JUDGMENT : J.B. Mehta, J. The petitioner who was Executive Engineer in State mice retired on December 2, 1962, on the completion of 55 years after putting in continuous service of 28 years. His full pension was fixed in 1965 and the sanctioned pension was drawn by him without any deduction under rule 188 or any other rule. Thereafter a charge-sheet was served on (he petitioner at Annexure A on November 30, 1968, by the State Government stating that the petitioner was being held responsible for the irregularities which he had committed while he was Executive Engineer in the Roads and Buildings Division, Palanpur in 1959-60 as he had permitted the use of metal of lower quality in the S. R. P. F. Quarters in Third Sub-division and did not make any deduction from the bills of the contractor, and allowed the above work to be done of lower quality. Therefore, this charge-sheet was issued treating the petitioner as responsible for this serious misconduct. He was further intimated that his explanation was invited why if any of these charges were established, it should not he treated as strong and sufficient reason for inflicting penalty under rule 189 of the B.C.S. Rules. He was informed that all the relevant records he may examine at the office. The petitioner challenged this charge-sheet and the enquiry instituted against him in Special C. A. No. 107 of 1970 The said application was disposed of by the order dated January 18, 1974. In the meanwhile as Rule 189A had been enacted on October 29, 1971, this Court required the authorities to first consider the question as to whether the authorities had jurisdiction and as to whether the proceedings have been validly instituted against the petitioner and whether they could be continued in view of the provisions of rule 189A which had been enacted during the pendency of the petition on October 29, 1971. It was directed that the officer conducting the enquiry should first decide this preliminary question and thereafter further enquiry on merits shall be proceeded with. Therefore, at that stage the petition was not entertained and a direction was only given that this contention about the applicability of rule 189A shall be first decided by the authorities and it is only after the decision thereof that the enquiry, if necessary, may be further proceeded with on merits. Therefore, at that stage the petition was not entertained and a direction was only given that this contention about the applicability of rule 189A shall be first decided by the authorities and it is only after the decision thereof that the enquiry, if necessary, may be further proceeded with on merits. Thereafter the petitioner was informed under Rule 9 (viii) of the Gujarat Civil Services Discipline and Appeal Rules as regards the enquiry kept in this connection The petitioner replied on January 27, 1975, raising a specific contention that rule 189A came in the way of the Government for holding such an enquiry after 8 years which took place prior to the date of this charge-sheet. Even a further reply was sent on February 4, 1975 on the basis of the interpretation of the two rules 189 and 189A. Thereafter the petitioner received a letter at Annex. E dated March 10, 1975, of the Deputy Secretary of the Government informing him that the aforesaid Rule 189A was prospective and not retrospective and therefore, the present proceeding which had been commenced under rule 189 was not governed by that rule and, therefore, the petitioner was required to submit his defence before the enquiry officer. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition challenging the vires of the said rule 189 and 189A as unconstitutional being contrary to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The petitioner further challenged the aforesaid enquiry after such unreasonable length of time as even under rule 189, when read in the light of guideline in rule 189A. such an enquiry could not be proceeded with, as in any event rule 189 A was really substitutive in nature and it barred such a proceeding. Rule 189 and rule 189A run as under: - "Good conduct is an implied condition of every grant of pension. such an enquiry could not be proceeded with, as in any event rule 189 A was really substitutive in nature and it barred such a proceeding. Rule 189 and rule 189A run as under: - "Good conduct is an implied condition of every grant of pension. Government may withhold or withdraw a pension or any part of it if the pensioner be convicted of serious crime or be found to have been guilty of grave misconduct either during or after the completion of his service, provided that before any order to this effect is issued, the procedure referred to in Note 1 to Rule 33 of the Bombay Civil Services Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules shall be followed :- "189A The Governor reserves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period and the light of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government if in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including services rendered upon re-employment after retirement : Provided that : (a) Such departmental proceeding, if instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall after the final retirement of the Government servant be deemed to be a proceeding under this rule and shall be continued in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service : (b) Such departmental proceeding, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor; (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than 4 years before such institution; and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the Governor may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relations to the Government servant during his service; (c) no such judicial proceeding, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution; and (d) the Gujarat Public Service Commission shall be consulted before final orders are passed. Explanation :- For the purpose of this rule - (a) a departmental proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date on such date, and (b) a judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted - (i) in the case of a criminal proceeding on the date on which the complaint or report of the police officer on which the Magistrate takes cognizance is made, and (ii) in the case of a Civil proceeding on the date of presentation of the plaint in the Court." 