Judgment P.S. SHAH, J.:---This appeal has been filed by the husband challenging the order dated October 30, 1972, passed by the Extra Joint Judge, Poona, whereby his petition under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent was dismissed. The facts giving rise to this unfortunate litigation are these : The petitioner is a Bengali Hindu. He has three brothers, the eldest being uccomar Roy alias Borda, and three sisters including one Mrs. Bharati Ghosh. All of them are highly educated. All the brothers seem to have been gainfully employed. The sister Bharati and her husband are Lecturers in Rajasthan University. After passing his Intermediate Examination in 1941, the petitioner worked in different companies in Calcutta till about 1952. In the year 1953, he went to United Kingdom to pursue further studies and was in Liverpool from 1953 to 1958 for his studies in different courses. It was in Liverpool that the petitioner came in contact with the respondent in about December 1956 and fell in love with each other. On July 20, 1957, they got married in Liverpool under the Marriage Act of England, 1949. The respondent was just 21 while the petitioner was about 34 years of age at the time of marriage. Before the marriage, the respondent frankly told the petitioner about her past including the fact that she was an illegitimate issue of her mother Moisan. In the year 1939 when she was hardly 3 ½ years old, she was adopted by Kirin Zoubkolb who was a Russian and his wife Marie was Yougoslav. The legal adoption, however, took place in 1947. The respondent took her education in Paris till about 1955 and had done part-time jobs in various firms. She knew shorthand and typing and also knew English, German and French. In the year 1956 she went England. At Liverpool, she worked as an aupair girl on a meagre salary with one family. It was during her stay at Liverpool that the petitioner and the respondent were introduced and got attracted to each other. After their marriage, for a short duration, they stayed with her adoptive parents in Paris, and by about the end of 1958, they decided to go to India. The petitioner came back to India in January 1959, while the respondent followed him in the month of April 1959. After their marriage, for a short duration, they stayed with her adoptive parents in Paris, and by about the end of 1958, they decided to go to India. The petitioner came back to India in January 1959, while the respondent followed him in the month of April 1959. On his return to India, the petitioner got a job as a Development Engineer with Automobile Products of India Ltd., Bombay. The respondent was pregnant with child. By the end of February 1960 she left India for Paris. There on August 6, 1960, the respondent gave birth to her first child, a son, who was named Anandkumar alias Nandu. She returned from Paris in month of October 1960. In the meantime, the petitioner had secured in employment in firm at Jaipur, and, therefore, the respondent joined him at Jaipur. Soon thereafter in about November 1960 she too got a job in Rajasthan University at Jaipur as a language-teacher. In about March 1961, the petitioner left Jaipur and took a job in a firm at Bombay. The respondent, however, continued to stay in Jaipur with the child. As the petitioner had left service in Jaipur, he had to vacate the Companys bungalow and, therefore, he took another bungalow on rent for his wife. Often he used to go to Jaipur and stay with his wife and child. By about the end of 1961, the respondent again became pregnant and was in bad health. She, therefore, went to Bombay and stayed with the petitioner. On July 21, 1962, she gave birth to their second son Rajannath alias Titu. Within a few days after delivery she was operated for sterilisation. Thereafter, in March 1963, the respondent left her job at Jaipur and came to Bombay with her sons. Soon thereafter, the respondent also was able to secure a job in Belgium Consulate as a Secretary. It appears that the respondent continued to be in a state of bad health, and in September 1963, she had to be operated upon for hernia. In May 1964, the respondent went to Paris with her children to see her father who was ailing and had a paralitic attack and returned with her two sons after about a month and a half. By about that time, in July 1964, the petitioner left Bombay and secured a job in Philips India as a Production Engineer in Poona. In May 1964, the respondent went to Paris with her children to see her father who was ailing and had a paralitic attack and returned with her two sons after about a month and a half. By about that time, in July 1964, the petitioner left Bombay and secured a job in Philips India as a Production Engineer in Poona. The respondent too got a job with another Company after her arrival from Paris. The respondent seems to have continued to keep bad health even while she was staying with the petitioner in Poona. In the beginning of 1965, she started getting severe pains on the backside of her head and got sleeplessness. She, therefore, used to take sleeping pills and tranquillisers. On the advice of Dr. Shaikh, who was employed by the Philips India Company, she was referred to some eminent doctors including Dr. Shirwaikar. In the opinion of Dr. Shirwaikar, she was suffering from nervous debility and required treatment and he recommended that the respondent should go to her parents in France which would help her in recouping her health. Accordingly, in February 1966, the respondent left alone for France. It appears that there were frequent quarrels between the petitioner and the respondent for one reason or the other during her stay with the petitioner. After she reached France, the respondent took a job there. She stayed in France till about the end of 1966 when she decided to come to India and ultimately she came to India by a ship on November 13, 1966. While she was in France, the petitioner and the respondent had exchanged letters. On her reaching Bombay on November 13,1966, she was received by the petitioner and her two sons. On that day, they stayed in a flat of one Moti Jagyani who happened to be a friend of the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that on the first night of her arrival from France itself, when they were sleeping together and while he was advancing towards her, she told him to stop and further gave him the information that in France, she met a young man who could satisfy her sexually and that she had come to know from her experience with that young man that the petitioner was sexually inadequate. She even alleged that the fault lay with the petitioner and not with her. She even alleged that the fault lay with the petitioner and not with her. According to the petitioner, when he asked her how she came to know about it, she told him that she had experienced a number of times with that young person, and she even described in detail how they slept together. She also told him that she had brought some books on sex and with the help of these books, she told the petitioner how he should behave. The petitioner was upset by the starting disclosure made by the respondent. He, however, alleges that he controlled himself for the sake of children, because he had promised them that he would take them to Goa. The respondent stayed with the petitioner for about six weeks till December 31, 1966 when she sailed back by ship to France. During this period, the petitioner and the respondent together with their children had gone to Goa and returned to Poona. According to the petitioner, since the disclosure by the respondent of her illicit connection with a person in France, he did not have any sexual intercourse with her during this period. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent, that she along with the petitioner led the normal marital life during this period, and in fact the petitioner did have sexual intercourse with her during their stay in Bombay, Poona and Goa. It is also the case of the respondent that she came to India to patch up her differences with the petitioner, and, according to her, it was agreed between her and the petitioner that she should go ahead to France and find out a suitable job for the petitioner in France or Europe, and for that purpose, he gave his bio-data. It is also her case that the petitioner agreed to send the children to her after she got accommodation and job and for that purpose, the passport of the children which stood along with the mother was separated and a passport exclusive in the names of the children was obtained. Accordingly, on December 31, 1966, the respondent left Poona, came to Bombay and proceeded to France by ship. After the respondent left for France, she had exchanged correspondence with the petitioner. Some of the correspondence is on record. Accordingly, on December 31, 1966, the respondent left Poona, came to Bombay and proceeded to France by ship. After the respondent left for France, she had exchanged correspondence with the petitioner. Some of the correspondence is on record. Till atleast August 4, 1968, there was no indication whatsoever in the letters to the respondent regarding the alleged disclosures made by the respondent to him on November 13, 1966; nor did he suggest that he wanted to divorce his wife. For the first time by his letter dated August 4, 1968, the petitioner wrote to the respondent stating that he was convinced that she had transferred her affection and attachment to another person and that she had decided to seek happiness as his companion in life. He further wrote that under these circumstances, it was fair that the legal marital