be said to be subsidiary facts or evidential details but must be regarded to contain the pith and substance of the primary fact of the premises being taken on lease by the detenu. We have shown that ground No. 2 did not mention the fact of the detenu having taken on lease the premises of Chhapekar. The ground only stated of some statement having been made by Chhapekar himself. In addition to the further fact that this ground was non-existent, namely, no statement had been made by Chhapekar during the inquiry which has been attributed to him, the material mentioned by the Detaining Authority in the affidavit can be nothing else than the pith and substance of the primary fact constituting the ground and showing the connection of the detenu with the undeclared stock of paddy and rice found in the premises of Chhapekar. Mr. Mr. Kotwal also relied upon the decision in (Binod Bihari v. State of Bihar)5, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2125 to show that the details stated in the affidavit of the Detaining Authority were only by way of reply to the allegations in the petition and that could not be the basic fact or material which had gone into the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. That case however, is clearly distinguishable. There, the Deputy Secretary to Government in the Home Department, in reply to the petition, had filed an affidavit. The various statements made therein were intended to repeal the allegation of the petitioner that he was a dedicated social and public worker devoted to the uplift of the backward and down trodden classes. They were not act out as facts taken into account by the District Magistrate for the purpose of arriving at his subjective satisfaction in regard to the necessity of the detentions of the petitioner. The District Magistrate had himself made an affidavit in reply to the petition in which he had not referred to any of the facts to be found in the affidavit of the Deputy Secretary as having been taken into account by him in passing the order of detention. Mr. Kotwal finally relied upon the decision in (Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal)6, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 550. In that case, the history-sheet of the petitioner was before the District Magistrate when he made the order of detention. The District Magistrate had stated in his affidavit in reply to the petition that beyond the three incidents mentioned in the grounds of detention, he had not taken any other material in the history-sheet into account in passing the order of detention. The material from the history-sheet was not disclosed to the petitioner. It was held in that case on facts that although the material from the history-sheet was not disclosed to the petitioner, there was no material before the District Magistrate other than the three incidents set out in the grounds of detention which had gone into the formation of the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate and this had been communicated to the petitioner. The principle stated in that case was that the basic facts and material particulars, which are the foundation of the order of detention, are also covered by grounds within the contemplation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Act and these are required to be communicated to the detenu. In the present case, on the facts, therefore, what was stated in ground No. 2 was only the statement of Chhapekar that the portion of the house where the undeclared stock of paddy and rice was found had been hired to the detenu and the stock found there belonged to the detenu. This statement and consequently the material mentioned in ground No. 2 was not existent. The material mentioned in the affidavit of the District Magistrate that he had ample grounds to come to the conclusion that the detenu had taken the premises of Chhapekar on lease was the basic fact or material which had influenced the Detaining Authority to arrive at its subjective satisfaction. It had not been communicated to the detenu. He had, therefore, no opportunity to make an effective representation against that material. On these grounds, therefore, the order of detention on the basis of ground No. 2 is liable to be struck down. That brings us to the third ground. It states that on 12th December, 1973, twenty-six bags of rice were being transported to Dohen Creek for export by country craft. About 20/25 persons, including the detenu, were present on the spot, watching and guiding the labourers engaged for transport. The detenu, on seeing the police and the officers approaching the spot, ran away, leaving behind the rice bags. The main contention of the petitioner in respect of this ground is that the ground is totally false and non-existence as the detenu had nothing to do whatsoever with the incident. The District Magistrate, in his affidavit, has reiterated that the incident was not imaginary. The Tahasildar of Alibag was on checking duty on the night in question along with certain officers, all of whom knew the detenu well. There was no question of any mistaken identity. The Tahasildar definitely saw the detenu watching the work. It was also mentioned in the affidavit that the detenu and his colleagues and subordinates were well-known for rice smuggling in Poynad area by different transport methods. There was no question of any mistaken identity. The Tahasildar definitely saw the detenu watching the work. It was also mentioned in the affidavit that the detenu and his colleagues and subordinates were well-known for rice smuggling in