Judgment 1. IN this Rule the petitioner has asked for a writ in the nature of Mandamus for allowing him forthwith the inspection of his answer scripts for the M. A. examination in history for the year 1969. The petitioner has also prayed for a writ in the nature of certiorari asking the opposite parties to place his said answer scripts before this Court so that they may be identified by him and considered by the Court and conscionable justice may be done in his case. It appears that while obtaining the Rule the petitioner also succeeded in obtaining an ad interim order of injunction restraining the opposite parties from destroying or otherwise disposing of his answer scripts of the said M. A. examination in history. 2. THE petitioner, who is a teacher of Shibpur Fallimangal Junior High school since 1966, has alleged that he duly obtained his Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Calcutta as a private candidate in 1965. Thereafter, he sat for his Master of Arts Degree Examination in History under the said University in 1969 which was held in 1970, as a private candidate. He has alleged that his Roll Number was Cal. H. 141 and he duly sat for the said examination and submitted his answer scripts in all the papers and the charge of the said scripts were also taken by the officers of the said University. The results of the said examination were published in or about September, 1970 and on or about October 3, 1970, the petitioner was supplied with his mark sheet under serial No. 7489 and the same disclosed that he was not successful in getting through the said examination. The petitioner has contended that the way and the manner in which he got himself prepared and answered the questions, he could not have failed so miserably in the said subject. He in fact has submitted that either there was great manipulation or gross negligence or mistake on the part of the authorities of the University or the persons responsible for examining the scripts and that has caused the happening of the unfortunate event. He in fact has submitted that either there was great manipulation or gross negligence or mistake on the part of the authorities of the University or the persons responsible for examining the scripts and that has caused the happening of the unfortunate event. The petitioner has further alleged that for the period of the examination under consideration, a peculiar procedure was followed by the authorities concerned inasmuch as scripts were sent to the examiners concerned under some secret code number without disclosing the actual Roll numbers of the examinees and he has a reasonable apprehension that the authorities concerned have not duly checked, verified and compared the said secret code numbers with the respective Roll numbers of the examinees after they were examined and for that he has become unsuccessful. The petitioner has further alleged that the said apprehension in his mind also finds support from the news item published in the daily issues at Ananda Bazar Patrika on January 28, 1971, which is said to be based on the statements of the Head of the Department of History of the University of Calcutta and which also speaks of "some mutual misunderstanding" in connection with the M. A. examination in History for 1969. 3. IN his petition, the petitioner has alleged that he has every right to sec and inspect the answer scripts or papers concerned and how the answers given by him have been considered and dealt with for the purpose of allotting marks and whether in his case there has been a misuse of the secret code. The petitioner has of course made it clear that he does not claim the re-examination of his answer scripts nor does he claim higher marks than what has been considered fit by the examiner concerned and he will base his prayers in the petition if the mistakes as mentioned hereinbefore or as apprehended by him have crept in or occurred. He has further contended that although due demand of justice was made but the same has not even been replied to by the authorities concerned and such refusal in the instant case has been in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. He has further contended that although due demand of justice was made but the same has not even been replied to by the authorities concerned and such refusal in the instant case has been in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. IN his affidavit-in-opposition, the acting Controller of Examinations, which has also been adopted by the Registrar of the University, apart from denying the material allegations, has stated that the petitioner has no legal right to ask for inspection of the answer scripts of his examination and the refusal to give him such opportunity was authorised and the same was neither illegal nor arbitrary or unconstitutional or against principles of natural justice. It has also been submitted that the petitioner has no legal right to have inspection of the answer scripts and furthermore there has been no violation of any such right which would entitle him to maintain the petition. It has further been contended by the opposite parties that the practice and procedure which is followed by the university in the matter of sending answer scripts to the examiners under secret code numbers are administrative in nature