JUDGMENT - B.M. SAPRE, J.:---The petitioner Mumtaz Pyarasaheb Rana, who is the wife of the detenu Pyarasaheb Kesrisingh Rana, has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of detention made in respect of the detenu by respondent No. 2 (Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Rural Development Department, specially empowered in this behalf) on 19th December, 1974 under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as "the new Act"). The order states that the Detaining Authority is satisfied with respect to the detenu that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange, it is necessary to detain him. The detenu was detained on the day on which the order was passed. Under section 3(3) of the new Act, grounds of detention were furnished to the detenu on 21st December, 1974. They are three in number. They are as follows per square meter: "1. A search by the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, Bombay on 24-1-1970, of the business premises of the following firms :--- (i) M/s. Khybar Traders, 638, Chori House, 8th Road, Khar Bombay-52. (ii) M/s. Raj Direct Supplies. 64/D/66, C. B. Road, Old Khar Bombay-52. (iii) Mr. M. I. Raj, G, Bharat Villa, Chandra Bala Estate, 30th Road, Bandra, Bombay-50. Led to the seizure of certain documents which pertained to M/s. Fairdeal Traders, Bombay, of which you were the Proprietor. You admitted in a statement, recorded on 6-11-1970, before the Officers of the Enforcement Directorate that Export proceeds amounting to Rs. 24,800/- were outstanding from your consignee M/s. Raj Co., London. You furnished a list of five shipments totalling Rs. 16,416. 05 for which proceeds remained unrealised from M/s. Raj Co., London. M. I. Raj one of the partners of the said Raj Co., is your maternal uncle. His wife owns the firm M/s. Khybar Traders, Bombay, mentioned above. The address of M/s. Fairdeal Traders, of which you are the proprietor, is the same as that of M/s. Khybar Traders. Adjudication proceedings have been commenced against M/s. Fairdeal Traders and you for the non-realisation of export proceeds amounting to /Rs. 16,416.05 vide show cause notice No. 1(20)/ 70 (SCBI) dated 23rd June, 1972. 2. The address of M/s. Fairdeal Traders, of which you are the proprietor, is the same as that of M/s. Khybar Traders. Adjudication proceedings have been commenced against M/s. Fairdeal Traders and you for the non-realisation of export proceeds amounting to /Rs. 16,416.05 vide show cause notice No. 1(20)/ 70 (SCBI) dated 23rd June, 1972. 2. In the year 1970, you started another firm in the name of M/s. Osman Rana at 362, Bainab Villa, Senapati Bapat Marg, Matunga, Bombay---16 with two other partners, for exporting vegetables and fruits to London. The said firm continued to export vegetables and fruits till February, 1971. One of the consignees to whom exports were made was M/s. Zakaria Patel Co., London, from whom export proceeds amounting to Rs. 1,64,085.40 were not repatriated. You have claimed to have obtained a decree against M/s. Zakaria Patel Co., London, for this amount some time in 1971, but so far you have not furnished to the Enforcement Directorate proof of obtaining the decree, which, according to you, has remained unexecuted. Adjudication proceedings in respect of the outstanding amount of Rs. 1,64,085.40 has been commenced against your firm M/s. Osman Rana, yourself, and your two partners of the said firm by the Director of Enforcement, New Delhi, vide show cause notice No. T-4/50-B/74(S.C.B. VII), dated 4th June, 1974. 3. In March 1971, you started another firm under the name of M/s. Rana Co., 2/3 United House, Manmala Tank Road, Bombay---16 showing your wife, your minor daughter and a cousin (also female) as partners. You hold the power of attorney from these partners of the firm. The purpose of this firm, as in the case of your previous two concerns, namely Fairdeal Traders and M/s. Osman Rana, is to export fruits and vegetables. Your third firm M/s. Rana Co., exported vegetables and fruits worth Rs. 31,12, 336.30 during 1971-73 out of which proceedings amounting to Rs. 22,30,785.79 are still outstanding. Photostat copies obtained by the Enforcement Directorate from one of the consignees, M/s. Nekiwalla Co., London, disclosed that you have received in advance, against the said proceeds of the exports made to them, a sum of Rs. 25,28,372/- during the year 1971, which was remitted to you through unauthorised channels. In a statement made by your to officers of the Enforcement Directorate on 28-11-1972, you have stated that export proceeds are outstanding. 25,28,372/- during the year 1971, which was remitted to you through unauthorised channels. In a statement made by your to officers of the Enforcement Directorate on 28-11-1972, you have stated that export proceeds are outstanding. You have also admitted that you have an account with the National Westminster Bank Ltd., London. You have further admitted to have made payments totalling £ 39,971.00 to various parties in the United Kingdom. Adjudication proceedings have been commenced against your firm M/s. Rana Co., and you by the Director of Enforcement vide six show cause notices Nos. T-4/56-B/74 S.C.B.I to VI dated 4th June, 1974." It may be stated that prior to the present detention order, the detenu was detained by the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, under an order dated 8th October, 1974 passed under Clause (c) of sub-section (I) of section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as "the old Act") as amended by the Maintenance of Internal Security (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 (II of 1974). The detenu was in detention under the said order till 19th December, 1974. The old Act, so far as it was amended by Ordinance II of 1974, stood repealed from 19th December, 1974 on the new Act coming into force with effect from that date. The impugned order under the new Act was served on the detenu on 19th December, 1974. It may also be stated that the detenu was arrested on 29th November, 1972 for violating certain provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. It appears that he had been released on bail pending investigation. Mr. Chagla for the petitioner has challenged the validity of the order of detention dated 19th December, 1974 under several heads. They are as under :--- (1) No reasonable person could rationally come to the conclusion that in view of the alleged grounds the detenu was likely to indulge in activities prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange or that it was necessary to detain him (detenu). (2) The impugned order of detention has been passed with total non-application of mind. (3) The alleged grounds are remote, stale and far-fetched and there is no proximity to or relation with the impugned order. (4) There is no nexus between the alleged grounds and the subjective satisfaction alleged to have been arrived at by the Detaining Authority. (5) The alleged grounds are non-existence. (3) The alleged grounds are remote, stale and far-fetched and there is no proximity to or relation with the impugned order. (4) There is no nexus between the alleged grounds and the subjective satisfaction alleged to have been arrived at by the Detaining Authority. (5) The alleged grounds are non-existence. (6) As the detenu is on bail during the pendency of a criminal case, no detention order can be passed on the basis of the same subject-matter. (7) No detention order can be passed on grounds which are the subject-matter of pending proceedings, whether departmental or criminal. (8) The detention order is passed mala fide. (9) There is a continuous detention from 8th October, 1974 and, therefore, on the repeal of Ordinance II of 1974, the detenu is entitled to be released. (10) The detention order was based on material not disclosed to the detenu. It may be stated that the petitioner had also challenged the constitutional validity and vires of the new Act. She had similarly challenged the detention order as infringing or violating the fundamental rights of the detenu. Mr. Chagla, however, on behalf of the petitioner made a statement before us that in view of the Presidential Order dated 23rd December, 1974 made under Article 359(1) of the Constitution suspending the right to move the Court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Clauses (4), (5), (6) and (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution, he is giving up the above two grounds taken in the petition. In view of this statement made by Mr. Chagla, the learned Advocate General appearing for respondent No. 1 (State of Maharashtra) and respondent No. 2 (the Detaining Authority) also made a statement before us that he is giving up the preliminary objection which had been raised in paragraph 2 of the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 in reply, based on the Presidential Order dated 23rd December, 1974, regarding the maintainability of the petition Although Mr. Chagla has based his challenge to the order of detention under as many as 10 heads, his principal argument was on the first head. However, that argument also, to a large extent, covers heads Nos. 2, 4 and 5 and, therefore, we propose to deal with his argument on head No.1 for the purposes of the submissions at serial Nos. 2, 4 and 5 also. However, that argument also, to a large extent, covers heads Nos. 2, 4 and 5 and, therefore, we propose to deal with his argument on head No.1 for the purposes of the submissions at serial Nos. 2, 4 and 5 also. On the submissions at serial Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5, the argument of Mr. Chagla can be summarised as follows :--- The order passed under section 3(1) of the new Act states that the Detaining Authority is satisfied with respect to the detenu that with a view to preventing him from setting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange, it is necessary to detain him. The purpose of the detention thus is augmentation of foreign exchange. The crux of the matter, therefore, is whether, by detaining the detenu merely, foreign exchange would be augmented, whether the detenu does or does not do any business. In other words, the question to be answered is whether detention is necessary to prevent the detenu from carrying on with his prejudicial activities or is it not possible to prevent him from carrying on with those prejudicial activities in any other way. If the answer to this question is that it is possible to prevent the detenu from carrying on with his prejudicial activities in any other way, then detention cannot be the answer. The law on this point is clear. "The essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of the likelihood of the detenu setting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same." (See H. Saha v. State of West Bengal)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154. The likely future activities of the detenu can be judged only from his past conduct. Only those kind of activities as he had indulged in the past are relevant. Now, what precisely is the case of the Detaining Authority ? For example, take ground No. 1. The past activities suggested are that the detenu had