JUDGMENT : P.N. Bakshi, J. S.P. Chadha has been convicted by a first class Magistrate Agra u/s 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act for a breach of Rule 50(1) of the Rules framed thereunder. He has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo one months' rigorous imprisonment. His conviction and sentence have been affirmed in appeal by the Sessions Judge. Hence this revision. 2. The facts of this case revolve round a very narrow compass. The applicant is the Salesman of Brook Bond Tea India, Limited at the Depot of the Company on Gokulpura Road, Raja ki Mandi, Agra where he used to stock, sell, distribute and expose for sale tea and coffee. The Food Inspector Sri B.S. Srivastava, inspected this Depot on 28th October, 1969 at about 8 O'clock in the morning. On a demand being made by the Food Inspector for the production of the licence under which the sale was being affected, the applicant was unable to produce the same. On these allegations sanction for prosecution was obtained by the Food Inspector and the applicant was tried and convicted as above. 3. The applicant pleaded not guilty. He admitted that he was a servant of the Brook Bond Company and that in his capacity as the Salesman of the said Company, he was stocking and exposing for sale tea and coffee. He denied that his shop was inspected by the Inspector on the relevant date and that a demand for licence was made from him. The applicant, however, admitted that on 28th October, 1969 he did not possess any licence in the name of the Company. 4. On a consideration of the evidence led by the prosecution both the courts below recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the applicant, who was a salesman of the Brook Bond Company, was stocking and exposing for sale tea and coffee at the said Depot on behalf of the Brook Bond Company. It has also been found by the courts below that on demand being made the applicant could not produce any licence. On the other hand he frankly admitted that he was not possessed of any licence on behalf of the Company. It has also been found by the courts below that on demand being made the applicant could not produce any licence. On the other hand he frankly admitted that he was not possessed of any licence on behalf of the Company. On these findings the applicant has been convicted for a breach of Rule 50(1) of the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the relevant portion of which runs as follows: 50(1). No person shall manufacture, sell, stock, distribute or exhibit for sale any of the following articles of food, except under a Licence.... (h) Tea, Coffee, Cocoa and Chicory,...1-A (9) No licencee shall employ in his work any person who is suffering from infectious, contagious or loathsome disease. It is clear that the above rule prohibits the sale of tea and coffee, except under a licence. It also contemplates that the employees of a licensee should not be suffering from any infectious, contagious or loathsome disease. In other words, the rule implies that the licencee may have in his employment able bodied persons for affecting the sale of his products. 5. As to what would be the interpretation of the word 'person' as envisaged in the above mentioned rule, is a matter for interpretation before this Court. Needless to point out that the word 'person' has not been defined in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, even though the word 'person' has been used in the prohibitive sections of this Act, namely Sections 5, 7 and 16. Section 7 prohibits any person either by himself or on his behalf to sell or distribute any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed except in accordance with the conditions of the licence. Section 16 is the penal clause. It prescribes penalty for any person who stores, sells or distributes either by himself or by any body else on his behalf in contravention of the provisions of the Act or any rules framed thereunder. I, therefore, have to place reliance on Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 for determining the scope and meaning of the word 'person'. In the aforesaid clause 'person' shall include any Company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Thus it is clear that even apart from the individuals a company can also be held liable for the infringement of this rule. In the aforesaid clause 'person' shall include any Company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Thus it is clear that even apart from the individuals a company can also be held liable for the infringement of this rule. A perusal of Section 17(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act reveals the contingencies in which every person who at the time of the commission of an offence is incharge of and responsible to the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company may be held guilty for the offence committed by the Company. Section 17(2) also provides for the liability to be imputed to the Director, Manager, Secretary and other officer of the Company when the offence in question is committed with his consent or connivance. Relying upon Section 17 of the Act, learned Counsel for the applicant has submitted that it was not the duty of S.P. Chadha who was merely working as the salesman of the Brook Bond Company Ltd. to have obtained a licence for the company and as such if the Company did not possess the licence on the relevant date, it cannot be said that he had neglected or connived in the act of the company in not obtaining the licence. He was merely duty bound being a salesman of the company to act on behalf of the company and to store, sell or expose for sale tea and coffee