and such practice is not justiceable. Furthermore, such practice is followed and kept secret for other obvious reasons and also on the ground of security and no examinee has any right to have the disclosure of the said practice. It was submitted that such disclosure, if directed by the court, would create serious administrative difficulties and problem and that apart such practice is duly authorised in terms of statute 163 of the Calcutta university First Statutes, 1966 which has also the force of law. It has of course been contended that the relevant scripts of the petitioner have been duly examined and his apprehensions are baseless. In short, it has further been stated that there is no basis for the allegations in the mind of the petitioner, particulars whereof have been mentioned in the petition. In fact it has been stated further by the opposite parties that the answer scripts of the petitioner were duly examined and he has not been successful in the examination. It has also been made clear that the marks obtained by the petitioner have been duly recorded and reproduced in his mark sheet. The opposite parties also contended that the report of the Ananda Bazar Patrika has no bearing or relationship with the petitioner's examination. It has also been made clear that the marks obtained by the petitioner have been duly recorded and reproduced in his mark sheet. The opposite parties also contended that the report of the Ananda Bazar Patrika has no bearing or relationship with the petitioner's examination. In his reply the petitioner, apart from reiterating the basic statements in the petition, contended further that there was no need for using and adopting the special code in the instant case and in any event the authorities concerned have not satisfactorily explained why such a special procedure was adopted or required. He has repeated further that because of the negligent conduct and laches of the University authorities in properly and duly comparing the allotted special code number with the respective roll numbers of the students, his case has also been prejudiced. Thus in order to succeed in the rule and more so in view of his prayers read with the pleadings, the petitioners must establish his legal right to have inspection of the answer scripts and if he succeeds on that point then the consideration of the other paints as raised would be necessary. 5. MR. Dutt for the purpose of establishing his case, submitted that the news item published in Ananda Bazar patrika should be considered as a "notification" by or at the instance of the University of Calcutta and since the said publication throws some doubt about the bonafide and valid examination of the answer scripts and allotment of marks, that would give the petitioner a right to have inspection of his scripts and thus to see if allotment of marks and the identify of the scripts have been duly made and established. This apart, Mr. Dutt submitted that when the petitioner has genuinely felt the difficulties and he has expressed them before this Court and furthermore when he has some apprehension in his mind, the principles of natural justice would require that he must have an opportunity to get the validity and bonafide of such apprehensions: satisfied by inspecting his answer scripts. Mr. Dutt submitted that when the petitioner has genuinely felt the difficulties and he has expressed them before this Court and furthermore when he has some apprehension in his mind, the principles of natural justice would require that he must have an opportunity to get the validity and bonafide of such apprehensions: satisfied by inspecting his answer scripts. Mr. Dutt, of course has not been able to point out from the Calcutta University Act, 1961, the Regulations framed thereunder and the Calcutta University first Statutes, 1966 framed in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (2)of section 58 of the Calcutta University act, 1966, any provision which gives the petitioner the right to have inspection of his answer scripts and also to have the disclosure of the basis and particulars of the secret code number under which the answer scripts were sent to the examiners Mr. Dutt has of course made scathing criticism of the conduct of the authorities of the university for their inability and inaction in not, producing the scripts before this Court. He submitted that the results were published in or about september 1970, justice was demanded on April 27, 1971 and the Rule and the ad interim order of injunction was obtained on July 6, 1971. Immediately thereafter, the said order was communicated to the opposite parties and the opposite party No. 2 entered appearance on June 5, 1972 and in that view of the matter there is no justification for non-production of the answer scripts and furthermore there cannot be any bonafide in the contentions of the opposite parties that the scripts have perhaps been destroyed or at best they cannot be traced out. Mr. Dutt submitted that such an attitude has been taken by the opposite parties intentionally as they want to secret those records and facts from this Court and thus to mislead the same. He has also contended that the opposite parties are not bring out or producing those scripts intentionally as they are aware of the fact that if the said scripts are produced, truth would be revealed and the manipulation and malafide act of the opposite parties would become apparent. 