exported certain goods. He had earned foreign exchange by sale of those goods outside India. The detenu had failed to bring a portion of the foreign exchange into India. Now, what precisely is the case of the Detaining Authority ? For example, take ground No. 1. The past activities suggested are that the detenu had exported certain goods. He had earned foreign exchange by sale of those goods outside India. The detenu had failed to bring a portion of the foreign exchange into India. Similar activities are suggested in the remaining two grounds also. It is not suggested that the detenu is exporting fruits and vegetables clandestinely, or his act of exporting these commodities is otherwise illegal. It is also not suggested that after exporting vegetables and fruits to a foreign land, the sale by him and the earning of foreign exchange are illegal. The only grievance is that after earning the foreign exchange, he is either bringing it into India through unauthorised channels, or he is not bringing a portion of the foreign exchange at all or instead of bringing the foreign exchange into India, he is making use of it in a foreign land. It is to stop him in future from indulging in these latter activities that the order of detention is sought to be made. But if he is prevented from exporting vegetables and fruits, his activities will be nipped in the bud and there will be no need to detain him. Can it be said that unless he is detained, he will continue to export vegetables and fruits; will sell them in a foreign land; will earn foreign exchange; will not remit it to India through authorised channels; will unauthorisedly use it in foreign land and will not bring a portion of the foreign exchange earned by him at all and thus the country will loose foreign exchange. Can he carry on his business of export of vegetables and fruits, if the Government or the authorities concerned do not permit him to do so ? Since it is not disputed that the export business done by the detenu in the past was not illegal, it must be under certain permit, licence or some authority or a simple permission, that he was doing the business. The Government in future could thus refuse to issue a permit or a licence or an authority or a permission to the detenu to do the business of exporting vegetables and fruits. If he cannot get a permit, licence, authority or permission, he cannot export. The Government in future could thus refuse to issue a permit or a licence or an authority or a permission to the detenu to do the business of exporting vegetables and fruits. If he cannot get a permit, licence, authority or permission, he cannot export. If he cannot export, he cannot sell the goods in foreign land. If he cannot so sell them, he cannot earn foreign exchange. If he cannot earn foreign exchange, he cannot unauthorisedly utilise it or get it remitted to him through unauthorised channels. He cannot thus act in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of the foreign exchange. The detention is not thus the only remedy open to the authorities. They can stop the activities of the detenu in future, the activities similar to those indulged in by him in the past, simply by refusing to issue a permit, licence, an authority or a simple permission to him for export of vegetables and fruits. The argument proceeds further thus. There are ample provisions and checks in the laws relating to export, foreign exchange and customs by resorting to which the activity of the detenu of export of vegetables and fruits can be totally stopped in future. Under section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, the Central Government has power to make provision for prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling export. Under the Exports (Control) Order, 1962 also, the Central Government possesses sufficient powers by making use of which the future business of the detenu can be totally stopped. Not only in respect of the goods for the export of which a permit or licence is required but even in respect of the goods for which no permit or licence is required, the Central Government has ample authority to prohibit export. Under Clause 3, the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports can debar an exporter or any other persons from exporting any goods and can direct that no permission should be granted to the exporter or any other person for any goods. One of the conditions in which this power can be exercised under sub-clause (g) is when a person commits a breach of any law (including any rule, order or regulation) relating to customs or import and export of goods or foreign exchange. One of the conditions in which this power can be exercised under sub-clause (g) is when a person commits a breach of any law (including any rule, order or regulation) relating to customs or import and export of goods or foreign exchange. Again, under Clause 8-A, the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports can suspend the grant of permission to export goods to an exporter or any other person, pending investigation into one or more of the allegations mentioned in Clause 8. It is the case of the Detaining Authority here that adjudication proceedings have been commenced against the detenu for non-realisation of export proceeds, that is, for committing a breach of the law relating to foreign exchange. The Central Government can, therefore, under Clause 8-A totally suspend permission to the detenu to export vegetables and fruits in future which business he had been doing in the past and thus nip his activities in the bud, totally preventing him from earning