relationship between them should be terminated. The respondent seems to have immediately reacted to this letter and sent a registered letter to the petitioner. The petitioner, however, has not produced this reply. On receipt of this registered letter from the respondent, the petitioner again wrote a letter dated August 13, 1968 to the respondent asserting that in the literal sense, it may not be that some man is living with her in her flat but he had no doubt that she had sought and probably found happiness in the company of another person. He also maintained that this fact was asserted by the respondent to him on several occasions and reiterated that a divorce was the only honourable solution to the problem, particularly when he had come to know that his wife was living in adultery. Thereafter, on October 19, 1968, the petitioner served the respondent with a legal notice through his Advocate informing her that the petitioner will be approaching a Court of law to get the marriage legally dissolved. Immediately on receipt of this letter, the respondent sent a reply dated October 25, 1968, wherein she stated that she was not averse to the idea of dissolving the marriage by divorce but emphatically denied the allegations against her as a “net of falsehood”. The Solicitors of the respondent by their letter dated November 22, 1968, denied all the allegations made against her as false and malicious and informed that after obtaining detailed instructions in the matter, they would further write to him in due course regarding the matter. The Solicitors of the respondent by their letter dated November 22, 1968, denied all the allegations made against her as false and malicious and informed that after obtaining detailed instructions in the matter, they would further write to him in due course regarding the matter. However, before any further detailed reply was received, on December 23, 1968, the petitioner filed the present petition in the District Court at Poona, under section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent. The respondent by her written statement denied all the allegations made by the petitioner and contended that the allegations made against her by the petitioner were totally false and denied that she ever made any confession or admission to the petitioner about her alleged connection with another man in France. She also made a counter charge of cruelty and prayed for a decree for judicial separation on that ground. Besides, she also prayed for the custody of the two sons. At the trial, both the sides produced voluminous documentary evidence principally in the form of correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent inter se as well as their correspondence with others. Besides himself, the petitioner examined Dr. Shaikh and Patil, the landlord of the building, where the petitioner was staying with his two sons, as his witnesses. The respondent examined herself and one more witness, viz. Father Desmet Richard, in support of her case. The learned Judge framed several issues which arose out of the pleadings, and on a consideration of the evidence on record held that the petitioner had failed to prove that the respondent had committed adultery or was living in adultery with another person in France, as alleged by the petitioner. The learned Judge also negatived the contention of the respondent that the petitioner was guilty of cruelty. In this view of the matter, the petition as well as the counter charge were dismissed. It is against this order that the petitioner has preferred this appeal. The respondent, however, has not preferred any appeal challenging the order rejecting her counter charge on the part of the petitioner. Some technical objection on the question of the maintainability of the petition were raised in trial Court. However, the learned Judge negatived those contentions holding that the petition was maintainable. The respondent, however, has not preferred any appeal challenging the order rejecting her counter charge on the part of the petitioner. Some technical objection on the question of the maintainability of the petition were raised in trial Court. However, the learned Judge negatived those contentions holding that the petition was maintainable. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent did not challenge the correctness of those findings recorded by the learned Judge. It is, therefore, unnecessary to consider those technical objections raised. Mr. Hedge, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the learned Judges approach to the case was erroneous. He placed particular on the evidence of Dr. Shaikh which, according to him, was independent and reliable. He submitted that there was abundant material on record which leads to the conclusion that the charge of adultery against the respondent has been established, and the petitioner was entitled to an order for dissolution of the marriage. Mr. Methalone, the learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, beside supporting the judgment of the trial Court on merits of the case, urged that the petition should have been rejected in limine on the ground of unreasonable and unexplained delay in filing the petition and also on the ground that there was condonation even after the petitioner came to know about the alleged adultery on the part of his wife. Before I proceed to consider the evidence on record, it would be worthwhile to refer to the relevant provision of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Section 10 gives to the husband a present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court praying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnization therefore, been guilty of adultery. It is significant that the Act does not contemplate another ground which can be availed of by a husband in order to get the marriage dissolved. I may mention that section 10 also gives a right to the wife to obtain dissolution of marriage on certain grounds. Section 11 enjoins the husband to make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the petition unless he is excused from so doing on the grounds mentioned in the section, one of them bring that the name of the adulterer is unknown to the petitioner and he has made due efforts to discover it. Section 11 enjoins the husband to make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the petition unless he is excused from so doing on the grounds mentioned in the section, one of them bring that the name of the adulterer is unknown to the petitioner and he has made due efforts to discover it. Section 12 inter alia provides that upon a petition for dissolution of a marriage, the Court should satisfy itself not only as to the facts alleged but also whether or not the petitioner has been in any manner accessory to, or conniving at, the going through of the said form of marriage, or the adultery, or has condoned the same, and shall also enquiry into any counter charge which may be made against the petitioner. Section 13 provides that the petitioner for divorce shall be dismissed if the Court is satisfied that the petitioners case has not been proved or is not satisfied that the alleged adultery has been committed, or finds that the petitioner has connived at or condoned the adultery complained of. Section 14, which is the counter part of section 13, relates to the power of the Court to pronounce decree for dissolving the marriage. In short, section 14 provides that if the conditions mentioned in section 13 do not exist, the courts hold pass a decree declaring the marriage to be dissolved. However, there is a further provision in section 14 which requires to be noticed, viz. that the Court shall not be pronounce such decree if it finds that the petitioner has been guilty of unreasonable delay in presenting or prosecuting the petitioner, or is guilty of cruelty towards the other party of the marriage. It is also made clear in the said provision that no adultery shall be deemed to have been condoned within the meaning of the Act unless where conjugal cohabitation has been resumed continued. It is now well settled that a charge of adultery is a serious charge and there is a heavy burden of proving the charge on the person making it. The petitioner cannot merely rely on preponderance of probabilities or possibilities. The petitioner has to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the charge of adultery. In this connection, it would be used to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.J. White v. Mrs. The petitioner cannot merely rely on preponderance of probabilities or possibilities. The petitioner has to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the charge of adultery. In this connection, it would be used to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (R.J. White v. Mrs. K.O. White)1, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 441. While recognizing the distinction between the matrimonial and criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court was of the view that the terms of section 14 marks it plain that when the Court is to be satisfied is to be satisfied on the evidence in respect of matrimonial offences the guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and it is on that principle that the courts in India would act and the reason for adopting this standard of proof is the grave consequence which follows a finding of guilt in matrimonial cases. The Court emphasised the expression "satisfied on the evidence" in section 14, and in that connection referred to the following observation of Lord Mac Dermott in (Preston Jones v. Preston Jones)2, 1951 A.C. 