6. AS noted hereinbefore Mr. He has also contended that the opposite parties are not bring out or producing those scripts intentionally as they are aware of the fact that if the said scripts are produced, truth would be revealed and the manipulation and malafide act of the opposite parties would become apparent. 6. AS noted hereinbefore Mr. Dutt also strongly deprecated the practice and procedure adopted in the instant case by the opposite parties in dispatching the scripts under secret code numbers to the examiners and submitted that such a procedure was unauthorised and since the petitioner has some apprehension in his mind, he should be given the chance to inspect his scripts for the purpose of finding out whether they have been duly examined and whether the secret code number in his case corresponds with his answer scripts. Lastly, Mr. Dutt submitted that in any event, in the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly when an examinee has some doubt in his mind, the opposite parties are under the moral obligation to produce the scripts for his inspection. Mr. Roy appearing for the opposite parties submitted that since the petitioner has neither any legal right nor he has been able to show and establish such right, no writ of mandamus, in the prayers as made, would be available to him. He submitted that in that view of the matter, other ancillary questions as are sought to be raised by the petitioner should not be gone into or considered or answered and adjudicated. Apart from this, he of course submitted that under statute 163 of the calcutta University First Statutes, 1966, which has the force of law, the university Authorities have duly adopted a procedure for dispatching the answer scripts to the examiners under secret code numbers and such an action in the instant case was not only proper and authorised but the same was required for maintaining secrecy of the results and security of all concerned. He has further denied any malafide use of power or any manipulation in the matter as alleged and contended that the adoption of the secret code is also not justiciable. 7. He has further denied any malafide use of power or any manipulation in the matter as alleged and contended that the adoption of the secret code is also not justiciable. 7. A Writ of Mandamus has been described in Halsburry's Laws of england (Third Edition), Volume 11, as follows : "the order of mandamus is an order of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, Corporation, or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to supply defects of justice; and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing such right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual". In the case of Praga Tools Corporation v. C. V. Imanual and Ors. reported in a. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1306 it has been observed that mandamus means a command. It differs from a writ prohibition or certiorari in its demand for some activity on the part of the body or persons to whom it is addressed. Mandamus is a command issued to direct any person, Corporation, inferior Court or government, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and if in the nature of public duty. Such a writ of mandamus is not a writ of right or a writ of course but is a discretionary one. A writ of mandamus as has been found in Rex. v. Bishop of Sarum, reported in 1916 (1) KB 466 is not a writ of course or a writ of right but is, a right, a matter for the discretion of the Court. But where a right which the applicant seeks to enforce is the performance of duties of public nature which duties are merely ministerial and cannot be secured at all if a mandamus is refused, the issue of the writ is not discretionary. It has been observed in Halsburry's Laws of england (Third Edition) Vol. But where a right which the applicant seeks to enforce is the performance of duties of public nature which duties are merely ministerial and cannot be secured at all if a mandamus is refused, the issue of the writ is not discretionary. It has been observed in Halsburry's Laws of england (Third Edition) Vol. 11, that in the exercise of its discretion, the court will refuse an order of mandamus, if there is an alternative specific remedy at law, but the said remedy must be equally convenient, beneficial and effective. For the purpose of availing of a writ of mandamus the petitioner has to establish that there is a legal duty cast on an officer or authority in his or its public character and the object of mandamus is not to give a party what he is not entitled to under the law. If the petitioner is not entitled to get a type of relief under the statute he cannot get over the difficulty by asking for a writ of mandamus and thus obtain that very relief which he would not be entitled to under the statute. Merely on that ground that a person may feel aggrieved or may have the grievance that hardship is caused to him would not entitle him to the assistance of the High Court for the purpose of issuing such a writ in his favour. Mandamus is issued for the purpose of doing a particular thing or to obtain from doing the same. In either case, the duty must