A. N. SURTI, M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) A question of considerable importance is raised in the present writ petition affecting the representation of parties as provided in sub-sec. (4) of sec. 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act 9147 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes before a Tribunal appointed by the State Government under Clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act and the alleged claim of the members of the legal profession of their right to practice before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence as provided under sec. 30 (ii) of the Advocates Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Advocates Act ). ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the central issue of dispute between the parties a few relevant facts may be stated. ( 3 ) ON November 23 1974 the Government of Gujarat appointed respondent No. 2 (Shri M. U. Shah) Industrial Tribunal of Gujarat at Ahmedabad as the Tribunal for adjudication of an industrial dispute connected with the matters specified in the schedule appended to the order at Annexure A to the petition. The said dispute existed between the Jyoti Switchgears Limited Mogar district Kaira and the workmen employed under it. The Schedule which is set out at the foot of Annexure A to the petition is as follows : 1 All workmen working in the factory should be given following leave with full pay: (a) 15 days sick leave. (b) 15 days casual leave. (c) 10 days festival leave. 2 Sick leave and privilege leave should be allowed to be accumulated upto 3 years. 9 ( 4 ) THE aforesaid reference before the Tribunal was numbered as Reference: I. T. No. 212/74. In the said reference respondent No. I Kheda Jilla Factory Kamdar Union appeared on behalf of the petitioner Companys workmen and objected to the appearance of the petitioner Companys advocate. ( 5 ) THE petitioner-Company submitted before the Tribunal that the aforesaid objection of the Union was not valid in law and not tenable. On behalf of the petitionercompany it was submitted that sec. 36 of the Act places partial restriction on the partys right for being represented by a legal practitioner. ( 5 ) THE petitioner-Company submitted before the Tribunal that the aforesaid objection of the Union was not valid in law and not tenable. On behalf of the petitionercompany it was submitted that sec. 36 of the Act places partial restriction on the partys right for being represented by a legal practitioner. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner-Company that it was open to the parties to be represented by legal practitioners having obtained the consent of the other parties as mentioned in sec. 36 (4) of the Act. It was also urged on behalf of the petitionercompany that the provisions contained in sec. 36 of the Act have been rendered ineffective and are superseded by subsequent legislation namely the Advocates Act. It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner-Company before the Tribunal that see. 31) of the Advocates Act confers a right on an advocate to practice throughout the territory to which the said Act extends and in all Courts and before any Tribunal etc. ( 6 ) THE Tribunal by the impugned order passed on July 1 1975 (vide Annexure C to the petition) rejected the submissions of the petitioner-company after hearing the Personal Officer of the petitioner company. The Tribunal took the view that sec. 36 (3) (4) of the Act does not permit of the appearance of a legal practitioner except with the consent of the other party. As a result of the said view of the Tribunal the Tribunal rejected the application of the petitioners Company for the necessary permission for the oppearance of an advocate before the Tribunal. ( 7 ) UNDER the aforesaid circumstances the petitioner-Company and Mr. Ashvin P. Hathi a practising advocate at Baroda filed the present writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against Kaira Jilla Factory Kamdar Union who represented the workmen of the petitioner-Company and Shri M. U. Shah who was appointed as the Tribunal for adjudicating the aforesaid dispute between the workmen of the petitioner-Company and the petitionercompany under Clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. ( 8 ) IN substance it is averred in the petition that there existed a dispute between respondent No. 1 and the petitioner-Company in regard to the demand of workers for various types of leave. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. ( 8 ) IN substance it is averred in the petition that there existed a dispute between respondent No. 1 and the petitioner-Company in regard to the demand of workers for various types of leave. It is also averred in the petition that the respondent-Union raised an objection to the appearance of an advocate representing the case of the petitioner-Company before the Tribunal and that the Tribunal has rejected the request of the petitioner-Company to engage an advocate for the reasons mentioned hereinabove. ( 9 ) IN paragraph 6 of the petition it is averred that sec. 36 (3) and (4) of the Act debarring advocates from appearing on behalf of a party to the proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal except with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and