Judgment 1. This miscellaneous appeal has been preferred by the judgment-debtor against the concurrent judgment of the courts below rejecting the objection under Sec. 47 read with Sec.151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"). 2. A money decree was obtained on the 22nd of April, 1952, by the respondent against the appellant from the Court of 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Arrah, in M. S. 233/4 of 1950/51. It appears that thereafter the decree was transferred to Balliya Court. Accordingly an execution case was filed on the 17th of March, 1962. The said execution case was dismissed for default on the 30th of May, 1962, and thereafter, on the 5th of March, 1964, a fresh execution case was filed at Arrah which was registered as execution Case No. 5 of 1964. Certain properties which were mentioned in the execution petition were attached and the execution proceeded as against these properties. It appears that thereafter on 21-4-1965 some of the properties were deleted and some new properties were added in the execution petition. Thereafter the appellant filed an objection under Sec. 47 read with S. 151 of the Code on the 5th of August, 1967, alleging that he had no knowledge of the execution case previously and he had come to know of the same only 22 days ago. He raised various objections in the said objection petition regarding the maintainability of the execution petition. He also pleaded that the execution case was barred by limitation. The said objection was recorded as Miscellaneous Case No. 21 of 1967. In that case, both parties adduced evidence. The trial Court, by its order, dated the 21st of March, 1970, dismissed the said execution case after giving a finding that the execution case was not barred by limitation and that the execution would proceed against the newly added properties. It also gave a finding though not very clear, that notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code was served upon the appellant. As against the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred miscellaneous appeal which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 44/2 of 1970. The said miscellaneous appeal was dismissed by order, dated the 18th of January, 1972. Hence, the present miscellaneous second appeal. 3. Mr. As against the aforesaid order, the appellant preferred miscellaneous appeal which was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No. 44/2 of 1970. The said miscellaneous appeal was dismissed by order, dated the 18th of January, 1972. Hence, the present miscellaneous second appeal. 3. Mr. Chandra Bhushan Sahay, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has contended that there is no finding that notice was served under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code upon the appellant in the execution proceeding and therefore all subsequent proceedings are illegal and void. In my opinion, this contention has no substance. It appears that this point of notice was raised in the trial Court and the trial Court has given a finding, as already stated above by me, that there was a service of notice upon the appellant. Thereafter, it appears that this point was not raised in the lower appellate Court. Only two points, as stated in that judgment, were raised before that Court. Hence, at the second appellate stage, it is not permissible to allow the petitioner to raise the point of non-service of notice which was abandoned before the lower appellate Court. It may also be stated here that issuance of notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code was never challenged. 4. The next question that has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that new properties having been added in Execution Case No. 5 of 1964 beyond 12 years from the date of the decree, the execution cannot proceed as against those added properties. In my opinion, this submission has substance and has to be accepted. It appears that the decree that was passed in the suit was dated 22-4-1952 and 12 years from that date expired on the 22nd April, 1964. The present Execution Case No. 5 of 1964 was, however, filed on the 15th March, 1964, i.e., within 12 years of the date of the decree. The application for amendment of the execution petition which was filed on 21-4-1965 is clearly beyond 12 years. It has been held in the case of China Venkanna V/s. Bangararaju, ( AIR 1964 SC 1454 ) that "an application made after 12 years from the date of the decree would be a fresh application within the meaning of Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, if the previous application was finally disposed of. It has been held in the case of China Venkanna V/s. Bangararaju, ( AIR 1964 SC 1454 ) that "an application made after 12 years from the date of the decree would be a fresh application within the meaning of Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, if the previous application was finally disposed of. It would also be a fresh application if it asked for a relief against parties or properties different from those proceeded against in the previous execution petition or asked for a relief substantially different from that asked for in the earlier petition." This decision has approved the decision in the case of Bandhu Singh V/s. Kayastha Trading Bank Ltd., (AIR 1931 All 134), Venkata Lingama Nayanim V/s. Rajagopala Venkata Narasimha Rayanim, (AIR 1947 Mad 216), Lakshminarasinga Rao V/s. Balasubramanyam, (AIR 1949 Mad 251) and Gajanand Shah V/s. Dayanand Thakur, (AIR 1943 Pat 127). They do not require separate discussion here. It may be stated here that Sec. 48 of the Code now stands repealed but its language has been reproduced substantially in Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is thus settled by authority that the decree-holder cannot include new items of properties in the execution petition after 12 years from the date of the decree. In the present case, as I have already indicated above, an application for amendment was filed much beyond 12 years and, therefore, those properties which have been added after 12 years could not be proceeded with in execution case No. 5 of 1964. I, therefore, hold that the Courts below were wrong in holding that the execution case could proceed as against the newly added properties. To that extent the order of the Courts below is liable to be set aside. 5. In the result, I allow this appeal in part. The judgment and the order of the Courts below in which it has been held that the execution could proceed as against the newly added properties are set aside to that extent. The Executing Court is now directed to proceed as against the properties which are now mentioned in the execution petition of Execution Case No. 5 of 1964 leaving, however, the newly added properties. There will, however, be no order as to costs.