arise under any law for the time being in forces as has been found by the Supreme Court in the case of Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N. M. Shah, Deputy Custodian cum Managing Officer, Bombay, A. I. R 1966 S. C. 334. In other words, such duty to abstain from doing a thing must also appear or arise under a law for the time being in force. For the purpose of having a mandate or a command in the shape of or by a writ of mandamus, there must be in law some duty cast upon the officer and if he does not do or perform the duties so cast, then the Court can call upon him to do the same. Similarly, if he does such act improperly or unauthorisedly the Court can also call upon him to forbear from doing it in that particular manner. Similarly, if he does such act improperly or unauthorisedly the Court can also call upon him to forbear from doing it in that particular manner. A writ of mandamus requires a public officer to do some particular thing which appertains to his office and is in the nature of a legal duty. This has been enunciated by the Supreme court in the cases of Raja, Ram Chandra reddy v. Rani Shankaramma and Ors., a. I. R. 1956 S. C 319 and Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Office Special Circle kanpur, A. I. R. 1966 S. C. 81. For the purpose of issuing of a mandamus to compel a public officer to do or perform a particular duty it must be apparent or patent from the statute itself that such duty is prescribed under the same and there is no ambiguity and no writ of mandamus as has been observed in the case of Arat Paul v. Registrar, Original Side, Calcutta High Court, A. I. R. 1969 S. C. 1133, can be issued directing the authorities to do something which they are not entitled in law to do. Thus unless an obligation to perform some legal duty is apparent from the face of the records or obtained from the statute, the High Court would not interfere in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with an action as taken or inaction of the authorities concerned. Before issuing the mandate the High Court must be satisfied that the officer or the authorities concerned is under an obligation to do or to forbear from doing something. So the High Court would not be justified in issuing an order of mandamus to compel public officials or a public body to perform any public duty with which they have not been charged and unless they have failed to perform such public duties. 8. A writ of mandamus can be used only for the purpose of enforcing a duty and not for the purpose of enforcing a liability. In other words, such writ would lie only to enforce a substantive duty corresponding to a substantive right and as distinguished from a duty corresponding to a remedial right under the law. 8. A writ of mandamus can be used only for the purpose of enforcing a duty and not for the purpose of enforcing a liability. In other words, such writ would lie only to enforce a substantive duty corresponding to a substantive right and as distinguished from a duty corresponding to a remedial right under the law. The point as to when powers become coupled with duty came up for consideration for the English Courts and in the famous case of julius v. Bishop of Oxford, 1880 (5)A. C. 214, and Earl Cairns, L. C. laid down the following proposition: - "the question has been argued and has been spoken of by some of the learned Judges in the Courts below as if the words it shall be lawful might have a different meaning, and might be differently interpreted in different statutes, or in different parts of the same statute. I cannot think that this is correct. The words 'it shall be lawful' are not equivocal. They are plain and unambiguous. They are words merely making that legal and possible which there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a faculty or power, and they do not of themselves do more than confer a faculty or power. But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power in whom the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so. Whether the power is one coupled with a duty such as I have described is a question which, according to our system of law, speaking generally, it falls to the Court of Queen's Bench to decide, on an application for a, mandamus. And the words 'it shall be lawful' being according to their natural meaning permissible or enabling words only, it lies upon those, as it seems to me, who contend that an obligation exists to exercise this power, to show in the circumstances of the case something which, according to the principles I have mentioned, creates this obligation". "the words 'it shall be lawful' are distinctly words of permission only-they are enabling and empowering words. "the words 'it shall be lawful' are distinctly words of permission only-they are enabling and empowering words. They confer a legislative right and power on the individual named to do a particular thing, and the true question is not whether they mean something different; but whether, regard being had to the person so enabled-to the subject matter, to the general objects of the statute, and to the person or class of persons for whose benefit the power may be intended to have been conferred-they do, or do not, create a duty in the person on whom it is conferred, to exercise it. " Lord Selborne