JUDGMENT : 1. In this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, Mrs. H.A. Rizvi, the petitioner has challenged the validity of the ORDER :dated the 4th of June, 1974 passed by the Government in the Education Department; a copy whereof has been made Annexure 1' to the writ application. The impugned ORDER :compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service has been passed under Rule 74(b) of the Bihar Service Code. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this writ application may be stated as follows. The petitioner was selected for appointment to the Bihar Education Service, Class II, and she was appointed as the District Inspectress of Schools, Ranchi, Manbhum and Singhbhum. She joined the said post in the forenoon of the 12th of March, 1946. She was confirmed in the post with effect from the 30th of March, 1950. During the period 1956 to 1969, the petitioner served as the District Inspectress of Schools and was transferred to various places in that capacity. By Notification No. 2347 dated the 13th of September, 1969, the petitioner was promoted to Class I Bihar Education Service, and was posted as the Principal B.N.R. Training College, Gulzarbagh, Patna. She joined that post on the 24th of September, 1969, and was holding that post when the impugned ORDER :was passed. Apart from the post of Principal, the petitioner was also holding the post of Principal, State Women's College, Gulzarbagh. It appears that Review Committee consisting of the Education Commissioner, the Director, Higher Education, the Director, Secondary Education, and the Director. Primary Education, reviewed the cases of fourteen officers of the Bihar Educational Service, Class I, including that of the petitioner, and the said Committee recommended for compulsory retirement of three officers including the petitioner under Rule 74(b) of the Bihar Service Code. The matter was ultimately placed before the Cabinet Committee and the Cabinet Committee on a consideration of the recommendations of the Review Committee agreed with the recommendations. Therefore on the 1st of June, 1974, the Council of Ministers approved the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee and the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 1) was issued to the petitioner compulsorily retiring her from service under Rule 74(b) of the Bihar Service Code. 3. The main contention, which has been raised by Mr. Therefore on the 1st of June, 1974, the Council of Ministers approved the recommendations of the Cabinet Committee and the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 1) was issued to the petitioner compulsorily retiring her from service under Rule 74(b) of the Bihar Service Code. 3. The main contention, which has been raised by Mr. K.D. Chatterji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that Rule 74 (b) of the Bihar Service Code is invalid and not applicable in the case of the petitioner. 4. The age of retirement of a Government Servant, other than a ministerial or inferior Government Servant, was 55 years as laid down in Rule 73 of the Bihar Service Code till January 1963, Rule 73(a) of the Bihar Service Code, as it originally stood, read as follows: "Except as provided in other clauses of this rule the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant other than a ministerial or inferior Government servant is the date on which he attains the age of 55 years. He may be retained in service after the date of the compulsory retirement with the sanction of the State Government on public grounds which must be recorded in writing.” By a notification dated the 10th of March, 1965, Rule 73(a) was amended and the age of retirement was changed to 58 years. By the same notification Rule 74 of the Bihar Service Code was amended and Sub-rule (b) was added to Rule 74. Sub-rules (a) and (b) to Rule 74, after amendment, read as follows : "74(a) The State Government may require any Government servant who has completed twenty-one years of duty and twenty-five years of total service calculated from the date of his first appointment to retire from Government service, if it considers that his efficiency or conduct is not such as to justify his retention in Service where any Government servant is so required to retire, no claim to any special compensation shall be entertained. (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-rule, the appointing authority may require a Government servant to retire after he attains the age of 55 years, on three months notice without assigning any reason. This will be in addition to the provisions contained in the above clause and Rule 2(a) of the Liberalised Pension Rules. This power will, however, normally be exercised to weed out unsuitable employees after giving three months notice to the appointing authority". This will be in addition to the provisions contained in the above clause and Rule 2(a) of the Liberalised Pension Rules. This power will, however, normally be exercised to weed out unsuitable employees after giving three months notice to the appointing authority". By notification dated the 23rd of November, 1972, Rule 73 was amended and the date of retirement of a Government servant was changed to 55 years. Again by a notification dated the 30th of September, 1973, the age of retirement of a Government servant was raised to 58 years. Rule 74 (b) was amended by notification dated the 12th of February, 1973. The amended Rule 74(b) under which the petitioner has been compulsorily retired from service reads as follows : "74(b) (i) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sub-rule, a Government servant may, after giving at least three months previous notice, in writing, to the appointing authority concerned, retire from service on the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. Provided that no Government servants under suspension shall retire from service except with the specific approval of the State Government. (ii) The appointing authority concerned may, after giving a Government servant at least three months previous notice, in writing, require him in public interest, to retire from service on the date on which such a Government servant completes thirty years of qualifying service or attains fifty years of age or on any date thereafter to be specified in the notice. (iii) A Government servant, who retires voluntarily is required to retire in public interest under this rule on attaining the age of 50 years, or completing qualifying service of 30 years, shall be entitled to retiring pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity” It is not disputed that on the date the ORDER :was passed the petitioner was aged more than 50 years. The impugned ORDER :shows that three months’ notice was given to the petitioner as provided in Rule 74(b) (ii). 5. Mr. K. D. Chatterji challenged the validity of the rules on the ground that Rule 74(b) violates Article 16 of the Constitution of India and it has taken away the vested right of the petitioner to continue in service till the age of 55 years. According to Mr. 5. Mr. K. D. Chatterji challenged the validity of the rules on the ground that Rule 74(b) violates Article 16 of the Constitution of India and it has taken away the vested right of the petitioner to continue in service till the age of 55 years. According to Mr. Chatterji, Rule 3 of the Bihar Service Code provides that nothing in these rules shall operate to deprive any person of any right or privilege to which he is entitled under the condition of his service and as such Rule 74(b) could not be legally made applicable in the case of the petitioner as she had a right to continue in service until she attained the age of 55 years. According to the submission of Mr. Chatterjee, Rule 74(b) may apply to Government servants who have entered into service after the date of the amendment but it cannot be applied to the cases of those Government servants who entered into service before the date of the amendment. 6. Before dealing with the contention which has been raised by Mr. Chatterjee, I would like to state that one of the grounds taken in the writ application is that the impugned ORDER :was passed in violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, did not press this ground and candidly stated that he was not challenging the ORDER :on the ground of its being in violation of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 7. The Supreme Court in a number of cases has considered the validity of the rules relating to premature retirement of Government servants. In (1) Shyamlal V. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1954 Supreme Court 369) the appellant, who was in Government service, had been compulsorily retired under Note 1 to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations. Note 1 to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations ran thus: "Note 1-Government retains an absolute right to retire any officer after he has completed twenty-five years qualifying service without giving any reasons, and no claim to special compensation on this account will be entertained. Note 1 to Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations ran thus: "Note 1-Government retains an absolute right to retire any officer after he has completed twenty-five years qualifying service without giving any reasons, and no claim to special compensation on this account will be entertained. This right will not be exercised except when it is in the public interest to dispense with the further services of an officer." One of the contentions which was raised on behalf of the appellant was that Note 1 to Article 465A, in so far as it conferred on the Government an absolute right to retire an officer who had completed twenty-five years qualifying service without giving any reason, was repugnant to Article 311 of the Constitution. The above contention was repelled by the Supreme Court and it was held that compulsory retirement did not amount to removal or dismissal and therefore, did not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. 8. The next case to which reference may be made is the case of (2) Moti Ram Deka V. N. E. Frontier Railway (A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court 600). That was not a case of premature retirement but the Supreme Court after considering a number of decisions held that so far as the question of compulsory retirement was concerned it must be taken to be concluded by several decisions of the Court. 9. In (3) T.G. Shivacharana Singh V. State of Mysore (A.I.R.1965 Supreme Court 280) the validity of Note 1 to Rule 285 of the Mysore Civil Services Rules, 1958, framed by the Governor of Mysore in exercise of his powers under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution was challenged. Note 1 to Rule 285 provided, inter alia, that Government may, in special cases, require any Government servant to retire any time after he had completed 25 years qualifying service or on attaining 50 years of age, if such retirement was considered necessary in the public interest. Provision was also made in the Rule for giving a notice in writing to the Government servant at least three months before the date on which he was required to retire. The rule was challenged on the ground that it contravened Article 14 as well as Article 16(1) of the Constitution. Provision was also made in the Rule for giving a notice in writing to the Government servant at least three months before the date on which he was required to retire. The rule was challenged on the ground that it contravened Article 14 as well as Article 16(1) of the Constitution. The contention was repelled and it was held that the impugned Note applied to all Government servants and as such it was not open to a challenge under Article 14 or Article 16. 10. In (4) Union of India V. J.N. Sinha (A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 40) the Government servant (respondent no. 1) had been prematurely retired by the Union of India under Rule 560) of the Fundamental Rules. The Supreme Court held that the validity of the rule is not open to question in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (3) T.G. Shivacharana Singh V. State of Mysore (A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 280). While considering the scope of Fundamental Rule 56(j), the Supreme Court made the following important observation :- "Compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences. The aforementioned Rule 56(j) is not intended for taking any penal action against the Government servants. That rule merely embodies one of the facets of the 'pleasure' doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. Various considerations may weigh with the appropriate authority while exercising the power conferred under the rule. In some cases, the Government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. There is no denying the fact that in an organisations and more so in Government organisations there is good deal of dead wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56(j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. There is no denying the fact that in an organisations and more so in Government organisations there is good deal of dead wood. It is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56(j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest". The Supreme Court further observed as follows : "In our opinion the High Court erred in thinking that the compulsory retirement involves civil consequences. Such a retirement does not take away any of the rights that have accrued to the Government servant because of his past service. It cannot be said that if the retiring age of all or a section of the Government servants is fixed at 50 years, the same would involve civil consequences. Under the existing system there is no uniform retirement age for all Government servants. The retirement age is fixed not merely on the basis of the interest of the Government servant but also depending on the requirements of the society." 11. The next case to which reference may be made is the case of (5) N.V. Putta v. State of Mysore (A.I.R 1972 Supreme Court 2185). In that case the Government servant had been prematurely retired in terms of Rule 285 of the Mysore Civil Services Rules read with Note 1 thereto. The Supreme Court following the earlier decisions upheld the validity of the rule. 12. The last case on the point to which reference may be made is the case of (6) E.V. Naidu v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1973 Supreme Court 698). In that case it has been held that when a notice of compulsory retirement of a Government servant had been validily issued, it could not become invalid merely by reason of the fact that the rule on which it was founded had undergone an amendment before notice was received by the Government servant. It was reiterated in that case that compulsory retirement according to rules did not involve civil consequences and hence it was not necessary to afford Government servant concerned an opportunity to show cause against his compulsory retirement. 13. It was reiterated in that case that compulsory retirement according to rules did not involve civil consequences and hence it was not necessary to afford Government servant concerned an opportunity to show cause against his compulsory retirement. 13. From the various decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to above, it may be held to be well-settled that (1) compulsory retirement does not amount to dismissal or removal from service and as such the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution are not attracted; (2) that the rule relating to premature retirement merely ambodies one of the facets of the ‘pleasure’ doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution; and (3) that premature retirement under the rule does not take away any of the rights that have accrued to the Government servant because of his past service and as such it does not involve civil consequences. 14. The amended Rule 74 (b) of the Bihar Service Code is applicable to all Government servants. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention raised by Mr. Chatterji that Rule 74(b) violates Article 16(1) of the Constitution. The contention of Mr. Chatterji that the petitioner has a vested right to continue in service till the age of 55 years is equally untenable in view of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court that the rule relating to premature retirement merely embodies one of the facets of the pleasure doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. 15. Rule 3(a) of the Bihar Service Code 1952 reads as follows: "Nothing in these rules shall operate to deprive any person, of any right of privilege to which he is entitled by or under any law, or by the terms of any contract or agreement subsisting between such person and the Government." According to Mr. Chatterji a Government servant, who has acquired a right or privilege under any law including the rules of the Bihar Service Code 1952, which are statutory rules, cannot be deprived of such right or privilege by a new rule. There is no substance in the above contention. Chatterji a Government servant, who has acquired a right or privilege under any law including the rules of the Bihar Service Code 1952, which are statutory rules, cannot be deprived of such right or privilege by a new rule. There is no substance in the above contention. A plain meaning of Rule 3(a) of the Bihar Service Code is that the rules made under the Bihar Service Code should not be such as to deprive any person of any right or privilege to which he is entitled to by or under any other law or by the terms of any contract or agreement subsisting between him and the Government, that is to say the Government cannot deprive a Government servant of his constitutional rights under Article 311 of the Constitution. It does not mean that the rules of the Bihar Service Code which were applicable to a Government servant at the time of his appointment cannot be altered which may affect his right or privilege. In my opinion, the expression "under any law" in Rule 3(a) means under a law other than the statutory rules embodied in the Bihar Service Code. 16. In (7) Roshan Lal Tandon V. Union of India (A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 1889) one of the contentions which was raised by the petitioner was that there was a contractual right as regards the condition of service applicable to the petitioner at the time he entered the service as train examiner in Grade 'D' and the condition of service could not be altered to his disadvantage afterward by a notification issued by the Railway Board. The Supreme Court did not accept that contention and held that the petitioner had no vested contractual right in regard to the terms of his service. While considering the question, the Supreme Court made the following observation: "It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hallmark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The emolument of the Government servant and his terms of service are governed by statue or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes constitutional restrictions upon the power of removal granted to the President and the Governor under Article 310. But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned." There was a difference of opinion amongst the various High Courts on the question whether the Government can make and change rules relating to the conditions of service taking away the rights which have vested in the employees by the existing rules. In the case of (8) B.S. Vadera V. Union of India (A.I.R. 1969 Supreme Court 118) the Supreme Court resolved the conflict by holding that retrospective effect can be given to the statutory rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution. It was observed by Vaidialingam, J., who spoke for the Court, as follows: "It is also significant to note that the proviso to Article 309, clearly lays down that any rules so made shall have effect, subject to the provisions of any such Act.' The clear and unambiguous expressions, used in the Constitution, must be given their full and unrestricted meaning unless-hedged-in, by any limitations. The rules, which have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. The rules, which have to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act. That is if the appropriate Legislature has passed an Act, under Article 309, the rules, framed under the Proviso, will have effect, subject to that Act, but in the absence of any Act, of the appropriate Legislature, on the matter, in our opinion, the rules, made by the President, or by such person as he may direct, are to have full effect, both prospectively and retrospectively. Apart from the limitations, pointed out above, there is none other, imposed by the proviso to Article 309, regarding the ambit of the operation of such rules. In other words, the rules, unless, they can be impeached on grounds such as breach of Part III, or any other Constitutional provision, must be enforced, if made by the appropriate authority." 17. Keeping in view the principles laid down in the two (Sic) mentioned above, the contention of Mr. Chatterji that Rule 74(b) could not be legally made applicable in the case of the petitioner as she had a vested right to continue in service until she attained the age of 55 years and that Rule 74(b) is applicable to Government servants who have entered into service after the date of amendment but not applicable to the case of the Government servants who entered into service before the date of amendment cannot be accepted. 18. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any substance in the main contention which was raised on behalf of the petitioner. 19. I may mention here that In the case of (9) C. Sankaranarayanan V. State of Kerala (A.I.R. 1971 Supreme Court 1997) the Supreme Court following an earlier decision in the case of (10) Bishun Narain Mishra V. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1965 Supreme Court 1567) held that change in the rule relating to retirement can be validly made and it does not attract either Article 311(2) or Article 14 of the Constitution. 20. In paragraph 17 to 26 of the writ application certain allegations of mala fides have been made against Dr. Ramraj Singh (respondent no. 2), at present Minister of Education, Government of Bihar. According to the petitioner, respondent no. 20. In paragraph 17 to 26 of the writ application certain allegations of mala fides have been made against Dr. Ramraj Singh (respondent no. 2), at present Minister of Education, Government of Bihar. According to the petitioner, respondent no. 2 had a grudge against her because she had refused his request to interview one Urmila Kumari for admission after the date of the interview had expired. Respondent no. 2 has filed a counter-affidavit and he has denied all the allegations and insinuations made against him in the writ application. In view of the denials of the allegations by the Education Minister, it is difficult to hold that the impugned ORDER :was passed because respondent no. 2 was biased against the petitioner. As I have already stated, the impugned ORDER :was passed after the Council of Ministers had approved the recommendation of the Cabinet Committee. Indeed, Mr. Chatterji very fairly stated that he was not in a position to challenge the validity of the ORDER :on the ground of mala fides. 21. One small point remains to be considered. According to Rule 74(b) a Government servant can be prematurely retired if the appointing authority requires him to do so in public interest. In the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 1) it has not been stated that the petitioner has been required to retire compulsorily in public interest. According to the contention of Mr. Chatterji, the impugned ORDER :(Annexure 1) is invalid because there is nothing in it to show that it was passed in public interest. I find it difficult to accept this contention also. In the impugned ORDER :a reference to Rule 74(b) has been made. It is. therefore manifest that the impugned ORDER :was passed because the appointing authority took the view that the petitioner should retire from service in public interest. No other contention was raised on behalf of the petitioner. 22. In the result, this writ application is dismissed, but in the circumstances, there will be no ORDER :as to costs. I agree. Appeal dismissed