2. Rule 189A, as earlier stated, was enacted on October 29, 1971. We may at the outset state that it is not necessary to go into the wider question raised by Mr. Daru on the score of vires of this rule 189 and 189A or an the ground that rule 189A is substitutive and not additional rule and so, because of implied repeal of rule 189 and contrary intention having been expressed in the self-contained provisos, this particular proviso (b) (ii) would clearly bar such a proceeding, especially on the ground that curtailment of limitation period of any proceeding would always be a change in the procedural law as laid down in Saiyed Yusuf's case, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1318 at page 1320. Mr. Daru is entitled to succeed on the short ground that this power has to be exercised within a reasonable time-limit, and such reasonable time-limit has to be implied even in the context of rule 189. As this ground was not specifically taken in the original petition and was only broadly hinted at, we permitted Mr. Daru to take this point specifically in para 18A of the petition. Mr. Daru while taking this point specifically stated in para 8A that the proceeding under rule 189 had been initiated after eight long years which was an unreasonably long time, and there was no justification whatever for taking proceeding after such a lapse of time. Even though the state was allowed time to file additional affidavit-in-reply to this amended petition, there is nothing made out in the further affidavit-in-reply to show any reasons or special facts to explain this long unreasonable delay. Even though the state was allowed time to file additional affidavit-in-reply to this amended petition, there is nothing made out in the further affidavit-in-reply to show any reasons or special facts to explain this long unreasonable delay. The state has only relied upon the fact that no limitation period has been prescribed for taking action under rule 189 because it was usual that in case of misconduct committed by a Government servant, the matter comes to the notice of the Government many times at a later stage. Even due (sic owing ?) to administrative reasons, unavoidable delay might take place in the institution of proceeding and in some cases, even the delinquent may be responsible for delay. Therefore, due (sic owing ?) to all these factors, enquiry may have to be instituted after misconduct came to the notice of the Government and, therefore, due (sic owing ?) to these inherent defects no limitation had been prescribed under rule 189 and, therefore, no such reasonable time-limit can be said to be implied in rule 189, as it would substantially add words in rule 189, which the rule-making authority had not intended. As regards the present petitioner the only thing stated was that the misconduct was only of the year 1962 and the inquiry was instituted in the year 1968 and this could not be said to be unreasonably long time. Even on this aspect the facts are clearly mis-stated because even in the show cause notice issued tinder rule 189 or the present charge-sheet at Annexure A on November 30, 1968, it is categorically stated that the petitioner was held responsible for the irregularities which he had committed as Executive Engineer in the Roads and Buildings Division at Palanpur in 1959-60. Therefore, the misconduct was not of the year 1962 as is assumed in this further affidavit but was clearly of the year 1959-60 and the proceedings are sought to be instituted for the first time in the year 1968. It is in the context of these relevant facts that we have to consider the present contention of Mr. Daru. 3. Therefore, the misconduct was not of the year 1962 as is assumed in this further affidavit but was clearly of the year 1959-60 and the proceedings are sought to be instituted for the first time in the year 1968. It is in the context of these relevant facts that we have to consider the present contention of Mr. Daru. 3. Rule 189 merely provides that good conduct was an implied condition of every grant of pension and Government may withhold or withdraw any part thereof if the pensioner was convicted of a serious crime and was found to have been guilty of misconduct either during or after the completion of his service, provided the procedure provided in Note 1 to rule 33 of the Bombay Civil Service, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules was followed. This rule was enacted in old times when such pension was looked upon as a mere bounty of the Government. Now the legal position is well settled after the decision in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1409 and State of Punjab v. K.R. Erry, A.I.R 1973 S.C. 834 that a pension could never be contended to be a mere bounty as it is now in terms held that the right of a Government servant to receive pension was property under Article 31 (1) and by mere executive order the State had no power to withhold the same. It was further held that the claim to pension was property under Article 19(1) (f) and is not saved by Article 19(5). That is why it has been in terms held that any curtailment of such a pension right of property which has been acquired by length of service, on the ground that faults which were either overlooked or condoned became grave enough to justify inflicting severe cut in the pension, would be forfeiture of the earned right to property. Therefore, even an administrative order under the relevant rules can be pissed for depriving a pensioner of a part of his property right by applying a cut to the pension only after following the procedure in accordance with the principles of fairness and elementary justice that he should be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Therefore, even an administrative order under the relevant rules can be pissed for depriving a pensioner of a part of his property right by applying a cut to the pension only after following the procedure in accordance with the principles of fairness and elementary justice that he should be given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed action. Such an administrative order which involved so serious civil consequences had to be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the pensioner of the case of the State, evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to him of being heard and explaining the said evidence. The very width of this power was such that the duty to act judicially implied in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice were ignored and an order to the prejudice of the pensioner was made the order would be a nullity. Their Lordships, therefore, in terms applied the basic concept of the rule of law which is the bedrock our constitution whose importance transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case, in this context of forfeiture of the pensioner's rights by seeking to inflict cut in the earned pension. 