M. B. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants-plaintiffs had filed Special Civil Suit No. 41 of 1972 before the Civil Judge (S. D.) Bhuj-Kutch against Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 who are owner of the vessel Sklerion disponent owner of the vessel agent and supplier-cum-shipper of the suit consignment and charterer of the said vessel respectively for recovering Rs. 39 465. 65 P. for the short delivery of the goods or loss as worked out as stated in paragraph 12 of the plaint. The plaintiffs have also claimed Rs. 1 74 491. 3 P. against Respondent No. 5 on the ground that on 15-11-1971 the suit cargo caught fire at Transit Shed No. II when the cargo was in custody of Kandla Port Trust i. e. Respondent No. 5. After recording the necessary evidence the learned Civil Judge (S. D.) Kutch at Bhuj by his judgment and decree dated 6th October 1975 dismissed the suit with costs against which the plaintiffs have preferred this appeal. ( 2 ) WITH regard to the claim of the appellant against Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 for Rs. 39 465. 65 P. on the ground that the plaintiffs have suffered the shortage or loss to the aforesaid extent because bags were found water damages and original contents hardened the said claim can be dismissed on the short ground that the Respondents Nos. 1 to 4 would not be liable to pay the said amount because as per the certificate of completion of discharge Exhibit 208 issued by Respondent No. 5 it is clear that the total cargo as per manifest was discharged. Port outturn Report Exhibit 211 and Remarks List Exhibit 212 also show that complete manifest cargo was discharged. Once it is established that complete manifest cargo was delivered to the receiver of the plaintiffs then the plaintiffs cannot contend that the quantity received was less. Further it is an admitted position that before removing the goods from the vessels hatch-way no notice in writing to tally the cargo was given to the Master of the ship as required by Clause 5 of Charter party Exhibit 202. In this view of the matter the learned Judge was right in rejecting the claim of the appellants on that count. ( 3 ) WITH regard to the second claim of Rs. 1 74 491. In this view of the matter the learned Judge was right in rejecting the claim of the appellants on that count. ( 3 ) WITH regard to the second claim of Rs. 1 74 491. 3 P. the said claim is made on the ground that the plaintiffs had suffered loss and damage due to negligence of the Defendant No. 5 as it did not take due and proper care of cargo which caught fire and because of that the plaintiffs suffered the afore-said loss. In our opinion the learned Judge was right in holding that the suit was barred by the plea of limitations prescribed under Section 1930 of the Major Port Trusts Act 1963 Section 120 reads as under: 120 No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against a Board or any member or employee thereof for anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of this Act until the expiration of one month after notice in writing has been given to the Board or him stating the cause of action or after six months after the accrual of the cause of action. From the aforesaid provision of Section 120 it is clear that the suit is required to be filed against the Board or any member or employee thereof for anything done or purporting to have been done in pursuance of the Act after expiration of one month after notice in writing has been given to the Board or to the employee thereof and within a period of six months after accrual of the cause of action. Under Section 42 (1) (b) of the Major Port Trusts Act storing of the goods is one of the services which are required to be undertaken by the Board. Section 43 provides for the responsibility of the Board for the loss destruction or deterioration of goods of which it has taken charge. Therefore it is statutory duty and function of the Board to store the goods and Section 43 provides for responsibility of the Board for loss or damage to the goods. Hence Section 120 of the Act is clearly applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore it is statutory duty and function of the Board to store the goods and Section 43 provides for responsibility of the Board for loss or damage to the goods. Hence Section 120 of the Act is clearly applicable to the facts of the case. Admittedly the suit filed beyond six months as it was filed on 15-11-1972 and the fire took place on 10-11-1971 as deposed by Velan Maruthodi Fire Officer F. C. I. at Exhibit 95 on temporary Shed No. 2 which was known to the plaintiffs at least on 15-11-1971 as deposed by their witness Indrapal Exhibit 65 who is Senior A. Manager F. C. I". ( 4 ) THE question when the period of limitation starts and whether the provisions of Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act can be applicable or not is well covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of The Trustees of Port of Bombay v. The Premier Automobiles Ltd. AIR 1974 Supreme Court 923. While interpreting the provisions of Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act 1879 the Supreme Court has held that the starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause of action and the date when the plaintiffs came to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port would be the starting point of the accrual of the cause of action. The Supreme Court in paragraph 58 of the judgment has formulated the conclusion after considering Section 87 from all its angles as under: (1) Section 87 of the Act insists on notice of one month. This period may legitimately be tacked on to the six months period mentioned in the Section (vide Section 15 (2) Limitation Act 1963 (2) The starting point of limitation is the accrual of the cause of action. Two components of the cause are important. The date when the plaintiff came to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port. Two components of the cause are important. The date when the plaintiff came to know or ought to know with reasonable diligence that the goods had been landed from the vessel into the port. Two clear though not conclusive indications of when the consignee ought to now are: (i) when the bulk of the goods are delivered there being short delivery leading to a suit (ii) 7 days after knowledge of the landing of the goods suggested in Section 61-A. Whichever is the later date ordinarily sets off the running of Limitation. (3) Letters or assurances that the missing packages are being searched for cannot enlarge limitation once the goods have landed and the owner has come to now of it. To rely on such an unstable date as the termination of the search by the