the leave of the Industrial Tribunal is inconsistent with the provisions of the Advocates Act 1961 and hence the former is abrogated. It is also averred in the petition that the name of petitioner No. 2 appears on the roll prepared by the Gujarat State Bar Council and he has been admitted on the above roll of the Gujarat State Bar Council and as such is having a right to act and appear on behalf of the petitioner-Company before the Tribunal as provided by sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. ( 10 ) SHORTLY stated on the aforesaid averments as set out in the petition the petitioner-Company prayed that the impugned order Ex. C rejecting the request of the petitioner-Company for allowing petitioner No. 2 as the petitioner-Companys advocate in a proceeding before the Tribunal should be quashed and set aside. It is also prayed that the direction should be given to respondent No. 1 to allow the petitioner Company to be represented through its advocates in the pending Reference No IT No. 212/74. The petitioner-Company also prayed for a declaration that sec. 36 and in particular sec. 36 (3) and sec. 36 (4) of the Act should be declared as unconstitutional ultra vires illegal and void. ( 11 ) AS the petitioners challenged the legality of the Central Act the necessary notice was issued to the Attorney General of India and he was duly served. When this petition was placed before us for disposal no appearance was made on behalf of the Attorney General of India. ( 12 ) MR. ( 11 ) AS the petitioners challenged the legality of the Central Act the necessary notice was issued to the Attorney General of India and he was duly served. When this petition was placed before us for disposal no appearance was made on behalf of the Attorney General of India. ( 12 ) MR. N. J. Mehta the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has raised the following contentions only: (1) The Advocates Act confers a right on an advocate to practice and to represent all suitors before a Tribunal Court or an Authority and that right of an advocate is unrestricted by any other provisions contained in any other Act or Acts. (2) The word practice in sec. 30 of the Advocates Act means to appear and act for a suitor in any case before a Court Tribunal or an authority. (3) Sec. 36 of the Act is in direct conflict and repugnant to the provisions of sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. (4) That the Advocates Act is a subsequent legislation and hence the provisions of the said Act must necessary prevail over the provisions contained in the Act. ( 13 ) IN order to appreciate the contentions raised by Mr. Mehta we may set out at this stage the relevant provisions of the Act. Sec. 36 (3) and (4) of the Act which provide as follows : 36 No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court. 36 In any proceeding before a Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceedings and with the leave of the Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be. ( 14 ) WE may also set out at this stage the statutory meaning of the expression state roll as provided in sub-sec. (n) of sec 2 of the Advocates Act 1961 (n) State roll means a roll of advocates prepared and maintained by a State Bar Council under sec. 17 sec. ( 14 ) WE may also set out at this stage the statutory meaning of the expression state roll as provided in sub-sec. (n) of sec 2 of the Advocates Act 1961 (n) State roll means a roll of advocates prepared and maintained by a State Bar Council under sec. 17 sec. 30 of the Advocates Act provides as follows : 30 Subject to the provisions of this Act every advocate whose name is entered in the common roll shall be entitled as of right to practise throughout the territories to which this Act extends (i) in all Courts including the Supreme Court: (ii) before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise. ( 15 ) IN course of the hearing of the petition our attention was also invited to sec. 14 of the Indian Bar Councils Act being Act No. 38 of 1926 which is in the fallowing terms : 14 (1) An advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise: (a) (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-see. (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence and (e) (2) Where rules have been made by any High Court within the meaning of clause (24) of sec. 3 of the General Clauses Act 1897 or in-the case of a High Court for which a Bar Council has been constituted under this Act by such Bar Council under sec. 15 regulating the conditions subject to which advocates of other High Courts may be permitted to prictise in the High Court such advocates shall not be entailed to practise therein otherwise than subject to such conditions (3) ( 16 ) NOW ill order to appreciate the contentions raised by Mr. Mehta we may say that the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was enacted with the principal object of making provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes between workers employed in any industry and their employer. Mehta we may say that the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was enacted with the principal object of making provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes between workers employed in any industry and their employer. Thus the perspective