JUDGMENT Bhattacharyya, J. : This appeal by the plaintiff under clause 15 of the Letters Patent arises out of a suit for eviction of a monthly tenant at will upon service of notice to quit. The plaintiff lost the suit in the courts below and against the decision of the first appellate court be preferred a second appeal to this Court, which was heard and dismissed by Murari Mohan Dult J. The short question canvassed in the second appeal and also before us is whether the plaintiff, who is himself a tenant of the suit premises, could be regarded as "the owner" within the meaning of the first part of clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as amended by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act (Act XXXIV of 1969). to be hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. Facts of the case lie in a short compass. The plaintiff, who was himself a tenant in respect of two flats in the disputed premises, each comprising two bed rooms, bath, privy and kitchen, was himself sued for ejectment by the owner landlord from one of the flats and a decree for ejectment was passed against him. He had been directed by this court to vacate the said flat within a certain period and bad actually vacated the same. One room in the other flat had been let out by the plaintiff to the defendant and the plaintiff on being directed to vacate the other flat, caused a notice to quit to be served upon the defendant respondent requiring him to quit and vacate the said room with the expiry of the month of July, 1966 on the ground that the plaintiff reason nably required the said room for his own use and occupation and also for the use and occupation of his family members, but the defendant refused and/or neglected to comply with the said notice, whereupon the present suit was instituted. 3. The defendant contested the suit disputing the plaintiff's requirement of the suit premises for his own use and occupation and on this point the learned Munsif framed an issue and answered it in affirmative, but finally dismissed the suit, on the ground that the plaintiff landlord not being the owner of the premises, was not entitled to get a decree for ejectment. On appeal by the Plaintiff, the learned Subordinate Judge, 4th Court, Alipore also took the same view and dismissed the appeal. 4. During the pendency of the second appeal before this court, section 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 came to be amended by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act XXXIV of 1969 and was substituted by clauses (f) and (ff). 5. The learned single Judge in this court also came to the conclusion that a lessee is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of the expression "if he is the owner" in clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the Act and accordingly held that a suit for eviction of a sub-tenant at the instance of the lessee on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own occupation was not maintainable. 6. Mr. Prafulla Kumar Roy, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended before us that the word "owner" in clause (ff) should not be interpreted to mean absolute ownership of the premises, but should also include a qualified or a limited owner such as a lessee, a trustee and, other persons. Two or more persons, Mr. Roy contended, may at the, same time have ownership of a thing wasted in them, one having the right of enjoyment, whilst the real owner for the time being may have become a sort of qualified owner, being deprived of his right of enjoyment of the property at the hands of the lessee. Such duplicate ownership, according to Mr. Roy, was possible and two or more persons may have at the same time ownership of the same thing vested in them and as instances referred to the cases of the co-owners and partners. To substantiate his contention Mr. Roy referred to the definition of the word "sale" in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and the word "transfer" in sections 41, 44 and 53 of the said Act as also various other provisions in West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and the Bengal Tenancy Act. In all these sections, the word "sale" or "transfer", according to Mr. Roy, did not contemplate absolute ownership of the property and a person, who was not an absolute owner could also transfer a property by sale. Mr. In all these sections, the word "sale" or "transfer", according to Mr. Roy, did not contemplate absolute ownership of the property and a person, who was not an absolute owner could also transfer a property by sale. Mr. Roy drew our attention to certain Passages in Article 46 of Salmond's Jurisprudence at page 254 (12th Edition 19.66) (relevant portion quoted by Murari Mohan Dutt J. in his judgment). Mr. Roy's argument would seem to convey that an absolute owner, once he parts with the possession of the property or grants a lease, becomes a sort of qualified owner and does not therefore answer the description of an absolute owner for the purposes of section 13 (1) (ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, inasmuch