391 P. 417(E). Wherein it was observed- "The jurisdiction in divorce involves the status of the parties and the public interest requires that the marriage bond shall not be set aside lightly or without strict enquiry. The terms of the statute recognise this plainly, and I think it would be quite out of keeping with the anxious nature of its provisions to hold that the Court might be satisfied in respect of a ground for dissolution, with something less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. I should, perhaps, add I do not base my conclusion as to the appropriate standard of proof an any analogy drawn from the criminal law. I do not think it is possible to say, at any rate since the decision of this House in (Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe)3, 1874(30) L.T. 649(F) that the two jurisdictions are other than distinct. The true reason, as it seems to me, why both accept the same general standard-proof beyond reasonable doubt-lies not in any analogy but in the gravity and public importance of the issue with which each is concerned." It was also observed by the Supreme Court in that case it is rarely possible to prove the issue relating to a matrimonial offence by any direct evidence, for in a very few cases, such a proof is obtainable. The case, therefore, has to be judged not only on the direct evidence, if available, but also on the circumstances and the probabilities of each case. Now, the sheetanchor of the petitioners case is the alleged confession or admission made by the respondent to him on the night of November 13, 1966. There is also the evidence of Dr. Shaikh who has deposed that a fortnight thereafter when the respondent had gone to him in his clinic, she made a similar voluntary disclosure about her illicit connection with some person in France. If the evidence of the petitioner and Dr. Shaikh on this point is found to be reliable, it would be a strong piece of evidence in support of the petitioners case against the respondent. Their oral testimony will have to be appreciated in the light of the probabilities and the circumstances of the case. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to refer to some of the letters exchanged between the husband and the wife. In his letter dated September 8,1961, to his wife, there is a reference to the fact that although there were differences between them, they were slowly but surely coming closer to each other on the mental plane. In this letter, there is a discussion about sex and the books written on sex which would indicate that even at that time each one was trying to impress upon the other regarding the correct approach to sexual life. The letter also refers to "shock-treatment" meted out by the wife to the husband. The later dated March 11, 1963, Which is at Ex. 156, by the wife to the husband also discusses sex and suggest that the time has come to try and find out a permanent understanding of their problems as most of them were practically cleared by them. There is yet another letter dated March 11, 1963, at Ex. 157 by the wife to the husband telling him that she valued the double bed above money and that he should understand this. This letter again refers to some books on sex-phychology and also gives a piece of advice to the husband on how one should lead a married life. 157 by the wife to the husband telling him that she valued the double bed above money and that he should understand this. This letter again refers to some books on sex-phychology and also gives a piece of advice to the husband on how one should lead a married life. The subsequent correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent also indicates that the respondent was all along frank to impress upon the petitioner as to what should be the correct approach by the petitioner towards her as well as towards bringing about peaceful marital life. The correspondence only indicates a frankness with which the respondent discussed sex in her letters to the petitioner, right until the date of her returning to India in November 1966 and even after she went back to France for good. That a part, it does appear from the record and the evidence of the parties that there were frequent quarrels between the petitioner and the respondent, even while they were living in Liverpool before they came to India for the first time between January and April 1959. While the respondent was in France when she gave birth to the first child, the petitioner left his employment with Automobile Products of India, Bombay and got an employment at Jaipur in Indo-Flex Pvt. Ltd. by about May 1960. On her return to India in the month of October 1960, the respondent went to Jaipur and joined the petitioner. Soon thereafter, in the month of November 1960, she too got a job in the University at Jaipur as a language teacher. However, the petitioner did not continue the Jaipur job for long and in December 1960 she left the job and went to Bombay and took up a job with Hind Razor at Bombay in March 1961. Their life at Jaipur also does not seem to have been quite happy. It is the case of the respondent that in March 1961, on one evening, they had a quarrel over money matters and the petitioner even insulted her parents and slapped her, as a result of which she lost her balance and the very next day the petitioner left for Bombay. Although the petitioner left Jaipur for Bombay, the respondent continued to serve at Jaipur. Although the petitioner left Jaipur for Bombay, the respondent continued to serve at Jaipur. It appears that the petitioner used to go to Jaipur during vacation and the respondent also used to go to the petitioner at Bombay on occasions. It appears that after her second delivery in July 1962, the respondent was not keeping good health. The difference between them went on widening and they were not able to pull on well in their married life. As pointed out earlier, she consulted eminent doctors for her ailment, and she was advised to go to her parents to recoup her health which had by that time shattered. Before she left for France, there is yet one more incident disposed to by the respondent in her evidence. According to her, in January, 1966, on one night, the petitioner grabbed her by throat when she cried. Their son Nandu came to their room crying, and it is alleged that the petitioner exclaimed, "Look Nandu, how beautiful your mother looks"! She then went out on the road and petitioner followed her and told her to return as Nandu was crying. According to her, the next day Nandu said to her that her would kill the petitioner with knife. This incident has been referred to by the respondent in her letter of October 22, 1967 to the petitioners brother Borda. The learned trial Judge does not seem to have believed this incident mainly on the ground that it was unlikely that a small boy like Nandu would say that he would kill his father with a knife. Whether Nandu meant what he said, it may be doubtful; but the fact remains that long prior to the petitioners demand for divorce in her letter of October 22, 1967, the respondent has describe the incident. Even making allowance for some exaggeration in what the respondent says as regards this incident, still it appears to me that some incident as alleged by the respondent must have taken place, otherwise, there was no reason for her to describe such an incident in her letter to Borda. What is urged by Mr. Hegde is that the real differences between the parties were on sex, and according to him, the respondent believed that the petitioner was inadequate to give her the necessary sexual satisfaction. What is urged by Mr. Hegde is that the real differences between the parties were on sex, and according to him, the respondent believed that the petitioner was inadequate to give her the necessary sexual satisfaction. He also submitted that the respondent being not sexually satisfied, she must have resorted to adultery, and, having regard to her frank nature, it was very likely that she would make confession about it to the petitioner. As regards the alleged confession, it would be necessary to closely scrutinise the evidence on record. One will have to bear in mind the conduct of the parties before she came to India on November 13, 1966, during her short stay with the petitioner in December 1966, and thereafter till the petitioner referred to her confession. Now the respondent came to India on November 13, 1966 of her own accord. If she had already started living with some other persons of her choice in France and did get the sexual pleasure which she did not find with the petitioner, it is difficult to see why she thought of coming to India on November 13, 1966. It appears that the respondent had given up her job before she came to India. If the intention was to merely inform the petitioner about her adultery and the fact that she was living with some other persons in France and to go back to France, there was no reason for her to give up her job. In fact, she stayed with he petitioner for about six weeks. Admittedly, the couple with their children had gone to Goa and from Goa returned to Poona and stayed there for some days. It seems rather stranger that the petitioner and the respondent would continue to lead normal life for six weeks as if nothing had happened even after the alleged confession. The petitioner tried to explain his conduct by saying that since after the confession made by the wife to him, they did not sleep in the same room but he was sleeping in childrens room while the wife was sleeping in the other room. He also explained that he had already promised his children that they would be taken to Goa