JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order will also govern Civil Revision No. 128 of 1975 (Ujiyarsingh v. Rampratapsingh and others) Civil Revision No. 146 of 1975 and Civil Revision No. 147 of 1975. ( 2. ) THIS revision arises from an interlocutory order passed in Misc. Judicial case No. 36 of 1974, by which the executing Court (4th Additional District judge, Jabalpur) has refused to stay the sale of two houses, which were attached in execution of a decree and in respect of which the revision-petitioner filed an objection under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code. ( 3. ) THE other revision (Civil Revision No. 128 of 1975) also arises from an order passed in identical terms on the same date in Misc. Judicial Case No. 35 of 1974, by which the same learned judge of the executing Court, refused to stay the sale of two other houses, which were also attached in execution of the same decree and in respect of which the revision-petitioner filed an objection under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code. ( 4. ) THE non-applicants, Rampratapsingh and his three sons, filed an application dated April 24, 1971, for execution against Durgasingh and Khuba. It appears from that application that in Civil Suit No. 49-A of 1960, the District court, Jabalpur, passed a decree on March 4, 1961, which decree was affirmed in First Appeal No. 65 of 1961 by the High Court against Smt. Mathurabai and others. During the pendency of that appeal, the appellants had prayed for stay of delivery of possession. By order dated August 11, 1961, the execution was stayed on the condition that the "appellants furnish security of rs. 2000 for mesne profits. This was followed by another order dated November 20, 1961, whereby the amount of security was raised to Rs. 5,000. Subsequently, there was another order dated April 22, 1965, by which a further security of Rs. 3000 was demanded. ( 5. ) DURGASINGH furnished a security for Rs. 5,000 which was accepted on december 4, 1961, and for Rs. 2. 000, which was accepted on April 26, 1965. Another order was passed by the High Court in the same appeal demanding security of Rs. 3,000 (order dated February 22, 1967 ). This security was furnished by Khuba, which was accepted by the executing Court on March 20,1967. ( 6. 2. 000, which was accepted on April 26, 1965. Another order was passed by the High Court in the same appeal demanding security of Rs. 3,000 (order dated February 22, 1967 ). This security was furnished by Khuba, which was accepted by the executing Court on March 20,1967. ( 6. ) AFTER the dismissal of the appeal, this execution was filed stating that a large sum of Rs. 95,000 odd became due on account of mesne profits, but the liability of Durgasingh was limited to Rs. 8,000 and that of Khuba to Rs. 3,000. Acccrdingly, in the said application dated April 24, 1971, the decree-holders applied for the recovery of Rs. 8,000 from Durgasingh and Rs. 3,000 from Khuba. ( 7. ) IT may also be mentioned just now that (a) during the pendency of the execution, Durgasingh died (see order-sheet dated July, 24, 1971) and his widow phoolbai, and his sons, Raj Bahadur Singh and Ujiyarsingh, and his daughters, ramratibai and Janunabai, were brought on record, (b) Khuba also died (see order-sheet dated April 5, 1972) and his widow Jinnat; his sons, Sheikhlal and Rahim, and his daughter, Kalloobai, were brought on the record. ( 8. ) BY order dated September 18, 1974, the executing Court directed warrant of attachment to be issued against Durgasingh and Khuba, but so far as Durgasingh was concerned, the executing Court said that, in the first instance, the execution shall issue for the recovery of Rs. 5,000 and as regards the balance, it will be considered, if in the meantime, nothing is recovered from the judgment-debtor. (See proceeding in M. C. J. No. 4 /72.) ( 9. ) ON October 12, 1974, a warrant of attachment was issued returnable on October 30, 1974. It appears that on October 13, 1974, four houses were attached. Their numbers are 2388, 2389, 2390 and 2390 A. ( 10. ) ON November 21, 1974, Gajendrasingh (revision-petitioner) filed the above said objection under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code (this rs m. J. C. No. 36 of 1974), contending that houses No. 2388 and 2389 were purchased by him by a registered deed of sale dated January 15, 1971, from one mahfuzal Kabir and that he was the exclusive owner and in possession of the two houses. (This is subject-matter of this Revision No. 148 of 1975 ). (This is subject-matter of this Revision No. 148 of 1975 ). A similar objection was filed on the same date, i. e. November 21, 1974, by ujiyarsingh, under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code, contending that houses No. 2390 and 2390 A are his exclusive property as he purchased them by a sale-deed dated January 15, 1971, (same date) from Mahfuzal Kabir (same vendor ). This was numbered as M. J. C. No. 35 of 1974. ( 11. ) NOW, it will be convenient to concentrate on the facts of M. J C. No. 36 of 1974, i. e. , the objection filed by Gajendrasingh. ( 12. ) IN reply, the decree holders contended that Gajendrasingh is neither owner nor in possession of the two houses in respect of which he has filed objection. He is merely a benamidar the real owner being Raj Bahadur Singh, inasmuch as the houses were purchased by Raj Bahadur Singh in the name of gajendra Singh. ( 13. ) GAJENDRA Singh, having filed that objection, made an application dated November 21, 1974, for stay of the sale of the attached property. This application was resisted by the decree holders. The executing Court said that since the property had already been attached, there was no point in staying the sale, but directed that the sale shall not be made absolute until Gajendra Singhs claim or objection is decided. Aggrieved by this order dated December 18, 1974, Gajendra Singh has moved this Court in revision. ( 14. ) IN this revision, Shri A. K. Jain learned counsel for the applicant, contends that as in the reply dated December 18, 1974, filed by the decree holders, there is no denial of possession of Gajendra Singh, the executing Court was bound to exercise its discretion in favour of the claimant and ought to have stayed the sale. By a local amendment, the full stop at the end of sub-rule (2)of Order 21, Rule 58, has been deleted and the following words have been added :- "or where the property to be sold is immovable property, the Court may, in its discretion, direct that the sale be held, but shall not become absolute until the claim or objection is decided. " This amendment was brought into force on September 16, 1960. " This amendment was brought into force on September 16, 1960. Learned counsels emphasis is on the word "discretion" and, for the above reason, it is urged, that the executing Court exercised its discretion arbitrarily. In my opinion, this contention must be rejected. It is true that in the reply dated december 18, 1974, nothing has been mentioned about possession, but it should be remembered that in the application for stay dated November 21, 1974, also the claimant did not say that he is in possession of the property. He alleged his possession and title in the main claim petition dated November 21, 1974, to which the decree-holders filed a separate reply, denying both title and possession. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the executing Court exercised its discretion erroneously. That apart, where the Legislature has conferred discretion in the Court about a certain matter, this Court will not interfere in revision, except when there is any error of jurisdiction, that is, where the discretion has been exercised in violation of any provision of law, or where the prescribed procedure has not been followed. But that is not the case here. ( 15. ) NO rules can be formulated as to the manner in which a discretion vested in the Court has to be exercised. The only rule which has become well settled is that every discretion must be exercised judicially, which means that (1) It must be exercised in view of the object and purpose of the law which confers the discretion upon the Court; (2) The facts and existing circumstances in which the discretion has to be exercised must be kept in view; (3) The principles which have come to be settled must be borne in mind and followed; and (4) Discretion must be exercised "according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not humour; it is to be legal and regular, not arbitrary, vague or fanciful". The following observations of the Lord Halsbury, L. C, in Sham v. Wakefield, (1891) A C 173. The following observations of the Lord Halsbury, L. C, in Sham v. Wakefield, (1891) A C 173. are classical :- "an extensive power is confided to the justices in their capacity as justices to be exercised judicially; and discretion means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities that that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; [rookes case, 5 Rep. 100]; according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular. And, it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. Wilson v. Rastall (4 T R at P. 757. ). " ( 16. ) THE object of the Madhya Pradesh amendment is obvious enough. After a decree has been passed, the policy of the law is that the path of execution must be smooth. But it is a matter of common experience that it is made as thorny as possible, by the judgment-debtor. One of the modes commonly adopted is that objections or claims are filed under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil procedure Code, and until the disposal of such objections or claims, the execution is hampered. In certain decisions of some of the High Courts it was laid down that the Court has no jurisdiction to put the property to sale, unless and until such an objection or claim is decided. Thus, the sale remained stayed, awaiting the decision of the claim or objection made under Order 21, Rule 58, civil Procedure Code. And, all sorts of tactics were adopted for delaying the disposal of such claim or objection. To get over these difficulties, but, at the same time to safeguard the interest of the objector or claimant, the Madhya pradesh amendment was made. It enables the executing Court to proceed with the sale of the property in spite of an objection or claim being pending under order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code However, the sale is no! to be made absolute until the claim or objection is decided; that is the safeguard. It enables the executing Court to proceed with the sale of the property in spite of an objection or claim being pending under order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code However, the sale is no! to be made absolute until the claim or objection is decided; that is the safeguard. Moreover, there may be circumstances in which the Court may think not to proceed with the sale and for that purpose, discretion has been conferred on the Court in the amended rule. Thus, it is not obligatory for the Court to proceed with the sale, but, at the same time, mere pendency of an objection or claim under order 21, Rule 58, is no legal impediment to the property being- put to sale. All that the Court cannot do is to make the sale absolute until the claim or objection is decided. ( 17. ) THE second contention raised by Shri Jain is that the question whether the sale in favour of Gajendra Singh was benami or not, cannot be enquired into in a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 58, Civil Procedure Code. Since the executing Court has said nothing about it, the contention before me is premature. ( 18. ) THE third contention for the petitioner is that since only Rs. 5000 has been ordered to be recovered from him, the whole of the house ought not to have been attached. Since this objection has not been decided by the executing Court in the impugned order, the question does not arise in this revision. ( 19. ) THE fourth contention is that the order directing sale was not according to law, inasmuch as under Order 21, Rule 64, Civil Procedure Code, unless and until the Court holds that the property is liable to sale, an order cannot be passed. Reliance is placed on Satyanarain v. Swarupnarain, 1959 MPLJ Short Note 214. Apparently, the Short Note of the case supports Shri Jains contention, but the date of that order in the Short Note is given as June 30, 1959. That was before the amendment and, therefore, that decision cannot govern the specific provision of the law in which the Court has been empowered, in its discretion, to direct that the sale be held even before an objection is decided. That was before the amendment and, therefore, that decision cannot govern the specific provision of the law in which the Court has been empowered, in its discretion, to direct that the sale be held even before an objection is decided. However, the interest of the objector is safeguarded by the mandatory provision in the amended Rule that the sale shall not become absolute until the claim or objection is decided. The learned Judge of the executing Court, in passing the impugned order, has emphasised this fact. She has said that the property has already been attached and it has not been shown what prejudice will be caused to the objector, if the sale proceeds further. She has expressly said that the sale will not be made absolute unless and until the objection is decided. For the aforesaid reasons, the decisions relied on by Shri Jain, namely, Ninjauda Patil v. Nabisaheb Patil, AIR 1942 Bom. 263. Gopal Chandra Mukerjee v. Notobar Kundu, 16cwn 1029. and Sasthi Charan Biswas Banik v. Gopal Chandra Shaha, 41 C W N 845. have no application to the present case. Therefore, there is no substance in this contention either. ( 20. ) THE revision is dismissed. The petitioner shall pay Rs. 50 as costs to the decree-holders. Revision dismissed.