as, he did not have any right of immediate enjoyment or possession of the property during the currency of the lease. If such a person could be regarded as owner within the meaning of clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the Act, then according to Mr. Roy, a lessee, who grants a sub-lease having a right of reversion as also the right to realise rent from the sub tenant, must also be regarded as an "owner" within the meaning of clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the Act. 7. Roy, a lessee, who grants a sub-lease having a right of reversion as also the right to realise rent from the sub tenant, must also be regarded as an "owner" within the meaning of clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the Act. 7. Section 13 (1) (f), as it stood before the amendment of 1969 were in these terms: "(f) where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord other for purposes of building or rebuilding or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations or for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held." This clause now stands, substituted by the present amended clauses (f) and (ff) and for the purposes of the present appeal, we are concerned only with clause (ff), which reads thus: "(ff) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3A), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation." Clause (ff), it appears, on a plain reading of the section consists of two parts; protection afforded to a tenant under section 13 of the Act, is waived by the first part, where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation "if he is the owner".....and the landlord...is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation. It is not Mr. Roy's case that the plaintiff's case is covered by the second part of this clause, even though we are referred to the cases of Receivers or Guardians by way of analogy. The plaintiff appellant in the instant case can get relief if he comes within the meaning of first part of clause (ff), that is if he could be regarded as "the owner" of the premises. The passage quoted by Mr. Roy from Salmond's Jurisprudence, in our view, does not assist him. "A lease as pointed out by Salmond in Article 114 (at page 424, 12th Edition) is "in this generic sense, that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the- possession-and use of property owned by some other person. It is the outcome of the separation of ownership and possession. "A lease as pointed out by Salmond in Article 114 (at page 424, 12th Edition) is "in this generic sense, that form of encumbrance which consists in a right to the- possession-and use of property owned by some other person. It is the outcome of the separation of ownership and possession. This separation of ownership and possession may be either rightful or wrongful, and if rightful it is an encumbrance of the owner's title." Perhaps there might be some force in Mr. Roy's argument in the case of a lease in perpetuity but as pointed out by Salmond in the said Article that a lease of that description would not be a true lease or encumbrance at all, but an assignment of the right itself and the grantee' would become the owner of the right. We are not however called upon to express any opinion on this point, as Mr. Roy's case clearly does not come within that description. We may here conveniently refer to the position ill English Law as summed up in Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn., Vol. 29, pages 372). "Ownership is nevertheless divisible to some extent. For example, one or more of the fasciculus of rights constituting ownership may be detached. Thus an owner is prima facie entitled to possession or to recover possession of his goods against all the world, a right which a dispossessed owner may exercise by peaceable retaking. He may however, voluntarily or involuntarily part with possession. for example, by the pledging, lending, hiring out, bailment, theft or loss of his goods in any of which cases he is left with a right of ownership without possession, accompanied or not accompanied, as the case may be, with the right to possess. Ownership is also divorced from possession where the goods, are in possession of a person who has a lien on them, or when they are seized under a distress and until a sale is made under the statute." 8. Before the learned single Judge, reliance was placed on two decisions reported in (1) I.L.R. 24 Cal. 440 and (2) 14 C. W. N. 1. in support of the respondent's contention that an owner did not cease to be an owner even though he parted with some interest or right in the property. Mr. Roy sought to distinguish those two decisions cited before the learned single Judge. 