JUDGMENT : B.K. Ray, J.—The claimant in petition u/s 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Balasore is the Appellant in this appeal. 2. The case of the Appellant before the Tribunal was as follows: Purusottam Parida, father of the Appellant, was involved in an accident with a truck bearing registration No. ORM 46 on Sore Kupari Road at about 7.30 p.m. on 17.12.68. As a result of the accident, Purusottam Parida died two days thereafter. Three years after the accident the Appellant filed an application before the Claims Tribunal claiming compensation of Rs. 12,000/-. 3. Respondent No. 1 who was opposite party No. 1 before the Tribunal and was the owner of the truck resisted the claim of the Appellant on several grounds, one of them being that the claim petition was barred by time. The insurer who is Respondent No. 2 also resisted the claim of the Appellant before the Tribunal en the selfsame grounds. 4. The Tribunal recorded the following findings: (a) The death of Purusottam Parida did not occur due to rash and negligent driving of the truck in question; (b) the truck bearing the aforesaid registration number was involved in the accident; (c) the claim of the Appellant was barred by limitation and (d) the Appellant was not entitled to damages for more than Rs. 4,320/-. Upon the aforesaid findings the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition and hence the appeal. 5. Mr. R. Das, learned Counsel for the Appellant challenges all the findings of the court below. According to him, the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the vehicle, the Appellant was entitled to compensation and the claim petition was not barred by time. On the question of limitation Mr. Das contends that under the proviso to Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act the Tribunal has ample discretion to condone the delay in filing the claim petition and that it in the present case having accepted the claim petition beyond time when the same was presented before it must be held that prime facie it was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In this connection, it may be remembered that the Tribunal accepted the claim petition of the Appellant at the time of its filing before the Respondents entered appearance. Mr. In this connection, it may be remembered that the Tribunal accepted the claim petition of the Appellant at the time of its filing before the Respondents entered appearance. Mr. Das, however, concedes that this condonation of delay by the Tribunal was open to challenge by the Respondents after they entered appearance. But according to him, once there was condonation of delay by the Tribunal before appearance of the Respondents, the onus was upon them to show that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. That being the position, the Respondents not having led evidence whatsoever to discharge the onus that was upon them before the Tribunal, it should not have dismissed the Appellant's application on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. Whatever be the merit of this contention, it is not disputed before me that a party upon whom rests the onus to prove a certain thing can prove the same either by adducing evidence on its own behalf or by relying upon the evidence led by the other side. In the present case, the Appellant himself has deposed that immediately after the accident causing the death of his father he was mentally unsound for a period of two years. If this evidence is accepted, it must be held that for the subsequent one year the Appellant was hale and hearty. That apart, Ex. C, the previous deposition of the Appellant in a criminal court, shows that he was examined on 3-2-70. This conclusively establishes that since the time he deposed in the criminal court he was mentally sound. The Appellant has also admitted in his deposition that shortly after the accident he intimated P.W. 2 to write to the insurance company claiming damages. This being the state of oral and documentary evidence, his claim petition at least two years after the accident and waited for another year, even accepting his case that for the first two years he was not mentally sound. If, Mr. Das's contention that the onus was upon the Respondents is accepted, still in the light of the evidence discussed above it must be held that the said onus has been fully discharged by the Respondents in this appeal. I therefore, hold that the Tribunal is fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the claim petition before it was hopelessly barred by time. I therefore, hold that the Tribunal is fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the claim petition before it was hopelessly barred by time. Once this conclusion of the Tribunal is upheld, there is no necessity to go into the other aspects of the case. 6. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances, there will be no order for costs.