Poynad area by different transport methods. It was reiterated by the petitioner in his rejoinder that the place was dark and it was highly improbable for either the Tahasildar or any of his officers to recognise the detenu or his companions. Now, in order to see whether the ground was there or it was non-existent, the important thing to be borne in mind is that the incident, if true, disclosed an offence for which the detenu could be tried. It is true that the mere fact that criminal prosecution could be launched would not prevent the Detaining Authority from passing an order of detention. In the case of (Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal)7, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154, it was stated : "The Power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosection even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosection and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosection is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosection." But then there ought to be some explanation why, instead of launching the prosecution, resort had been taken to preventive detention. Let us see what is the explanation here ? The only explanation given by the District Magistrate in his affidavit is that "since the detenu and the others ran away there was no sufficient evidence to lodge a prosecution against them". This explanation hardly makes any sense. Even if the detenu had run away, it is the contention of the Detaining Authority that he had been recognised at the spot. The rice bags were also left behind. The detenu could be apprehended and prosecuted. There was no question of witnesses not coming forward to depose against the detenu. This explanation hardly makes any sense. Even if the detenu had run away, it is the contention of the Detaining Authority that he had been recognised at the spot. The rice bags were also left behind. The detenu could be apprehended and prosecuted. There was no question of witnesses not coming forward to depose against the detenu. The witnesses in this case were only the Tahasildar and the officers of the Government. There was no question of their not coming forward to depose against the detenu. In (Grilal Shaw v. The State of West Bengal)8, 1975 U.J. (S.C.) 401, it was observed that where a Sub-Inspector of Police was the only material witness, it could not be imagined that he was afraid of giving evidence against the detenu. There was also no question of the Court not likely to believe them. These are also not stated to be the reasons for not prosecuting the detenu. The only probable reason then for not prosecuting the detenu appears to be that the detenu must not have been identified at the spot. Hence, in the absence of the evidence of identification of the detenu, perhaps the prosecution could not stand in a Court of law. This reason following not only from the fact of the non-prosection of the detenu but also from the additional and new material mentioned by the District Magistrate in his affidavit, namely, the detenu and his colleagues and subordinates were well-known for rice smuggling in Poynad area by different transport methods. The possibility could not be ruled out that this material had influenced the Detaining Authority in reaching a conclusion that it was the detenu who was transporting rice to Dohen Creek for export by country craft. Because this material was placed before the Detaining Authority, it must have been led to believe, through there was no evidence of the identification of the detenu at the spot, that it was the detenu who was concerned in the incident. This shows non-application of mind and a casual approach and "a case of jumping to a conclusion", to borrow the expression from (Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar)9, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1303. The Detaining Authority had also relied upon the material which was not disclosed to the detenu disabling him from making an effective representation. This shows non-application of mind and a casual approach and "a case of jumping to a conclusion", to borrow the expression from (Rameshwar Lal v. State of Bihar)9, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1303. The Detaining Authority had also relied upon the material which was not disclosed to the detenu disabling him from making an effective representation. On these grounds, therefore, the order of detention based on the third ground, is liable to be struck down. Turning to ground No. 4, it is stated that on 1st November, 1974, motor car No. M. R. H. 8392 was halted by the police near Pen. A stock of rice weighing five quintals and odd was found in the car. The owner of the car K. K. Ardeser Suran of Bombay stated to the police that the stock of rice in question was purchased by him from Girdhar Shet of Poynad. The case of the petitioner is that the said ground is totally false and non-existent. It was a case of mistaken identity, because the reference to Girdhar Shet made by Ardesar, if any, was not to detenu. The detenu was not acquainted with Ardesar and had not sold any quantity of rice to Ardesar. The petitioner contended that at Poynad thee are there persons who are known as Girdhar Shet. Hence, if Ardesar had stated that he had purchased the rice from Girdhar Shet, that did not lead to the only conclusion that the rice must have been purchased by Ardesar from the detenu. The District Magistrate in his affidavit admitted that there are three persons in Poynad village whose name is Girdhar, but explained that it was only the detenu who was