and, therefore, with a view not to disappoint them, he controlled himself. He also explained that he had already promised his children that they would be taken to Goa and, therefore, with a view not to disappoint them, he controlled himself. Now, it is the case of the petitioner that after a fortnight of the confession, he decided to put an end to his wedlock with the respondent. In any event, therefore, one would expect that he should take some steps in getting divorce from his wife. Admittedly, he kept quiet even thereafter. He did not even take any legal advice, nor did he talk about the confession to any of his friends or relations. The matter does not rest here. Even after the respondent went back to France, he went on writing affectionate and loving letters to his wife which renders his case of the wife having confessed to him highly improbable. Before adverting to the correspondence which took place between the petitioner and the respondent after her departure to France, it would be necessary to consider the case of the respondent that during her stay here, they had arrived at an understanding that they should separate and the respondent should stay in France. According to her, he agreed to send the children to her after the respondent got accommodation and job. The respondent was also asked by the petitioner to find out a suitable job for him in France or Europe and for that purpose he gave her his bio-data. It is also the case of the respondent that in December 1966, both of them went to Bombay and got a separate passport for the children and as still they were included in the passport on the respondent. The petitioner denies that any such understanding was reached by him with his wife. That the respondent took the bio-data with her to France is not disputed. It is also in evidence that the petitioner and the respondent had gone to Bombay in order to have a separate passport for the children. However, according to the petitioner, he had not given his bio-data to the respondent but he had kept it ready to enable him to secure a job, and the respondent might have taken it away without his knowledge. The bio-data, which is at Ex. 102, is admittedly signed by the petitioner and he has put the date as December 1, 1966 below his signature. The bio-data, which is at Ex. 102, is admittedly signed by the petitioner and he has put the date as December 1, 1966 below his signature. This bio-data gives the details of his education, qualifications and experience in Firms where he worked. Admittedly this bio-data was prepared with a view to enable the petitioner to secure a job. Question is whether the petitioner himself gave this bio-data to the respondent to enable her to secure him a job in France or Europe as contended by the respondent. In view of the divergence of the cases made out by the petitioner and the respondent on this question, it would be necessary to refer to their evidence. In her deposition, the respondent has stated that in view of the constant quarrels, in order that the children should be brought up properly and in order to have peace, they decided that it was better that they split home and both of them resided in Europe, but not under the same roof. The agreement was that the respondent should first go and get a job in France and set up a home, arrangements should be made for the petitioner to go there by her standing as a guarantee for him and then he would leave the children with her. She has further deposed that at that time, the petitioner told her that if she found out a job for him, she could apply on his behalf, and it is precisely for this purpose that he gave her his bio-data with his signature and date being put thereunder. She denied the suggestion that she took the bio-data without his knowledge. In his examination-in-chief, the petitioner denied any such understanding as alleged by the respondent. He, however, stated in examination-in-chief itself that the respondent took the bio-data from him telling that she would try a job for him. This would clearly negative the case of the petitioner that the bio-data was taken by the respondent without his knowledge. In his cross examination, the petitioner made out a different case. First he stated that the document at Ex. 102 was in the house and that the respondent took it without his knowledge or consent. He, however, turned round and stated that his statement that she took it from his house without his knowledge and consent was not true. In his cross examination, the petitioner made out a different case. First he stated that the document at Ex. 102 was in the house and that the respondent took it without his knowledge or consent. He, however, turned round and stated that his statement that she took it from his house without his knowledge and consent was not true. He explained the discrepancy by saying that he said so because he did not remember the facts clearly and he made it in confusion. Then he admitted that he himself gave the bio-data to the respondent but qualified the statement by saying that the bio-data was given to her because she wanted to try and find out a job for him, and he acuqiesced. Then again, he stated that he gave the bio-data because she insisted on taking it and he did not want to make a scene and wanted to get rid of the matter. In view of the contradictory statements made by the petitioner in his evidence, I see no reason to reject the evidence of the petitioner that the bio-data was given by the petitioner to her with a view to enable her to find out a job for him in Europe. It is significant that the bio-data bears the date December 1, 1966. At that time, the petitioner was already having a job in Philips India. The petitioner has not explained as to why he had kept the bio-data ready, nor has he state that he was going to leave hi present job for some reason and was going to try for another, and, therefore, he kept the bio-data ready. If the respondent was interested in living with some other person in adultery in France, it is difficult to see why she would offer of her own accord to try and to help the petitioner in securing a job in France or Europe. If she was happy with that person, she would rather try to keep the petitioner away from her so that the life as desired by her would not be interfered with. The other important circumstance which goes to support the case of the respondent is the fact that both of them had gone to Bombay to take a separate passport for the children which till then was included in the mothers passport. The other important circumstance which goes to support the case of the respondent is the fact that both of them had gone to Bombay to take a separate passport for the children which till then was included in the mothers passport. The petitioner has not explained as to why he thought it necessary at that stage to take a separate French passport for the children. There is, therefore, substance in the contention of the respondent that his passport was obtained pursuant to the understanding between her and the petitioner. The case of the respondent finds further corroboration from the letter of October, 22, 1967 written by her to Borda. In this letter she has mentioned that before she left she got the petitioner to promise her to let he have the children if she had a job and accommodation. She expressed her doubt whether the petitioner would keep his promise. She has also referred to the visit of a Missionary to her place who asked her what plans she had for the children. At that time she was surprised since she thought that if the petitioner had sent him, it was only natural that he would have told him every thing. She has also stated in the letter that the missionary told her that the petitioner would be quite ready to come and live in France, and to that her reply was that she was prepared to do what she could if he really wished to come but it was impossible for her to live with him under the same roof. This letter was written long before petitioner tried to allege that the respondent had confessed to him about her having committed adultery. But for the fact that there was some such understanding reached between the parties as contended by the respondent, such a reference would not have found place in this letter. Again there is the letter of November 22, 1967 by the petitioner to the respondent. While acknowledging the various articles sent by the respondent, the petitioner suggested to her not to send heavy things but advised her to send money to buy such things here as it costs more in custom. He even advised her not to send warm clothes as the children do not even get a chance to put them on and they had too many of them. He even advised her not to send warm clothes as the children do not even get a chance to put them on and they had too many of them. In this letter, however, there is a reference to the childrens education. He has stated that they have been put in Shivaji School since last June as a trial and he has expressed satisfaction that the trial was worked satisfaction. But what is important is that in this connection he has written to the respondent that he hand sent her the details of the school long ago, but since then he had taken legal advice and thought it best for the boys "to be here now". The implication is clear that the boys were to be sent to France, but in view of the later developments as stated in the letter, he had abandoned the idea. This letter, therefore, goes a long way in supporting the case of the respondent that there was an understanding between them to send the boys to France. Thus taking into consideration all the circumstances