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1975 DIGILAW 11 (CAL)

Swarnalata Gupta v. State of West Bengal

1975-01-10

CHITTATOSH MOOKERJEE

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JUDGMENT In this Rule the subject-matter of challenge is an order under section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kalna Settlement Camp, revising entries in a number of Khatians of Mouza Kashipur. 2. The ground that section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is ultra vires has not been urged before me. It was also not disputed that the impugned proceedings under section 44(2a) were not barred by limitation. The only point taken before me is that an Officer exercising his power under section 44(2a) bas no jurisdiction to decide as to whether title to the land has been obtained by any benami document and such question of benami can be decided only by a Court of competent jurisdiction. According to the petitioners, in the instant case, the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kalna Settlement Camp, had exceeded his jurisdiction by entering into questions of title. 3. I hold that the petitioners are not entitled to get any relief in the instant Rule. In the first place, any person aggrieved by an order passed in revision under sub-section (2a) may appeal in the prescribed manner to a Tribunal appointed for the purpose of section 44(2a) within such period and on payment of such court fees as may be prescribed. When the petitioners no longer dispute the jurisdiction of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Kalna Settlement Camp to initiate the proceedings under Section 44(2a), I find no sufficient reasons why this Court should invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of those who did not exhaust the remedies provided under Section 44 (3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. These petitions involve determination of disputed questions of fact, and, therefore, a tribunal under Section 44(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act would be in a far more advantageous position to weigh evidence and to decide whether the tenancies originally recorded in Khatians in question were really created and were subsisting at the date of vesting~ In the facts of this case I am not inclined to embark on a detailed enquiry for resolving disputed questions of fact concerning revision of entries in the relevant khatians. 4. 4. I am also unable to accept the extreme submission made on behalf of the petitioners that an officer specially authorised under Section 44(2a) to revise record of rights cannot even incidentally consider questions of title to plots entered in a particular khatian. Section 39(1) inter alia empowers the State Government to direct that the record of rights be prepared or revised for carrying out the purposes of the Act. The West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act provides for acquisition of estates, or rights of an intermediaries therein and of certain right of raiyats and under-raiyats and also the rights of certain other persons in lands comprised in estates. Upon publication of the notifications under Section 4 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act all estates and rights of every intermediary vested in the State free from in-cumbrances with effect from the date mentioned in such notifications. The Section 5 of the Act not only provides for vesting of all rights of intermediaries, but also provides that on and from the date of vesting certain classes of tenants shall be holding directly under the State, as if the State was the intermediary. Section 6 confers upon the intermediaries rights to .retain certain classes of lands. It is unnecessary for our present purposes to refer other Sections of the Act. 5. The Records of Rights have been prepared in order to carry out the purposes of the Act. For the above purpose the Revenue Officer is bound to adjudicate whether a particular right claimed by a person prima facie existed and to make entries or deletions as the case may be in appropriate columns of the revisional record of rights. In a given case where a person claimed that in terms of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 5 he has become a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant directly under the State, the Revenue Officer is required to make a prima facie finding regarding such claim of tenancy. 6. In pursuance of Section 39 (3) of the Act Rule 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules, specified the particulars to be recorded in the record of rights. Not only the Revenue Officer might enter in a Khatian the name of each person who is the tenant and/or occupant of the land, but also record the class or classes to which tenant belongs the rent payable, etc. Not only the Revenue Officer might enter in a Khatian the name of each person who is the tenant and/or occupant of the land, but also record the class or classes to which tenant belongs the rent payable, etc. Rule 26 also provided other incidence of the plot of land to be recorded. Therefore, the Revenue Officer preparing the record of rights must satisfy himself whether a person whose name is recorded in the column 13 of the record of rights is, in fact, a tenant or occupant. In this connection, reference may be also made to the Schedule 'B' to the Rules which contains the detailed procedure for preparation of record of rights. The form used for preparing the R. S. Khatians show that in the column 13 of the Record of Rights both the status of the occupant and the class tenancy are to be entered. 7. Thus, the preparation and revision of record of rights in accordance with the above' provisions necessarily involve at least a tentative adjudication about status of occupants of plots entered in a khatian and other incidence thereof. Thus the Revenue Officer has jurisdiction under Section 44 (2a) to adjudicate an objection that a particular tenancy does not exist. 8. The decision of Anil Kumar Sen, J. in Ramesh Chandra Sood v. Assistant Settlement Officer, Sub• Division Ranaghat, District Nadia and others, 76 CWN 149 is distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The learned Judge quashed a suomato proceeding under -Section 44 (2a) inter alia on the ground that the notice of the said proceeding did not contain any ground. When the learned Judge found that the initiation of the proceeding was without jurisdiction really it was not strictly necessary to consider whether adjudication on the merits of the case was sustainable or not. Secondly, in the said proceeding, the Assistant Settlement Officer had apparently adjudicated questions of benami as if the proceeding before him was a suit. Sen, J. at page 152, however, recognised that the question of title can be gone into by a Revenue Officer in a summary manner on the basis of possession. 9. The Revenue Officer in the order impugned in the present Rule did not pronounce the settlement by way of tenancies claimed by the petitioners as benami. Sen, J. at page 152, however, recognised that the question of title can be gone into by a Revenue Officer in a summary manner on the basis of possession. 9. The Revenue Officer in the order impugned in the present Rule did not pronounce the settlement by way of tenancies claimed by the petitioners as benami. On the other hand, the Revenue Officer in his own way considered the evidence and came to conclusion that the tenancies previously recorded in the revisional records it: question did not exist. In other words, he was not satisfied about the prima fade existence of the tenancies claimed by the petitioners. Therefore, he ordered that the records be revised accordingly. Thus, what he did in these cases was clearly within the bounds of law As already stated, the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to decide whether the tenancies in question were ever created and whether same were existing. The decision of the Revenue Officer under section 44 (2a) was subject to an appeal to the tribunal. In the circumstances, I decline to enter into the correctness or otherwise of the order as the impugned order of the Revenue Officer did not suffer from any error of jurisdiction. I further make it clear that the order passed in this Rule is without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties in any other proceedings in accordance with law. Subject to the above observations, I discharge this Rule. There win be, however, no order as to costs.