( 1 ) THE appellant is the plaintiff, The Church of Our Lady of Immaculate conception, Urva, Mangalore Town, represented by the Parish Priest and the President of the Board of Administration of the said Church, the present incuumbent being Rev. Father V. D. Souza. It is a Roman Catholic church. The subject-matter of the suit is the land Sy. No. 57/12 measuring 60 cents situate in Bollor village in Mangalore Town. According to the case of the plaintiff, the suit property along with the property lying to its west, namely, Sy. No. 57/6 was purchased by the plaintiff-Church from one anthony Kamthi alias Scuza, under a registered sale deed dt. 14-2-1969. The patta of the suit land continued to stand in the name of the vendor and the plaintiff was paying the assessment of the suit land to the hands of the vendor for payment to the Govt for some years. The suit land was consecrated as a burial ground of the plaintiff-Church and is being used ever since its purchase as burial ground of the Parishoners of the plaintiff- church. Siace it was used as burial ground, the Pattadar was granted remission of assessment in respect of the suit land by the Revenue Authorities. Thus, since about 1900 no assessment was demanded or paid though the suit land continued to be in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff all along. The plaintiff also purchased Sy. No. 61/1 oi Boloor village on 21-7-1890 and likewise consecrated the same as second burial ground of the plaintiff-Church in or about 1897, but even thereafter there have been burials in the 'a' Sch. property i. e. Sy. No. 57/12 so late as the year 1961. The graves in the 'a' Sch. property are alleged to be mostly in a strip of land 35 ft. in width and 65 ft. in length running East to West in the northern boundary of Sy. No. 57/12 which is described as the plaint 'b' Sch. property. The second defendant purchased a plot of land Sy. No. 57/8b, 57 7b and 57/. 13b, which lie a little distance towards tstate v. Raghunatha Tathachoriar, ILR. 38 Mad. 108he North-West of the suit property in the year 1960 and built a house thereon. He applied to the Deputy Commr of S. Kanara for permission to use the northernmost part of Sy. No. 57/8b, 57 7b and 57/. 13b, which lie a little distance towards tstate v. Raghunatha Tathachoriar, ILR. 38 Mad. 108he North-West of the suit property in the year 1960 and built a house thereon. He applied to the Deputy Commr of S. Kanara for permission to use the northernmost part of Sy. No. 57/12 as a road in order to provide access to his property from the Govt road which lies to the East of Sy. No. 57/12. He alleged that he had already obtained the previous permission of the plaintiff- church to go across the northern part of the land Sy. No. 57/6 belonging to the plaintiff-Church. The Deputy Commr passed an order on 2-1-1963 treating the 'a' Sch. property, namely Sy. No. 57/12, as Govt land and setting apart as road poramboke a strip of land of the width of 20 ft. along the northern portion of the 'a' Sch. property measuring in all 6 cents in extent and granting permission to the second defendant to form a road on that strip of land with the condition that it must be permissible for the members of the public also to make use of that road. Hence, the plaintiff brought the suit for a declaration that it is the owner of the plaint 'a' Sch property, that the order of the Deputy Commr d/. 2-1-63 is not valid or binding on the plaintiff and for an injunction restraining defendant 1, the State of mysore, as well as the second defendant from trespassing into the plaint 'b' Schedule property. ( 2 ) THE first defendant pleaded that the suit land belongs to the Govt and is registered as a Poramboke burial ground in its records and that the alleged vendor of the plaintiff had no title to the suit land. No assessment was levied on the suit land as it belongs to the Govt. The plot Sy. No. 57/12 was being used very rarely for burying dead bodies of those Christians who were denied religious rites oi burial and such burials have taken place in the centre of the land Sy. No. 57/12 and not on the northern side of the said land. The land bearing No. 61/1 is being used by the Church authorities as regular burial ground attached to the plaintiff's Church all along since the date of its purchase in the year 1890. No. 57/12 and not on the northern side of the said land. The land bearing No. 61/1 is being used by the Church authorities as regular burial ground attached to the plaintiff's Church all along since the date of its purchase in the year 1890. The second defendant pleaded that he has a right of way through Sy. No. 57/12, that the said road had been jn existence from time immemorial and generally supported the pleas of defendant 1. ( 3 ) THE trial Court held that the plaintiff had established its title by purchase and also by virtue of adverse posssesion and decreed the suit. Both the defendants filed separate appeals against the said decision before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court held that the sale deeds between third parties Exts. A4 to A6 as well as the partition deed, Ext. A7, and the probate, Ext. A8, were inadmissible in evidence and that the plaintiff had failed to establish the identity of the property purchased under the sale deed of 1869, namely, Ext. A3. It also held that the plaintiff had failed to establish its title by adverse possession. It accordingly reversed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. ( 4 ) THE first question to be decided is whether the lower appellate court was justified in holding that the identity of the properties purchased under Ext. A3 has not been established. Exts. A4 and A5 are documents between strangers. Hence, the recital with regard to the boundaries in those documents are not admissible in evidence. This finding of the lower appellate Court is not challenged by Mr. Holla. But his contention is that the recitals in Ext. A7 with regard to the boundaries are admissible and therefore, it must be held that the identity of the property conveyed under ext. A3 is the same as the suit Sch. 'a' property. ( 5 ) THE sketch prepared by the Commissioner appointed by the trial court shows the relative positions of the lands with respect to the suit property. The suit property Sy. No. 57/12 is bounded on the East by Govt road, namely, Kooloor Ferry Road, on the North by Syno. 57/5, on the West by Sy. No. 57/6 and on the South by Sy. No. 61|4. According to the case of the plaintiff, what was conveyed under Ext. The suit property Sy. No. 57/12 is bounded on the East by Govt road, namely, Kooloor Ferry Road, on the North by Syno. 57/5, on the West by Sy. No. 57/6 and on the South by Sy. No. 61|4. According to the case of the plaintiff, what was conveyed under Ext. A3 to the plaintiff is the land composed of both Sy No. 57/6 and Sy No. 57/12. If both Sy No. 57|6 and 57/12 we taken as one land, the eastern and northern boundaries are the same as stated above. But the western bondary is Sy. No. 57/8c and the southern boundary will be partly Sy. No. 61/4 and partly Sy. No. 61/2 which lies to the west of Sy No. 61/4. The contention urged by Mr. Holla, on behalf of the plaintiff, is that the land Syno. 57|5 belonged to Anthony Kamthi alias souza and that he retained that land when he conveyed the land to the scuth of it to the plaintiff under the sale deed, Ext. A3, in the year 1869, that the northern boundary of the land conveyed by him under Ext. A3 to the plaintiff is described as the land retained by him out of the Varg. No. 26. His further contention is that the land which formed the northern boundary of the property conveyed to the Church fell to the share of Anthony kamthi's son Barnard in the partition evidenced by Ext. A7 of the year 1889 and thereafter it was bequeathed under the will of Barnard under Ext. A8 to his legatees. By the time of Ext. A8, i. e. 1939, survey settlement had been introduced and the lands bearing Synos. 