of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 essentially aimed at industrial peace between the workers and their employers in any industry by enacting suitable and expedient statutory provisions so as to bring about settlement of disputes between the workers and their employers as expeditiously as possible. Bearing in mind the said objective of legislating Industrial Disputes Act 1947 we may usefully refer to the preamble of the Act which is in the following words: whereas it is expedient to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing; it may be emphasised at this stage that before enacting the Advocates Act the legislature did not and could not have kept before its eyes the obvious purpose for which Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was enacted. Suffice it to state that the Advocates Act was essentially put on the statute book with the object of amending and consolidating the law relating to legal practitioners and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and All India Bar. ( 17 ) FOR the disposal of the present petition it is abundantly clear to us that the respective fields of the aforesaid two legislative enactments are entirely distinct and separate and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the legislative fields of the respective enactments are the same. ( 18 ) AT this stage we may also refer to sec. 10 of the Act. 10 Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended it may at any time by order in writing : (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof or (b) refer any matter appearing to he connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court of Inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to he connected with or relevant to the dispute whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second or Third Schedule to a Tribunal for adjudication. Provided that. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provided further that. . Provided that. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Provided further that. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The matters relating to the following disputes can be referred to the Tribunal for adjudication under sub-clause (d) of subsec. (i) of sec. 10 the Second Schedule 1 The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders; 2 The application and interpretation of standing orders: 3 Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of or grant of relief to workmen wrongfully dismissed; 4 Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege; 5 Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock-out; and 6 All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule. The Third Schedule. Matters within the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals. 1 Wages including the period and mode or payment ; 2 Compensatory and other allowances ; 3 Hours of work and rest intervals ; 4 Leave with wages and holidays ; 5 Bonus profit sharing provident fund and gratuity ; 6 Shift working otherwise than in accordance with standing orders ; 7 Classification by grades ; 8 Rules of discipline ; 9 Rationalisation ; 10 Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment ; and 11 Any other matter which may be prescribed. ( 19 ) IT can be seen from the provisions contained in sec. 10 and the contents of the second and the third schedule of the Act that the object in enacting the said provisions was to promote achieve and secure industrial peace between the workers of any industry and their employer. The obvious legislative object in enacting the said provisions was to put a halt to any unrest amongst the workers and to avoid a feeling of unjust exploitation of the workers of any industry and their employer by referring certain kinds of disputes for adjudication before a Tribunal. It is also clear from the aforesaid provisions that whenever the appropriate Government is of the opinion that there exists any industrial dispute of the type mentioned in second and third schedules of the Act it is open to the Government to refer the dispute for adjudication to a Tribunal under clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. It is also clear from the aforesaid provisions that whenever the appropriate Government is of the opinion that there exists any industrial dispute of the type mentioned in second and third schedules of the Act it is open to the Government to refer the dispute for adjudication to a Tribunal under clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 and in such cases the Government is always anxious to obtain an adjudication from a tribunal as expeditiously as possible and that too not at the cost of the best interests of any industry. ( 20 ) WHEN we turn to sub-sec. (4) of sec. 36 of the Act it is clear to us that the Legislature in its supreme wisdom thought it desirable practicable and expedient thar the aforesaid object can best be achieved by putting two fetters on the parties right of representation before a Labour Court Tribunal or National Tribunal and accordingly enacted sec. 36 (4) of the Act. We may say and emphasise that on the said right of representation of the parties before the Labour Court Tribunal National Tribunal there are two fetters viz. : (1) That a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to a proceeding ; (2) That before