( 1 ) IN these two writ petitions the question that arises for consideration is whether S. 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to appeals filed under S. 15 of the Karnaaka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957. The Deputy Transport commissioner, Mysore, dismissed two appeals filed by the petitioners in these two petitions on the ground that they were barred by time. One of the contentions raised in these two writ petitions is that the petitioners had made applications under S. 5 of the Limitation Act before the Deputy Transport commr to condone the delay in filing the appeal and that in not taking them into consideration, he had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him. ( 2 ) ON behalf of the respondents it is urged that S. 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the appeals in question. The Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and the Rules framed thereunder do not expressly prqvide that S. 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to the appeals filed under S. 15. Sri R. J. Babu, learned Counsel for the petitioners, contended that the principle underlying S. 5 of the limitation Act should have been applied by the Deputy Transport Commr by virtue of sub-sec (2) of S. 29 of the Limitation Act. I find it difficult to agree with the submission made on behalf of the petitioners. ( 3 ) THE Deputy Transport Commr is not a Court. The appeals in question arose under a taxing statute. S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act does not say that the provisions of the Limitation Act would be applicable to appeals filed under a taxing statute. In the above situation it is not possible to apply by analogy the principles underlying S. 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals filed under the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. ( 4 ) THE true principle governing the question is laid down by the Supreme court in Commr of Sales Tax, U. P. . v. Parson Tools and plants, Kanpur AIR. 1975 SC. ( 4 ) THE true principle governing the question is laid down by the Supreme court in Commr of Sales Tax, U. P. . v. Parson Tools and plants, Kanpur AIR. 1975 SC. 1039 @ p. 1045 paras 17 and 18, as follows : Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitatiqn for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of S. 14 (2) of the Limi. Act. ( 5 ) WE have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver; more so if the statute is a taxing statute. We will close the discussion by recalling what Lord Hailsham (at p. 11 in Pearlberg v. Varty (1972) 2 A11er. 6)) has said recently in regard to importation of the principles of natural justice into a statute which is a, clear and complete Code, by itself,"it is true of course that the Courts will lean heavily against any construction of a statute which would be manifestly unfair. But they have no power to amend or supplement the language of a statute merely because in one view at the matter a subject feels himself entitled to a larger degree of say in the making of a decision than a statute accords him. Still less is it the function of the Courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment". Still less is it the function of the Courts to form first a judgment on the fairness of an Act of Parliament and then to amend or supplement it with new provisions so as to make it conform to that judgment". ( 6 ) IN para 9 of the same decision the Supreme Court considered the applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act and observed that it was not applicable. The taxing authorities are merely instrumentalities of the State. They do not form part of the judiciary. Their functions and powers are governed by the statute under which they are created. They cannot be converted into Courts of Civil Judicature. In D. H. Raghavendra Rao v. Bellary Town Co-op Stores Ltd, 1973 (1) Myslj. 12. a Divn Bench of this Court has declined to apply the provisions of the limitation Act to proceedings before an arbitrator under the Karnataka co-operative Societies Act on the ground that he was not a Court. In view of. the foregoing, I hold that S. 5 of the Limitation Act is not appliable to appeals filed under Sec. 15 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles taxation Act. In the result these petitions fail and they are dismissed. No costs. --- *** --- .