and the evidence on record, I am satisfied that the case of the respondent regarding the agreement be true. In paragraph 60 of his judgment, the learned Judge has observed that beyond the word of the respondent, there was nothing to show that there was any such agreement. It appears that the learned Judge did not think it necessary to consider the evidence on record on this point as in his view the question as to whether there was an agreement or not was not material for the determination of the relevant issue. If the circumstances and the evidence on record were considered in proper perspective, the case of the respondent on this point seems to be probable and true. The fact that there was an understanding as deposed to by the respondent before she left for France is a circumstance clearly indicating against the case of the petitioner about the alleged confession. If the respondent who had differences with the petitioner and had a different outlook of material life and had in fact found happiness with the person in France, she would not be interested in such an agreement, nor would the petitioner think of arriving at such a thing. If the respondent who had differences with the petitioner and had a different outlook of material life and had in fact found happiness with the person in France, she would not be interested in such an agreement, nor would the petitioner think of arriving at such a thing. This, in my view, is an important circumstance against the case of the petitioner about the so-called confession made by the respondent. Even the correspondence which took place after she left for France by the end of December 1966 leads to the same conclusion, viz. that the respondent must not have made any confession. Immediately after the respondent reached France, she was quick enough to write to the petitioner inquiring about the petitioner and the children. This is quite clear from the letter of January 20, 1967 by the petitioner to the respondent wherein he refers to the fact of the receipt of the letter on the previous day, but it is pertinent to note that the petitioner writes to the respondent in this letter saying, "I hope, you have found a comfortable place to stay. I can hardly write how I feel about it all. In fact I hardly feel like doing anything at all." If the case of the petitioner was true, it is rather strange that he would enquire as to whether she had found a comfortable place to stay. He also wrote about the children saying that they were happy. He further has requested the respondent to write soon and said, "May God help you and be with you." This is entirely incompatible with the disclosure of adultery on the part of the respondent to the petitioner. Then there is a the letter dated February 6, 1967 again written by the petitioner to the respondent which clearly shows that he had received a birthday card from the respondent. It appears that before this letter the petitioner was informed about the respondent getting a job and, therefore, he writes that he was glad that she found a job and expressed hope that she would like it. It is not probable that the respondent would send birthday card and the petitioner would express the happiness over the respondent getting a job. In this letter ha has also informed about his health. It appears that he was then under the treatment of Dr. Shaikh. It is not probable that the respondent would send birthday card and the petitioner would express the happiness over the respondent getting a job. In this letter ha has also informed about his health. It appears that he was then under the treatment of Dr. Shaikh. He has requested her to write to her parents on his behalf and to apologies him for his not writing to them. This again is a conduct on the part of both the petitioner and the respondent which strongly militates against the petitioner's case. The letter is dated March 20, 1967 written by the petitioner to the respondent. Even this letter indicates that the relations between the petitioner and the respondent were normal as before. Then there is the letter dated October 28, 1967 by the respondent to the petitioner. It is true that in this letter she writes to the respondent as "My dear Roy", instead of the usual name "Jhunu". Mr. Hegde says that its a clear indication that she was not treating the petitioner as her husband and, therefore, it corroborates his case of adultery. But then we must not lose sight of the fact that by that time the petitioner had not kept up the promise of sending the children to her, and it is quite possible, therefore, that the respondent out of exasperation started her letter with he words "My dear Roy". That she was agitated on account of the attitude of the respondent is clear from what she has written in the letter, viz..--- "Now what do you intend doing about the children and me. If they were with me I had got 200-F monthly from the State additional I could manage. Don't think about me in this. I did the only thing possible : a live mother even far away, in readiness, is still better than a dead one. Because you have to face it (I do not wish you any harm, if I can help I will) with you under the same roof I had have done it again, and I would not have missed. I an sorry. How sorry you will never know. ..." This letter only indicates the mental agony through which the respondent was passing. She was not only separated from the petitioner but even the children were away from her. I an sorry. How sorry you will never know. ..." This letter only indicates the mental agony through which the respondent was passing. She was not only separated from the petitioner but even the children were away from her. If she was leading a very happy life and had found pleasure which she had desired with another person, one would not expect her to write letter in such a style. There is yet another statement in this letter which is of some significance. It appears that by then she had purchased certain articles such as electrical sewing machine, electric steam iron and gas-cooker with oven. Besides informing about this, she has also written to the petitioner that she intended to buy a T.V. on an instalment basis of 100 Francs a month. But what is important is what she writes further, viz. "So, as you can see, I live quite alone and independently without debt : I have made it." It would have been hypocritical on her part to write so if she already informed the petitioner that she was actually living with another person. The letter clearly shows that she was trying to impress upon the petitioner that in spite of the odds, she has been able to manage things herself. Why she should have taken all this trouble of informing the petitioner of everything that was taking place around her. Would the petitioner have interest in all such things if she had already informed him about her being in adultery ? What she has written in this letter also goes against probabilities of the respondent having made any such confession. Then there is a letter of November 3, 1967 by the respondent to the petitioner. It seems that before that she had received a letter dated October 30, 1967 from the petitioner. In this letter, she has again tried to paint a picture of her agonies and her mental condition. She writes--- "It somehow shocked me to realise you have moved house-much better for you I guess-peace of mind I mean-no ghosts. I am still trying to get over it all, nor the children of course, but our marriage or rather the failure of it, but I cannot and start all over again, never. So I try, as best I can, to live with my memories---painful, and yet. I am still trying to get over it all, nor the children of course, but our marriage or rather the failure of it, but I cannot and start all over again, never. So I try, as best I can, to live with my memories---painful, and yet. Tuesday Lobsaug Rampa did say we are in this world to learn, I wonder what else I am supposed to learn. Anyway, never mind about me, what about me, what about you, how are you getting on, and the children?" Mr. Hegde, however, had drawn my attention to a sentence in this letter namely--- "The only thing I can say is that I did love you, now you have become a brother, one accepts disillusion from a brother with forgiveness." It is, therefore, urged by him that because the respondent was already loving some person in France and had treated the material tie with the petitioner as having come to an end, she has referred to the petitioner as her brother. Now this letter has been written about a year after she left for France. Her letters show that she was depressed and in such a state of mind that she started first writing to the petitioner as "My dear Roy" and thereafter also has referred to him as "a brother". From this circumstances, no inference can be drawn that she had taken to adultery and treated her relations with the petitioner as her husband having come to an end. I have already referred to the letter dated November 22, 1967 by the petitioner to the respondent while dealing with the contention of the respondent relating to the understanding reached between her and the petitioner before she left for France. The contents of this letter also show that even till the end of November 1967, he was writing in a normal way to the respondent. The letter of February 19, 1968 by the respondent to the petitioner is written by her in her usual way. She writes---"But do not forget the last word is not said. The future will tell and it might do what I cannot. Destiny is a strange thing. I have learned to be patient with an infinite patience, but also will". This again indicates that she was