a party is permitted to be represented by a legal practitioner the leave of the Labour Courts Tribunal or National Tribunal must be necessarily obtained. Surely such a limitative provision contained in sec 36 (4) of the Act on the parties right of representation is in the best interests of achieving the aforesaid desired object of the Legislature viz. promoting a settlement of disputes between the workers and their employer of achieving industrial peace and putting a halt to any unrest and a feeling of unjust exploitation amongst the workers of any industry and thereby safeguarding the best interests of any industry as expeditiously as possible. Suffice it to state that the Act intended and aimed to achieve i. e. speedy settlement of disputes between the workers and their employer and while deciding the dispute between the parties we cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act covered a special field of legislation with the principal object of ameliorating the living conditions of those who earn their bread by their sweat and perspiration. The emphasis was no speedy expeditious disposal of industrial disputes and the perspective was that of fashioning a machinery for resolving such disputes and designing its procedure. And it is this provision which is said to have been impliedly repealed by sec. 30 of the Advocates Act which operates on an altogether different field. . ( 21 ) IN view of what has been stated above we may now turn to the relevant provisions of the Advocates Act. As stated above sec. 2 (n) defines the expression State Roll. Sec. 30 provides for the right of advocates to practice. In the said section there is no tittle of indication to suggest that an advocate is having any inherent or legal right of being engaged by any party appearing before any of the forums as provided in sec. 36 (4) of the Act. No doubt it is true that once the name of an advocate is entered in the State roll he is entitled to practice throughout the territories to which the Advocates Act extends viz : (i) in all Courts including the Supreme Court; (ii) before any Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence; and (iii) before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under any law for the time being in force entitled to practise; and the advocates right to practise will be subject to the provisions of the Advocates Act. ( 22 ) BUT Mr. Mehtas contention is that sec. 30 of the Advocates Act confers on an advocate an unrestricted and absolute right to practice meaning to appear and act for a suitor in any Court Tribunal or Authority. In substance in this behalf Mr. Mehta submitted that if the aforesaid fetters are put on the right of representation of a party viz. to obtain the consent of the other parties before the Tribunal and to secure its leave before a party can be represented by legal practitioners before the Tribunal the right conferred on the members of the legal profession under sec. 30 (ii) of the Advocates Act is seriously affected to the prejudice of the legal profession. Mr. Mehta urged that to the aforesaid extent sec. 36 (4) of the Act is in direct conflict and repugnant to the provisions of sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. 30 (ii) of the Advocates Act is seriously affected to the prejudice of the legal profession. Mr. Mehta urged that to the aforesaid extent sec. 36 (4) of the Act is in direct conflict and repugnant to the provisions of sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. He also submitted that the Advocates Act came into force on January 4 1963 and in point of time is a later legislation and hence the provisions of sec. 36 (4) of the Act are abrogated by sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. In sec. 30 of the Advocates Act it is impossible for us to see any such absolute and unrestricted right as canvassed by Mr. Mehta. Sec. 30 of the Advocates Act does not lay down any such absolute rule of law. It does not confer on a litigant a right to be represented by an Advocate. It presupposes that the litigant is entitled to be represented by an Advocate. If otherwise a person is not free to appoint an agent. Sec. 30 of the Advocates Act will not authorise him to do so. Sec. no is the successor of and similar to the provisions of sec. 14 of the Bar Council Act 1926 Thus it is clear to us that no such absolute and unrestricted legal right is conferred on the members of the legal profession as canvassed by Mr. Mehta. There is no such indication or any tittle of indication worth the name of such an absolute right in the statutory provisions contained in sec. 30 of the Advocates Act as urged by Mr. Mehta. The statutory language of sec. 30 of the Advocates Act in our opinion does not indicate any inconsistency or repugnancy between the provisions sec. 20 of the Advocates Act and sec. 36 of the Act. To read the two sections in such a manner would obviously and patently result into defeating the very purpose and object of legislating Industrial Disputes Act 1947 IN enacting sec. 36 (4) of the Act the paramount consideration which weighed with the legislature was that all settlements between the workers and their employer in any industry should be promoted and achieved as expeditiously as possible with a view to safeguard and maintain industrial peace and as stated above to bring an expeditious halt to any feeling of unrest and disatisfaction amongst the workers and their employer. If we accept Mr. If we accept Mr. Mehtas submission the very object of enacting the Act would be totally frustrated. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to accept Mr. Mehtas submission the an advocates right to appear and act is offended in any manner by virtue of the provisions contained in sec. 36 (4) of the Act. ( 23 ) MR. Mehta invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1461-1468 of 1974 delivered on August 13 1975 In a group of these appeals the Supreme Court had to consider the question as to whether the State Bar Council is a person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 38 so that it has locus standi to appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision of the disciplinary Tribunal of the Bar Council of India which it claimed was embarrasingly erroneous and if left unchallenged might frustrate the high obligation of maintaining standards of probity purity and canons of correct professional conduct among the members of the Bar on its roll Mr. Mehta invited our attention to the following passage from the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court. The Bar is not a private guild like that of barbers butchers and candlestickmakers but by bold contrast a public institution committed to public justice and pro bono publico service. The grant of a monopoly licence to practice law is based on three assumptions: (i) There is a socially useful function for the lawyer to perform. (2) The lawyer is a professional person who will perform that function and (3) His performance as a professional person is regulated by himself and more formally by the profession as a whole. rile central function that the legal profession must perform is nothing less than the administration of justice (The practice of law is a public Utility The Lawyer The Public and Professional Responsibility by F. Raymond Marks et al Chicago American Bar Foundation 1972 P. 288289 A glance at the functions of the Bar including and it will be apparent that a rainbow of public utility duties including legal aid to the poor is east on those bodies in the national hope that the members of this monopoly will serve society and keep to cannons of ethics befitting an honourable order. If pathological cases of misbehaviour occur the reputation and credibility of the Bar suffer a mayhem and who but the Bar Council is more concerned with a sensitive to this potential disrepute the few black sheep bring about ? The official heads of the Bar i. e. the Attorney General and the Advocates General too are distressed if a lawyer stoops to conquer by resort to soliciting touting and other corrupt practice. ( 24 ) MR. Mehta also invited our attention to a reported decision in MULCHAND V. MUKUND A. I. R. 1942 BOMBAY 296 In that case there was a dispute between a member of the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. Dhulia and the Society and the dispute was referred to arbitration under sec 54 of the Co-operative Societies Act. The concerned Society had framed Rule 36 under the Act. Rule 35 was to the following effect: in proceedings held under Rules 32 to 35 no party shall be represented by a legal practitioner. In that case it was one of the contentions that Rule 36 was ultra vires. It was pointed out that the petitioner was considerably handicapped by having to appear before the arbitrators without the assistance of a lawyer and that the rule inasmuch as it totally prohibited representation of a party by a legal practitioner was unreasonable and therefore should be held to be bad by the Court In course of the judgment the Court observed as follows : but as I shall presently point out the right of a lawyer to practice is not an absolute right. The very charter which gives him the right to practice controls limits and circumscribes his right. Now there are two charters which entitle a lawyer in this State to practise. One is the Bar Councils Act and the other is the Pleaders Act. The first gives the right to a lawyer to practise as an advocate of this Court the other gives him a right to practise as a District Pleader but as the matter is of considerable importance we might consider the right of all lawyers both pleaders and advocates. Turning first to the Bar Councils Act the statutory right given to an advocate who has been enrolled as such by this Court is under sec. 14 (1) of the Bar Councils Act and that right is to practise subject to the provisions of sub-sec. Turning first to the Bar Councils Act the statutory right given to an advocate who has been enrolled as such by this Court is under sec. 14 (1) of the Bar Councils Act and that right is to practise subject to the provisions of sub-sec. 4 of sec.) in the High Court of which he is an advocate and save as otherwise provided by sub-sec. (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Court in the Province and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence and before any other authority or person before whom such advocate is by or under the law for the time being in force entitled to practise. Therefore his right to practise is controlled by this important pervasion that any other law for the time being in force may restrict or take away