bailee is apt to make the law uncertain the limitation liable to manipulation and abuses of other types to seep into the system. (4) Section 87 is attracted not merely when an act is committed but also when an omission occurs in the course of the performance of the official duty. The act-omission complex if it has a nexus to the official functions of the Board and its officers attracts limitation under Section 87. In this view of the settled legal position we hold that the learned Judge was right in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs as barred by limitation as prescribed under Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act. The learned advocate for the appellants vehemently contended that the language of Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act and Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act is different. He contended that Section 120 prescribes two periods of limitation : (1) one month after issuing notice as prescribed in Section 120 and (2) within six months of accrual of cause of action. According to his contention the plaintiffs were entitled to file a suit even after lapse of six months if the suit is filed within one month of the issuance of the notice. In our opinion this submission is devoid of any merit. Firstly we do not and any substantial difference in Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act and Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act. In our opinion this submission is devoid of any merit. Firstly we do not and any substantial difference in Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act and Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act. The only difference is that the Legislature in Section 87 has urged negative term by stating that no suit or other proceeding shall be commenced. . . . without giving to such person one months previous notice in writing of the intended suit or other proceeding and of the cause thereof nor after fix months from the accrual of the cause of such suit or other proceeding. . . . while Section 120 of the person Port Trusts Act prescribes that no suit or other proceeding shall be commenced until the expiration of one month after; notice in writing has been given to the Board stating the cause of action or after six months after the accrual of the cause of action That is Section 120 contemplates that no suit or proceeding shall be commenced against the Board or member or employee thereof before expiration of one months period before notice in writing and after six months after the accrual of cause of action. Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act states that without giving one months previous notice in writing nor after six months form the accrual of the cause of section suit or proceeding cannot be commenced. Therefore in our view as such there is no difference in the wording of Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act and Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act except that Section 87 uses the words without and nor while Section 120 uses the words until and or. As interpreted in the aforesaid case of The Trustees of the Port of Bombay (Supra) Section 87 of the Bombay Port Trust Act insists on notice of one month and this period may legitimately be tacked on to the six months period mentioned in the Section vide Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act 1963 The same would be the petition with regard to Section 120 of the Major Port Trust Act that is the Legislature insists on notice of one month before filing of the suit and this period of one month may legitimately be tacked to the six moths period mentioned in the Section vide Section 15 (2) of the Limitation Act. ( 5 ) HOWEVER learned advocate for the appellants submitted that in Section 120 of the Act two alternative periods are -provided as the word or is used and or should not be interpreted as and. According to his submission a suit or other proceeding can be commenced against the Board or any member or employee them of after expiration of one months after notice in writing or in the alternative after six months after the accrual of the cause of action. In our opinion this would be total misreading of Section 120 of the Act. The Legislature has clearly provided that no suit or any proceeding against the Board or any member of employee thereof can be commenced after lapse of six months from the accrual of cause of action. Before filing such suit or proceeding notice in writing stating cause of action is required to be given. It farther states that no suit or proceeding can be commenced before expiry of one month after notice. When we examine the scheme of doe Section be becomes obvious that the Section has been enacted as a measure of public policy with the object of ensuring that before a suit or proceeding is instituted against the Board or any member or employee thereof it is afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the claim in respect of which the suit or proceeding is proposed to be commenced and if it be found to be a just claim to take immediate action and thereby avoid unnecessary litigation and save public time and money by settling the claim without driving the person who has issued the notice to institute the suit or proceeding involving considerable expenditure and delay. Therefore the Section requires that before expiry of one month after notice in writing is given a suit or proceeding cannot be initiated. Section 120 further provides for a period of limitation of six months for commencing a suit or proceeding against the Board or any member or employee thereof. Therefore it is apparent that the word or is used in conjunctive sense as a substitute for the word and meaning thereby that no suit or proceeding shall be commenced. . . . until the expiration of one month after notice in writing. . . . stating the cause of action and after six months after the accrual of cause of action. . . . until the expiration of one month after notice in writing. . . . stating the cause of action and after six months after the accrual of cause of action. If we accept the contention of the learned advocate for the appellants that suit or proceeding can be commenced against the Board after any number of years after accrual of the cause of action only by giving one months notice the result would be totally absurd. Therefore there is no substance in the contention urged by the learned advocate for the appellants. ( 6 ) IN view of the aforesaid finding we are not discussing whether there was negligence on the part of the Port Trust authorities in handling or storing the said goods. ( 7 ) IN the result the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. .