4. There is a further consideration which has to be borne in mind when the pension right has been held to be a property right which is a fundamental right under our constitution, as it can be sought to be forfeited only in pursuance of a valid law which satisfied the rationality test of Articles 14, 16 and 19 of the Constitution. In the case of such a pensioner who is a retired Government servant, the bound of master and servant relationship has already come to and end and the petitioner has started drawing his pension which had already been sanctioned by the authorities. At the ti ne of sanctioning the pension, either the fault having been overlooked or condoned, the authority never thought it fit to impose any cut in the pension. Full pension had been once sanctioned and now the State Government seeks to impose this cut on the ground of the alleged misconduct which took place in 1959-60 after a period of 8 years, and even after a period of 6 years after the retirement of this pensioner on December 2, 1962. Full pension had been once sanctioned and now the State Government seeks to impose this cut on the ground of the alleged misconduct which took place in 1959-60 after a period of 8 years, and even after a period of 6 years after the retirement of this pensioner on December 2, 1962. It is true that the relevant rule 189 does not provide any limitation for instituting such departmental proceeding for the forfeiture of the earned pension. The rule as enacted, however, has proceeded on the assumption that the pension was a mere bounty of the State. That is why in the light of the settled legal position the rule has been substantially sought to be altered by the new rule enacted on October 29, 1971, as rule 189A. 5. We will at this stage consider the said new rule 189A to consider what guidelines have been now enacted for safeguarding the pensioner's right after the settled legal position which now recognises the pension as a fundamental right of property. Under rule 189A the Governor has reserved the right of withholding or withdrawing pension or part thereof permanently or even for a specified period and the right of ordering recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government, if in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner was found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, which includes service rendered upon reemployment. There are provisos to this rule. Proviso (a) deals with a case where such departmental proceeding is instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, and such pending departmental proceeding, which has been instituted while in service before his retirement or during reemployment, is deemed to be a proceeding under rule 189A and has to be continued and concluded by the authority by which it had been commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service. Proviso (b) deals with those cases where the departmental proceedings have not been instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his reemployment. Proviso (b) deals with those cases where the departmental proceedings have not been instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his reemployment. In such cases this relevant proviso (b) lays down that the departmental proceeding shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the Governor, and that it shall not be in respect of an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution, and a further condition is that such proceeding shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the Governor may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service. The proviso (c) further provides that no judicial proceedings, if not instituted, while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement or during his reemployment, shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution. Proviso (d) gives further safeguard that the Public Service Commission shall be consulted before final order are passed. The Explanation defines a departmental proceeding as being deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the statement of charges was issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, from that date, and the judicial proceeding is deemed to be instituted in the case of a criminal proceeding, on the date on which the complaint or report of the police officer on which the Magistrate takes cognizance was made; and in a Civil proceeding', it is deemed to be instituted when the plaint was presented. A bare perusal of rule 189-A makes it abundantly clear that although the Governor has reserved this right of withdrawing or withholding a pension or part of it, or the right of passing the order to recover from pension the whole or part of pecuniary loss caused to the Government, in case a pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement, in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the right is hedged down by the various safeguards. We are not concerned with a judicial proceeding where the safeguard is in proviso (c), or with the further safeguard in clause (d) regarding consultation of the Public Service Commission before the final orders are passed. The departmental proceedings which were already instituted while the Government servant was in service, before his retirement or during his re-employment, are under proviso (a) deemed to be proceedings under rule 189-A and should be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant has continued in Government service. Under proviso (b) if such departmental proceedings were not instituted while Government servant was in service before retirement or during re-employment, three material safeguards are that such institution will require sanction of the Governor and the departmental proceeding shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than 4 years before such institution, and it has to be conducted by such authority and at such place as the Governor directs and the procedure is one applicable to departmental proceedings where an order of dismissal from service can be made in relation to the Government servant during his service. We are at this stage not considering the wider question but one thing is certain that in view of the recognition of the legal position that a pensioner has a fundamental right of property, the rule-making authority has enacted this relevant statutory guidance in rule 189-A even for a departmental or judicial proceeding which has not been instituted, while the Government servant was in service either before retirement or during his re-employment, that no such departmental or judicial proceeding, shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution, and even in the case of already instituted departmental proceedings, in the case of Government f servants, who are fortunately continuing in the service before retirement or after re-employment, that they shall be deemed to be under the new rule 189-A so as to attract this relevant safeguard of the four years time limit in proviso (b) (ii). 