writing in depressed mood. Then in this letter, several other things regarding children and various other matters have been discussed by her. The future will tell and it might do what I cannot. Destiny is a strange thing. I have learned to be patient with an infinite patience, but also will". This again indicates that she was writing in depressed mood. Then in this letter, several other things regarding children and various other matters have been discussed by her. It would be worthwhile at this stage to refer to the respondent's correspondence with the petitioner's brother Borda and also a letter by the petitioner to her parents. There is one letter of October 22, 1967 (Ex. 132) by the respondent to Borda. It is a very long letter which I have already referred to while dealing with the case of the respondent regarding the agreement. In this letter she has complained about the attitude of the petitioner towards her. She has narrated the incident as to how the petitioner treated her when she left India for France in these words--- "I went on leave to France with the children. Roy put us on board like as many pieces of luggage and without even a slight kiss, turned on his heels and left. I know may be he was so sad he could stay. I don't know but it was like an iced hand on my heart and I thought something has got to be done. I did not eat during the journey. I reached somehow." Such and other passages form this and the other letters do not merely indicate that she wanted to make a grievance against the petitioner but discloses a state of mind which is full of unhappiness. This incident referred to by her sees to be of February 1964. In this letter, she has also narrated the incident of grabbing her by throat which according to her took place in the month of January 1966. Then she points out how the petitioner did not fulfil his promise of sending the children to France. She of course has emphatically stated that even if the petitioner were to come to France, it was not possible for them to live under the same roof. She further writes--- "It does not stop me from crying while I am writing these lines. She of course has emphatically stated that even if the petitioner were to come to France, it was not possible for them to live under the same roof. She further writes--- "It does not stop me from crying while I am writing these lines. But what's the use, it won't give me my sons back; the only thing I can do is get my career well ahead and wait for them to come for their higher studies." The manner in which this letter is written also in my view militates against the case of the petitioner. This letter was replied to by Borda in December 1967. His reply is dated December 14, 1967. It would be worthwhile to refer to only a few lines in this letter wherein he has referred to the fact that the petitioner had come to him and then he only told him that the disagreement between the petitioner and the respondent which started long ago was so serious that it was not possible for him to live with him any longer and therefore she had left inspite of the fact that the petitioner did not want her to do so. It is quite possible as urged by Mr. Hegde that the petitioner may not have liked to disclose to his brother about the alleged confession and take him into confidence. However, the fact that the petitioner desired that the respondent should not leave him is not without any significance. This may be a small circumstance but still read in the light of other evidence on record, it indicates that the case of the petitioner regarding the confession cannot be true. Then there is the letter dated January 22, 1968 by the petitioner to the respondent's parents. He writes--- "Jacqueline has stopped writing to us for almost three months now. I feel a little anxious at times and hope God will keep her safe and happy........ I hope, Jacqueline writes to you often and will stay close to you for ever." Will the petitioner keep on writing like this even after one year after the alleged disclosure by the respondent ? Reliance is placed by the petitioner on office copies of two letter as Exs. 72 and 73 dated May 29, 1968 and January 18, 1968. I hope, Jacqueline writes to you often and will stay close to you for ever." Will the petitioner keep on writing like this even after one year after the alleged disclosure by the respondent ? Reliance is placed by the petitioner on office copies of two letter as Exs. 72 and 73 dated May 29, 1968 and January 18, 1968. In these two letters for the first time there is a reference to the alleged confession made by the respondent, and both of them were requested to inquire and inform him about the name and whereabouts of the man in France with whom the respondent had intimate relations. Mr. Methalone has pointed out that these letters have not been proved and therefore ought not to have been exhibited. Apart form the fact that the petitioner has not made any attempt to get produced the original documents, he has not produced any other evidence that such letters were posted by him. Ordinarily, one would expect some reply to these letters from the addressee, but no such reply is forthcoming. I am aware of the difficulties in the way of the petitioner in proving these letters by calling the addressees as his witness as they are residents of a far off country. However, in the absence of any other corroborating circumstance, it is difficult to say that these letters have been proved. Even if the objections to the admissibility of these two letters are ignored, still the fact remains that these two letters have been written by the petitioner about a year and a half after the alleged disclosure of adultery by the respondent. Never since before has he mentioned about this confession to anyone. Not much importance, therefore, can be attached to the fact that the petitioner asked the two ladies to make inquiries and pass on the information to him. If we leave aside these two letters, then it is only in the month of August 1968 that the petitioner has for the first time suggested that the respondent did make a confession to him. There is the letter of the petitioner to the respondent of August 4, 1968 which is on record. It is this letter that he comes out with a case of adultery on her part. There is the letter of the petitioner to the respondent of August 4, 1968 which is on record. It is this letter that he comes out with a case of adultery on her part. In this letter he writes--- "From what you have personally told me while you were in India, and what you have been writing to me from France, since you left India in January 1967. I am convinced that you have transferred you affections and attachments to another person and that you have decided to seek happiness as his companion in life. Even since you addressed me as your brother in your letter dated 3rd November, 1967, it has been difficult for me to think of you as my wife. ............... Since you are now living with a man who according to you has been able to give you the happiness you have been seeking, it is fair that the legal relationship of man and wife now existing between us must be forthwith terminated. ........." The petitioner was cross-examined on this letter and he admitted that there was nothing in the letters written by the respondent to him from France which would lead to the inference that she has transferred her affection or attachment to some other person or had taken someone as her companion in life. If the petitioner had decided to put an end to the legal relationship of husband and wife within a fortnight after the disclosure, he would not have taken so much time to think of taking action in the matter. In the ordinary course, one would except that atleast after her departure to France, he would have taken some steps in the matter. It is not that he was merely silent but his conduct is to the contrary as can be seen from the correspondence with respondent. It appears that this letter was replied to by the respondent and the petitioner again wrote a letter on August 13, 1968 repeating the allegation of adultery. Thereafter he sent a legal notice through his Advocate which is dated October 19, 1968. It appears that in this notice the petitioner has asserted that from France show wrote to him stating that she was extremely unhappy with him and that she would like to break up the marriage and settle permanently in France. However, no such letter has been produced by the petitioner. It appears that in this notice the petitioner has asserted that from France show wrote to him stating that she was extremely unhappy with him and that she would like to break up the marriage and settle permanently in France. However, no such letter has been produced by the petitioner. This notice was immediately replied to by the respondent wherein she emphatically denied the allegations made against her as a net of falsehood and asserted that she will prove the same in a Court of law. She, however, stated that she did not wish to refuse the idea of divorce. The sharp reaction in this letter would clearly indicate that it was not likely that she would make a confession of a sort alleged by the petitioner. After exchange of notices, on December 23, 1968, he filed the present petition. It was the case of the petitioner that he had requested Father Desmet Richard, who was going to Belgium by about the end of March 1967, to make enquiries and to get information as to with whom the respondent was living in France. If father Desmet was asked to enquire into such a delicate and important matter, it is rather strange that the petitioner would forewarn the petitioner