Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal against the judgment of a learned judge in O P. No. 4611 of 1971 by which the learned judge quashed certain land acquisition proceedings (Ext. P-4 declaration and Ext. P-5 notification) and directed the 1st respondent in the writ petition (first appellant in this appeal) to pursue the land acquisition proceedings after disposing of the petitioner's objections in accordance with law or to take fresh proceedings for acquisition if deemed necessary. The grounds on which the learned judge quashed Exts. P-4 and P-5 actually Ext. P-4 is the S.9 notice and P-5 is the S.6 declaration, were that the objections preferred to the Land Acquisition Officer by the writ petitioner (1st respondent) had not been enquired into as required by the provisions of the statute, and that the result of the enquiry had not been communicated to the 1st respondent; and further that there was a variation in respect of the extent of the land as between the. S.3 notification and the S.6 declaration. The learned judge was of the view that S.6 declaration cannot cover an extent of land greater than what was included in the S.3 notification. 2. We regret our inability to agree with the learned judge. In regard to the objection preferred by the 1st respondent and the enquiry into the same, the position was stated thus in Para.3 of the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State: "3. The notification under S.3(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the Gazette dated 22nd September 1970 at pages 2116 and 2117 of Part III for the acquisition of 60.49 acres of land as proposed by the Executive Engineer. R.3 notices were also issued and published as per rules. The allegation contra is incorrect. No petition objecting to the acquisition was received within the statutory period of 30 days from the date of publication of the 3 (1) notification and hence no enquiry under S.5 of the Land Acquisition Act need be conducted in this case. A joint petition from M/s Mar Mathews Mar Ivanios and Z. M. Parel was received on 8th June 1971, objecting to the proposed acquisition. Even though the petition was time barred the objections raised in the petition was enquired into by the Personal Assistant (L. A.) at the time of inspection the land on 15th June 1971." 3. A joint petition from M/s Mar Mathews Mar Ivanios and Z. M. Parel was received on 8th June 1971, objecting to the proposed acquisition. Even though the petition was time barred the objections raised in the petition was enquired into by the Personal Assistant (L. A.) at the time of inspection the land on 15th June 1971." 3. We have little doubt that an objection filed beyond 30 days of the notification under S.3 did not require to be enquired into under the statutory provisions of S.5 of the Act. If as a measure of indulgence the same was actually enquired into by the Personal Assistant to the Land Acquisition Officer, at the time of the inspection of the land, such enquiry does not clothe the 1st respondent with a right to a personal hearing: much the less, can it give the 1st respondent a right to have the result of the enquiry communicated. Even apart from this, the provisions of S.5 of the Act, are clear in regard to the course of action to be pursued after enquiry into an objection filed within the time limit provided by the statute. Even in such a case, the obligation is only to report the result of the enquiry either to the Government or the Board of Revenue and not to intimate the result of the enquiry to the objector. The objector will of course get a chance to know the result of the enquiry front S.6 declaration. There is no provision for any appeal against the result of the enquiry under S.5 of the Act, and there seems to be little justification to insist on communication of the result of the enquiry to the objector. For these reasons, we are unable to sustain the reasoning of the learned judge that the proceedings were vitiated for want of an enquiry remark into the objections and for the absence of any communication of the result of the enquiry to the objector. We are also unable to share the learned judge's view that the proceedings are vitiated as S.6 declaration took in an extent of land different from what was covered by the S.3 notification. As the learned judge had himself stated in the order, this objection was not taken by the 1st respondent in the writ petition. The learned judge felt this was an objection available as it appears from the record. As the learned judge had himself stated in the order, this objection was not taken by the 1st respondent in the writ petition. The learned judge felt this was an objection available as it appears from the record. S.3 notification of the Land Acquisition Act is clear that it is only after the issuance of the notification that the officers authorised by the Government or the Collector can enter upon and survey the land in the locality, work out the boundaries thereof and do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adopted for the purpose of the acquisition. It is only thereafter that the extent, measurement and boundaries of the land become crystallised and these are eventually effected in the S.6 declaration, after these operations are completed. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the objections that the S.6 declaration takes an extent of land different from or at variance with what is covered by the S.3 notification. In the instant case, the S.3 notification is in respect of four items of land covering an extent of 1-49 acres and 500 sq. links. It is indicated in Ext. P-1 itself that the extent given is approximate. The notice under S.9 (3) and 10 of the Act (Ext. P-4) shows only two items of an extent of 1-37 acres and 430 sq. links. Item No. 1, Sy. No. 433/ 3A Part, which was shown in Ext. P-1 as of an extent of 0-49 acre and 350 sq. links, is shown in Ext. P-4 as Sy; No. 433/A-1-2,0-54 acre and 640 sq. links. Items 2,3 and 4 in Ext. P-1 are Sy. Nos. 433/5 Part, 434/1 Part and 434/3 Part. The second item in Ext. P4 is Sy. No 433/5-1-2 of an extent of 0-82-790 sq. links. There is no case that the properties covered by Exts. P-1 and P-4 were different and the learned judge has not found they were. Ext. P-5 is the S.6 declaration. As produced, that only shows that the extent of the land is 1 acre 37.40 cents, and no more. For reasons stated earlier, we are unable to hold that the discrepancy in regard to the extent between Exts. P-1 and P-4 or P-5, vitiated the acquisition proceedings. Ext. P-5 is the S.6 declaration. As produced, that only shows that the extent of the land is 1 acre 37.40 cents, and no more. For reasons stated earlier, we are unable to hold that the discrepancy in regard to the extent between Exts. P-1 and P-4 or P-5, vitiated the acquisition proceedings. We allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and direct that O. P. No. 4611 of 1971 will stand dismissed. We make no order as to costs. 4. Counsel for the 1st respondent brought to our notice a hardship that is likely to arise for his client as a result of this judgment of ours. Ext. P-4 notice under S.9 (3) and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act required the statement of claim regarding compensation to be put in on or before 13th October 1971 by appearance either personally or by authorised agent. It was after receipt of the notice that the writ petition was filed in this court on 20th October, 1971. There was a stay during the pendency of the writ petition. The writ petition was eventually allowed by the judge whose judgment we have now reversed. The time fixed for filing the statement of claim having expired, counsel for the 1st respondent rightly raised the contention that his valuable right would be lost. we think that in the circumstances, it is only fair and proper that the authorities issue fresh notice under S.9 (3) and 10 of the Act to the 1st respondent. Allowed.