in the same case endorsed the views of Earl Cairns and Lord Penzance and observed : "the question whether a Judge, or a Public Officer, to whom a power is given by such words, is bound to use it upon any particular occasion, or in any particular manner, must be solved aliunde, and, in general, it is to be solved from the context, from the particular provisions, or from the general scope and objects of the enactment conferring the power". Lord Blackburn in the same case also expressed the view that the words "it shall be lawful" are not in themselves significant of any obligation, but that if the object for which the power is conferred is for the purpose of enforcing a right a duty may arise to exercise the power for the benefit of those who have the right. His Lordship observed as follows : "i do not think the words 'it shall be lawful' are in themselves ambiguous at all. They are apt words to express that a power is given; and as, prima facie, the donee of a power may either exercise it or leave it unused, it is not inaccurate to say that, prima facie, they are equivalent to saying that the donee may do it; but if the object for which the power is conferred is for the purpose of enforcing a right, there may be a duty cast on the donee of the power, to exercise it for the benefit of those who have that right, when required on their behalf. Where there is such a duty, it is not inaccurate to say that the words conferring the power are equivalent to saying that the donee must exercise it. Where there is such a duty, it is not inaccurate to say that the words conferring the power are equivalent to saying that the donee must exercise it. It by no means follows that because there is a duty cast on the donee of a power to exercise it, that mandamus lies to enforce it; that depends on the nature of the duty and the position of the donee". In The Queen v. The Tithe Commissioners, (1849) 14 Q. B. 459, Justice coleridge in delivering the judgment of the Court observed : "the words undoubtedly are only empowering, but it has been so often decided as to have become an axiom that in public statutes words only directory, promissory, or enabling may have a compulsory force, where the thing to be done is for the public benefit or in advancement of public justice". With reference to these words, lord Blackburn made the following observations in Julius v. Bishop of oxford (supra) : "the only part of this to which exception can be taken is the use of the word 'public': if by that it is to be understood either that enabling words are always compulsory where the public are concerned, or are never compulsory except where the public are concerned, I do not think either was meant. The enabling words are construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right. It is far more easy to show that there is a right where private interests are concerned than where the alleged right is in the public only, and in fact, in every case cited, and in every case that I know of (where the words conferring a power are enabling only, and yet it has been held that the power must be exercised), it has been on the application of those whose private rights required the exercise of the power. The personal liberty of the person arrested by the sheriff, the rights of the creditors of the bankrupt to their debts the rights of the plaintiff who had recovered judgment of his costs, the right of the constable out of pocket to be paid by the parish, the right of the creditor of the bank or of the local board to be paid, were all private rights. I do not, however, question that there may be a right in the public such as to make it the duty of those to whom a power is given to exercise that power. I should say, for instance, that if, by enabling words, a court is empowered to pass sentence on one convicted of a crime, it would be the duty of the Court to pass that sentence. But I cannot agree with the Court of Queen's bench, that whenever the statute is for the public good, and of general interest and concern, powers conferred by enabling words are, prima facie, to be considered powers which must be exercised,". With reference to Justice Coleridge's judgment above referred to and other cases, Earl Cairns, L. C., also observed as follows : "my Lords, the cases to which i have referred appear to decide nothing more than this, that where a power is deposited with a Public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons who are specifically pointed out, and with regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the conditions upon which they are entitled to call for its exercise, that power ought to be exercised, and the Court will require it to be exercised. " 9. IN England mandamus is a peremptory order issued out of the king's Bench Division requiring a public authority or official to perform a duty owed to the public; it will not lie where there is any discretion in the exercise of duty. It will not issue as of right. Blackstone described it as : "a Command in the King's name from the King's Bench and directed to any person, Corporation or inferior Court of jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to their duty or office. " 10. MANDAMUS is an order issued by the High Court to compel performance of a public duty. Like the other orders it is entirely