P. N. BAKSHI, J. Janta Laghu Madhyamik Vidalaya, Ranipar is an educational institution. Sri Ram Karan Singh, M. L. A. was the first President of the Managing Committee and Sheo Murat Upadhaya was its Secretary. Sri Ram Karan Singh was later on re moved from the office of the Presidentship and it is said that Sri Brij Pal Singh was set up by him as Manager-cum-Secretary of the insti tution. There was a serious dispute between Sheo Murat Upadhaya and Brij Pat Singh for the management of the aforesaid institution. On June 29, 1972 the Station Officer, Sahajanwa submitted a report in which it was mentioned that there was a serious apprehension of the breach of peace from the side of Sheo Murat Upadhaya and Brij Pat Singh, who were both claiming the right to manage the aforesaid institution. On a perusal of the report of the Station Officer, the Magistrate first class, Gorakhpur passed a preliminary order on June 29. 1972 and directed attachment of the School under Section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. He directed the parties to file their written statements and affidavits in support of their respective claims. Sheo Murat Upa dhaya filed a written statement on July 7, 1972 in which he alleged that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. are totally miscon ceived. It was also pleaded in his written statement that there was no apprehension of the breach of peace from his side and that he had been in continuous management of the institution. On the same day an application under sub-clause (5) of Section 145, Cr. P. C. was filed on behalf of Brij Pat Singh in which it was also alleged that the dis pute between the parties was "not a matter of some quarrel or con test between the parties of possession on immovable property, but it was a matter of rights between the parties constituting the members of the Management Committee as to who should be allowed to con tinue the management. It was further mentioned in this application that the question of attachment of the institution did not arise. It was alleged therein that if at all attachment was necessary then that could only be affected under Section 147, Cr. P. C. and not under Sec tion 145, Cr. P. C. as the dispute between the parties related to the right of management. It was alleged therein that if at all attachment was necessary then that could only be affected under Section 147, Cr. P. C. and not under Sec tion 145, Cr. P. C. as the dispute between the parties related to the right of management. It was also mentioned in this application that if any apprehension of the breach of peace is found to exist between two individuals a case under Section 1071117, Cr. P. C. should have been started rather than attaching the institution itself against pub lic policy and the spirit of law. On this basis the prayer was that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. be dropped. No order appears to have been passed on this application so far. A written statement has also been filed on behalf of Brij Pat Singh in which a plea has been taken that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. are misconceived, that, if at all the proceedings can only be taken under Section 147, Cr. P. C. that the dispute in question relates to the rights of management of the institution and as such Section 145, Cr. P. C. is not applicable and the proceedings there under should be quashed. It was also mentioned in this application that there is no apprehension of the breach of peace. Feeling aggrieved by the preliminary order of the Magistrate dated June 29, 1972 attaching the institution a revision was filed by Sheo Marat Upadhaya before the Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur which has been dismissed on July 28, 1972. Hence the present revision. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also per used the record of the case. I have carefully scrutinised the preli minary order which has been passed by the Magistrate on August 29, 1972. It is clear there from that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is himself of the opinion that there is a dispute between Sheo Murat Upadhaya and Brij Pat Singh with regard to the election of the President of the said institution and that this dispute has become so serious that it is likely to lead an apprehension of the breach of peace. It is significant that in this preliminary order the Magistrate has not specifically mentioned that the dispute in question relates to immovable property. It is significant that in this preliminary order the Magistrate has not specifically mentioned that the dispute in question relates to immovable property. On the contrary the order makes it clear that the dispute is merely concerned with the right to manage the insti tution. From the report of the Station Officer I find that he has men tioned therein that attempts have been made by him to perused both the parties not to commit any breach of peace but this persuasion has had no effect. In these circumstances, it is amply clear that the pro per section to be invoked by the Magistrate was Section 107/117, Cr. P. C. He should have taken action under the aforesaid section and ought to have issued notice to the parties to show cause why they should not be bound down for keeping the peace. Instead of taking appropriate action under Section 107/117, Cr. P. C. the Magistrate has attached the institution. It must be pointed out that the attachment of an educational institution is a very serious matter and is