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1975 DIGILAW 126 (GUJ)

Parsing Sardar Parmar v. Ruddaji Pannaji

1975-10-20

J.M.SHETH

body1975
JUDGMENT : J.M. SHETH, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the original applicants against the respondents against the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division and Ex-Officio Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Nadiad, dated 12.7.1972 dismissing Workmen's Compensation Case No. 7 of 1971, filed by the appellant against the respondents for recovery of compensation of Rs. 6,000/- on account of the death of their daughter Bai Sabu on 29.12.1970. 2. In the written-statement, a contention was raised that the appellants had also filed application under section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (which will be hereinafter referred to as "the Act") before Claims Tribunal, Nadiad, and it was registered the Motor Accidents as Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Case No. 34 of 1971 and in that view of the matter, they had no right to make an application before the Commissioner for Workmen's compensation. Respondent No. 1 gave application, Ex.24 and prayed that in view of the appellants having filed application before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for compensation, they could not file this application under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in view of the provisions of section 110-AA of the Act. He, therefore prayed that an issue be raised to that effect and it be heard as a preliminary issue. Accordingly issue was raised and the Commissioner for Workmen's compensation has dismissed this application observing:- "They cannot prefer claim before both the institutions on account of the same accident. The reason is very obvious. The dependants cannot make profit out of the death of their relative. In the present case, the learned Advocate for the applicants admitted by an endorsement below application, Ex.24, that the applicants had filed a claim In Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Application No. 34 of 1971 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Nadiad. He was asked, if in view of the said claim before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Nadiad, the applicants would withdraw this application and he said that the applicants were not prepared to withdraw this claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and they would continue their claim before both the institutions, While claim under the workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is made against the contactor, the claim under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939; is made against the owner of the truck. I do not find any force in this argument. I do not find any force in this argument. The fact is that the claim is made before both the institutions in respect of the death of the same person. The applicants cannot, therefore, be permitted to make two claims in respect of the death of the same person. As the applicants wish to pursue their claim made before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Nadiad, section 110-AA of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, bars them from making the claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. This application under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is, therefore, not tenable and as such, it should be dismissed. Application is dismissed. No order as to costs." 3. Mr. I. C. Bhatt, appearing for the appellants, has contended that this order cannot he supported in law. It was only at the time these two different tribunals made awards, the applicants-appellants have to choose one of those awards and both the awards cannot be executed as the applicants cannot get the double advantage in respect of death by an accident. 'The learned Commissioner was not justified in asking the appellants to chose the forum at this stage. Such a claim, submitted Mr. Bhatt in view of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, could be entertained only by the learned Commissioner. 4. Mr. A.S. Qureshi, appearing for respondent No. 1 and Mr. G. M. Vidyarthi learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for respondent No. 2 contended that the aforesaid submission made by Mr. Bhatt is not well-founded. The learned Commissioner, according to their submission has rightly dismissed the appeal as the appellants had no right to pursue both the remedies in view of section 110-AA of the Act. 5. G. M. Vidyarthi learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for respondent No. 2 contended that the aforesaid submission made by Mr. Bhatt is not well-founded. The learned Commissioner, according to their submission has rightly dismissed the appeal as the appellants had no right to pursue both the remedies in view of section 110-AA of the Act. 5. Prior to the insertion of section 110-AA by section 59 of Act No. 56 of 1959, the Courts had occasions to interpret section 110-F of the Act which deals with "Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts." It reads: "Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area and no injection in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the Claims Tribunal in respect of the claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil Court." Section 110-A of the Act deals with "Application for compensation." Material part of it reads: 1. An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 may be made:- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury. (b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased. (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be." Section 110 of the Act deals with "Claims Tribunals." Sub-Section (1) of it reads: 1. A State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, person arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both." Section 3 of the Workmen's compensation Act, 1923, deals with "Employers liability for compensation." Sub-section (5) of it reads: "5. Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to confer any right to compensation on a workman in respect of any injury if he has instituted in a civil court a suit for damages in respect of the injury against the employer or any other person; and no suit for damages shall be maintainable by a workman in any Court of law in respect of any injury- (a) if he has instituted a claim to compensation in respect of the injury before a Commissioner. (b) if an agreement has been come to between the workman and his employer providing for the payment of compensation in respect of the injury in accordance with the provisions of this Act." Section 4 of the Workmen's Compensation Act reads: "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the amount of compensation shall be as follows, namely: (a) Where death results from the injury and the deceased workman has been in receipt of monthly wages falling within limits shown in the first column of Schedule IV-the amount shown against such limits in the second column thereof......." Section 10 of it deals with "Notice and claim." Section 19 of it reads: "1. If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation (including any question as to whether a person injured is or is not a workman) or as to the amount or duration of compensation (including any question as to the nature or extent of disablement), the question shall in default of agreement, be settled by a Commissioner. 2. No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under this Act." The provisions of section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as well as the provisions of section 110-F of the Act deal with bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts. They do not indicate bar of jurisdiction of any of these Tribunals. 6. They do not indicate bar of jurisdiction of any of these Tribunals. 6. The Legislature, to remove any doubt, by inserting section 110-AA by section 59 of Act No. 56 of 1969, has made the position in this behalf quite clear, as to what should be done when the claim falls under the Act as well as under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and such claims are made before both the Tribunals. That section 110-AA of the Act reads: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), where the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), the person entitled to compensation may claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both." A plain reading of the wording of this section makes it clear that where the death or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under both the Acts, viz, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation has to choose as to where the claim should be made. He can claim such compensation under either of those Acts, but not under both. It will not, therefore, be correct to say that it is only when both the Tribunals, after hearing the parties on merits, make awards and those awards are sought to be executed, at that stage the person entitled to compensation has to choose, which award he wants to execute. 7. Even prior to inserting of section 110-AA in the Act, question arose as to whether the jurisdiction under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, was ousted in view of the provisions of section 110-F of the Act. In Ram Sarup vs. Gurdev Singh, 1968 (1) LLJ 80 a single Judge of the Punjab High Court, after referring to the provisions of section 110-F of the Act, at page 84 observed: "It is not disputed that a claims tribunal has been constituted for the whole of Punjab under the Motor Vehicles Act. But I do not think that a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Civil Court within the meaning of section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act. A Civil Court is the Court of general civil jurisdiction. But I do not think that a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act is a Civil Court within the meaning of section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act. A Civil Court is the Court of general civil jurisdiction. In the absence of any statutory bar, all civil cases have to be tried by Civil Courts Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act has excluded from the jurisdiction of such a Civil Court, i.e. Court of general civil jurisdiction, all claims for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the claims tribunal appointed under that Act. An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act lies exclusively to a claims tribunal. The nature of claims referred to in section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act includes claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. But such a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act can be filed (in case where death has resulted from the accident) only by the legal representatives of the deceased. Minor brothers of a deceased, who are dependents within the meaning of the Compensation Act (really, Workmen's Compensation Act) may or may not be legal representatives of a deceased. The scope of proceedings under the two Act appears to be different. From amongst the cases taken out of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts by section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act, the cases triable by a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act form a separate category. The Court of the Commissioner under the Compensation Act is a special Court and not an ordinary Civil Court. The mere fact that the powers of the Commissioner are vested in a senior Subordinate Judge or a District Judge does not mean that the Commissioner acts 'as' a Civil Court. A petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not lie to a Civil Court but only to a Commissioner appointed under the Act...The Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensations Act is a mere tribunal and is not a Civil Court within the meaning of section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act. A petition under the Workmen's Compensation Act does not lie to a Civil Court but only to a Commissioner appointed under the Act...The Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensations Act is a mere tribunal and is not a Civil Court within the meaning of section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act. This question was raised before the learned Commissioner and he also held that the Motor Vehicles Act does not repeal or abrogate the relevant provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act in the absence of any specific provisions to that effect. I am in agreement with that view of the matter. I, accordingly, hold that section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act does not bar the jurisdiction of a Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act from trying a claim under the latter Act in respect of death or bodily injury arising out of a motor accident in a case where the claim is by dependent within the meaning of section 2(d) or by the injured person and is against an employer within the meaning of section 2(c) if the deceased or a person who has suffered bodily injury was a workman as defined in section 2(n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act." 8. In Ogeti Pedda Ranganna vs. Zalekha Bee, 1970 ACJ 178 similar question had arisen before a single judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The relevant observations at pages 124 and 125 are:- "The contention of the learned counsel is that the tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is constituted under a special enactment relating to accidents arising in connection with the motor vehicles and that therefore the jurisdiction of the tribunal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which should be regarded as a general Act, is excluded. Section 110-F of the Motor Vehicles Act in express terms excludes only the jurisdiction of a Civil Court with respect to any action taken or to be taken before the claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. The legislature is certainly aware of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act the tribunal constituted therein for adjudication of claims under the said Act. The provisions of section 110-F, while expressly barring the jurisdiction of Civil Courts as such, do not contain any indication that the jurisdiction of any other tribunal is barred. The legislature is certainly aware of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act the tribunal constituted therein for adjudication of claims under the said Act. The provisions of section 110-F, while expressly barring the jurisdiction of Civil Courts as such, do not contain any indication that the jurisdiction of any other tribunal is barred. Turning to the provisions of the workmen's Compensation Act, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court alone is barred with respect to adjudication of claims falling under the purview of the said Act. It is therefore a clear case where the provisions of each of the enactments operate independently of one another having concurrent jurisdiction to entertain claim for compensation. In such a case, the option lies with the workman to choose one or the other tribunal. It is of course undisputed that if the workman chooses a particular tribunal, it will not be open to him to choose the other tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act. In the present case, the workman or the claimant having chosen the tribunal under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it is not open to the employer to ask him to choose a different tribunal, for, the choice lies with the claimant and not with the employer. The decision of the Punjab High Court in Ram Sarup vs. Gurdev Singh, 1968 (1) LLJ 80 directly supports the contention of the respondent that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act do not exclude the jurisdiction of the tribunal under the Workmen's Compensation Act." 9. This was the view taken on interpretation of section 110-F of the Act prior to the bringing on the statute book section 110-AA of the Act. The provisions of the aforesaid section, which have been set out earlier, clearly indicates that if the death of or bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation has to make a claim for compensation under either of those Acts but not under both. There is a non-obstante clause. Mr. Bhatt is, therefore, not right in making submission in this behalf on the strength of certain provisions contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act. There is a non-obstante clause. Mr. Bhatt is, therefore, not right in making submission in this behalf on the strength of certain provisions contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act. In section 110-AA of the Act in terms it is stated "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923)." Such a consequence as contemplated under the provisions of that section has to follow. In the instant case, therefore, it is first necessary to decide by the learned Commissioner, whether it is a case where the death of Bai Sabu gives rise to a claim for compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. If the claim made falls under both the Acts, then the learned Commissioner has to call upon the present appellants (original applicants) to choose the forum of their choice. The order passed by the learned Commissioner without making such an inquiry and straightway dismissing the application on the ground that the applicants (appellants) have filed applications under both the Acts and do not agree to withdraw the application filed before the Accidents Claims Tribunal, this application should be dismissed, requires to be set aside. 10. The appeal is allowed. The order passed by the learned Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is set aside and he is directed to first decide, whether the death of Bai Sabu gave rise to a claim for compensation under the Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. If he records that finding in the affirmative, than he should call upon the present appellant (original claimants) to choose their own forum. In view of the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs is made in this appeal.