any foreign exchange at all. There will then be no question of his earning foreign exchange and not bringing it into India and thus indulging in activities prejudicial to the augmentation of the foreign exchange. There are effective checks and provisions in the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Rules, 1974 also, by resorting to which the future activities of the detenu can be nipped in the bud and he can be totally prevented from exporting vegetables and fruits to a foreign land and from earning foreign exchange. Under section 18 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, the Central Government can, by notification, prohibit the taking or sending out by land, sea or air of all goods or of any goods, etc. from India unless the exporter furnishes to the prescribed authority a declaration in the prescribed form. Under sub-section (9) of section 18, the Reserve Bank also, for the purpose of ensuring that the full export value of the goods is received in proper time and without delay, can direct that the exporter shall, prior to the export of the goods, comply with certain conditions. Under sub-section (9) of section 18, the Reserve Bank also, for the purpose of ensuring that the full export value of the goods is received in proper time and without delay, can direct that the exporter shall, prior to the export of the goods, comply with certain conditions. Under-sections (10) of section 18, the Central Government, where it is of the opinion that, in respect of any goods, it is likely that the full export value might not be brought into India in the prescribed manner or within the prescribed period, can prohibit the export of such goods. A notification C.S.B. 79 dated 1-1-1974 has been actually issued under section 18(1) by which the Central Government has prohibited the export of all goods outside India unless the exporter furnishes in the prescribed authority a declaration in the prescribed form. Under Rules 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Rules, 1974 also, there are checks provided where the person exporting goods has to pass through the export authority, the customs authority and if the foreign exchange is involved, then the foreign exchange authority, and all those must be satisfied before a person is able to export his goods. If, therefore, the Government decides, in view of the past history of the detenu, that he should be prevented from doing his business of export of vegetables and fruits, it can do so by taking resort to the provisions in the laws relating to export, customs and foreign exchange. Mr. Chagla, therefore, sums up his submission by stating that the Detaining Authority in the instant case, acting as a reasonable person and in a rational way, could not come to the conclusion that the detenu should be detained. Instead, the Detaining Authority would first ask itself a question, "why not prohibit the detenu from exporting vegetables and fruits in future and thus nip his activities in the bud ? I see that Government possesses sufficient powers by the exercise of which the future export business of the detenu can be totally stopped. It would, therefore, be more reasonable and national to resort to remedy first. Only if that remedy fails, I would resort to the remedy of detention." Mr. I see that Government possesses sufficient powers by the exercise of which the future export business of the detenu can be totally stopped. It would, therefore, be more reasonable and national to resort to remedy first. Only if that remedy fails, I would resort to the remedy of detention." Mr. Chagla does not dispute that if there are two remedies open to the Detaining Authority to prevent the future prejudicial activities of the detenu, it is for the Detaining Authority to decide which of these it will adopt. For example, if the Detaining Authority decides upon the remedy of detention in place of the other remedy based on its subjective satisfaction as the only answer to prevent the prejudicial activities of the detenu in future, the Court cannot objectively decide that the Detaining Authority should have preferred the other remedy to the remedy of detention. Mr. Chagla has conceded that the Court cannot embark upon such a kind of inquiry. His contention, howecer, is that the Court can emabark upon the limited inquiry to see whether any reasonable person acting rationally, on the material placed before him, would decide to choose the remedy of detention instead of the other remedy. Now, the three grounds must be read together in order to see what impact they had on the mind of the Detaining Authority. Could it be said from reading the three grounds together that the Detaining Authority had not acted reasonably and rationally when it came to the conclusion that the only way to stop the future activities of the detenu, the like of which he had indulged in the past, was to detain him and the resort to the checks and provisions in the laws relating to export, foreign exchange and customs, by which the business of export carried on by the detenu could be stopped, was not an effective remedy ? The three grounds show that the detenu had done business in three different names. This is one of the known modes adopted by the detenu. The detenu could adopt any other mode which cannot be foreseen today and because of which the checks by which he could be stopped from doing the business of export may prove to be ineffective. The three grounds show that the detenu had done business in three different names. This is one of the known modes adopted by the detenu. The detenu could adopt any other mode