Judgment S.K. Jha, J. Defendants 2, 7 and 8 are the petitioners being aggrieved by the order dated the 16th of November, 1973, passed by the Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Patna, in Title partition Suit No. 82 of 1971. 2. In the Suit for partition the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 claimed half of the property and during the pendency of the wit filed an application for interim relief by way of subsistence allowance under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That application was opposed by the petitioners. By the impugned order the learned Subordinate Judge has directed the petitioners to pay to Opposite Party No. 1 subsistence allowance by way of interim relief at the rate of Rs.120/- per month. The payment for each month is to be made by the 10th of the next following month. The petitioners challenged the order as being without jurisdiction. It is contended that in no circumstance can an interim relief by way of payment of maintenance be granted in a suit for partition under section 151 of the Code. 3. Since there were conflicting decisions of learned single judge of this Court, the matter has been referred to the Division Bench for an authoritative pronouncement. On one hand S.P. Sinha, J. has held in the case of Ramji Gir and others Vs. Elaichi Devi that no order for interim payment of maintenance can he granted under section 151 of the Code at all; on the contrary, Anwar Ahmad, J. in an unreported decision in case of Amarnath Singh and others Vs. Phulwa Devi and another has held that in appropriate cases such an order can be passed. Indeed, the decision of this Court in Ramji Gir's case was not brought to the notice of his Lordship. 4. The first and the foremost point to be decided in this application is as to whether in any circumstance an order directing payment of interim maintenance during the pendency of a partition suit can be passed by the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or not. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Subhaya Maniyagarar Vs. A learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of Subhaya Maniyagarar Vs. Kanda swami and another held that on the principles of natural justice the minor plaintiffs who were admittedly entitled to maintenance should not be allowed to starve while a partition suit was going on and the order allowing maintenance on a petition filed on their behalf was within the jurisdiction of the Court under section 151 of the Code. A learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Asa Nand and others Vs. Baldev Raj and another has also held that it cannot be said that since there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for grant of interim relief in a matter like the one with which we are seized, there is a prohibition to grant the same and it has been held in that case that in appropriate cases the power under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, should be exercised and relief be granted. On the contrary, Mr. Mazhar Hussain learned counsel for the petitioners also placed reliance upon a Single Judge decision of this Court in the case of Rambhujhawan Pathak and others Vs. Gaurikant Pathak and others. The case of Rambujhawan Pathak decided by U.N Sinha, C.J. is of no avail to learned counsel for the petitioners for the proposition that he has enunciated. In that case having regard to the special facts and features, his Lordships held that that was not a fit case in which an order for interim relief could be light heartedly passed in exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction. An application for appointment of a receiver had been filed. That was rejected by the trial Court. An application for injunction was filed which again did not find favour with the Court. But while rejecting the applications for the appointment of receiver and for issuance of an injunction, the Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction passed an order for maintenance during the pendency of the suit. In such circumstances it was held in the case of Rambujhawan Pathak that having refused to entertain the plaintiff's petition for appointment of a receiver and the application for injunction, the trial court should not have so light-heartedly directed the payment of maintenance in a suit for partition without giving any reasons at all. In such circumstances it was held in the case of Rambujhawan Pathak that having refused to entertain the plaintiff's petition for appointment of a receiver and the application for injunction, the trial court should not have so light-heartedly directed the payment of maintenance in a suit for partition without giving any reasons at all. This case, therefore, is no authority for the proposition that in no circumstance an the inherent powers of the Court be invoked for the purpose of granting interim relief by way of payment of maintenance in appropriate cases. The preponderance of authority seems to be in favour of the view that in appropriate cases interim releif can be granted directing the payment of maintenance allowance to a party while the partion suit takes its own course. The Judgment of S.P. Sinha, J. in the case of Ramji Gir proceeds upon the premises that since there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure regarding the grant of interim relief in a partition suit, the Court cannot grant interim maintenance under its inherent powers in a suit for partition. 5. Having given the matter a due consideration, I think ill principle the ratio of the case of Ramji Gir does not seem to lay down the correct proposition of law. This I say not only on account of a number of single Judge decisions of various High Courts, to which I have made a reference earlier, but this with all humility I say is the correct position in law in so far as the scope of section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal where their Lordships have rather elaborately dealt with the scope of section 151 of the Code. It is well settled, as has been pointed out in Manohar Lal's case that the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive for the simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of contemplating all the possible circumstances which may arise in future litigation and consequently for providing the procedure for them. Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do Justice between the parties before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying, any powers out-side the limits of the Code. It will thus be seen that the powers can be exercised by the Court ex debito Justitiae. In appropriate cases, therefore, where the ends of justice so deemed it will be too much of a technicality to suggest that merely because there is no express provision in the Code under which an interim relief can be granted, the Court will be power-less to do Justice between the parties in exercise of its power under section 151 of the Code. On the pure question of law, therefore, I must hold that in appropriate cases interim relief by directing payment of maintenance during the pendency of the partition suit can be granted. To that extent, therefore, the case reported in A.I.R. 1974 Patna 280 must be held to be not good law. 6. The only question that then remains to be seen is as to whether the instant case is one which can be said to be an appropriate case for the grant of such a maintenance. Admittedly Deo Prasad Singh is the husband of the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 Dipkala Devi. According to her, he was a man of religious bend of mind who renounced the world and became a Sanyasi. There was thus his civil death. The properties possessed by him were in possession of the petitioners whose father (an original defendant) since dead happened to be the own brother of Deo Prasad Singh aforesaid. The plaintiff claimed half share in the joint family property to which her husband was entitled. There was thus his civil death. The properties possessed by him were in possession of the petitioners whose father (an original defendant) since dead happened to be the own brother of Deo Prasad Singh aforesaid. The plaintiff claimed half share in the joint family property to which her husband was entitled. According to the petitioners, Deo Prasad Singh was entitled only to one third share in the property; It is admitted that he was a man of religious temperament and a public spirited man but it is disputed that he renounced the world and became a Sanyasi, thereby causing his own civil death. On the contrary it has been asserted by the petitioners that Deo Prasad Singh aforesaid was traceless for the last one year proceeding the institution of the suit. On such averments the defence was that the plaintiff was not entitled to any share in the joint family property in which her husband had a moity interest. The admitted position as has been held by the Court below is that there was no separation between the husband of the plaintiff and the petitioners. The family is apparently possessed of sufficient agricultural lands. On the one hand the contention of the plaintiff is that she was entitled to half share in the joint family property corresponding to the interest that her husband had while, on the other, according to the petitioners, if at all her husband had any interest in the property, it was only to the extent of one third. In spite of this it is asserted on behalf of the petitioners that merely because it has not been fully established on evidence aliunde that the plaintiff's husband renounced the world by causing his own civil death, no relief whatsoever can be granted to the plaintiff. In such circumstances I do not think the Court below was in any way unjustified in taking the view that the plaintiff ought to be granted interim maintenance in order to survive during all the time consumed by the partition suit. In my view, therefore, this is one of those appropriate cases in which in the ends of justice interim maintenance was rightly granted by the Court below to opposite party No. 1. 7. In my view, therefore, this is one of those appropriate cases in which in the ends of justice interim maintenance was rightly granted by the Court below to opposite party No. 1. 7. In course of submission at the bar initially it was vehemently contended that the fixation of quantum of Rs.120/- per month was not based on any evidence on the record but subsequently learned counsel for the parties agreed that so far as quantum is concerned, the matter may not be thrashed out any further. Mr. Mazhar Hussain for the petitioners and Mr. Satyanad Kumar for opposite party No. 1 agreed that substantial Justice between the parties would be done if interim maintenance is granted to opposite party No. 1 at the rate of Rs.75/- per month payable to her by the petitioners from the date on which the impugned order was passed. Since the order under revision was passed on the 16th of November, 1973, learned Counsel for the parties also agreed that in order to make the figure a round one maintenance from the month of December 1973 at the rate of Rs.75 per month should be paid to the Plaintiff Opposite Party No. 1 by the petitioners. It is accordingly directed that all arrears of maintenance payable, as indicated above, from the month of December, 1973 to May 1975 must be deposited by the petitioners in the Court below on or before 30th of September, 1975. The amount so deposited may be withdrawn by the plaintiff opposite party no. 1 All future interim maintenance at the rate of Rs.75/- per month payable for the month of June 1975 onwards must be deposited in the court below by the 15th of the succeeding month; for instance, interim maintenance of Rs.75/- for the month of June must be deposited on or before the 15th of July and for the month of July must be deposited on or before the 15th of August and so on with liberty to the plaintiff to withdraw the same. An undertaking has been given to this Court by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners that the deposits as directed above shall be made by the stipulated dates failing which the petitioners will be liable to be proceeded against for contempt of this Court. 8. With the aforesaid modification with regard to the quantum of interim maintenance this application is dismissed. 8. With the aforesaid modification with regard to the quantum of interim maintenance this application is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.