57/5, 57/9 and 57/10 are described as the lands which fell to the share of Bernard son of Antony Kamthi under the partition in the document Ext. A8. It is the contention of Mr. Holla that syno. 57|5 originally belonged to Anthony Kamthi, that was the property which is described as the northern boundary of the suit property in Ext A and since the suit property is to the South of Syno. 57/5. it is the suit property which has been conveyed to the plaintiff under Ext. A3. ( 6 ) THE recitals in Ext. 57|5 originally belonged to Anthony Kamthi, that was the property which is described as the northern boundary of the suit property in Ext A and since the suit property is to the South of Syno. 57/5. it is the suit property which has been conveyed to the plaintiff under Ext. A3. ( 6 ) THE recitals in Ext. A3 are to the effect that Anthony Kamthi had purchased the land in Mali No. 26 standing in the Varg of Anthe Prabhu and salu Prabhu bearing an assessment of Rs 7-14-0 and that he conveyed the property described in the boundaries to the plaintiff-Church. It is also recited that 0-12-0 is the assessment payable in respect of the portion of the property conveyed to the plaintiff, that the said assessment must be paid by the plaintiff to the hands of the vendor and receipts obtained in order that the vendor may pay the assessment of the entire land to the govt. The eastern boundary of the land conveyed under Ext. A3 is mentioned as the Govt road the southern boundary as the land purchased by vykunta Prabhu in a Court sale, the western boundary as the land in the possession of Bhostu Kamthi and the northern boundary is mentioned as the land retained by the vendor out of the same varg. It is to be noticed that the measurement of the area conveyed is not to be found in the document. ( 7 ) THE suit property is classified in the revenue records as poramboke and is described as a bufial ground. According to para (2) of Standing order No. 15 of the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue, Govt of Madras, 'poramboke' is a land prima facie not available for assignment. Under para 5 of the same Standing Order, it is provided that only land the assignment of which is unobjectionable shall be assigned. The lands acquired for communal purposes shall not be assigned. Grazing ground porambokes shall not be assigned unless there is sufficient grazing ground available to the cattle at the rate of one acre of pasture per head of cattle. Tank-bed lands should on no account be assigned without consulting the appropriate technical officer. Lands close to village sites which are likely to be required for communal purposes or provision of house-sites should not be assigned. Tank-bed lands should on no account be assigned without consulting the appropriate technical officer. Lands close to village sites which are likely to be required for communal purposes or provision of house-sites should not be assigned. Applications for assignment of lands with dense and valuable forest should be rejected. Under Cl (ii) to Para (3) of the same Standing Order, the collector is empowered to order transfer of poramboke from one head to another or to assessed waste. Under Para (38) of the same Standing Order, it is stated that the grant of any land registered as poramboke is prima facir objectionable and that applications for grant of such land shall not be entertained by the Village Officers or Revenue Inspectors but may be received by Tahsildars. A special procedure is prescribed for grant of such land and there must be a publication of the proposal to assign it. Thereafter, the Tahsildar should obtain the orders of the Collector to transfer it to the head of Assessed Land. Thereafter, if the Collector sanctions the transfer, the Tahsildar then should deal with the land in the manner prescribed for an Assessed Land. In the present case there wag such a publication and the objections filed in respect of the proposed road in the suit property were considered before the impugned order was passed by the Deputy Commr. The contention of Mr. Holla, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, is that the fact that the suit land is described as poramboke does, not show that it belongs to the Govt, but that it indicates only the fact that the suit property is being used for communal purposes viz, as burial ground of the reman Catholic community. Hence, according to him, it does not negative the title of the plaintiff to the suit property. He has relied upon the decisions in secretary of State v. Raghunatha Tathachoriar, ILR. 38 Mad. 108. and Batchu Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State, AIR. 1938 Mad. 565 In raghunatha Tathachariar's case (1), a grant of land by the Govt of a whole village consisted of a certain specified area ' besides poramboke'. He has relied upon the decisions in secretary of State v. Raghunatha Tathachoriar, ILR. 38 Mad. 108. and Batchu Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State, AIR. 1938 Mad. 565 In raghunatha Tathachariar's case (1), a grant of land by the Govt of a whole village consisted of a certain specified area ' besides poramboke'. It was held that the grant confers on the grantee a right to all the unassessed waste land in the village including the land between a river bed and the high flood bank of the rivet though it may not operate to give communal property such as burying grounds, temples sites etc, toi the grantee. It was observed that the word 'poramboke' is loosely used in many senses and that whatever land which does not yield revenue to Govt is usually known as Poramboke, though several kinds of lands may be included in it. In Ballabh Das v. Nur Mohammad, AIR. 1936 PC. 83. it was held that when a land is described in the Khasra as qabristan or graveyard, this prima facie at all events means that the land is a graveyard in the sense known to the Mohamedan Law. It was held that where the khasra itself is the instrument which confers or embodies the right and there is no other document which created title, the khasra and the map are not merely 'historical materials' in the sense in which that phrase is used in 57 I. A. 86, but fall within the phrase 'instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundation of right'. In Batchu Venkataratnam's case (2), the question was whether a tank situate in a village which was granted to a Zamindar belongs to the Zamindar or to the Goivt. The tank was within the territorial boundaries of the Zamindar's village and the govt during a period of over a century never exercised any acts of ownorship over the tank. In the survey and settlement register the tank was described as 'poramboke'. Following the decision of the Privy Council in 62 I. A. 166, it was held that merely because in fixing the peishkush certain properties were excluded, it cannot be considered as having been excluded from the grant. It was further held that merely because a tank is called a village tank, it cannot be said that the. villagers necessarily