which cannot be foreseen today and because of which the checks by which he could be stopped from doing the business of export may prove to be ineffective. It may not be the case of the Detaining Authority that because the detenu is doing business in fictitious names, it would be difficult to keep track of his activities in future rendering the checks ineffective. But, in view of the fact that he had done business in different names in the past, the Detaining Authority could legitimately feel that the checks would not be effective and the prejudicial activities of the detenu in future could not be prevented, except by detaining him. That is a matter entirely of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority. What one person may not find sufficient for reaching his subjective satisfaction, another person may find sufficient. It is not necessary that every detail and every reason, which had gone into the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority, should find place either in the grounds or in the affidavit-in-reply. As pointed out in (Tulsi Dabidas v. State of West Bengal)2, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 638 it is sufficient if there is some minimum material in the grounds to justify the conclusion reached by the Detaining Authority. All that is necessary is that there is some evidence to be found in the grounds from which the Detaining Authority could legitimately feel that the checks by which the future business of export of the detenu could be stopped, would not be effective and the prejudicial activities of the detenu in future cannot be prevented except by detaining him. It cannot be said from reading the grounds that this minimum evidence is not there. It is not for the courts to inquire into the sufficiency of that evidence. The Detaining Authority might feel that theoretically it may be possible to stop the business of export in future, the like of which the detenu had resorted in the past. But it may still feel that those checks may not prove to be fool-proof. It is not for the courts to inquire into the sufficiency of that evidence. The Detaining Authority might feel that theoretically it may be possible to stop the business of export in future, the like of which the detenu had resorted in the past. But it may still feel that those checks may not prove to be fool-proof. It cannot be said from reading the three grounds together that any reasonable person acting rationally could not come to the conclusion that the desired result may not be brought about by applying such checks against the detenu as would prevent him from exporting his goods. In (Jagdish Prasad v. State of Bihar)3, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 911 there were restrictions on the detenu to carry on his business within the prescribed limits. There were checks by which he was expected not to cross those limits. He was a licensed wholesale dealer. He could carry on his business only at a place mentioned in his license and could not do transport and sale outside those limits. He could sell only to a wholesale or retail merchant holding a permit. He was required to issue to every customer a correct receipt giving the name, address and licence number of the customer and other details and was required to keep a duplicate of the same. In spite of these checks, in violation of all these safeguards, the detenu had attempted to run the gauntlet of the law. It was held that an intelligent forecast made by the District Magistrate that the detenu would break the control system and blackmarket in rice cannot be castigated as irrational. Although the observations were made in a different context, yet they are relevant for our purposes in the sense that the Detaining Authority, in the present case, could also feel that despite the checks by which the future activities of the detenu could be stopped by preventing him from exporting his goods, he could still break the barriers of the law and the checks would not prove effective in view of his past conduct, as disclosed in the three grounds. If, therefore, the Detaining Authority had arrived at a subjective satisfaction that it was necessary to detain the detenu in order to prevent him from carrying on in future his prejudicial activities, the like of which he had resorted in the past, it could not be said that it was a satisfaction which no reasonable person acting rationally could ever reach. The order of detention is, therefore, not invalid for the reasons mentioned under submissions 1, 2, 4 and 5. Mr. Chagla has urged some more points under submissions 2 and 3. Submissions No. 2 is that the impugned detention order has been passed with total non-application of mind. Mr. Chagla has pointed out that the Detaining Authority was not yet sure what is the exact amount that had remained to be repatriated. In ground No. 1, for example, the Detaining Authority had mentioned at one place that export proceeds amounting to Rs. 24,800/- were outstanding from Messrs. Raj Co., London but the adjudication proceedings had been commenced for non-realisation of export proceeds amounting to Rs. 16,416.05. Similarly, in ground No. 3, it was stated that the detenu had exported vegetables and fruits worth Rs. 31,12,336.30, out of which an amount of Rs. 22,30,785.79 p. is still outstanding, but it was also stated that a sum of Rs. 25,88,372/- had been received by the detenu in advance against the proceeds of the exports made by him. This, according to Mr. Chagla, shows a total non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority. There is no force in this submission. It has been stated in ground No. 1 that the detenu had furnished a list of five shipments totalling Rs. 16,416.05, as the amount of unrealised proceeds from Messrs. Raj Co., London, and it was on this basis that the adjudication proceedings had been commenced against Messrs. Fairdeal Traders and the detenu. The reference to Rs. 24,800/- is to the amount mentioned in the statement of the detenu recorded on 6th November, 1970. So also, the reference in ground No. 3 to amount of Rs. 25,88,372/-, was on the basis of the photostat copies obtained by the Enforcement Directorate from one of the consignees, Messers. Mekiwalla Co., London, to whom the goods were exported. 