( 1 ) IN a suit for declaration of title and possession of an agricultural land, the defendant contended that he was a tenant of the land from 1954 to 1961 and, thereafter, became owner, pursuant to an agreement for sale and family arrangement. The trial Court among other issues, framed issue no. 3 which reads:"whether the defendant proves that, from the time of partition in 1954 till the time of settlement in 1961, he was in possession of the suit land as a tenant or deemed tenant?"during the pendency of the suit, the Karnataka Act 31 of 1974 came into force substantially amending the provisions of S. 133 of the Karnataka land Reforms Act, 1961 (hereinafter called as 'the Act'), and providing that an issue relating to the tenancy arising in any suit should be remitted to the Tribunal for decision. Taking advantage of the amendment, the defendant filed an application that the above issue should be referred for decision to the Tribunal constituted under the Act. The plaintiffs opposed the said move. But the Court accepted the plea of the defendant, the validity of which is challenged in this revision petition. ( 2 ) BEFORE I proceed further, it is necessary to recall the narrow controversy raised in the case. The plaintiffs do not admit that the defendant was or is their tenant. According to them, the defendant is their close relative and has no right to be in possession of the suit land. Even the defendant does not state that he is a tenant or deemed tenat on the date of the suit. He pleaded that he was a tenant or deemed tenant from 1954 to 1961 and thereafter he has been the owner thereof. On these limited contentions, the only question that boils down in this revision petition is whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to try the issue relating to the past tenancy pleaded by the defendant, or should Issue No. 3 be referred to the Tribunal for decision. ( 3 ) THE relevant provisions of the Act bearing on the question are these: The Act by S. 112 (B) (b) confers power on the Tribunal "to decide whether a person is a-tenant or not". ( 3 ) THE relevant provisions of the Act bearing on the question are these: The Act by S. 112 (B) (b) confers power on the Tribunal "to decide whether a person is a-tenant or not". S. 132 bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tribunal. Section 133 provides :" 133. . . . . . . . (2) (a) If any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tribunal or any suit is instituted in any such Court for possession of or injunction in respect of an agricultural land on allegation that the defendant has trespassed or is trying to trespass on such land and the defendant denies the said allegation and claims that he is in possession on the strength of a tenancy existing from prior to 1st March 1974, then the civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues or the claim, as the case may be, to the Tribunal for decision. (b ). '. . . . . . . . . " ( 4 ) THE first part of 3. 133 (2) (a) of the Act provides that if any suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issue which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tribunal, such issue will have to be referred for decision to the Tribunal. The questions which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tribunal, are referred to in Section 112 (B) (b) of the Act. It confers on the Tribunal the power to decide "as to whether a person is tenant or not. " (Underlining italics is mine ). The scope of the enquiry by the Tribunal under S. 112 (B) (b) of the Act is, therefore, limited to the existing tenancy, in dispute and not the tenancy that existed at the remote past. The latter part of 5. 133 (2) (a) of the Act is also of the same effect. " (Underlining italics is mine ). The scope of the enquiry by the Tribunal under S. 112 (B) (b) of the Act is, therefore, limited to the existing tenancy, in dispute and not the tenancy that existed at the remote past. The latter part of 5. 133 (2) (a) of the Act is also of the same effect. It states, if any suit instituted in any Civil Court for possession of or injunction in respect of an agricultural land on the allegation that the defendant has trespassed or is trying to trespass on such land and the defendant denies the said allegation and claims that he is in possession on the strength of a tenancy existing from prior to 1st March 1874, then the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issut or the claim to the Tribunal for decision. (Underlining italics it mine ). It is apparent therefore that the claim of the defendant in the suit should have been that he is in possession on the strength of a tenancy existing from prior to 1st March 1974. This part also refers to, the present possession of the defendant as a tenant and not tht possession of the defendant at any remote time. ( 5 ) UNDISPUTEDLY, the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a person is tenant or not; but I cannot agree to the contention that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to determine whether a party ot the suit was a tenant or not. In Abdul Waheed Khan v. Bhawani AIR. 1866 SC. 1718, 1719. , the Supreme Court observed that a statute ousting the jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be strictly construed. In Secretary of State v. Mask and Co AIR. 1940 PC. 105. , the Privy council observed that tht exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly inferred. In other words, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain Civil Causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of the nature. In other words, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain Civil Causes will not be assumed unless the relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect or leads to a necessary and inevitable implication of the nature. Having regard to these well settled principles, and the provisions of S. 112 (B) (b) read with Section 133 (2) (a) of the Act, it must be stated that the question of tenancy pleaded by the defendant is not required to be transmitted to, the Tribunal for decision and the Civil Court is competent to determine that question. ( 6 ) A reference to the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural lands Act (Bombay Act 67 of 1948) and the decision rendered thereon, would further lend support to my view. S. 70 of the BT and AL Act is similar to S. 112 (B) (b) of the Act. S. 85 of the BT and AL Act is analogous to s. 132 of the Act. S. 85a of the BT and AL Act is substantially similar to 3. 133 (2) (a) of the Act. ( 7 ) WHILE dealing with the scope of the above provisions in Musami imam Haider Box Razvi v. Rabari Govindbhai Ratnabhai AIR. 1989 SC. 490. , ramaswami, J. , speaking for the Supreme Court, observed at page 445 as follows :"s. 70 (b) of the Act imposes a duty on the Mamlatdar 10 decide whether a persqn is a tenant, but the sub-section does not cast a duty upon him to decide whether a person was or was not a tenant in the past whether recent or remote. The main question in the present case was the claim of the defendants that they had become statutory owners of the disputed lands because they were tenants either on the 'tillers day' or on the date of the release of the management by the Court of Wards. In either case, the question for decision will be not whether the defendants were tenants on the date of the suit but the question would be whether they were or were not tenants in the past. The question whether the defendants were tenants on July 28, 1956 or on May 11, 1958 was not an independent question but it was put forward by the defendants as a reason fqr substantiating their plea of statutory ownership. The question whether the defendants were tenants on July 28, 1956 or on May 11, 1958 was not an independent question but it was put forward by the defendants as a reason fqr substantiating their plea of statutory ownership. In other words, the , plea of tenancy on the two past dates was a subsidiary plea and the main plea was of statutory ownership and the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot therefore be held to be barred in this case by virtue of the provisions of S. 70 of the Act read with the provisions of s. 85 of the Act. "the learned Judge continued ;" In our opinion, there is nothing in the language or context of s. 70 or S. 85 of the Act to suggest that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly or by necessary implication barred with regard to the question whether the defendants had become statutory owners of the land to decide in that connection whether the defendants had been in the past tenants in relation to the land on particular past dates': We are also of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred in considering the question whether the provisions of the Act are applicable to the disputed land during a particular period. " ( 8 ) THE above principles are equally applicable to the case on hand. ( 9 ) IN the result, this revision petition is allowed. The order of the court below is set aside. In the circumstances, I make no order for costs. --- *** --- .