his right Therefore if the Co-operative Societies Act were to provide that an advocate of the High Court of Bombay shall not practise before the arbitral tribunal set up under that Act then the right of the advocate will be circumscribed by the provisions of that law. Mr. Mehtas submission is that under set 30 of the Advocates Act the legislature has deliberately not used the words under any other law for the time being in force. In this view of the matter Mr. Mehta submitted that an advocate is having an absolute and unrestricted right to practise as provided in sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. In the earlier part of our judgment we have mentioned our reasons as to why we disagree with the said submission of Mr. Mehta. ( 25 ) IN RANGASWAMY V. INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL A. 1. R. 1954 MADRAS 558 in paragraph while dealing with the provisions of sec. 36 (4) of the Act it is observed as follows :- it is next contended that the impugned provisions are in contravention of Art. 14 of the Constitution and therefore void. The argument is that while a litigant who has a cause in a Civil Court has a right to be represented by counsel a party to a proceeding before a Tribunal is denied a similar right and that it is discrimination obnoxious to Art. 14. The argument is that while a litigant who has a cause in a Civil Court has a right to be represented by counsel a party to a proceeding before a Tribunal is denied a similar right and that it is discrimination obnoxious to Art. 14. The answer to this contention is that Art. 14 does not forbid classification and provided it rests on some difference relevant to the subject it cannot be assailed as repugnant to it. This is so well settled that there is no need to refer to the authorities on the subject. The question to be decided is whether any ground exists for treating appearance before Tribunals differently from appearance before Courts. There can be little difficulty in answering this question. We wish to make it clear that in the petition before us the impugned provisions of sec. 36 of the Act are not challenged on any of the constitutional grounds. That being so the aforesaid reported decision of the Madras High Court does not assist the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. ( 26 ) IN RAJAGOPALA V. COLLECTOR OF SALT-REVENUE A. I. R. 1937 MADRAS 735 the Court had to consider the right of a civil servant to appear before the authority concerned. The Court considered the provisions of sec. 14 (1) (b) of the Bar Councils Act and observed as follows : with regard to point (b) namely the right of the appellant to be represented by counsel Mr. Jayarama Ayyar relies upon sec. 14 (1) (b) Bar Councils Act which reads as follows: an advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise. . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-sec. (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force in any other Court in British India and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence. Under Rule 55 the person holding the enquiry is legally authorised to take evidence and hence he argues that an advocate is entitled as of right to appear at such an enquiry. Under Rule 55 the person holding the enquiry is legally authorised to take evidence and hence he argues that an advocate is entitled as of right to appear at such an enquiry. But the Advocate General argues that the real question is not whether an advocate has a right to appear but whether his client has a right to be represented by him that is to say is the enquiry one at which the person charged is entitled to appear at all or to appear in person only or by himself or by his agent. Mr. Jayarama Ayyar has conceded that there is no right at common law to appear by an agent and the Advocate General argues that there is no such general right and that the scheme of the Indian Legislature is to confer only a special right to be represented by an advocate or agent such as that given by sec. 340 Criminal P. C. Such a statutory right is also given under Order 3 Rule 1 Civil P. C Also Order. 33 Rule 3 enables a person to present an application through an authorised agent if he is exempted from appearing in Court. Sec. 31 Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act entitles a person to appear by his advocate in cases under that Act. Sec. 76 Patents and Designs Act is another instance in point. So also sec. 30 of Railways Act of 1890 sec. 14 of Trade Disputes Act and sec. 24 of Workmens Compensation Act. There is very little authority in the shape of decision but the Advocate General cites a case where the Court denied the right of a person to appear except by himself. . . . . . . . . . The Court further observed : there being no common law right to be represented by counsel and if there are statutes directing how a person is to be heard as in the case referred to than the words of the statute alone afford a solution of the question. Are there any words in Rule 55 which sufficiently clearly show how the person charged may appear at the enquiry ? Are there any words in Rule 55 which sufficiently clearly show how the person charged may appear at the enquiry ? The rule provides that the person charged shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heared in person and that he is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. In my view the words to be heard in person must be given their natural and ordinary meaning; and the other provisions already referred to appear to me to be consistent with an appearance in person and not by agent or counsel and adopting the method of construing a statute preferred by Lord Coleridge C. J. in (1889) 23 Q. B. D. 29. I look at the words used which appear to me to be sufficiently plain to give effect to them. That being so in my view they exclude the appellant from being heard by counsel or otherwise than in person. I agree with the Advocate Generals contention and the view of the learned trial Judge that this question has to be determined not by counsels right of audience in inferior Courts but by the right of the client to be represented by him and any argument based on sec 14 (b) Bar Councils Act therefore does not assist the appellant. If there is any hardship caused to the appellant by his being deprived of the assistance of counsel though I do not think that there is in the present case the construction of a statute is not to be governed by any such consideration. ( 27 ) IN ZONAL MANAGER L. I. C. V. CITY MUNSIF MERRUT A. I. R. 1968 ALLAHABAD 270 at page 272 in paragraph 7 it is observed as follows : sec. 30 of the Advocates Act does not lay down an absolute rule of law. It does not confer on a litigant a right to be represented by an Advocate. It presupposes that the litigant is entitled to be represented by an Advocate. If otherwise a person is not free to appoint an agent sec. 30 of the Advocates Act will not authorise him to do so. Sec. 30 is the successor of and similar to the provisions of sec. It presupposes that the litigant is entitled to be represented by an Advocate. If otherwise a person is not free to appoint an agent sec. 30 of the Advocates Act will not authorise him to do so. Sec. 30 is the successor of and similar to the provisions of sec. 14 of the Bar Council Act 1926 there is in British India no common law right in a party to be represented by counsel. The Advocates right of audience since the Bar Councils Act depends on sec. 14 of the Act. But the Advocates right of audience is necessarily inseparable from his clients right to appear by advocate before a particular Tribunal If the client is expressly denied the privilege of being heard by counsel it is obvious that the Bar Councils Act will not save him from the disability. Thus a person has no common law right to appoint a counsel as his agent. ( 28 ) WE have referred Craies on Statute Law by S. C. G. Edgar Seventh edition. At page 377 it is observed as follows : the general rule that prior statutes are hold to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the two are repugnant is said not to apply if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent enactment is general the rule of law being as stated by Lord Selborne in SEWARD V. VERA CRUZ that where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words without any indication of a particular intention to do so. There is a well-known rule which has application to this case which is that a subsequent general Act does not affect a prior special Act by implication. ( 29 ) HAVING carefully considered the authorities and the aforesaid statement of law to which our attention was invited by the learned advocates at the Bar we are of the opinion for the reasons aforesaid that sec. 30 of the Advocates Act does not confer on any advocate an absolute and an unrestricted right as canvassed by Mr. Mehta. ( 29 ) HAVING carefully considered the authorities and the aforesaid statement of law to which our attention was invited by the learned advocates at the Bar we are of the opinion for the reasons aforesaid that sec. 30 of the Advocates Act does not confer on any advocate an absolute and an unrestricted right as canvassed by Mr. Mehta. In course of the judgment we have also set out our reasons as to why we have come to the conclusion that sec. 30 of the Advocates Act is not in direct conflict and repugnant to the provisions of of sec. 36 of the Act. As stated above the legislature enacted the relevant provisions of law in both the acts in distinct and separate legislative fields and that being so even if the Advocates Act is a subsequent and later legislation the same will not affect in any manner whatsoever the provisions of sec. 36 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons mentioned in course of the judgment we are of the view that there is no implied repeal of sec. 36 (4) of the Act in sec. 30 of the Advocates Act. ( 30 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons we do not see any substance or merit in any of the contentions raised by Mr. Mehta. As a result of the aforesaid discussion the rule issued on the petition is discharged with costs. ( 31 ) MR. N. J. Mehta the learned advocate for the petitioners made an oral application for the necessary certificate under Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution for leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court of India. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that this is not a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. The application of Mr. Mehta for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected. .