24,800/- is to the amount mentioned in the statement of the detenu recorded on 6th November, 1970. So also, the reference in ground No. 3 to amount of Rs. 25,88,372/-, was on the basis of the photostat copies obtained by the Enforcement Directorate from one of the consignees, Messers. Mekiwalla Co., London, to whom the goods were exported. Moreover, it could not be said that there was non-application of mind on the part of the Detaining Authority simply because it had failed to determine what exact amount had not been repatriated, so long as the Detaining Authority was in possession of material to show that some foreign exchange had not been repatriated. It cannot be said that the Detaining Authority was not in possession of any material to come to the conclusion that the detenu had not repatriated some foreign exchange which was the basis of the detention order. The impugned detention order could not thus be said to have been passed with total non-application of mind. On submission No. 5 that the alleged grounds are non-existent, Mr. Chagla has urged that the basis of the detention order is non-repatriation of foreign exchange by the detenu, but in ground No. 2 there is no allegation of non repatriation and, therefore, this ground is non-existent. This submission is not factually correct. The averment is very much there that one of the consignees to whom export was made was Messers. Zakaria Patel Co., London, from whom export proceeds amounting to Rs. 1,64,085.40. I were not repatriated. It is true that it has also been stated in the ground that the detenu claims to have obtained a decree against Messers. Zakaria Patel Co., London, for this amount some time in 1971 and so far he had not furnished to the Enforcement Directorate the proof of obtaining the decree which, according to the detenu, had remained un-executed. This is only the statement of what the case of the detenu was and it was suggested that the detenu had not furnished any evidence in support of his contention. But there is the allegation in no mistaken terms that the amount of Rs. 1,64,085.40 had no been repatriated. Mr. This is only the statement of what the case of the detenu was and it was suggested that the detenu had not furnished any evidence in support of his contention. But there is the allegation in no mistaken terms that the amount of Rs. 1,64,085.40 had no been repatriated. Mr. Chagla also referred us to paragraph 10 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2 in which it was stated that the detenu had been filing suits against his foreign consignees only when an inquiry was started against the detenu. According to Mr. Chagla, this statement is factually incorrect, because the suits were not filed after but before the adjudication proceedings were started. The dates of the adjudication proceedings have been given in the three grounds. They fall in the years 1972 and 1974. But in a letter dated 21st October, 1970 from the First Secretary in the Office of the High Commissioner, London, to the firm of Osman Rana, reference is made to the suits, which shows that the suits were already filed before October 1970. The statement in the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2 that the suits were filed after the inquiry was not started was thus factually correct. The dates which fall in the years 1972 and 1974 mentioned in the three grounds, however, are not the dates when the inquiry was started, but are the dates of the starting of the adjudication proceedings. In ground No. 1 itself it has been stated that a search by the Officers of the Enforcement Directorate, Bombay, was made on 24th January, 1970 of certain premises, which shows that the inquiry was started in January 1970. From the reference to the filing of the suits in the letter dated 21st October, 1970 it could not, therefore, be said that they were filed earlier in the starting of the inquiry. Moreover, the impugned detention order is not based of this material, namely, the filing of suits regarding which it is alleged that certain statements were factually incorrect. For all these reasons, the submission, therefore, that ground No. 2 is non-existent, must fail. We will then turn to the remaining submissions of Mr. Chagla. Submission No. 3 is that the alleged grounds are remote, stale and far-fetched and there is no proximity to or relation with the impugned order. Mr. For all these reasons, the submission, therefore, that ground No. 2 is non-existent, must fail. We will then turn to the remaining submissions of Mr. Chagla. Submission No. 3 is that the alleged grounds are remote, stale and far-fetched and there is no proximity to or relation with the impugned order. Mr. Chagla has pointed out that from the three grounds the detenu could be said to have done business only upto 1973. The first time when the authorities had thought of detaining the detenu was on 8th October, 1974 when the previous order of detention