known by the name Girdhar Shet. Hence, the reference by Ardesar to Girdhar Shet was reference to the detenu. Moreover, the detenu is the only person in Poynad who is dealing in illegal sale and transport of rice and paddy. At the outset, we may state that it is doubtful if Ardesar had made any statement that he had purchased the rice from a person by name Girdhar Shet. Ardesar was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. He had pleaded guilty, but had stated that he had purchased rice at Dolvi from some agriculturists whose names he did not know (Vide Ex. II). Ardesar was prosecuted for an offence under section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. He had pleaded guilty, but had stated that he had purchased rice at Dolvi from some agriculturists whose names he did not know (Vide Ex. II). There is no reason why Ardesar should not have mentioned the name of Girdhar Shet as the person from whom he had purchased the rice, during the trial, if he had made that statement when he was apprehended. Ardesar had pleaded guilty and it is not as if it was in his interest not to disclose the name of Girdhar Shet. But that apart. If information had been disclosed by Ardesar from which it could be known that it was the detenu who had sold the rice to Ardesar, the natural conduct of the police who had apprehended Ardesar would have been to raid the house of the detenu and interrogate him. In regard to the raid, there are the conficting versions of the Detaining Authority and the petitioner. While the petitioner says that the house of the detenu was not raided, the Detaining Authority says that it was raided. The petitioner has, however, further contended that the detenu was not interrogated in regard to the statement made by Ardesar and to this there was no challenge in the affidavit of the District Magistrate. This shows that even if Ardesar had stated that he had purchased the rice from Girdhar Shet, that he had not led to the identification of the detenu as the person who had sold the rice to Ardesar. Although the District Magistrate has stated in his affidavit that is only the detenu who is known as Girdhar Shet and the other two persons are known merely as Girdhar, the certificate issued by the Deputy Sarpanch of Ponyad Gram Panchayat (Vide Ex. III) shows that all the three persons are known as Girdhar Shet. From the more disclosure by Ardesar, therefore, that Girdhar Shet of Poynad had sold the rice to him, the detenu could not be fixed as the person concerned. III) shows that all the three persons are known as Girdhar Shet. From the more disclosure by Ardesar, therefore, that Girdhar Shet of Poynad had sold the rice to him, the detenu could not be fixed as the person concerned. There is reason to believe that the basis of the conclusion reached by the Detaining Authority that Girdhar Shet mentioned by Ardesar was the detenu, was the material which finds place in the affidavit of the District Magistrate, namely, Besides, the detenu Girdhar Shet is the only person in Poynad area who is dealing in illegal sale and transport of rice and paddy. It was thus a case where from the disclosure by Ardesar that Girdhar Shet of Poynad had sold the rice to him, the Detaining Authority, without proper application of mind and with a casual approach, had jumped to the conclusion from the circumstances, that it is only the detenu who was dealing in illegal sale and transport of rice and paddy, that Girdhar Shet referred to by Ardesar was the detenu. The above material fact was also not communicated to the detenu and this had disabled him from making an effective representation against the order of detention. For all these reasons, the order of detention based on the fourth ground is also bad in law. In view of our Findings that the second, the third and the fourth grounds are bad in law, we need not go into the first ground, because even if that ground were to be upheld, the order of detention would be bad. It has been stated in the case of (Dwarika Prasad v. State of Bihar)10, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 134. In view of our Findings that the second, the third and the fourth grounds are bad in law, we need not go into the first ground, because even if that ground were to be upheld, the order of detention would be bad. It has been stated in the case of (Dwarika Prasad v. State of Bihar)10, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 134. :--- "If there is one principle more firmly established than any other in this field of jurisprudence, it is that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority is non-existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid and it would not avail the Detaining Authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons are good and do not suffer from any such infirmity, because it can never be predicated to what extent the bad grounds or reasons operated on the mind of the Detaining Authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if the bad ground or reason were excluded and the good grounds or reasons alone were before the Detaining Authority." The result is that the petition is allowed. During the course of the judgment yesterday, after we concluded that the second ground was bad in law and could not be upheld and the detention order was liable to be struck down on that score alone, on the request of Mr. Porus Mehta, we had directed that the detenu should be set at liberty forthwith. We confirm that order and make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. There will be no order as to costs. ------