at the Depot. In my opinion this argument cannot stand the test of scrutiny. For this proposition he has relied upon a case reported in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1966 SC 43. It is true that in this case their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence. But they have further held that the statute may exclude the element of mens rea.... "Where the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated." The provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act leave on scope for the argument that mens rea would be an essential ingredient for the commission of the offence under that Act. But they have further held that the statute may exclude the element of mens rea.... "Where the implementation of the object of the statute would otherwise be defeated." The provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act leave on scope for the argument that mens rea would be an essential ingredient for the commission of the offence under that Act. It is to eradicate this social evil of adulteration which is spreading its fangs far and wide, that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act casts a liability for the offence on any person, who contravenes the provisions of this Act, either himself or through some one else. Nothing can be more explicit on this aspect of the matter than the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sarjoo Prasad v. State of U.P. 1961 SC 631. While considering liability for sale of adulterated food stuff by an employee of the business concern it was observed as follows: Prohibition of sale of adulterated food is evidently imposed in the larger interest of maintenance of public health. The prohibition applies to all persons who sell adulterated food, and for contravention of the prohibition all such persons are penalised. Because the Legislature has sought to penalise a person who sells adulterated food by his agent, it cannot be assumed that it was intended to penalise only those who may act through their agents. If the owner of a shop in which adulterated food is sold is without proof of mens rea liable to be punished for sale of adulterated food, we fail to appreciate why an agent or a servant of the owner is not liable to be punished for contravention of be same provision unless he is shown to have guilty knowledges. In view of the aforesaid decision I have no doubt in my mind that the applicant would clearly be guilty for the infringement of Rule 50(1) of the Rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 6. In this connection, however, I would like to refer again to the concurrent findings of fact, which have been recorded by the courts below. The Food Inspector when he visited the Depot of the Brook Bond Company on 28th October, 1969 asked the applicant who was the salesman of this concern to produce the licence. The salesman admitted that he was not possessed of any licence on behalf of the company. The Food Inspector when he visited the Depot of the Brook Bond Company on 28th October, 1969 asked the applicant who was the salesman of this concern to produce the licence. The salesman admitted that he was not possessed of any licence on behalf of the company. It is true that in his own individual capacity a salesman of a business concern is not required to obtain a licence for affecting the sale at the Depot but the Company is bound by the rules to obtain a licence prescribed under the rules. The licence so obtained by the company has to be given in the possession of the salesman or has to be retained at the premises of the Depot so that when the Depot is inspected by the Food Inspector the salesman can produce the licence before him to show that he is acting in his capacity as a salesman of the company which is duly authorised under the terms of the licence to stock and sell tea and coffee. The ingredient which form the gravamen of the offence is the failure of the salesman to produce this licence at the time of the inspection by the Food Inspector. If the company had obtained the licence as mentioned above and the salesman had showed the licence to the Inspector in the name of the company, in that event no offence would be committed by the salesman. I have already referred above to Rule 50(1)(A-9) which envisages the employment of an individual by a company for affecting sale. There individuals should be able bodied persons and not affected by contegious, infectious or loathsome diseases. There is nothing in the provisions of this Act or the rules framed thereunder which requires that the individual salesman should also possess a licence in his personal capacity for affecting the sale at the Depot on behalf of the Company. But the company has to obtain such a licence before authorising its agent or salesman to store or sell tea and coffee, as in the present case, for which a licence has to be taken under the rules. It is thus made clear that the inability of the salesman to produce the licence for inspection before the Food Inspector, which licence should have been in the name of the Brook Bond Company, is the offence which has been committed by the applicant S.P. Chadha. 7. It is thus made clear that the inability of the salesman to produce the licence for inspection before the Food Inspector, which licence should have been in the name of the Brook Bond Company, is the offence which has been committed by the applicant S.P. Chadha. 7. In that view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the applicant has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the courts below. 8. In the result, therefore, I do not find any merit in this revision application which is hereby dismissed.