Judgment :- 1. This revision which is directed against an order of the Land Board, arises under the following facts: 2. Petitioner submitted a statement before the Land Board under S 85 (2) of the Land Reforms Act, in respect of the lands held by the partnership-firm of which he was the Managing Partner. In the course of the proceedings he filed certain other statements also and to spins of them I shall refer later The firm holds 261.55 acres, of which the greater part is a coffee estate After the usual enquiries and verifications the Board passed the order under revision exempting a total area of 206.44 acres and allowing the firm to retain 15 acres within the ceiling area and directing the surrender of 40.11 acres as excess land The ceiling area was fixed under S.81 (1) (d) of the Land Reforms Act and in this revision which is pressed only with respect to the excess land of 4011 acres, the sole question is whether the determination of the ceiling by the Land Board is correct. 3. The statement under S.85 (2) was submitted, as noticed above, on behalf of the firm of which the petitioner was the Managing Partner, the other partners being his 3 brothers and 3 sisters. In a subsequent statement submitted before the Board on October 4, 1973, the petitioner put forward a case that the partnership which was one at will had been dissolved and the property orally divided and that each partner is entitled to his or her respective share. This case of dissolution and partition was not accepted by the Board and although faintly suggested at the bearing it is too tenuous to be accepted. There is no evidence either of the one or the other and what is more it is disproved by the later objection and affidavit of January 1, 1,974, in which the petitioner repeated the claim of partnership and his own status as its Managing Partner. Indeed the petitioner describes himself as the Managing Partner in this revision also. The story of dissolution of the firm and division of the property among the 7 partners must therefore be rejected. 4. Indeed the petitioner describes himself as the Managing Partner in this revision also. The story of dissolution of the firm and division of the property among the 7 partners must therefore be rejected. 4. Even so, counsel contended, the Board was wrong in dealing with the case under S.85 (1) (d) for two reasons one that the firm is not a person and second that the property although a partnership property really belongs to the partners in severality or co-ownership and cannot be treated as one unit. Taking the first point, S.2 (43) of the Land Reforms Act defines "person" to include, among others, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The definition appears to be designed to cover not only incorporated bodies but also such associations like partnerships but counsel contended that it should be limited to a body that has at least unity of title like a registered society or Co-operative Society. The expression "association or body of individuals" is very wide and is comprehensive enough to take in firms and I find it difficult to accept the contention which limits its ambit. In C.I.T. Madras v. Angidi Chettiar, AIR. 1962 S.C. 970 (1963-2 S.C.J. 81) in construing S.3 (42) of the General Clauses Act which defines that a "person includes any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not" the Supreme Court held that "a firm is manifestly a body of individuals and would therefore fall within the definition of 'person'." In a subsequent case M.M. Ipoh v. C. I. T. Madras, AIR. 1968 S.C. 317 (1968-1 S.C.J. 106) the Supreme Court applied the above definition to the inclusive definition of the expression "person" in the Income-tax Act, 1922 and held that a firm is therefore a "person" within the meaning of the latter Act. On the terms of the definition of person in S.2 (43) of the Land Reforms Act and these decisions, the petitioner's contention that a firm is excluded from the definition has only to be rejected. 5. Counsel next contended that although the estate belonged to the firm, its ownership was really vested in the seven partners, as the firm has no legal personality, apart from the partners and that it is thus incapable of holding property. 5. Counsel next contended that although the estate belonged to the firm, its ownership was really vested in the seven partners, as the firm has no legal personality, apart from the partners and that it is thus incapable of holding property. The exact nature of the status of a firm does not fall for consideration because this contention is only concerned with the incidents of partnership property, although I might note in passing that there is authority to hold that while the firm is no corporate body or legal entity it possesses a personality distinct from its members, for certain purposes, (see AIR. 1948 P. C. 100). As to the incidents of the partnership property or rather the rights of the partners over such a property, the position is thus stated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhasara Krishnappa, AIR. 1966 S.C.1300 (1966 2 S. C. J. 490): "From a perusal of these provisions it would be abundantly clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to his share of profits, if any, accruing to the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership. During the subsistence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in clause (a) and sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (b) of S.48." 6. That then is the legal position. That then is the legal position. Although they have acquired the property and have in that sense an interest in the property, and although the partnership property will be deemed to be held by the partners for the business of the partnership, the partners cannot claim to own the property in the several rights originally acquired by them; their rights are, to repeat what their Lordships have laid down, to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to their share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm, including this property, which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in S.48 of the Partnership Act. I am therefore unable to accept the contention that the seven partners had each an 1/ 7th share in the property and that their rights and liabilities under the Land Reforms Act should have been determined on that footing. 7. It was next contended that each of the partners should have been treated as a "family" in the sense of the Land Reforms Act. The finding that the property was an asset of the firm must necessarily involve rejection of this contention. For another, at least three partners, who are ladies will not constitute families as defined in that Act; they are part of the families of their husbands. There was another contention that the partners- brothers and sisters constitute a Hindu undivided family and have to be treated as such. Apart from what I have stated, about the rights to the property, this contention must fail for the further reason that the seven partners consisting of four brothers and three married sisters do not constitute a joint Hindu family. 8. Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S.82 (1) of the Land Reforms Act do not apply to the partnership. Nor do sub-sections (2) and (3) of the same Section. Clause (d) of S.82 (1) is a residuary provision that applies to "the case of any other person, other than a joint family." As stated earlier the firm is a "person" within the Act and the partners do not constitute a family. It follows that it is clause (d) that governs the case and that has been rightly applied by the Land Board. 9. I dismiss the revision, but in the circumstances without costs. Dismissed.