440 and (2) 14 C. W. N. 1. in support of the respondent's contention that an owner did not cease to be an owner even though he parted with some interest or right in the property. Mr. Roy sought to distinguish those two decisions cited before the learned single Judge. In (1) Kally Dass Ahiri v. Monmohini Dassee. (ILR 24 Calcutta 440), the lease that came up for interpretation before Jenkins J. (as his Lordship then was) upon repudiation of the lessor's title by the lessee, was a permanent lease that came into existence before the passing of the Transfer of property Act. It was held therein that a man, who being owner of land grants a lease in' perpetuity carves a subordinate interest and does not annihilate his own interest and the me of the word "lease" implied an interest still remaining in the lessor." Before the lease, the owner bad the right to enjoy the possession of the land, and by the lease, be excludes himself during its currency from that right, but the determination of the lease is a removal of that barrier, and there is nothing to prevent the enjoyment from which he had been excluded by the lease". Judicial Committee, of the Privy Council approved the views expressed by Jenkins J in (2) Abhiram Goswami's case (14 CWN 1). 9. We are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Roy that the word "owner" in clause (ff) of section 13 (1) of the Act includes a lessee of the premises, who only had a right of user or enjoyment for the period limited by the lease itself. In the case of a monthly tenant at will this period is of necessity precariously limited but for the protection afforded by section 13 (1) of the Act. In summing up his conclusions as to the ownership of a material thing in Art. 110 (at page 415) of his book on Jurisprudence, Salmond describes the right of ownership in a material thing as general, permanent and inheritable right to the uses of that thing and in Article 114 at page 424 where the learned author in dealing--with various rights in realiena proceeded to observe in the manner quoted by us at page 5 of this judgment (at page 407-8 of the report-Ed.). In referring to the provisions of Sections 35, 44 and 58 (e) of the Transfer of Property Act; where transfer by persons other than an absolute owner had been contemplated and by referring to the restrictions on certain transfers under section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, Mr. Roy drew our attention to the meaning of expression of the word "transfer" which not only includes a transfer by sale but also by other modes such as, lease etc. and contended that if the word 'owner' is to be interpreted in the sense of absolute ownership, it would create difficulties for a receiver or a guardian in bringing a suit under clause (ff) of Sec. 13 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. We do not see any difficulty as envisaged by Mr. Roy in this connection. Apart from the fact that the words "owner" or "transfer" used in different statutes or even in any particular Statute may have different connotations depending on the construction and context of the section in which that expression occurs, a guardian or a receiver would not necessarily come within the first part of clause (ff) ; for they would have to bring the suit for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises were held presumably as owner, but in the instant case, we are not called upon to express any opinion of that score. 10. Mr. Roy also relied on the decision of the Privy Council in the case of (3) Ram Kinkar Banerjee v. Satya Charan Srimani, (AIR 1939 PC 14) where the Privy Council had to consider the question of transfer of the whole of the term of the lease by the lessee to the sub-lessee on terms similar to the original lease. Such a transfer, it was held, operated by way of sub-demise and not of assignment and their Lordships in referring to section 108 (j) of the Transfer of Property Act pointed out that the wording clearly makes a distinction between absolute transfers and transfers by way of mortgage and thus showed that the Act regarded the latter as not being absolute. Their Lordships, further, pointed out that in India when a mortgagor assigns his interest under a lease to a mortgagee, he does not under any of the forms specified in section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, transfer an absolute interest to the mortgagee and consequently the mortgagee is not liable by privity of estate for the burdens of the lease. 11. These considerations apart, there is considerable difficulty in the way of acceptance of the interpretation sought to be put forward by Mr. Roy, for there are already a number of Division Bench decisions of this Court on this point. In (4) Yogamaya Pakhira v. Santi Sudha Bose ILR 1968 (II) Calcutta 70, a Division Bench of this Court in construing clause (f) of section 13 (1) was clearly of the opinion that the two expressions "owner" and "permanent lessee" were not synonymous and the word "owner", it was held, must be given its ordinary connotation or diary or usual meaning, that is, a person having full or absolute ownership of the disputed property and would not include a permanent lessee. The plaintiff in that suit, being a permanent lessee, sued for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own occupation under the un-amended section 13 (1) (f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The same view was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in