likely to jeopardize the interest of the student community. Recourse to such action should only be taken under exceptional circumstances. In the present case it is evident that both the parties are claiming a right to manage the institution. Personal rivalry and bickering between the parties should not be allowed to hamper the smooth working of an educational institution. On behalf of the opposite party No. 2 reliance is placed upon a Single Judge decision Gurdev Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 Punj. Law Reports 112. It was held therein that the order under Section 145 (1) was not vitiated merely because the grounds were not repeated in the preliminary order, though they were mentioned in the Police report. In my opi nion this case is not applicable. In the present case the Magistrate has mentioned the reasons for satisfaction and they are to the effect that there is a dispute between the parties with regard to the rights of the parties to manage the institution which is likely to lead to an apprehension of the breach of peace. In view of these reasons which have been given by the Magistrate after a perusal of the Police re port there can be no doubt that Section 145, Cr. P. C. would not ap ply to the facts of the present case. In view of these reasons which have been given by the Magistrate after a perusal of the Police re port there can be no doubt that Section 145, Cr. P. C. would not ap ply to the facts of the present case. Section 145, Cr. P. C. concerns itself with disputes concerning immovable property. This is not a case in which the contesting par ties are claiming possession over immovable property. The right to manage an educational institution cannot be deemed to be covered within the provisions of Section 145, Cr. P. C. where the court is merely concerned with disputes regarding possession of immovable property. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. and the preliminary order which has been passed there under are misconceived and not legally maintainable. It is significant to note in this connection that in the written -statement which have been filed by both the contesting parties it has been clearly mentioned that if at all the provisions of Section 147, Cr. P. C. would be attracted and not of Section 145, Cr. P. C. Section 147, Cr. P. C. no doubt deals with disputes concerning right of uses of immovable property. Whether the present dispute would fall un der this Section or not is a matter on which I do not wish to express any opinion at this stage. It would be for the Magistrate concerned to consider this aspect of the matter and if he opines that Section 147, Cr. P. C. applies to the facts of this case, he may proceed there under. Another question which arises in the present case is that in their written statements both the parties have alleged that there is no ap prehension of the breach of peace. As a matter of fact Brij Pat Singh has filed an application under Section 145 (5), Cr. P. C. on July 7, 1972 in which he has alleged that there does not exist any appre hension of the breach of peace and the proceedings should be drop ped. I have already made a detailed reference of this application in the proceeding paragraphs of this judgment. Therefore, this also would be one of the aspect which the court below will have to take into consideration before proceeding further in the matter under Section 147, Cr. I have already made a detailed reference of this application in the proceeding paragraphs of this judgment. Therefore, this also would be one of the aspect which the court below will have to take into consideration before proceeding further in the matter under Section 147, Cr. P. C. In this very connection I would like to point out that under Section 147 (1-A), Cr. P. C. it is mentioned that the provisions of Section 146 shall as far as may be, be applicable in the case of such inquiry. Section 145 (5), Cr. P. C. which gives a right to a party or any person interested to apply to the Court and to show that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or existed would also be ap plicable to proceedings under Section 147, Cr. P. C. As such the ap plication filed by Brij Pat Singh under Section 145 (5), Cr. P. C. which is pending can be legally considered even during the continuance of the proceedings under Section 147, Cr. P. C. In other words if the Magistrate is of the opinion that Section 147, Cr. P. C. applies to the facts of the present case, and he decides to pass a preliminary order in writing under Section 147 (1), Cr. P. C. and thereafter to proceed with the enquiry, it will be incumbent upon him also to consider the application of Brij Pat Singh, in deciding the question whether the apprehension of the breach of peace, if at all, still continues to exist. If, on the other hand, the Magistrate, is of the opinion that Section 147, Cr. P. C. is not applicable to the facts of the present case he would be naturally not proceed to take any action under that sec tion and would then proceed under Section 107|117, Cr. P. C. In the result, therefore, this application in revision is allowed. The impugned orders of the Magistrate, First Class, Gorakhpur dated June 29, 1972 and of the Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur dated July 28, 1972 are quashed and the Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case either under the provisions of Section 147, Cr. P. C. , if that is ap plicable; or under the Provisions of Section 107|117, Cr. P. C. .