6. 6. Even proceeding on the assumption that the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was not governed by rule 189-A being a pending proceeding but only by rule 189, we will have to consider a reasonable time-limit for the exercise of this wide power of forfeiture of an earned right of pension. Some reasonable time-limit for the exercise of this wide power so as to deprive a pensioner of his earned property right which has already been sanctioned would always have to be implied. Such power has to be exercised reasonably, and unreasonable exercise of power in such context would be clearly ultra vires, in the sense, that it had no just and reasonable relation to the object which is sought to be achieved. The public servants have a guarantee not only of Art. 19 but of the equality guarantee under Art. 14 and specific guarantee under Article 16 and so in order to make the law valid, the rule 189 about withdrawal of such earned pension right of property of a Government servant would have to satisfy the rationality test under Articles 14 and 16 and 19 of the Constitution, in this salutary context of forfeiture of such a pension right. Guidelines may not have been written in the statute but they have to be spelt out as such power is always coupled with the duty to exercise the same in a reasonable manner or in a reasonable time. In Delhi Municipality v. R.C.SW. Mills, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1232 at page 1247, their Lordships in terms followed the universally accepted principle which was laid down as far back as 1898 in Kruse v. Johnson, (1898) 2 Q.B. 91, that if the act of such a body in the exercise of the power conferred on it by the law is unreasonable, the Courts could hold that such exercise was void for unreasonableness. At page 1254 in the concurrent judgment it was in terms pointed out that this rale in Krusse v. Johnson was universally accepted and applied in India and elsewhere. The un-reasonableness which makes the exercise of such statutory power ultra vires was considered at page 99 of the said decision in Kruse v. Johnson in the following words : - "But unreasonable in what sense ? The un-reasonableness which makes the exercise of such statutory power ultra vires was considered at page 99 of the said decision in Kruse v. Johnson in the following words : - "But unreasonable in what sense ? If, for instance, rules were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith ; if they in volved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court might well say, Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules ; they are unreasonable and ultra vires". Their Lordships emphasised that it was in this sense and in this sense alone that the question of unreasonableness could properly be regarded. 7. This principle has been time and again invoked and has been firmly entrenched in our country as well. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1297 in the context of a revisional jurisdiction under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, at page 1301, their Lordships in terms held that even though no period of limitation was prescribed for exercising such revisional jurisdiction under section 211, it was plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which was being revised. The context in the case was of orders of permission under section 65 and section 65 had in terms provided that if the Collector did inform the applicant of his decision on the application within the period of three months, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. Their Lordships observed that section 65 showed that a period of three months was considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the Legislature thought that the matter was so urgent that the permission should be deemed to have been granted. Therefore, reading sections 211 and 65 together it was held that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. Therefore, reading sections 211 and 65 together it was held that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. That was reasonable time b cause after the grant of permission for building purposes the occupant was likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. Therefore, when the revisional jurisdiction was sought to be exercised in that case after a period of more than a year after the Collector's order, is was held that the revisional jurisdiction was exercised too late. In Valji Mulji v. State, 11 G.L.R. 95, the learned Chief Justice Bhagwati C.J. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench in terms held that even though no express provision in the Land Acquisition Act required that the notification under section 6 must be issued within a reasonable time after the issue of section 4 notification, implication of a reasonable time-limit had to be made on a true construction of the provisions of the Act because of the nature of the power, its impact on the rights of the public, its effect and consequences and the context and scheme of the provisions relating to conferment of the power. The learned Chief justice had made pertinent observations that the doctrine, that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably, was a doctrine too firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence to brook any refutation, and it might also assist in raising the implication. It was pointed out that where the exercise of power after unreasonably long time would render exercise unreasonable, implication would readily be made that the Legislature could not have intended that the power could be exercised at any time, however, distant or remote. Considerable prejudice was likely to be caused to the owner of the land if there was unreasonable delay between the publication of sec. 4 notification and the making of declaration under sec. 6 because during the whole of the period he would have only a qualified ownership or enjoyment of his property. 