Judgment : The detenu is the petitioner in this Rule and is praying for a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus seeking his release form detention. The detention is under an order dated February 24, 1975 passed by the District Magistrate, Murshidabad, in purported exercise of his power under Section 3(1)(2) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The declared object of such detention is to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, 2. The detenu is admittedly a government appointed Tahasildar of Kirtipore Anchal. The detention rests on three grounds incorporated in the grounds of detention. So far as the first ground is concerned it refers to an alleged misconduct on the part of the Government Tahasildar in wilfully making certain manipulated entries in the list of producers which was entrusted to him for preparation with a view to help an assessee under the Levy Order to get the benefit of lower scale of levy. That is single default on the part of the Tahasildar alleged and incorporated in first ground as an act of misconduct. We have serious doubt as to how such an act even if it is a misconduct can have a direct bearing of a satisfaction being arrived at that the detenu if not detained will act in manner prejudical to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community. The sole idea behind preventive detention is to prevent a person from doing the prejudical act which he but for the detention would be capable of doing again in future. But here the act alleged is a misconduct as a Government appointed Tahasildar which he would be incapable of repeating if his appointment is suspended or terminated. Government has ample power to do so in respect of an erring Tahasilder and unless the detention was made as a penal measure for the misconduct there is little necessity for. Detention on such a ground is hardly bonafide. 3. But that apart the other two grounds, in our opinion, would clearly show that they are either vague or irrelevant vitiating the detention itself. The second ground recites that on February 8, 1975, the detenu-petitioner was found to have himself locked in the house of assessee Abdul Joad on the arrival of the requisitioning party. 3. But that apart the other two grounds, in our opinion, would clearly show that they are either vague or irrelevant vitiating the detention itself. The second ground recites that on February 8, 1975, the detenu-petitioner was found to have himself locked in the house of assessee Abdul Joad on the arrival of the requisitioning party. When the door was forced open he was found to be lying in the room covering himself with a blanket and he interrupted the operation with the ulterior motive of frustrating the policy of the Government. It is difficult to understand or appreciate how and why a Government Tahasildar will go all the way to hide himself in the house of an assessee by having himself locked but even if that be so, we do not find proximate nexus between such an act being prejudicial to maintenance of supplies essential to the community. If the latter part of the allegations was meant to be the real act constituting an act prejudicial to the supplies essential to the community unfortunately that part is conveniently vague. What was the nature or character of the act of interruption put forward by the detenu and what was the exact nature of the operation is not said anywhere in this ground. It is not specifically alleged that there was any paddy found inside the house or that the requisitioning party while recovering such paddy was obstructed by any overt act of the petitioner. Taking these circumstances into consideration we have reason to believe and accept the case made before us to the effect that in was a case of concoction, the sole object behind it being a co-lateral use of the Act against an inconvenient Tahasildar. In any event on the conclusions as above, this ground must be held to be both irrelevant and vague. 4. So far as third ground is concerned the allegations are clearly vague and indefinite, incapable of being effectively answered. It is said that the detenu being a Tahasildar had started an ill propoganda against the State Government's Food Policy since February, 1975, and had been holding meetings at different villages to incite the villagers not to discharge their levy obligations. Without any doubt such a generalisation could hardly be met except by a general denial. It is said that the detenu being a Tahasildar had started an ill propoganda against the State Government's Food Policy since February, 1975, and had been holding meetings at different villages to incite the villagers not to discharge their levy obligations. Without any doubt such a generalisation could hardly be met except by a general denial. No particulars of ill propoganda have been set out nor the particulars of the villagers or of the meetings held are furnished in the ground; nor is there any indication as to who are the villagers and belonging to which of the village that are being subject to levy obligations were incited not to fulfil the same. This being the position, we cannot but hold that this ground is materially vague and no detenu could have been able to make any effective representation on such a ground. 5. On the conclusions above, we must hold that the grounds Nos.2 and 3 are materially vague and irrelevant and no detention can rest on such grounds. 6. This application, therefore, succeeds. The Rule is made absolute and we direct that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith and as we are also of the opinion that this is a case of misuse of power by the detaining authority we would direct the detenu be compensated by award of costs of this proceeding in this Court-hearing fee being assessed at 20 gold mohurs. Let this order be communicated by special messenger at the cost of the petitioner. Bhattacharya, J. I agree.