the case of (5) Carrit Moran & Co. Ltd. v. Roneo, (ILR 1969 (I) Cal. 347). Both these cases were decided when clause (ff) had not been introduced into the Statute book. Mr. Roy has questioned the propriety or correctness of these decisions on the footing that these decisions had been given per incuriam and at any rate, these decisions were given at a time, when clause (ff) was not introduced in the Statate book. 12. We are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Roy. It is well settled that "when a particular form of legislative enactment which has received authoritative interpretation, whether by judicial decision or by long course of practice, is adopted in the framing of a later statute, it is sound rule of construction to hold that the words so adopted were intended by the legislature to bear the meaning which had been so put upon them" (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. at page 139) and Odgers on Construction of Deeds & Statutes at page 341-5th Ed. 1967, Maxwell in his well known book on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn. 1969 at page 73) also pointed out that when a legislation is repealed and re-enacted substantially on the same terms, the new legislation is taken to have been drafted with knowledge of the judicial decisions on the old. The Supreme Court also affirmed this principle in, the case of (6) Ahmed G.H. Ariff v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, (AIR 1971 NSC 167 at page 170). 13. The argument of Mr. Roy that the decision given in Yogamaya Pakhira and Carrit Moran's case was given per incuriam and cannot as such be accepted. A decision per incuriam is generally a decision given in ignorance or forgetfulness of the existence of an earlier case or statute, which is not brought to the attention of the Court. As observed by Evershed, M. R. in the case of (7) Morelle, Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 1 All. E. R. 708 at page 718) : "As a general rule the only cases in which decisions should be held to have been given per incuriam are those decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority binding on the court concerned so that in some cases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning on which it is based is found, on that account, to be demonstrably wrong." It has not been brought to our notice that the word or the particular clause in the Statute was differently interpreted by any earlier decision of this Court before (4) Yogamaya Pakhira and (5) Carrit Moran & Co. Ltd.'s case. P.N. Mookerjee, J. who gave these decisions interpreted the word "owner" in the unamended clause (f) of Section 13 (1) of the Act and gave to it its the usual or dictionary meaning and the fact that the word 'owner' or "transfer" was used in a different sense in some other enactments would not make it a decision per incuriam. On the contrary, this Court followed the earlier decision in Yogamaya Pakhira's case in the case of Carrit Moran Co. On the contrary, this Court followed the earlier decision in Yogamaya Pakhira's case in the case of Carrit Moran Co. Ltd. The amended clause (ff) of section 13 (1) further came to be interpreted by another Division Bench of this Court who preferred to follow the interpretation put on the word "owner" in the case of (4) Yogamaya Pakhira v. Santi Sudha Bose and (5) Carrit Moran & Co. Ltd. v. Roneo. The single Bench decision cited by Mr. Roy in the case of (8) Sriram Pasrisha v. Jagannath Sell (AIR 1974 Calcutta 80) which put a somewhat unrestricted interpretation on the word "held" in clause (ff) is of little help, for this decision, it appears, has recently been overruled on this point in (9) Letters Patent Appeal No. 74 of 1974 (judgment delivered on 4-3-75) (Since reported in 1975(1) CLJ 4 13-Ed). It was held therein on a consideration of the two earlier decisions of this court in the case of (4) Yogamaya Pakhira v. Santi Sudha Bose and (5) carrit Moran & Co. Ltd. v. Roneo that lessees, mortgagees in possession and all such subordinate interest-holders should be excluded from the term "owner" within the meaning of clause (ff). The Division Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal pointed out that ownership consisted of a bundle of rights. The various rights and interests may vest in the same person or may vest in different persons. Section 13(1) (ff) when it restricted the right therein provided in favour of a owner landlord, it only contemplated that he must be the absolute owner in the sense that he must be the person holding above all the subordinate rights which are normally called interests in property so that persons possessing such subordinate rights like lessees, mortgagees etc. are excluded. We respectfully concur with this view and are unable to accept the extended meaning attempted to be put on it by Mr. Roy in this appeal. It follows therefore that the appellant is not the owner within the meaning of clause (ff) of Section 13 (1) of the Act and instant appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed We make no order as to costs. Mookerjee, J.: I agree.