about his visit to her. In his letter of March 20, 1967, the petitioner writes to the respondent that Father Desmet, the Belgium Missionary, was going home for holiday and he will be going through Marceille and, therefore, he had asked him to call on her. Ordinarily, the petitioner would not have disclosed the proposed visit of Father Desmet to the respondent. He would have liked Father Desmet to make a confidential enquiry, and in any case to go to her place without any prior intimation. It, therefore, does not appear probable that the petitioner should have asked father Desmet to make enquiries as to with whom the respondent was staying. The respondent has examined Father Desmet as her witness. He, however, does not support he petitioner's case that he was asked to find out where she was living and with whom she was living. According to Father Desmet, the petitioner's request must have been to visit his wife at Marceille and to explore the possibility of resuming the common life with the petitioner. He, however, does not support he petitioner's case that he was asked to find out where she was living and with whom she was living. According to Father Desmet, the petitioner's request must have been to visit his wife at Marceille and to explore the possibility of resuming the common life with the petitioner. In the cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that the petitioner had told him that his wife had left him and went to Marceille and, therefore, he asked him to find out where she was living and with whom she was living. The witness, however, stated that perhaps he had asked him to see in which condition she was living. The evidence of Father Desmet, therefore, does not support the case of the petitioner. If in March 1967, the petitioner had tried to ascertain the information about the name of the person with whom the petitioner was living in adultery, he would not have written to his wife thereafter informing her about the visit of Father Desmet. There is one letter dated September 30, 1966 by the respondent to the petitioner. It was sent by the respondent to the petitioner before her arrival in India on November 13, 1966. It is submitted by Mr. Hegde that the contents of this letter would indicate that the respondent must have taken recourse to adulterous life since before she came to India, and this would lend corroboration to the case of the petitioner regarding the confession alleged to have been made by her. In the concluding paragraph of the letter, the respondent writes "I guess this time your wife is going to give you either heart failure or something to think about." Mr. Hegde's contention, therefore, is that there was nothing unnatural for the respondent to make the disclosure-unusual as it may appear to be-even on the first night of her arrival in India. Now, if the letter is read as a whole, it is difficult to arrive at such an inference. In the preceding paragraphs of the letter, she has referred to several domestic affairs; for instance, she has written about the requirement of a polishing machine for being used by the petitioner and the respondent in India. In this connection, she writes--- "Now as I can see it, in India we rather require a polishing machine with hoover. In the preceding paragraphs of the letter, she has referred to several domestic affairs; for instance, she has written about the requirement of a polishing machine for being used by the petitioner and the respondent in India. In this connection, she writes--- "Now as I can see it, in India we rather require a polishing machine with hoover. So I plan to bring back a Philips make polishing machine and spares, but I have to know the voltage. Because they do not make them in double voltage. I may bring a small hoover though, they are cheap but not very efficient; what do you think. But I do stick to my idea of a polisher. For the kids I have already earmarked a boat about one meter long with folding sails. Having gone with two I shall naturally come back with three at least because of my dozen aeroplanes." This clearly indicates that the respondent did take interest in the domestic affairs, and it is possible that she was in a mood to settle down in India with the petitioner after her arrival. There is also a reference to trousers with a pink jacket for the use of the petitioner. This in my view is incompatible with the inference which the Counsel wants me to draw from the concluding portion of the letter referred to above. In this letter, there is also a reference to sex matters and some books thereon including kamasutra. Then there is also a reference to life in France; for instance, she has referred to the admiration that the men have about the hair, shoulders, neck, legs of women and joculerly remarks "that is probably why the skirts have shrunk so much very often at traffic lights, the cars stop and you see two kissing each other with his hands either in her blouse or under her skirts or both." She has also referred to the behaviour of the men and women towards each other in France and tried to suggest how liberal they were in comparison with Indian conditions. On reading of this letter, it does appear to me that some of the remarks seem to have been made by her in a lighter vein. Moreover, the respondent has not been cross-examined with regard to the concluding portion in the relied on by the petitioner. On reading of this letter, it does appear to me that some of the remarks seem to have been made by her in a lighter vein. Moreover, the respondent has not been cross-examined with regard to the concluding portion in the relied on by the petitioner. In the absence of any cross-examination with regard to the intention with which the concluding portion of the letter written by the respondent, I am unable to draw any inference therefrom as suggested by Mr. Hegde. Turning to the evidence of Dr. Shaikh who has supported the claim of the petitioner, the question is whether his evidence should be relied on. Dr. Shaikh was the Medical Officer of Philips India from 1958 to 1959. During the period when the petitioner was in Poona serving in Philips India, both the petitioner and the respondent seem to have come in contract with him as a Medical Officer. It appears that Dr. Shaikh treated the respondent for her ailments. In fact when in the year 1965 she was suffering from nervous debility, it was Dr. Shaikh who had referred her to some other doctors including Dr. Shirvaikar. Before she came to India, the respondent had also written a letter on October 17, 1666 to Dr. Shaikh. In this letter, she seems to have made a grievance about he petitioner's attitude towards her. She expressed in the letter that the petitioner knows nothing of a woman psychology and expects a woman to work like a machine. But the main purpose for her writing such a letter seems to be to request him to talk to the petitioner and find out what is the real cause of their not coming closer to each other as husband and wife and his not understanding her view. In this letter, she has written "So I wonder whether you could get across to him and by so called chatting find out what is really that makes a wall which in any case was always there", and ends the letter by saying "I shall be very grateful for whatever you will be able to do." This letter has been written a few days prior to her leaving France for India. If she was really living with some other person and the intention was to break the news to the petitioner, it is difficult to comprehend why she should have thought of writing such a letter to Dr. Shaikh. Apparently, the reason for such a letter seems to be that she wanted to stay with the petitioner in India, and with that end in view, to make her relations with the petitioner as smooth as possible. It is the case of Dr. Shaikh in his evidence that the respondent had come to him his clinic after she came to India sometime after November 13, 1966 when she had come to Poona. According to him, the respondent told him that she was not satisfied with the petitioner and in France she had intercourse with one man satisfactorily. He stated he did not ask her as to how she was related to that man but asked her whether the petitioner knew about it, and at that time she told him that she had confessed it to her husband. She also told him that she did not bother about the marriage which had already gone to rock. Now if Dr. Shaikh can be believed, then certainly it would strongly corroborate the petitioner's case that the respondent had confessed to him about her adultery. There are, however, serious infirmities which are apparent from the evidence of Dr. Shaikh. Dr. Shaikh claims himself to be a friend of both the petitioner and the respondent. Ordinarily, being interested in the welfare of his friend, he would have talked to him soon after the receipt of the letter from the respondent, but, according to him, he never talked to the petitioner about this letter although the petitioner met him many times either in the factory, or at his house or in the clinic. It is only after 8 or 9 months when the petitioner had left Philips India in the year 1967 that for the first time he talked about this letter to the petitioner. As the letter was not confidential, it is possible to say that he may not show the letter to the petitioner after its receipt. But one would expect him to atleast talk to the petitioner about the difference between him and the respondent particularly when he was specially requested to do so by the respondent. Dr. As the letter was not confidential, it is possible to say that he may not show the letter to the petitioner after its