a matter for the discretion of the Court. It lies to enforce public duty which has been imposed by statute upon a public authority, but it is necessary for the applicant to show that the duty is one which is owed to him personally and not merely to the public at large. Mandamus would not ordinarily lie if there is an alternative remedy. It lies to enforce public duty which has been imposed by statute upon a public authority, but it is necessary for the applicant to show that the duty is one which is owed to him personally and not merely to the public at large. Mandamus would not ordinarily lie if there is an alternative remedy. On account of these limitations, as has been observed in "an Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution" by Dicey (10th Edition), the operation of mandamus in comparison with the other orders is confined to a more limited class of cases affecting the administration of the public affairs. So in order to obtain a Writ or order in the nature of mandamus, the petitioner in the instant case must satisfy that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the opposite parties and such right must be subsisting on the date of the petition. Such duty as may be enforced by mandamus must be one imposed by the statute, in the instant case, by the Calcutta University Act, the Regulations framed thereunder and its First Statutes of 1966. Furthermore, since the writ of mandamus is only granted to compel the performance of duties of public nature and does not issue against the private individual unless he was acting in collusion with a public authority, the petitioner cannot succeed unless he succeeds in establishing the requirements as mentioned hereinbefore. A writ of mandamus cannot also lie if the duty required to be performed by the authorities concerned is discretionary. But where in the exercise of their discretion, the authorities have refused to do the thing which is empowered under the law to do, they cannot also be compelled by mandamus to do such thing except where the power becomes coupled with a duty to exercise it. As soon as the power becomes coupled with duty the same ceases to be a matter of discretion on the part of the authority. Even where a statute confers a discretion on the authority mandamus will not lie unless the exercise of such discretion is shown to be capricious, arbitrary or malafide. Thus where the matter is left to the absolute discretion of the executive, mandamus will not lie to question the decision of the executive except on such matters. Even where a statute confers a discretion on the authority mandamus will not lie unless the exercise of such discretion is shown to be capricious, arbitrary or malafide. Thus where the matter is left to the absolute discretion of the executive, mandamus will not lie to question the decision of the executive except on such matters. Where the matter is not left to the subjective opinion o the executive the same has to be decided by him after considering pros and come. Mandamus will not lie to question the duties, if it is within the jurisdiction of the authority and there are no vitiating circumstances. The relief by way of mandamus, which is discretionary and not of right, may be refused in the circumstances as mentioned hereinbefore and more particularly where the Government or the authority concerned is not under any statutory duty or obligation to do anything. Since the petitioner in the instant case has not been able to establish his legal right or a corresponding legal duty or obligation imposed on the authorities of the University of Calcutta to give him inspection of the answer scripts, a writ of mandamus for allowing him inspection of the answer scripts cannot be issued and this is also not possible even on a stretched application of the principles of natural justice as was contended by the petitioner. 11. THE submissions of Mr. Dutt about the moral duty of the authorities of the University of Calcutta to give the petitioner inspection of his answer scripts are also of no avail and assistance as mandamus cannot be issued to enforce moral duty. The said view finds support from the case of Manjula dei v. N. C. Prodhan, Director of Public Instructions, reported in A. I. R. 1952 orissa 344. The above view is also fortified by the fact that mandamus can only be issued to compel public officials or authorities to perform their public duties. 12. The said view finds support from the case of Manjula dei v. N. C. Prodhan, Director of Public Instructions, reported in A. I. R. 1952 orissa 344. The above view is also fortified by the fact that mandamus can only be issued to compel public officials or authorities to perform their public duties. 