own it. It was further held that merely because a tank is called a village tank, it cannot be said that the. villagers necessarily own it. It was observed that the word 'poramboke' is used in several senses and that though it includes commxmal property, it cannot be said that it connotes no other kind of property The learned Additional Government Pleader, has relied upon the decision in Venkatarama Sivan v. Secrctary of State, AIR 1919 Mad 765. In that case the deed of grant of a whole inam village recited that the grant was of the entire village on sarvamaniyam 'besides poramboke' It was held that the words 'besides poramboke' should be construed as excluding burning and burial grounds and other portions required for communal purposes. The decision in Raghunatha Tathachariar's case (1), was distinguished. As regards burial and burning ground porambokos and public road porambokes, it was held thet the legal ownership of the Govt is of a different character from its legal ownership of cultivable waste lands in raiyatxvari villages, but that both kinds of lands are the subject of the govt's legal ownership It was further held that the legal right has all along been in the Govt in respect of such communal land for the sake of convenience as the custodian of the rights of the public and it could not assign those rights to the inamdar without a violation of its trust to the community to preserve the land for communal use and that it could not be assumed without clear proof that the Gnvt intentionallv committed a violation of the trust Rx. B1 is the objection statement filed by the Parish Priest on behalf of the plaintiff objecting to the proposal of defendant 2. Ext. B2 is the statement made by him recorded by the Tahsildar In both of them the suit property is referred as Catholic burial ground. In Ext. B10 which is a lease deed granted by the plaintiff in respect of a neighbouring property belonging to the plaintiff viz, Sy No. 57/1, the suit property is referred to as poramboke. Ext. B2 is the statement made by him recorded by the Tahsildar In both of them the suit property is referred as Catholic burial ground. In Ext. B10 which is a lease deed granted by the plaintiff in respect of a neighbouring property belonging to the plaintiff viz, Sy No. 57/1, the suit property is referred to as poramboke. Under S. 2 (1) of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905, it is stated that all public roads, streets etc, and all lands wherever situated except those of the persons including a wargdar in S. Canara or in any way subject to the payment of land revenue direct to the Govt or of any other registered holder of land in proprietary right etc, are declared to be the property of Govt except as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force subject always to all the rights of way and other public rights and to the natural and easementary rights of other land owners and to all customary rights legally subsisting. ( 8 ) IT is also the case of the plaintiff according to the plaint, that the suit property was being used as a burial ground ever since its purchase, i. e. , since 1869, and that there was a remission of the assessment payable to the Govt in the year 1900 on that account. Hence, prima facie the suit property must be considered to be the property of the Govt though it may be subject to the rights of a section of the public for whose use it is meant as a burial ground. It is in this background that the question whether the plaintiff has made out its title to the suit property has to be examined. ( 9 ) THE survey settlement took place only in the year 1904 as evidenced by Ext. B4, the Survey Settlement Register. Hence, the description of the suit property in Ext. A3 or A7 is not with reference to its survey numbers. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the boundaries of the suit property as described in Ext. A3 tally with the boundaries of the suit property bearing Sy No,. 57/12 and Sy No. 57/6, which together are alleged to constitute the plaintiff's property conveyed under Ext. A3. The western boundary in Ex. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the boundaries of the suit property as described in Ext. A3 tally with the boundaries of the suit property bearing Sy No,. 57/12 and Sy No. 57/6, which together are alleged to constitute the plaintiff's property conveyed under Ext. A3. The western boundary in Ex. A3 is stated to be the wall of the plot in the possession of Basthu Kamthi. PW. 2 Francis Pinto, is a near relative of Basthu kamthi and is 81 years of age. He stated in his evidencee that Juam Souza was the son of Basthu Kamthi. He also stated that the property of Basthu kamthi went to, Gabriel Souza. The western boundary of the property alleged to have been conveyed under Ext. A3, according to the Commissioner's map, is Sy No. 57/8. Ext. B4 shows that the pattadar of this property is John Souza or Juam Souza. This contradicts the evidence of PW. 2. It cannot, therefore, be said that the western boundary as shown in Ext. A3 has been shown to tally with the western boundary of the property conveyed to the plaintiff, as it stood in 1904. The southern boundary of the property conveyed to the plaintiff under Ext. A3, as described in Ext. A3, is the property belonging to Vaikunta Prabhu having been purchased by him in at Court sale. According to Ext. B4, the southern boundary of the property conveyed to the plaintiff under Ext A3 consists of Sy No. 61/4 and part of Sy No. 61/2. Both these lands stand in the patta of Vaikunta Prabhu. This entry would indicate that Vaikunta Prabhu was the owner of these lands in the year 1904. But, according to the plaintiff's own case, these two lands as well as Sy Ncs. 61/1 and 61/3 had been by that time purchased by the plaintiff and the plaintiff had become the owner of the same. The relevant documents relating to the purchase of these lands by the plaintiff are Exts. A4, A5 and A6. A4 is a sale deed d/. 18-12-3882 under which one Bhima Rao residing in Shimoga, has sold the property bearing Muli No. 48 in favour of Rama Rao resident of Mangalore. The relevant documents relating to the purchase of these lands by the plaintiff are Exts. A4, A5 and A6. A4 is a sale deed d/. 18-12-3882 under which one Bhima Rao residing in Shimoga, has sold the property bearing Muli No. 48 in favour of Rama Rao resident of Mangalore. The recitals in the documents show that Nelkai Thimmappaiah had executed a mortgage deed in favour of the father of the vendor and that the vendor had filed the suit No. 423 at 1877 in the Court of Munsiff. Mangalorp, and that the vendor had purchased the same in execution of his decree on 13-9-1880. No boundaries of the property sold thereunder are mentioned in Ext. A4. Thereafter, on 19-1-1889 rama Rao sold the property purchased by him under Ext. A4 to Salwador saladan under Ext. A5, the sale deed of the above date. This document gives the boundaries cf the property sold. The eastern boundary is the Govt road, the northern boundary is stated to consist of four properties a voni, the plot belonging to the Juje Souza, the plot belonging to Bosthy Souza and the plot belonging to Church. Thereafter, under Ext. A6 on 21-7-1890 salwador Saladan sold the property purchased by him under Ext. A5 to the plaintiff-Church. No boundaries of the property sold under this document are mentioned. It is not disputed that the property purchased by the plaintiff under A6 consists of Sy Nos. 61/1, 61|2, 61/3 and 61|4. Hence, according to the plaintiff's own case, the plaintiff had become the owner of sy Nos. 61/2 and 61/4 in the year 1890 itself. But according to Ext. B4 vaikunta Prabhu is shown as pattadar of these two lands in the year 1904. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the southern boundary of the property conveyed under ext. A3, is the present Sy No. 61/4 and part of Sy No. 61|2, since there is no evidence to show that Vaikunta Prabhu was the owner of Sy nos. 61/2 and 61/4 on the date of Ext. A3. ( 10 ) IN order to establish the identity of the northern property, the plaintiff relies on Exts. A7 and A8. Ext. A7 is a partition deed d/. 31-5-1889. The parties to that deed are Juje Michal Souza son of Anthony Kumthi alias Souza the widow of Anthony Kamthi and the younger son of Anthony kamthi, namely, Bernard. A3. ( 10 ) IN order to establish the identity of the northern property, the plaintiff relies on Exts. A7 and A8. Ext. A7 is a partition deed d/. 31-5-1889. The parties to that deed are Juje Michal Souza son of Anthony Kumthi alias Souza the widow of Anthony Kamthi and the younger son of Anthony kamthi, namely, Bernard. The first three items of the properties described as being available for partition are of a different village. The fourth item is described as Muli No. 26 of Bolur village standing in the warg of Sali prabhu bearing assessment of Rs. 7-3-1 and excluding the property left to the Church by their elders bearing assessment of Rs. 2-4-0, which has to be paid by the Church to the parties to the document. The property under this item is described as consisting of partly mulgeni property and partly in their own possession. There is no description of the property left to the church in this part of the document except as stated above. Later on in the document the description of the properties which fall to the share of bernard are given with their boundaries. They are items 10 and 11. The boundaries of the property allotted under item 10 are given as East: Govt road, South the plot of Urva Church and wall, West: Wall of the land belonging to Bosthu Kamthi, and North: the wall and plot of Sale Kamthi. Item 11, which also fell to the share of Bernard, is shown as being bounded on the East by the wall of the land belonging to Bosthu Kamthi and the church, on the South the wall of the Church plot, on the West voni and on the North, the wall of the Church. It is stated that it is a mulgeni property in the enjoyment of Juje Kamthi. This mulgeni right and the muli right in respect of this property is allotted to Bernard. The other properties allotted to Bernard's share are of a different village. Under item 14 it is stated that out of item 10 allotted to the share of Bernard, his mother is entitled to enjoy a portion of it for her life time and thereafter it must go to Bernard. There is also recital in the document to the effect that the elder son must collect Rs. Under item 14 it is stated that out of item 10 allotted to the share of Bernard, his mother is entitled to enjoy a portion of it for her life time and thereafter it must go to Bernard. There is also recital in the document to the effect that the elder son must collect Rs. 2-4-0 in respect of the property shown as having been left as the property of the Church and should pay the same to the Govt. Ext. A8 is the will executed by Bernard on 25-8-1939 bequeathing his properties. While describing the properties owned by him he has stated in that will that according to the settlement deed of 31-5-1889 he got to his share the property bearing Sy No. 57/5, being the muli property, and the properties bearing Sy Nos. 57|9 and 57/10, being the mulgeni properties. The boundaries of these properties are not mentioned in the will. According to the entries in Ext. B4 the pattadar of Sy No. 57/5 is Joseph Michel Souza alias Juje Mingal Souza. The pattadar of Sy No. 57/9 is also the same person. In respect of Sy No. 57/10 the pattadar is also the same person but the mulagenidar is shown as Joseph alias Juje. Though in Ext. A8. Sy no. 57/9 is also described as being in the enjoyment of mulgenidar in Ext. B. 4 it is shown as if in the enjoyment of the pattadar himself. ( 11 ) THE case of the plaintiff is that item 10 allotted to the share of bernard became later to be indicated as Sy No. 57/5 at the time of survey settlement and is so found in Ext. B4. Since admittedly, according to the sketch of the Commissioner', Sy No. 57/5 forms the northern boundary of sy No. 57/6 as well as Sy No. 57/12 it is urged that the property conveyed under Ext. A3 is the property which lies to the South of Sy No. 57/5, i. e. , the property now indicated by Sy No. 57/6 and Sy No. 57/12 put together. Mr. Holla relies on the southern boundary of item 10 mentioned in ext. A7. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of respondent 1 that the statement of boundaries in Ext. A7 is not admissible in evidence either under Ss. 11 or 13 or S. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act. Mr. Holla relies on the southern boundary of item 10 mentioned in ext. A7. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of respondent 1 that the statement of boundaries in Ext. A7 is not admissible in evidence either under Ss. 11 or 13 or S. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act. ( 12 ) MR. HOLLA relied upon the decisions in Ningawwa v. Bharamappa, ILR. 23 Bom. 63. Sheik Ketabuddin v. Nafar Chandra Pattok, AIR. 1927 Cal. 230. Trimbak v. Ganesh,air. 1923 Nag. 22. and in tika Ram v. Moti Lal, AIR. 1930 All. 299. in support of his contention that the statement of boundaries in a document between strangers is admissible in evidence in order to establish the identity of the property. In sheik Ketabuddin's case (6) the owners of the lands were examined and the statements as to boundaries were considered as corroborative evidence. In trimbak's case (7) the admission purports to be under S. 32 (2) of the Evidence Act. But the persons connected with the document were alive and were examined as witnesses It cannot, therefore, be said to be a decision under S. 32 of the Evidence Act In Tike Ram's case (8 ). the statement as to boundaries were held not admissible under S. 32 (3), but were held to be admissible u/s. 13 (b) of the Evidence Act. The decision in Ningawwa's case (5) no doubt supports him. In that decision, as the son of the person who executed the document was examined it was held that it constituted independent evidence and admitted on that ground. But in Kumudo Kumari dasi v. Dilsook Roy, AIR. 1927 Cal. 918. it was held that the recitals as to boundaries of lands other than those in tuit contained in documents between third parties who are strangers to the suit are not admissible and cannot be relied upon in evidence, relying on the decision in AIR 1926 Cal 948. The Calcutta decisions are not uniform. ( 13 ) THE Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Soney Loll Jha v. Darbdeo Narain Singh, AIR. 19,35 Pat. 167. . has held that S. 11 of the Evidence Act has no application in determining the question as to whether the recitals as regards the boundaries in documents between strangers are admissible. ( 13 ) THE Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Soney Loll Jha v. Darbdeo Narain Singh, AIR. 19,35 Pat. 167. . has held that S. 11 of the Evidence Act has no application in determining the question as to whether the recitals as regards the boundaries in documents between strangers are admissible. It was held that two conditions must be satisfied before a statement is admissible under s. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act; firstly, that it must be a statement of a relevant fact and secondly, it must be a statement against the proprietary interest of the person making it. With regard to what constitutes a statement of a relevant fact, it was observed as follows :" A fact to be relevant or the method of proof to come within any particular section in my judgment must be or do so prima facie. Its relevancy must not and cannot depend upon the proof of other facts and it cannot be such a matter capable of more than one interpretation. "it was, therefore, held that the statement of boundaries in a document of title relating to a different land between third parties are not admissible under Sec. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act. In Kalappa Shiddappa uppar v. Bhima Govinda Uppar, 1960 Myslj. 675, the recital of the boundaries of another land in a document between him and a third party was considered to be inadmis sible in evidence either under S. 11 (2) or S. 13 of the Evidence Act, following the Full Bench decision in Brojendra v. Mohim Chandra, AIR. 1927 Cal. 1 FB. and in madanlal v. Durgadutt, AIR. 1958 Raj. 206. Mr. Holla has relied upon an observation in that decision to the effect that if the documents in question had been executed by a stranger in favour of another stranger there would have been much force in the contention that great weight should be attached to such recitals, they haying no interest in the subject-matter of the recitals. This observation is obiter dicta and appears to be based on the decision in "rangayyan v. Innasimuthu, AIR. 1956 Mad. 226. which was later overruled in Nainar v. A. Chettiar, AIR. 1972 Mad. 154. ( 14 ) IN Savithri Devi v. Ram Ran Bijoy, AIR. 1950 PC. 1. This observation is obiter dicta and appears to be based on the decision in "rangayyan v. Innasimuthu, AIR. 1956 Mad. 226. which was later overruled in Nainar v. A. Chettiar, AIR. 1972 Mad. 154. ( 14 ) IN Savithri Devi v. Ram Ran Bijoy, AIR. 1950 PC. 1. it has been held that the principle upon which hearsay evidence is admitted under S. 32 (3) of the evidence Act is that a man is not likely to make a statement against his own interest unless true, but this sanction does not arise unless the party knows the statement to be against his interest In that case it was not shown that a person making the statement knew that he was thereby exposing himself to a suit for damages. Their Lordships held that this statement ought not to have been admitted in evidence. But this decision does not help the respondents since it cannot be said that the parties did not know what they were stating in Ext. A7 when they say that certain property had been left to the plaintiff-Church by their elders. On behalf of the respondents reliance was placed on the decision in Madanlal's case (13), wherein it has been held that the recials in a document between strangers, is not a particular instance in which a right was claimed, recognised or exercised or a transaction by which a right was claimed or asserted within the meaning of s. 13 of the Evidence Act and that the recitals of boundaries in documents between third parties are inadmissible to show that any party to the suit is or is not the owner of an adjoining land which has been mentioned as one of the boundaries in such documents. The principal reasons for this view were stated to be, firstly, that it will not be right to hold a party bound or affected by a recital as to the making of which he could have no control whatever and which has been made completely behind his back and. secondly, that such third parties have no particular reason to be accurate as to who is the owner of the land adjoining their own, and therefore, a mistake may easily creep in, in the mentioning of such boundaries, and that the boundaries may often be mentioned on imperfect knowledge or merely on hearty information. secondly, that such third parties have no particular reason to be accurate as to who is the owner of the land adjoining their own, and therefore, a mistake may easily creep in, in the mentioning of such boundaries, and that the boundaries may often be mentioned on imperfect knowledge or merely on hearty information. This decision has been relied on in Kalappa v. Bhima. In Subudhi Paahan v. Raghu Bhuvan, AIR. 1962 Ori. 40. the decision in Sonilal v. Narain Singh, was followed and it was held that the statements of boundaries in documents of title between third parties were not admissible under S. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act, as such admission cannot be said to be necessarily against the proprietary interests of the person making it. It was further held that it could be admissible only if it is shown that at the time it was made it was contrary to the interests of the maker and at the time it was sought to be used it is a statement of a relevant fact. In Chandreshwar v. Ramachandra Singh, AIR. 1973 Pat. 215. also it has been held that the recital of a boundary in a document executed by a third party is not admissible in evidence. In Nainar's case (15) a Division Bench considered the question of admissibility of recitals as to boundaries in a document not inter parties relating to a different property other than suit property under Ss. 11, 13 (a), 32 (3) and 32 (7) of the Evidence Act, since there was a conilict of opinion in the earlier decisions of the same Court. It was held that the decision of the learned single Judge in AIR 1956 Mad 226 was wrongly decided. The decision of the Patna High Court in Sonilal v. Darbdeo and the decision in Subudhi v. Raghu were followed. It was held that the recitals in a documaent not inter parties are not admissible under S. 11 or 13 or 32 (3) of the evidence Act, following the decisions in AIR 1924 Cal 1067 and AIR 1927 cal 918. The decision of the Patna High Court in Sonilal v. Darbdeo and the decision in Subudhi v. Raghu were followed. It was held that the recitals in a documaent not inter parties are not admissible under S. 11 or 13 or 32 (3) of the evidence Act, following the decisions in AIR 1924 Cal 1067 and AIR 1927 cal 918. Though in this decision the view taken appears to be that there is an absolute bar to the admissibility of the statement regarding boundaries in a document relating to a property other than the suit property between third parties, the correct view appears to be the one stated by the Full bench in Sonilal v. Darbdeo, viz, that such a statement would be admissible only in case both the conditions are satisfied i. e. , that it must be a relevant fact and that the statement must be against the proprietary interest of the person making it. According to the decision in Savithrl v. Ram Ran it is also necessary that the person making the statement must be aware of the fact that it is against his interest. ( 15 ) THE above decision of the Privy Council has been followed in ramrati Kuer v. Dwarika Prasad, AIR. 1967 SC. 1134. wherein it is held that a statement can be admissible under S. 32 (2) of the Evidence Act only if it is shown that the person making it knew at that time that it was against his pecuniary or proprietary interest and that in most cases such knowledge has to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. ( 16 ) MR. HOLLA also relied on the decision in Bhagawati Prasad v. Rameswari Kuer, AIR. 1952 SC. 72, wherein it has been held that the statements of a particular person that he is separated from a joint family of which he was a coparcener and that he has no further interest in the joint property or claim to any assets" left by his father, would be a statement made against the interest of such person, and after such person is dead, they would be relevant under S. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act. It has also been held that the assertion that there was separation not only in respect of himself but between all the coparceners would be admissible as a connected matter and an integral part of the same statement and that it is not merely the precise fact which is against the interest that is admissible but all matters that are involved in it and knit up with the statement. But it was not a case relating to a statement of boundaries in a document between third parties what Mr. Holla contends is that the statement regarding boundaries of item 10 mentioned in Ext. A7 relating to the share of the properties allote to Bernard is involved as a connected matter and is an integral part of the statement contained in the earlier part of the same document viz. , that to properties divisible between the parties to that document are those excluding the properties left to the Church by their elders. It is his contention that the statement in the earlier part of Exhibit A7 is against the interests of the persons making it in so far as they admit that they have no right to the said property, which originally belonged to their ancestors but has been conveyed to the Church. In so far as the right of the Church to the property excluded from division under Ext. A7 has been recognised. , it is a statement of a relevant fact under S. 13 of the Evidence Act and, being a statement contrary to the interests of the persons making it, is admissible under Sec. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act. This part of the statement in ext. A? in the earlier part of the document must therefore be held to be admissible under sub-sec (3) of S. 32 of the Evidence Act. But the argument of Mr. Holla that the statement of boundaries of item 10 in Ext. A7 is also admissible in evidence cannot be accepted. The statement regarding the southern boundary of the property allotted to Bernard under Ext. A7 is made in order to identify the property which fell to his share and is not connected in any way with the earlier recital recognising the right of the church to some other property. A7 is also admissible in evidence cannot be accepted. The statement regarding the southern boundary of the property allotted to Bernard under Ext. A7 is made in order to identify the property which fell to his share and is not connected in any way with the earlier recital recognising the right of the church to some other property. Hence, the statement of boundaries cannot be considered to be an integral part of the statement which is admissible under S. 32 (3) of the Evidence Act. It is, therefore, clear that there is no satisfactory evidence as to the northern boundary of the property conveyed under Ext. A3. ( 17 ) IT is the contention of Mr. Holla that even apart from the recital with regard to the boundaries in Ext. A7, the plaintiff has established that the property conveyed under Ext. A3 to the plaintiff-Church is the properly which is to the South of the present Sy. No. 57/5, namely, the suit property. It is clear from Ext. A8 that Sy Nos. 57|5: 57/9 and 57|10 are the properties which fell to the share of Bernard under the partition evidenced by Ext. A7. According tc the description of the properties which fell to the share of pernard under Ext. A7, two of the properties out of the three properties situate in Booloor village consisted of Mulgeni properties and only one was muli property. In Ext. A-8 it is only 57/5 which is described as muli property and the other two lands, S. No. 57/9 and 57 10, are described as mulgeni properties. It is therefore his contention that S. No. 57 5 fell to the share of Bernard as part of the property which originally belonged to anthony Kathi, the vendor under Ext. A-3. P. W. 4 is the son of Bernard. It is in his evidence that he is in possession of S. No. 57/5 having built a house thereon. The eastern boundary of the property conveyed to the plaintiff-Church under Ext. A-3 is also Government road. The eastern boundary of the property retained by Anthony Kamthi under Ext. A-3 is also Government road. Since the common boundary on the east of 57/5 is the same as that of the property retained by Anthony Kamthi under Ext. A3, it is urged that it is the property 57/5 which was retained by Anthony kamthi under Ext. A-3. Ext. The eastern boundary of the property retained by Anthony Kamthi under Ext. A-3 is also Government road. Since the common boundary on the east of 57/5 is the same as that of the property retained by Anthony Kamthi under Ext. A3, it is urged that it is the property 57/5 which was retained by Anthony kamthi under Ext. A-3. Ext. A-3 is of the year 1869. The partition under ext. A-7 is of the year 1889. Unless it is proved that Anthony Kamthi had no other property which had its eastern boundary as the Government road at the time o,f the execution of Ext. A-3, it cannot be said that the property which Barnard got to his share under Ext. A-7 was the only property which anthony Kamthi had having the Government road as its eastern boundary. The Survey map attached to Ext. D-4 shows that the Government road runs north to south and the entire survey numbers 56 as well as 57 had as their eastern boundaries the Government road. The property retained by anthony Kamthi under Ext. A-3 and described as lying to the north of the property conveyed to the plaintiff-Church under that document is part of muli No. 26 as recited in Ext. . A-3. From Ext. B-4 it is clear that what was muli No. 26 formerly became survey Nos. 56 and 57. Both 56 and 57 have been divided into a number of sub-divisions. Hence, it is possible that more than one part of survey No. 56 as well as of survey No. 57 had its eastern boundary ag the Government road on the date of Ext. A-3. There is no evidence to show that Anthony Kamthi did not possess any other property out of what was then muli No. 26 with the Government road as its eastern boundary. It is also not shown that the plaintiff-Church did not own any other property in muli No. 26 on the date of Ext. A-3. It is reasonable to expect the plaintiff-Church to maintain the records showing the properties of its ownership. But no such records have been produced. It is also not shown that the plaintiff-Church did not own any other property in muli No. 26 on the date of Ext. A-3. It is reasonable to expect the plaintiff-Church to maintain the records showing the properties of its ownership. But no such records have been produced. Hence, by the mere fact that survey No. 57/5 is one of the lands which fell to the share of Bernard, son of Anthony Kamthi, at the partition of 1889, it cannot be inferred that it is the only land which Anthony Kamthi possessed out of muli No. 26 having its eastern boundary as the Government road. It can also not be inferred that the land transferred under Ex. A-3 did continue to belong to Anthony Kamthi's sons on the date of Ext. A-7 i. e. , 20 years after the date of Ext. A-3 and that it was part of the properties which were treated as divisable by the heirs of Anthony Kamthi. The possibility that anthony Kamthi