24th September 1915, 8. Considering the various restrictions on the owner, and as the compensation had to be determined with reference to the date of publication of sec. 4 notification and the making of declaration under sec. 6 because during the whole of the period he would have only a qualified ownership or enjoyment of his property. 24th September 1915, 8. Considering the various restrictions on the owner, and as the compensation had to be determined with reference to the date of publication of sec. 4 notification, it was held that the implication must be made that the notification under section 6 must be issued within a reasonable time after section 4 notification. It was further pointed out that the Legislature instead of waiting for this question to be determined by the Courts proceeded to set right this state of affairs by enacting that no declaration under section 6 shall be made after the expiration of the two years from January 20, 1967, in respect of the land notified under S. 4 prior to that date, by the amending Act. It was held that it could not assist in determining what was the true construction to be placed on sections 4, 5A and 6 because once the reasonable time-limit was implied, the power would come to an end and it would not be revived, because the amendment in the law had been made betraying the erroneous opinion of it. The settled rule was applied that the Act of Parliament did not alter the law by merely betraying the erroneous opinion of it. That is why in the next decision in Dosabhai Kerawala v. State, 11 G.L.R. 361, ever, the interval of 3 years and two and half months between the two notifications was not regarded as reasonable, as the Government could not be permitted to strafed with the property rights of a citizen. Even in Trilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 898, at pages 903 - 904 while considering the question of a reasonable period during which the fundamental right under Article 32 can be exercised, the principle which was invoked was the fundamental principle of administration of justice that apart from the express provision to the contrary, stale claims should not be given effect to. Just like the principle of res judicata, this principle was also equally well settled, even in the absence of a limitation period, on considerations of public policy, because of the difficulty of doing entire justice when the original transactions had become obscure by time and the evidence might have been lost, and from the consciousness that the repose of titles and the security of property are mainly promoted by a full enforcement of the maxim, Vigilantibus, nondormientibus jura subveniunt. Finally, in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 150 at pages 154 to 157 their Lordships in terms pointed out how the dividing line between the administrative power and the quasi-judicial power had been very thin and is being gradually obliterated, because an unjust decision even in an administrative enquiry may have more far-reaching effect than the decision in quasi-judicial enquiry. In a welfare State like ours it was inevitable that the organ of the State under our Constitution was regulated and controlled by the rule of law. It was further pointed out by their Lordships that with the increase of the power of administrative bodies it had become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it did not become a new despotism, Courts were gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In such context new problems called for new solutions. It was neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But the entire concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State were not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. That is why the requirement of acting judicially in the sense of acting fairly and justly was held to be an implicit requirement in every such decision which had to be honestly and justly reached, as it was nothing in essence but the requirement not to act arbitrarily or capriciously. That is why the requirement of acting judicially in the sense of acting fairly and justly was held to be an implicit requirement in every such decision which had to be honestly and justly reached, as it was nothing in essence but the requirement not to act arbitrarily or capriciously. In State of Mysore v. P.R. Kulkarni, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2170 at page 2172, this doctrine of misuse or misapplication of power was explained on the basis that the exercise of every power, whatever its nature, lodged in Government authorities is controlled by the need to confine it to the ambit with in which it could justly and reasonably be expected to take place. A power used under the misapprehension that it was needed for effectuating a purpose, which was really outside the law or the proper scope of the power on its true perspective could be said to be an exercise for an extraneous or collateral purpose. 9. It is in the light of these settled principles that this doctrine of ultra vires, in the sense of unreasonable exercise of power, which has no fair and reasonable relation or nexus to the object sought to be achieved, has to be invoked in the present context, by the requirement of implication of a reasonable time limit for the just and reasonable exercise of this wide statutory power so that a fair and just decision is reached in this important service matter. The nature of the order which has to be passed is forfeiture by imposing pension cut after the pension has once been sanctioned, overlooking the past fault, after a long period after the service bond has been snapped and at such a long distance of time from the alleged misconduct that the claim has become really a stale claim. The nature of the order which has to be passed is forfeiture by imposing pension cut after the pension has once been sanctioned, overlooking the past fault, after a long period after the service bond has been snapped and at such a long distance of time from the alleged misconduct that the claim