12. STATUTE 163 of the Calcutta University First Statutes, 1966 which lays down the provisions regarding savings as to previous practice and procedure of the University is in the following terms: "the practice and procedure of the University established under the Calcutta University Act, 1951 which were in force immediately before the appointed date, shall, in so far as they are not repugnant to the provisions of the Act, these statutes the Ordinance and the Regulations, continue to be in force in respect of the University, until altered, repealed or amended". Relying on the above provisions mr. Roy submitted that the previous practice of allotting secret code numbers has also been adopted in the instant case and such practice is also authorised. The affidavit-in-opposition of the university of Calcutta is silent on the point as to whether previously there was such a practice of sending answer scripts to the examiners under secret, code numbers. In that view of the matter and more particularly in the absence of relevant statements in the affidavits, this argument of Mr. Roy is difficult to be accepted. If the University authorities wanted to rely on the said statute 163 and in the manner as they are sought to be done before me, they should have pleaded whether previously there was such a practice of sending answer scripts to the examiners under such secret code numbers. But in the view which I have taken viz., that the petitioner has neither any legal right to have inspection of his answer scripts nor he has been able to establish such right, the determination on such question is not required. In any event, an examinee in my view has no right to challenge a practice and procedure, here in the instant case allotment of secret code number required for the purpose of maintaining secrecy of results and security of all concerned, unless he succeeds in establishing malafide use of power or manipulation or manouvering in the said practice. In any event, an examinee in my view has no right to challenge a practice and procedure, here in the instant case allotment of secret code number required for the purpose of maintaining secrecy of results and security of all concerned, unless he succeeds in establishing malafide use of power or manipulation or manouvering in the said practice. As the petitioner has not been able to establish any such defects or irregularities, I also feel that no determination is required to be made to that effect in this proceeding. Before I conclude, I must also point out that the affidavits as filed by the opposite parties are far from being satisfactory. Admittedly, the ad interim order of injunction was issued on July 6, 1971 restraining the opposite parties from destroying or otherwise disposing of the answer scripts of the M. A. Examinations in History for the year 1969 and the Rule must have been served or at least the opposite parties had notice of the same prior to June 7, 1972 i. e. the date when appearance was entered on their behalf. In this proceeding, the answer scripts of the petitioner have not been produced and Mr. Roy appearing for the respondents have taken the plea, not very definitely, that such scripts have either been misplaced or destroyed. The affidavits as mentioned hereinbefore are peculiarly silent on the date when they have been destroyed, if at all. Mis-placement of the answer scripts is no answer to the requirement as was directed by this Court. It may be that the answer scripts have been destroyed after sometime and they are not kept for long. But in that case it was expected of the University Authorities to satisfy this Court with such statement. Mr. Roy has further submitted that in any event the inspection of the scripts to the petitioner should not be allowed because that would create great repercussions and will have adverse effect on the administration of the University of calcutta. I am afraid, the opposite parties, in making such submissions through Mr. Roy are not perhaps aware of the powers of this Court in this jurisdiction and furthermore I am of the view that the exercise of such power by this Court should not be fettered by the difficulties or repercussions which the University Authorities I will have to face if inspection of the scripts is directed. Roy are not perhaps aware of the powers of this Court in this jurisdiction and furthermore I am of the view that the exercise of such power by this Court should not be fettered by the difficulties or repercussions which the University Authorities I will have to face if inspection of the scripts is directed. If the petitioner had succeeded in establishing his legal right to have his answer scripts inspected then i would not have hesitated even inspite of the supposed difficulties of the University Authorities, to direct inspection of the answer scripts to him. But as the petitioner has not been able to establish his legal right to have inspection of the answer scripts and I also find that ordinarily, the special procedure when adopted, is not justiciable, I cannot, in exercise of my discretion direct the inspection of the answer scripts to him. The power to adopt a special procedure or practice viz., the allotment of secret code numbers for the purpose of maintaining secrecy of results and for the security of all concerned is the exclusive right of the university authorities, so long such power is used and exercised bonafide and unless contrary is proved and established and furthermore so long such power is not used or exercised in a manner which would be repugnant to the provisions of the Calcutta University Act, 1966, the ordinances, Regulations and the Calcutta University First statutes, 1956, as framed thereunder. In view of the above, no writ of mandamus would go and consequently the prayer for a writ of certiorari cannot also be entertained. The Rule is thus discharged. But there will be no order for costs.