might have acquired the property which fell to the share of Bernard subsequent to the date of Ext. A-3 cannot be ruled out on the material placed before the Court. Under the circumstances, therefore, the plaintiff must be held to have failed to establish the identity of the northern boundary of the suit property. ( 18 ) THE eastern boundary of the suit property is the same as the eastern boundary of the property conveyed to the plaintiff-Church under Ext. A-3. But this fact is not of much significance in view of the fact that admittedly the eastern boundary of several other lands, sub-numbers of survey nos. 56 and 57, also have the Government road as their eastern boundary. Hence, the identity of the suit property must be held to have been not established. ( 19 ) THE plaintiff has also relied on Ext. A-9 and A-10 in support of its title. They are extracts from the Municipal registers. According to Ext. A-9 municipal tax has been paid in respect of survey No. 57/12, the suit property, for the year 1954-55. Plaintiff is described as the owner. Ext. A-10 shows that municipal tax has been paid on survey No. 57|12 for the year 1943-44 and the plaintiff has been treated as the person liable to pay the municipal tax. ( 20 ) IN Subbaraya v. Appathurai, AIR. 1943 Mad 756. Plaintiff is described as the owner. Ext. A-10 shows that municipal tax has been paid on survey No. 57|12 for the year 1943-44 and the plaintiff has been treated as the person liable to pay the municipal tax. ( 20 ) IN Subbaraya v. Appathurai, AIR. 1943 Mad 756. relied on by Mr. Holla, it has been held that the fact that the patta has all along stood in the name of the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-title and that thsy were paying the kist due to the Government constitute prima facie evidence of the title to the land being in the plaintiff more especially in the absence of any claim of original title in the defendants. But in Ramakrishniah v. Madhavakrishniah, 1964 Myslj. Supp 74. it has been held that neither the extracts from the property tax register maintained by the Municipality nor the receipts of municipal taxes are either evidence of title or possession and that such registers are primarily maintained for the purpose of levy and recovery of taxes and that the column for entry of the name of the persons liable to pay the taxes reads: 'assessee, owner or occupier'. It was further held that an entry in such a register can have only some corroborative value if independent evidence was adduced to show how it came to be made. But in the present case, there is no evidence to show as to how the entries in Exts. A-7, A-8 and A-9 came to be made. In Hazard asrabuddin v. Hussein Khan, (1966) 1 Myslj. 772. it has been held that a patta is not a document of title or a deed of grant but that it is a record of demand by the government that such and such an amount is due as land revenue on such and such an area. Hence, the entries in the Municipal registers cannot be placed on a higher footing than a patta maintained under the Land Revenue code. ( 21 ) RELIANCE is next placed on the reports of the shanbogue and the health Officer and the Tahsildar They the Exts. A24, A25 and B3, dated 3-8-61, 25-11-61 and 8-7-62. They are made in the course of the enquiry which was originated on the application of defendant 2. The suit property in Ext. A24 is referred to as suruva eijerga sambandha patta dhagirthethe in Ext. A24, A25 and B3, dated 3-8-61, 25-11-61 and 8-7-62. They are made in the course of the enquiry which was originated on the application of defendant 2. The suit property in Ext. A24 is referred to as suruva eijerga sambandha patta dhagirthethe in Ext. A25 it is stated by the Health Officer of the Municipality that the suit property is now being used exclusively by the Church Authorities. Similar statement is to be found in Ext. D3 But it cannot be said that these statements amount to an admission of title of the plaintiff to the suit property. ( 22 ) IT is contended by Mi Holla that defendant 1, has failed to produce the chittas which ought to have been maintained by the Gcvt relating to the year of Ext A3. namely. 1869, and that if produced, they would show that Vaikunta Prabhu who is described as the owner of the property lying to the South of the property conveyed to plaintiff-Church under Ext. A3 was the owner of the property which came to bear the Sy Nos 61/1, 61/2, 61/3 and 61/4 under Ext. B4 after the survey settlement and that he ceased to be the owner of he said land prior the date of Ext 4 He has relied on the decision in Hiralal v Badkulal, Therein the contention of the defendants in a suit on accounts that it was not part of the defendants duty to produce their account books unless they were called upon to do so because the onus rested on the plaintiffs to prove their case was rdecled, relying on the observations in Murugesham Pillai v Gnaga Sambandha pandara Sannadhi, AIR. 1917 PC. 6, The defendants had srgned in the plaintiff's book an entry which stated that a certain amount was due as balance after the checking of the accounts with the books of the defendants. The first issue in that crse was whether defendants did sign that entry after understanding the debit and credit accounts and accepting the sum thereir mentioned as the correct balance due to the plaintiffs. Hence, the observations of the supreme Court must be understood in relation to the facts of the above- said case. In Secretary of State v. Upendra Narain, AIR. 1923 Cal. 247. Hence, the observations of the supreme Court must be understood in relation to the facts of the above- said case. In Secretary of State v. Upendra Narain, AIR. 1923 Cal. 247. the disputed land was subjected to the action of the river which shifted its bed at various periods for over a peried of 30 years. The lands disappeared and reformed from time to time. The most valuable evidence to show whether they were at that time in the bed of a public navigable river and were consequentty not only assessed with revenue but were excluded from the permanently settled estate, would have been the papers relating to the decennial settlement and the permanent settlement of estate. These were in the custody of the Crown and were not brought before the Court though every effort was made to secure their production. Hence, the adverse comment against the crown made by the Sub. Judge was held to be justified on account of the valuable evidence which had not been produced by the Crown and an adverse inference was therefore drawn against the Crown. But in the present case, no attempt was made by the plaintiff to get the chittas produced. There is also no evidence to show whether those chittas relating to the relevant period were in the custody of the State or not. Hence, under the circumstances no adverse inference can be drawn against the Government in the present case. ( 23 ) BEFORE the Deputy Commr the document Ext. A3 was produced and on behalf of the plaintiff, title to the suit property was claimed, but at the time of Exts. Bl and B2, which were much earlier, the plaintiff did not claim title to the suit property. Ext. B8 is the permission granted by the plaintiff to defendant 2 to pass across the land Sy No. 57/6 and to take vehicles also across the northern part of that land. This permission was granted at the request of defendant 2, since he wanted to construct a house in his property and wanted access from the Govt road which lies on the east of Sy No. 