was made. That had no proximity in point of time with the prejudicial activities of the detenu. In the first place, merely because the grounds refer to the activities of the detenu upto the year 1975, it cannot be said that there is an admission on the part of the Detaining Authority that no business was carried on by the detenu after 1973. It is true that in Clause (1) of paragraph 34 of the petition, the petitioner has averred that the detenu had not done any export business for the last two years. But that has been denied in the affidavit-in-reply filed by the Detaining Authority in paragraph 43. Moreover, the test of proximity depends upon the nature of activities. The test which may be applied in cases of maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community and maintenance of public order cannot be applied to activities, like smuggling and those in relation to foreign exchange. Finally, the power to detain a person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange was given, for the first time, when Clause (c) was inserted in section 3(1) of the old Act by Ordinance No. II of 1974 in September, 1974. Before that there was no power in the authorities to detain a person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation of foreign exchange. The first order of detention in respect of the detenu was passed on 8th October, 1974. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was delay in passing the order of detention. That brings us to the 6th and 7th submissions and they can be taken up together. The first order of detention in respect of the detenu was passed on 8th October, 1974. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was delay in passing the order of detention. That brings us to the 6th and 7th submissions and they can be taken up together. The 6th submission is that because the detenu is on bail during the pendency of the criminal case, no detention order can be passed on the basis of the same subject-matter. The 7th submission is that no detention order can be passed on grounds which are the subject-matter of pending proceedings, whether departmental or criminal. The answer to these submissions is furnished in the case of H. Saha v. State of West Bengal. It was laid down in that case :--- "The power of preventive detention qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecute." The 8th submission of Mr. Chagla in that the impugned detention order is passed mala fide. The only argument advanced by Mr. Chagla on this submission is that the previous order of detention dated 8th October, 1974 was made on the basis of an allegation that the detenu had been blacklisted. That was a factually incorrect statement. The previous detention order was, therefore, liable to be struck down only on that ground. The petitioner had pointed out in the previous petition that there was no blacklisting order against the detenu. The Detaining Authority had, therefore, passed the present detention order by deleting the allegation of black-listing. We, however, fail to see how that could make the impugned order of detention as having been passed mala fide. The 9th submission is that as there was a continuous detention of the detenu from 8th October, 1974, on repeal of Ordinance No. II of 1974, the detenu was entitled to be released. We, however, fail to see how that could make the impugned order of detention as having been passed mala fide. The 9th submission is that as there was a continuous detention of the detenu from 8th October, 1974, on repeal of Ordinance No. II of 1974, the detenu was entitled to be released. The question before us, however, is not whether the detenu could still be held to be under detention in pursuance of the previous detention order dated 8th October, 1974, whether he was entitled to be released on the basis of that detention order on repeal of Ordinance No. II of 1974 and whether his detention under the old Order is wrongful. The question before us is whether the present detention of the detenu under the impugned order of detention is valid. There is, therefore, no substance in this submission of Mr. Chagla. The last submission of Mr. Chagla is that the detention order was based on certain material which was not disclosed to the detenu and, therefore, the impugned detention order is invalid. Three instances of material on which the detention order is alleged to have been based and which were not disclosed to the detenu have been referred to by Mr. Chagla. Chagla is that the detention order was based on certain material which was not disclosed to the detenu and, therefore, the impugned detention order is invalid. Three instances of material on which the detention order is alleged to have been based and which were not disclosed to the detenu have been referred to by Mr. Chagla. The first is in paragraph 9 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by respondent No. 2, where it is stated :--- "The record reveals that it is a modus operendi of the detenu to create records of dispute between the foreign consignees and his firm just to deceive the Exchange Control Authorities." The second piece of material is in paragraph 10 of the affidavit-in-reply to the following effect :--- "Filing of this suit also indicates that it is a modus operendi of the detenu to file suits against the foreign consignees only when an inquiry is started against the detenu just to deceive the Exchange Control Authorities." The third piece of material is in paragraph 13 of the affidavit-in-reply and it is : "I say that I had carefully considered the material placed before me and I was satisfied that all the three suits filed by the detenu in England were not intended to recover the monies claimed in the suit but were intended to create false evidence to show that the detenu was not able to repatriate the monies." There is a short answer to this submission that the grounds are not based on the material alleged to have not been disclosed to the detenu. It was only by way of reply to the claim of the detenu that he had been taking steps to recover the amount from his consignees by filing suits against them, that statements were made in the affidavit-in-reply to challenge and deny the claim of the detenu. The impugned order is, therefore, not bad in law on the ground that it is based on some material which had not been disclosed to the detenu. None of the submissions made by Mr. Chagla, with a view to challenge the validity of the impugned detention order, thus survives. To sum up, the impugned detention order says that the Detaining Authority was satisfied with respect to the detenu that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange, it was necessary to detain him. Chagla, with a view to challenge the validity of the impugned detention order, thus survives. To sum up, the impugned detention order says that the Detaining Authority was satisfied with respect to the detenu that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange, it was necessary to detain him. The object sought to be achieved by detaining him was augmentation of foreign exchange. From the past activities of the detenu, a reasonable inference could be drawn that he will continue to act in a manner judicial to the augmentation of foreign exchange. The material on which the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was based is to be found in the three grounds. Ground No. 1 says that the detenu exported certain goods. He earned foreign exchange by sale of those goods outside India. He did not repatriate a portion of foreign exchange. The second ground says that the detenu started another firm in another name for exporting vegetables and fruits to London. He exported vegetables and fruits. He earned foreign exchange by sale of those goods. He did not bring in the sale proceeds to India. Ground No. 3 says that he started another firm in the third name. That firm exported fruits and vegetables, during 1971-73 worth Rs. 31,12,336.30, out of which Rs. 22,30,786.79 had not been repatriated. A portion of the foreign exchange was brought by him to India through unauthorised channels. Another portion of the foreign exchange was utilised by him in making payments to parties in the United Kingdom. The grounds thus show the activities of the detenu as exporting vegetables and fruits in different names; earning foreign exchange by sale and not transmitting foreign exchange through authorised channels. This material disclosed in the three grounds is quite relevant and germane to the object for which the order can be made under the new Act and the Detaining Authority acting as a responsible person rationally could conclude on the material before him that it was necessary to detain the detenu in order to prevent him from acting in future as he had done in the past. The impugned order must, therefore, be held to be valid. Mr. Parekh for respondent No. 3 (Union of India), after we had heard Mr. The impugned order must, therefore, be held to be valid. Mr. Parekh for respondent No. 3 (Union of India), after we had heard Mr. Chagla and the learned Advocate General on merits of the petition, made submissions in the nature of preliminary objectings. For example, he contended that as the right to move the Court under Article 21 of the Constitution is suspended by the Presidential Order dated 23rd December, 1974, a writ of habeas corpus cannot be filed by the petitioner for the release of the detenu. Mr. Chagla contended that it was not open to respondent No. 3 to make any such submissions. According to him, the only reason why the Union of India was made a party to this petition was that the petitioner had challenged the constitutional validity and vires of the new Act and had also contended that the impugned detention order is bad as it infringes or violates the fundamental rights of the detenu. But these grounds had been specifically given up by the petitioner. Secondly, no affidavit-in-reply had been filed by respondent No. 3 and it would be unfair to the petitioner to be called upon to reply to the submissions which would be made on behalf of the Union of India. There appears to be some force in these contentions of Mr. Chagla. But assuming that Mr. Parekh is entitled to make his submissions on the ground that the Union of India is still a party to the petition and the non-filing of an affidavit-in-reply cannot debar the Union of India from making submissions which are purely legal, we do not think it necessary to decide in this petition the submissions made by Mr. Parekh which are in the nature of preliminary objections. The reason is that we had already heard both Mr. Chagla and the learned Advocate Central or the merits of the petition and, on considering those merits, we find that the impugned detention order is valid. In the result, we find that the impugned detention order is valid and we uphold it. The petition consequently fails and is dismissed. The rule is discharged. We make no order as to costs. Mr. Chagla makes an oral prayer for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The leave is refused, because in our opinion, no question of the interpretation of the Constitution or any substantial question of law is involved. -----