receipt. But one would expect him to atleast talk to the petitioner about the difference between him and the respondent particularly when he was specially requested to do so by the respondent. Dr. Shaikh has not given any cogent reason for his keeping silent for such a long time. The petitioner left Philips India in about September 1967. This means that he opened the talk for the first time with the petitioner in about May 1968. This seems to be quite unnatural conduct on his part. Not only that he had received a letter from the respondent to help her in her marital life but she even had made a startling disclosure of her life in France when she met him in the clinic. If not after the receipt of the letter, he would ordinarily have had a talk with the petitioner about the information which was received by him from the respondent herself. His explanation that he did not speak to the petitioner because it was a delicate matter between husband and wife cannot stand to reason. He has stated in the evidence that once or twice he asked the petitioner after December 1966 about his wife and he told him that she had left and at that time the petitioner did not tell him anything else or the reason why she left. Atleast at that time Dr. Shaikh could have told the petitioner about the information which he got from the respondent. In his cross-examination, Dr. Shaikh has admitted that he could not give any reason why the respondent voluntarily gave the information on such a delicate and private matter. It is rather strange that the respondent should have chosen the clinic of Dr. Shaikh to pass on such an information to him. According to his evidence in the cross-examination, on all the occasions when he met him till he left Philips India, the petitioner did not tell him that his wife had left him, nor did he ask the petitioner about his wife and family. According to Dr. Shaikh, it was only when the petitioner saw him in the middle of 1968 after he had left Philips India that the petitioner told him that he was going to take divorce from the respondent. According to Dr. Shaikh, it was only when the petitioner saw him in the middle of 1968 after he had left Philips India that the petitioner told him that he was going to take divorce from the respondent. He then asked him the reasons for seeking divorce when the petitioner told him that she was unfaithful to him. It was only then that he told him that he had received a letter from the respondent long ago. According to him, he then searched for the letter and showed it to the petitioner. If he had received the letter from the respondent seeking his help and thereafter if the disclosure which was undoubtedly a serious one, was made by the respondent it is highly unlikely that the witness would have kept quiet till the petitioner himself told him of his intention to seek divorce from the respondent. The evidence of this witness was first recorded on September 28, 1972 and therein in his examination-in-chief he had referred to the fact that the petitioner had met him at his (Dr. Shaikh's) house. However, when he was further examined the next day, at the end of his cross-examination he volunteered to say that what he had stated on the previous day was not his (witness's) home but his (petitioner's) home. The learned judge has made a note that the statement of the witness was read out and he admitted it to be correct, and, therefore, he could not be heard to say that it was wrongly recorded. It is urged by Mr. Methalone that this indicates that the witness was somewhat over-enthusiastic and wanted to support the cause of the petitioner. This by itself-may not mean much, but it does have some impact when appreciating his evidence with regard to such a serious allegation against the respondent. On a careful consideration of his evidence and the circumstances of the case, I do not think it safe to rely on the testimony of Dr. Shaikh. He admitted in the cross-examination that he was a friend of the petitioner. He, however, denied the suggestion that he was not a friend of the respondent. To a question as to whether the petitioner used to meet him several times in his home, he replied emphatically that he had never come to his house. Shaikh. He admitted in the cross-examination that he was a friend of the petitioner. He, however, denied the suggestion that he was not a friend of the respondent. To a question as to whether the petitioner used to meet him several times in his home, he replied emphatically that he had never come to his house. This reply is inconsistent with his own case that the petitioner had met him on some occasions in his (Dr. Shaikh's) home. In his endeavour to show that he was not interested in the petitioner, he seems to have given somewhat contradictory replies in his cross-examinations which would have a bearing on the question of the veracity of his testimony. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am in agreement with the trial Court that the evidence of Dr. Shaikh does not inspire confidence and cannot be believed. Then what remains is the oral testimony of the petitioner himself wherein he has spoken about the alleged voluntary confession made to him by the respondent about her adultery. The respondent in her evidence has denied to have made such a confession. She has also denied that she was guilty of the adultery as alleged by the petitioner. There is thus word against word. As regards the petitioner, I have already dealt with some of the aspects of the case which run counter to his allegations regarding the confession. As pointed out earlier, even after the alleged disclosure, the respondent was with the petitioner for six weeks till she left for France, and during this period, they led a normal life as husband and wife. As regards the case of the respondent regarding the understanding reached by them prior to her departure to France, the same is borne out by the circumstances and the correspondence referred to above. It is highly improbable and unlikely that the petitioner should not have reacted to the respondent's conduct as disclosed by her not only prior to her departure to France but even thereafter for a very long time. The subsequent correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent also runs counter to her having committed adultery or having made such a confession to the petitioner. On a close scrutiny of his evidence, I am unable to consider it as worthy of reliance. The subsequent correspondence between the petitioner and the respondent also runs counter to her having committed adultery or having made such a confession to the petitioner. On a close scrutiny of his evidence, I am unable to consider it as worthy of reliance. The burden of proving the adultery was heavily on the petitioner, and, in my view, he has failed to discharge the said burden. It is urged by Mr. Methalone that even assuming that she has made the disclosure to the petitioner, it must be held on the facts and circumstances of the case that the petitioner had condoned her act. In this connection , he relied on the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of the Act which inter alia provide that before the decree for divorce is passed, the Court has to be satisfied that the act has been condoned by the husband. It is true that the respondent has not specifically pleaded that the adultery was condoned by the petitioner. However, on the evidence and the circumstances brought on record, such an inference can be legitimately drawn. As stated by me earlier, the petitioner and the respondent lived together for six weeks even after the discloser made by the respondent. Even thereafter, as the correspondence and the conduct of the parties show, the petitioner did condone the alleged act of adultery on the part of the respondent. Even if I were to be wrong on the principal question regarding the alleged disclosure made to the petitioner by the respondent on November 13, 1966, in my view, the petitioner would not be entitled to a decree for divorce as he has condoned the act of adultery. It is then urged by Mr. Methalone that the learned Judge should have held that there was inordinate delay in filing the petition and that also should be considered as a ground for refusing the decree for divorce. In view of the provisions of sections 13 and 14 of the Act, if the petitioner is guilty of unreasonable delay in presenting the petition, he would not be entitled to claim divorce. In the present case, the petitioner came to know about the adultery in November, 1966. Admittedly, he did not take any steps whatsoever till about May, 1968 when according to him he wrote letters to Mrs. Margaret and Miss Ducass. In the present case, the petitioner came to know about the adultery in November, 1966. Admittedly, he did not take any steps whatsoever till about May, 1968 when according to him he wrote letters to Mrs. Margaret and Miss Ducass. He admitted that he contacted the legal adviser for the first time in June, 1968. It is difficult to see why he was silent and did not take any steps whatsoever for such a long time. Further it was only in the month of August, 1968 that he wrote a letter to the respondent accusing her of adultery and claiming divorce from her and thereafter he filed the petition on December 23, 1968. If all these facts are taken into account, in my view, there is much substance in the contention of Mr. Methalone that the petitioner is guilty of unreasonable delay in presenting the petition and that by itself is a ground for rejecting his claim for divorce. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be nor order as to costs. -----