57/12. Though the plaintiff gave permission to defendant 2 to pass across its property Sy No. 57/6, it is significan that the defendant 2 did not ask for any permission to pass across the suit land Survey No. 57/12. Though the plaintiff gave permission to defendant 2 to pass across its property Sy No. 57/6, it is significan that the defendant 2 did not ask for any permission to pass across the suit land Survey No. 57/12. The plaintiff-Church also did not raise any objection to defendant 2 passing across the suit land. Ext. B-10 is a lease deed in respect of the northern part of suryer No. 57/6. The lessor is the plaintiff-chuih. The eastern boundary of the property leased is the suit property described as Poramboke. The lower Appellate Court at cached importance to this circumstance and held it was improbable that the property was owned by the plaintiff Mr. Holla, however, relied on the observations in Kali Prasad Singh v. Ram prasad Singh, AIR. 1974 SC. 148. and urged that the description of the property lying to the East of the property leased was merely copied from the revenue records. In that case it was agreed that the donor Debi Prasad had 1|6th share in the toatlity of family pronerty comprised in Sch. B which was transferred into half share in Schedule C properties and converted into Schedule F property. The deed of gift left no doubt that the whole property belonging to the donor was transferred by him by Ext A7 The non-mention of schedule c and specific mention of 1/6th share in the properties was held to be due to the fact that inspite of various decrees the revenue records were not corrected by mutation proceedings and the donor therefore was required to refer to his 1/6th share to conform with the revenue records. The recitals in the deed were held to mcke it clear that the donor intended to convey and did convey the whole property, owned by him to the donee. Under these circumstances it was held that the description of the property according to the revenue records was immaterial. But in the present case the plaintiff has claimed title to the suit property which forms the eastern boundary of the subject matter of the lease. Ext. B-10 is of the year 1961. Under these circumstances it was held that the description of the property according to the revenue records was immaterial. But in the present case the plaintiff has claimed title to the suit property which forms the eastern boundary of the subject matter of the lease. Ext. B-10 is of the year 1961. II really the plaintiff was to the owner of the suit property it is unlikely that he would have referred to it merely as Poromboke in Ext B-10 After the controversy arose with regard to the suit property, the Board of management of the plaintiff-church passed a resolution agreeing to a road being laid across the northern part of the suit property on condition that the road did not pass over any graves. In this resolutuon also there is no claim of ownerhip in the suit pioperty put-forward by the plainttif. The suit property has been described as burial ground proomboke in Ext. B-4 of the year 1904. These circumstances show that the plaintiff did not put forward its claim to title even upto the date of Exi. B-? The Parish Priest who made the satement under Exts. B-1 and B-2 had not been examined to show that those statements were made under any mistake. No office bearer of the plaintiff charch has been examined as a witness. The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, justified in making the observation that the claim put-forward by the [laintif ia an afte-thought. ( 24 ) IT is urged by Mr. Holla that the land bearing Sy. No. 61/1 admittedly belongs tc the church and is used as a burial ground and simce it has been described as Porommboke Burial ground in the Survey and Settlement register Ext. B-4 and description of the suit property as Poromboke burrar ground does not negative the recognition of the plaintiff's title to the suit property by the Government. But what is admitted in the written statement of defendant 1 is that Sy. No. 61/1 was purchased by the plaintoff. B-4 and description of the suit property as Poromboke burrar ground does not negative the recognition of the plaintiff's title to the suit property by the Government. But what is admitted in the written statement of defendant 1 is that Sy. No. 61/1 was purchased by the plaintoff. There is no admission that even after it came to be used as a bunal ground the plaintiff continued to have a subsisting title to n. D. W. 2 was the Assistant commissioner and the Headquarters Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, south Kanara in 1962 He has stated in his evidence that sometimes the owners relinquish their rights in favour of Government, that then it becomes government land and that Poromboke land is a land left to be used for public purposes. He also stated that survey No 61/1 is in the enjoyment of the church, it being a public property. Hence, it is probable that the plaintiff-church relinquished it's title m Suivey No. 61/1 at the time of its conversion to a burial ground. Hence, this circumstance does not support the contention of Mr. Holla. ( 25 ) ON behalt of the appellant I. A 11 an application under Or 41 R. 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been filed in this Court for admitting as additional evrdenee the certified copy of the survey plan of the lands s. No. 57 of Boloor village The purpose of seeking admission of this document is to show that the lands bearing Survey Nos. 57/9 and 57|10 do not have as their eastern boundaries the Government road. This is intended to support the contention of (he appellant thai it is only S. No 57|5 out of the properties which fell to the share of Barnard which has its eastern boundary as the Government road. The certified copy which is sought to be admitted in evidence was obtained in the year 1915 There is no explanation as to why it was not produced in the trial Court. Besides the application being highly belated, this is an attempt to fill up a lacuna in the case of the plaintiff. Hence, this application is rejected. ( 26 ) THE plaintiff also claimed title by adverse possession. As observed already, Exts. B-1, B-2 and B-10 show that the plaintiff did not claim any title to tht suit property till the year 1961. Hence, this application is rejected. ( 26 ) THE plaintiff also claimed title by adverse possession. As observed already, Exts. B-1, B-2 and B-10 show that the plaintiff did not claim any title to tht suit property till the year 1961. The suit property is not enclosed on its eastern side. Moreover, Survey No. 57/6 which hes on the western side of the suit property, and belongs to the church, is separated from the suit property by the wall of Sursurvey No. 57/6. Similarly the suit property is separated on its southern side by the wall of the land Survey No. 61/4 which also admittedly belongs to the plaintiff. There is also evidence to show that there are roads and path-ways running across the suit property as shown in the Commissioner's sketch. Thus, the possession of the suit property by the plaintiff-Church, if any, as evidenced by the graves found in the suit property by the Commissioner, was neither exclusive nor accompanied by the required animus to establish adverse possession. Hence, the lower appellate court was justified in finding that the plaintiff failed to establish its title by adverse possession. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .