Ramachandra Raju, J.-The petitioner is Dr. Jayanthi Dharma Teja, now a prisoner in the Central Jail, Chenchalaguda, Hyderabad. This writ of habeas corpus is filed for a direction for his release from jail immediately, on the ground that he has already undergone the substantive sentence of imprisonment and the imprisonment for default in payment of fine amounts, taking into consideration the period of detention undergone by him during investigation which is to be set-off against the term of imprisonment as provided under section 428 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure which came into force on 1st April, 1974, and the sum of Rs. 1,13,000 which has been paid to the credit of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, on 1st February, 1975 under four demand drafts drawn on the State Bank, of Hyderabad and delivered to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Chenchalaguda, Hyderabad, towards balance of fine amounts. 2. A few facts necessary for the purpose of this petition may be stated. The petitioner was the Managing Director of M/s. Jayanti Shipping Company during the years 1963 to 1966. The President of India promulgated an Ordinance on 10th June, 1966 for taking over the management of the company. Thereafter on a complaint given by the Secretary, Shipping Corporation of India, which had been appointed as the Managing Agents of the Jayanti Shipping Company, a case was registered on 4th August, 1966 against the petitioner under several sections of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter the case was investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation, Special Police Establishment, New Delhi, and a preliminary charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner on 28th February, 1967 before the Court of the Additional District Magistrate, Delhi. It was alleged that the petitioner was guilty of criminal breach of trust, cheating and forgery. At that time the petitioner being not in India and in United States of America and there being an extradition treaty with the United States the Magistrate by passing an order holding inter alia that the petitioner had committed extraditable offences under sections 409, 420, 456/457 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, issued warrant of arrest and requested the Government of India to initiate extradition proceedings. Accordingly the Government of India, New Delhi, requested the Government of United States of America for surrendering the petitioner. Accordingly the Government of India, New Delhi, requested the Government of United States of America for surrendering the petitioner. During the extradition proceedings started by the United States against him, the petitioner jumped his bail and absconded to Costa Rica. The Republic of India had no treaty of extradition with Costa Rica. But they approached the Government there to send back the petitioner to India. The President of Costa Rica referred the matter to the Supreme Court of Costa Rica to advise him in the matter. The proceedings before the Supreme Court, Costa Rica, continued for a considerable period. Ultimately on 12th June, 1969 by a majority decision the Supreme Court, Costa Rica, advised the the President that the petitioner should not be extradited. As a result of that advice the Government of Costa Rica decided in April, 1970 that the petitioner should not be returned to India. 3. While so in July, 1970 the petitioner came to United Kingdom on a passport issued by the Government of Costa Rica. On the basis of a Red Corner notice issued by the Government of India for arresting the petitioner, if he happens to visit United Kingdom, on 24th July, 1970 when he was about to leave London, after obtaining the warrant for his arrest from a Magistrate in London, the London Police arrested the petitioner. On being informed about the arrest of the petitioner in London, the Government of India obtained a fresh warrant of arrest from the Magistrate at Delhi on 28th July, 1970, and on the basis of it issued a requisition to the Government of United Kingdom for extradition of the petitioner. The petitioner claimed immunity from arrest-on the ground that he was on a Diplomatic Mission, being a Diplomatic Agent of the Government of Costa Rica. This contention was negatived by Queen’s Bench Division in a habeas corpus petition field by the petitioner. After extradition proceedings ended, the petitioner was handed over on 15th April, 1971 to the officer of the Central Bureau of Investigation, who had been deputed by the Government of India as their representative to take charge of the petitioner and to bring him to India to take his trial. After the petitioner was brought to India on 16th April, 1971 he was produced before the Magistrate who remanded him to judicial custody. After the petitioner was brought to India on 16th April, 1971 he was produced before the Magistrate who remanded him to judicial custody. After completion of the investigation the final charge-sheet was filed on 11th May, 1971. Thus from 24th July, 1970 up to 15th April, 1971 the petitioner was in detention in a London Jail. The petitioner was ultimately convicted under section 409, Indian Penal Code., etc, and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and pay a total fine amount of Rs. 14,13,000 and 10 undergo further terms of imprisonment in default of payment of fine amounts. 4. The chief controversy between the petitioner and the respondents in this petition is whether the days the petitioner was kept in detention in the jail in Logon during the pendency of the extradition proceedings, can be included in the period of detention for the purpose of set off as envisaged under section 428 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force on 1st April, 1974 as already mentioned above, even though, the conviction of the petitioner was prior to that date under the old Criminal Procedure Code in which there was no similar provision. 5. Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads that: "428. Period of detention undergone by the accused to be set off against the sentence of imprisonment: Where an accused person has on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term, the period of detention, if any undergone by him during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case and before the date of such conviction, shall be set-off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on such conviction, and the liability of such person to undergo imprisonment on such conviction shall be restricted to the remainder, if any, of the term of imprisonment imposed on him." In Biddika Jagannadham v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Visakhapatnam1, a bench of this Court held that persons convicted and sentenced before the commencement of the new Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 are also entitled to the benefit to the set-off given by section 428. The Supreme Court also took a similar view in B.P.Andre v. Superintendent, Central Jail2 and held that section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code embraces cases where a person has been convicted before the coming into force of the new Criminal Procedure Code, but his sentence is still running at the date when the new Code of Criminal Procedure, came into force. The Supreme Court said that section 428 on a plain natural construction of its language, posits for its applicability a factual situation which is described by the Clause "where an accused person has, on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term". There is nothing in this clause which suggests, either expressly or by necessary implication, that the conviction and sentence must be after the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, and hence, even where an accused person has been convicted prior to the coming into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, bur. his sentence is still running, it would not be inappropriate to say that the "accused person has on conviction, been sentenced to imprisonment for a term". The Supreme Court has further held that section 228 applies not only in relation to a substantive sentence of imprisonment but also in relation to a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine and that the period for which an accused person has been detained during investigation, inquiry or trial of the case is liable to be set-off not only against the term of substantive imprisonment but also against the term of imprisonment in default of payment of fine. The Supreme Court has further held that the section 428 is absolute in its terms and it provides for set-off of the pre conviction detention of an accused person against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction, whatever be the term of imprisonment imposed and whatever be the factors taken into account by the Court while imposing the term of imprisonment. 6. 6. Thus the petit oner herein, though convicted and sentenced prior to 1st April, 1974 on which date only the new Code of Criminal Procedure, came into force, is entitled to the benefit of section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and can claim set off of the period he was, under detention and he can claim set-off not only against the substantive sentence of imprisonment but also in relation to the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine. 7. The petitioner was convicted and sentenced in all under 8 counts. The total period of substantive imprisonment would come to only three years on the 8 charges as the sentences were directed to run concurrently. Besides, the petitioner was sentenced to various terms of imprisonment under the 8 charges, he was also sentenced to pay various amounts of fine under the charges, totalling to an amount of Rs. 14,13,000. For payment of each fine amount there was a clause to undergo a particular period of imprisonment in default of payment. But so far as the default sentences are concerned, according to the direction, they had to be run consecutively. The total period of imprisonment in default of payment of fine amounts would come to three years. 8. According to the petitioner, he completed the substantive sentences of three years by 23rd July, 1973 after deducting the remissions earned and taking into consideration the period he had undergone detention prior to his conviction. Subsequently he suffered imprisonment for a period of 1 year 6 months 10 days by the time he filed the present habeas corpus petition. Adding the remission of 5 moths 20 days to 1 year 6 months 10 days, the petitioner claims to have served the default imprisonment of two years by 4th February, 1975. The total default sentence of imprisonment under charges Nos. 1 to 4 is two years. This according to the petitioner, he had already served. The total fine amounts payable under charges Nos. 5 to 8 is Rs. 1,13,000 This according to the petitioner has been paid on 1st February, 1975 to the credit of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. 9. The above facts are not in dispute except to the claim made by the petitioner that he completed the substantive sentences of three years by 23rd July, 1973. 5 to 8 is Rs. 1,13,000 This according to the petitioner has been paid on 1st February, 1975 to the credit of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi. 9. The above facts are not in dispute except to the claim made by the petitioner that he completed the substantive sentences of three years by 23rd July, 1973. This claim of the petitioner is on the basis that the period for the purpose of set-off under section 428, Criminal Procedure Code, would also include the days he was kept in the London prison during the pendency of the extradition proceedings before he was handed over at London to the representative of the Government of India. According to section 428, Criminal Procedure, a prisoner is entitled to set-off against his term of imprisonment the period for which he was detained during the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case prior to his conviction. The contention of the respondents is that the detention of the petitioner in the British jail cannot be said to be the detention as envisaged under section 428, as the petitioner was kept in prison there not for the purpose of the case pending against him but for the purpose of extradition proceedings then pending there against him. 10. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether the detention of the period from 24th July, 1970 to 15th April, 1971 in the British jail can be called “detention” within the meaning of section 428 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure. Sri P. Ramachandra Reddy, the learned Advocate-Genaral has argued for the respondents that the Code of Criminal Procedure has no extra-territorial operation. The detention’ mentioned in section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be understood with reference to the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The detention should be under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Viewed from that point of view, the learned Advocate-General has submitted that as the detention of the petitioner in the British prison was not under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and not prima facie in the same case in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced, that period is not available to the petitioner for the purpose of set-off against the term of imprisonment imposed on him in the case. 11. We do not think we can agree with this argument of the learned Advocate-General. 11. We do not think we can agree with this argument of the learned Advocate-General. We fail to see how it cannot be said that the detention of the petitioner in the British jail was not during the investigation of the case in which he was convicted and sentenced The petitioner was wanted in the case filed against him in the Delhi Court and therefore the Delhi Court issued against the petitioner a warrant of arrest. As the petitioner was outside India in a foreign country, the petitioner had to be surrendered by the foreign country before he could be brought to India. Surrender by a foreign country being a political act done in pursuance of a treaty or an arrangement entered into between Sovereign States, after issuing the warrant the Delhi Court requested the Government of India to initiate extradition proceedings for the petitioner to be brought to India and produced before it. The Court within whose jurisdiction the offence is committed decides whether there is prima facie, evidence on which a requisition may be made to another country for surrender of the offender. When the State to which a requisition is made agrees consistently with its International commitments to lend its aid, the requisition is transmitted to the police authorities and the Courts of that country. Though the extradition is granted in implementation of the International commitments of the State, the procedure to be followed by the Courts in deciding whether extradition should be granted and on what terms, is determined by the Municipal Law of the State to which requisition for extradition is made. Pending decision by the British Court whether the petitioner could be extradited in pursuance of the request made by the Government of India, the petitioner was arrested and kept in the British prison and after the Court’s decision he was handed over to the official of the Special Police, Central Bureau of Investigation. 12. It is true a warrant issued by Court for an offence committed in a country from its very nature has no extra-territorial operation. But it is clear that the arrest of the petitioner in London was as a result of the arrest warrant issued by the Delhi Court in the case in which the petitioner was ultimately convicted and sentenced. It is true a warrant issued by Court for an offence committed in a country from its very nature has no extra-territorial operation. But it is clear that the arrest of the petitioner in London was as a result of the arrest warrant issued by the Delhi Court in the case in which the petitioner was ultimately convicted and sentenced. The extradition proceedings were taken for the purpose of surrender of the petitioner, so that he could be taken to India and produced before the Court in the case pending against him. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the detention of the petitioner in the British prison was for the purpose of the case pending against him and in which he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to imprisonment on various counts. Therefore the petitioner can be said to have undergone that detention during the pendency of the investigation, inquiry or trial of the same case before the date of his conviction. 13. The object of enacting section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to provide for set-off of the pre conviction detention of an accused person against the term of imprisonment imposed on him on conviction and it is absolute in its terms. The detention of the petitioner in the British jail is in connection with or for the purpose of the case in which he was convicted and the detention took place while the case was pending against him. Accordingly we hold that the detention of the petitioner from 24th July, 1970 to 16th April, 1971 can be called detention within the meaning or section 428, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. If that is so, it is not in dispute that the petitioner is entitled to immediate release. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed and the respondents are directed to set at liberty the petitioner forthwith. Advocates fees Rs. 250.