has become really a stale claim. The power is no doubt conferred by rule 189 but the power is not an arbitrary power but the power coupled with the duty to act reasonably in the present context so that the 3word of Damocles is not kept hanging in respect of such pensioner, so as to enforce at any time stale claims or so as to exercise the same with an evil eye and an unequal hand, as that would be an oppressive interference with the earned right of a pensioner which would frustrate the whole object of such a pension rule, unless such a safeguard for the concerned pensioners is read into the rule. In the case of such a stale claim, it is implicit in the very rule, when such power has to be promptly and diligently exercised in a reasonable time in the context of such a fundamental right of property of the pensioner, that he must be allowed to rest in peace after a reasonable 'time so that the hatchet must be once and for all buried. If the underlying principle not to enforce stale claims on the ground of public policy is kept in mind, it would be all the more applicable in such a context, when at such distance of time the relevant evidence of the original misconduct or otherwise might be lost and the pensioner would have no opportunity worth the name of offering any defence. There would, therefore, be a real difficulty of doing entire justice to such a pensioner, after such long delay for no fault of the pensioner. The State must see that the pensioner rests in peace after a reasonable time since the pension has been fixed and sanctioned overlooking any fault. If the State has remained so grossly negligent, it becomes duty bound on the settled principles not to enforce such stale claims after such an unreasonable length of period by this summary mode of forfeiture of the earned pension. If the State has remained so grossly negligent, it becomes duty bound on the settled principles not to enforce such stale claims after such an unreasonable length of period by this summary mode of forfeiture of the earned pension. Such a reasonable implication would not in any way come in the way of the State and the public interest in appropriate cases would be duly served as the relevant civil or criminal liability could still be enforced as per the general law, and this reasonable implication of a time-limit is only in the context of the aforesaid summary forfeiture of the pension under rule 189 which does not specifically provide any such time-limit. 10. In such a context the further guidelines would emerge even from what has been considered as reasonable by the rule making authority itself by enacting rule 189A. Under the new rule, as already pointed out, proof of such misconduct as a result of judicial proceeding is also not contemplated by institution of such judicial proceeding in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution. Even in a departmental proceeding where the concerned delinquent was fortunate to continue in Government service even after his retirement, the proceedings which were instituted For imposing such a pension. cut are deemed to have been instituted under proviso (a) under rule 189A. and have to be continued and concluded by the authority in the same manner is if the Government servant had continued in service. Therefore, because of this fortuitous circumstance that such a pensioner had continued in service and the proceeding had already been instituted against him, he would have the benefit of this new rule 189A under which such departmental proceeding shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than 4 years before such institution. If those persons were not in Government service, for instituting fresh departmental proceedings in this behalf, besides other safeguards they would have the safeguard of proviso (b)(ii) that such proceeding shall not be instituted in respect of an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution. Therefore, a reasonable yardstick or guideline has now been adopted of the aforesaid four years period or interval between the event of misconduct and the institution of such a departmental proceeding for forfeiture of the pension. Therefore, a reasonable yardstick or guideline has now been adopted of the aforesaid four years period or interval between the event of misconduct and the institution of such a departmental proceeding for forfeiture of the pension. If this is the reasonable guideline under rule 189A, which even the rule-making authority considers as reasonable time-limit, it is obvious that the guideline or the perspective of such reasonable time-limit under rule 89 could not be anything which differs much from that because otherwise such a pensioner would stand discriminated by the fortuitous circumstances cither of non-continuance in service after retirement or the institution of this proceeding by such delivery of the charge-sheet. If the object of the whole rule is not to enforce such stale claims after the fault has once been overlooked in the context of such a pensioner so as to give a reasonable safeguard so that a pensioner rests in peace after some reasonable length of time, and especially because of the policy consideration that the evidence might disappear and so the whole proceeding would be an empty formality and would not do justice to such a pensioner, it is obvious that if the servants are not to be discriminated or arbitrarily and unjustly dealt with, we must read the analogous guideline even in the old rule 189 so as not to enforce any such stale claims, after such a long period of more than 4 years, whenever this pensioner has retired. 11. In the present case, the charge-sheet was first served in 1968 for the alleged misconduct of 1959-60 and in spite of ample opportunity given to the State nothing was pointed out by way of any plea of justification for instituting this proceeding after such an unreasonable length of time. Therefore, the aforesaid ultra vires doctrine must clearly apply in the present case and we must quash the impugned charge-sheet and the aforesaid enquiry sought to be instituted against the petitioner for imposing the pension cut. 12. In the result this petition is allowed by quashing the impugned charge-sheet at Annexure A, dated November 13 1968 and we direct the respondents not to continue any longer this stale proceeding thereunder and to drop the same for good for burying the hatchet once and for all. Rule is accordingly made absolute with costs. Appeal allowed.