JUDGMENT - B.M. SAPRE, J.:---These two Criminal Revision Applications have been filed by original accused No. 1 Bhavrilal s/o Chisulal. In Criminal Case No. 386 of 1973 before the Judicial Magistrate,F.C. Jalna, he was convicted for an offence committed by him on 9th May, 1972 under section 7(v) read with section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of four months. In Criminal Case No. 387 of 1973 before the same Magistrate in respect of an offence committed on 14th June, 1972, he was similarly convicted and sentenced. He preferred two separate appeals in the Court of Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, against his conviction and sentence in the two cases. Both the appeals were dismissed and the order of conviction and sentence in each case was confirmed. Bhavrilal has now come to this Court in revision. There is a grocery shop at Jalna, by name Shah Hastilal Shantilal Co. of which Bhavrilal was an employee. One Hastilal was the owner of the shop. (Hastilal was also prosecuted along with Bhavrilal and was convicted and sentenced by the trial Magistrate, but on appeal to the Sessions Court, he was acquitted). The commodity involved in the case is Lakh-Dal also know as Kesari-Dal. There is no dispute that under Rule 44-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules", the effect from such date as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette specify in this behalf, no person in any State shall sell or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession for the purpose of sale under any description etc. inter alia, Kesari-Dal. The Government of Maharashtra accordingly issued a notification dated 15th November, 1961, specifying 20th November, 1961 as the date with effect from which the sale, possession for the purpose of sale etc., of Kesari-Dal were totally banned in the State. However, by virtue of a circular dated 7th July, 1966, the Government of Maharashtra relaxed the notification to a certain extent. However, by virtue of a circular dated 7th July, 1966, the Government of Maharashtra relaxed the notification to a certain extent. Under this Circular, the Government of Maharashtra decided that the sale of Kesari-Dal for animal food through cattle food shops should be permitted, but the Circular added that Kesari-Dal should not be allowed to be sold by grocers and shop keepers who sell foodgrains and pulses for human consumption. It appears that the Government did not give any publicity to this circular. Subsequently, the Government came forward with another circular dated 27th June, 1969, by which it withdrew the Circular dated 7th July, 1966. The position, after the circular dated 27th June, 1969 was issued, was as it obtained on the notification dated 15th November, 1961, being issued to take effect from 20th November, 1961. However no publicity to the circular dated 27th June, 1969 was given. On 9th May, 1972, Food Inspector Jadhav (P.W. 1), visited the shop of Shah Hastilal Shantilal and Co., Bhavarilal was present. 17 bags of Kesari Dal were found stocked in the shop. After disclosing his identity to Bhavrilal and his intention to purchase Kesari Dal as sample for analysis, Jadhav purchased 750 grams of Kesari Dal and paid Rs. 0-65 as price to Bhavrilal. Following the prescribed procedure, Jadhav divided the sample purchased by him in three equal parts. He sent one of these to the Public Analyst for analysis and report. In due course, the report was received that the sample was lakh dal, the sale of which was not permissible. In that case, one Prabhakar Joshi (P.W. 2), was examined. He had carried the sample to the Public Analyst. On 14th June, 1972, Food Inspector Jadhav again visited the shop. He found 17 bags of Lakh Dal stocked at the same place. Here also, Jadhav followed the same procedure and the same report of the Public Analyst was received. In that case, one Suman Kulkarni (P.W. 2), who had carried the sample to the Public Analyst was examined. The defence of Bhavrilal was that he was a mere servant in the shop and he had acted on the instructions of his master. According to him, the Lakh Dal in the shop was not for sale. It was meant for cattle food. It was a cattle food which was to be taken to village Chikhangaon where the master had agricultural lands. According to him, the Lakh Dal in the shop was not for sale. It was meant for cattle food. It was a cattle food which was to be taken to village Chikhangaon where the master had agricultural lands. Evidence was adduced in defence to show that the master did own lands at Chikangaon. Both the courts below seem to have rejected the defence of Bhavrilal that Lakh Dal found in the shop was not to be sold and was to be taken to village Chikangaon for feeding the cattle of the master. The two courts below found that the Lakh Dal in question was kept in the shop for sale. Even if it was kept there for sale, as cattle food and the sample was sold to food Inspector Jadhav, as cattle food, on the dates of the offence, the sale of Lakh Dal was totally banned and, therefore, the offence had been proved. Mr. Agarwal on behalf of the petitioner Bhavrilal has made the following submissions before me : (1) There was non-compliance of Rules 17 and 18 of the Rules. (2) There was non-compliance of Rule 7 of the Rules. (3) In view of the circular dated 7th July, 1966, there was no total ban on the sale of Lakh Dal. It could be sold as cattle food and, in the instant case, it was sold as cattle food. It is true that under the circular dated 27th June, 1969, the Circular dated 7th July, 1966 was withdrawn, but no publicity was given to the Circular dated 27th June, 1969 and, therefore, if Lakh-Dal was sold as cattle feed as permitted by the Circular dated 7th July, 1966, no offence was committed. (4) Proviso (ii) to section 16(1) of the Act is attracted and the Court had power to impose a sentence less than the prescribed minimum and even to pass a sentence of fine only, for adequate and special reasons. In the present case, there were extenuating circumstances to award a sentence of fine only. Bhavrilal was a mere servant and he was acting under the instructions of his master. Immediately on coming to know that the shop was involved in an offence under the Act, Bhavrilal had left the job. Kesari-Dal was sold only as a cattle feed on the assumption that its sale was permitted by the Circular dated 7th July, 1966. Bhavrilal was a mere servant and he was acting under the instructions of his master. Immediately on coming to know that the shop was involved in an offence under the Act, Bhavrilal had left the job. Kesari-Dal was sold only as a cattle feed on the assumption that its sale was permitted by the Circular dated 7th July, 1966. Without the Circular dated 27th June, 1969 being given publicity, the persons managing the shop had no means of knowing that Kesari-Dal could not be sold even as cattle feed and its sale had been totally banned. In addition to these submissions. Mr. Agarwal has made an additional submission in Criminal Revenue Application No. 559 of 1975 that on the principle of double jeopardy, the petitioner Bhavrilal could not be convicted in respect of the subsequent sale on 14th June, 1972, which was from the same consignment from which the sale had been made on 9th May, 1972. The first question to be decided is whether there was due compliance of Rules 17 and 18 of the Rules. Rule 17 provides that the container of sample for analysis shall be sent to the Public Analyst registered post or railway parcel or air freight or by hand or by any other suitable means of transport available, in sealed packet, enclosed together with a memorandum in Form VII in an outer cover addressed to the Public Analyst. Rule 18 provides that a copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent to the Public Analyst separately by registered post or delivered to him. Thus, under Rule 17, the sealed sample alongwith the memorandum in form VII has to be sent. Under Rule 18, a copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet have to be sent and they have to be sent separately. Now, in Criminal No. 386 of 1973 for proof of compliance of Rules 17 and 18, the prosecution has examined Prabhakar Joshi (P.W. 2). His evidence has been accepted by the two courts below. On that day, two different samples of two different commodities were taken one of which was Lakh Dal and the evidence of Prabhakar Joshi is that he was given who sealed samples, memorandum forms and specimen seals for being carried to the Public Analyst at Aurangabad. His evidence has been accepted by the two courts below. On that day, two different samples of two different commodities were taken one of which was Lakh Dal and the evidence of Prabhakar Joshi is that he was given who sealed samples, memorandum forms and specimen seals for being carried to the Public Analyst at Aurangabad. He accordingly went to Aurangabad, and handed over the samples and the memorandum and specimen seals separately to the Chief Chemist, Public Health Laboratory. This evidence has been accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad, who was the final Judge of facts, as proving compliance with Rules 17 and 18 of the rules. In regards to Criminal Case No. 387 of 1973, the prosecution has examined Suman Kulkarni (P.W. 2), to prove compliance with Rules 17 and 18. It is true that in paragraph 30 of his judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 80 of 1974, out of which Criminal Revision Application No. 559 of 1975 arises, the learned Judge has made some confusion in reproducing the evidence of Suman Kulkarni. Prabhakar Joshi was not the witness in that case, and Suman Kulkarni who had taken the sealed sample, memorandum and specimen seal to the Public Analyst and instead of reproducing his evidence, the learned Judge has reproduced the evidence of Joshi and has held that evidence proves compliance with Rules 17 and 18. I have, however, gone thorough the evidence of Suman Kulkarni recorded in Criminal Case No. 387 of 1973, and I find that the evidence has not been happily recorded. By and large, the evidence shows that he had handed over the sample and memorandum and also a copy of the memorandum and specimen seal to the Public Analyst separately, though he does not use the word "separately". There is another way of looking at the matter. So far as the evidence of Suman Kulkarni is concerned, there was not much challenge in cross-examination. In regard to the evidence of Prabhakar Joshi, the main attempt in cross-examination was to show that it was during one and the same visit that he had handed over the sealed sample packet and the specimen impression of the seal used to seal the sample packet. The witness admitted that he had handed over the sealed packet and the specimen seal to the Public Analyst in one and the same visit. The witness admitted that he had handed over the sealed packet and the specimen seal to the Public Analyst in one and the same visit. His cross-examination was apparently directed to show that the specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet of the sample was not delivered to the Public Analyst separately, inasmuch as it was delivered at the same time when the sealed sample packet was delivered. But a Division Bench of this Court (to which I was a party has taken the view in (Criminal Revision Application No. 129 of 1975, decided on 16th-17the December, 1975)1, that the mere fact that the sealed sample packet and the specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet are delivered to the Public Analyst by one and the same person at one and the same time, will not in itself show that the specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet was not separately delivered to the Public Analyst. The report of the Public Analyst (Ex. 15 in each case) also shows that the sample had been received properly sealed and fastened and the seal was found to be in tact and unbroken. The seal fixed on the container of the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent by the Food Inspector. In (Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 1974, with Criminal Appeal No. 392 of 1974, decided by me on 12th/13th November, 1975)2, I had taken the view that the above recitals in the report of the Public Analyst are inadmissible in evidence without the Public Analyst going into the witness box and deposing to the facts in proof of the above recitals. But the Supreme Court seems to have taken a contrary view in an unreported case which Mr. Bardey cited before me and which does not appeal to have been cited before me when I decided the above two criminal appeals. The unreported case is (Kassim Kunju v. K.K. Ramakrishna Pillai)3, Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1968 decided on 2-12-1968 S.C. The appeal before the Supreme Court was by special leave from the judgment of the Kerala High Court. In the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that Rule 18 had not been complied with. The unreported case is (Kassim Kunju v. K.K. Ramakrishna Pillai)3, Criminal Appeal No. 29 of 1968 decided on 2-12-1968 S.C. The appeal before the Supreme Court was by special leave from the judgment of the Kerala High Court. In the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the accused that Rule 18 had not been complied with. The High Court relied on the report of the Public Analyst in which it was stated inter alia, that the Public Analyst had received from the Food Inspector a sample of the article for analysis properly sealed and packed and that he had found the seal intact and unbroken. It was not even stated by the Public Analyst in his report that he had compared the specimen impression of the seal with the seal of the packet of the sample. But the High Court relied on the principle that official acts must be presumed to have been regularly performed. Under Rule 7, the Public Analyst had to compare the seal on the container and the outer cover with the specimen impression received separately on receipt of the packet containing the sample for analysis. The High Court considered that it must be presumed that the Public Analyst acted in accordance with the rules and he must have compared the specimen impression received by him with the seal on the container. The Supreme Court agreed with the view of the High Court, and held that report of the Public Analyst could be relied upon to find out whether the requirement of Rule 18 had been satisfied. In this view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the recitals in the report (Ex. 15) of the Public Analyst also show due compliance of Rules 17 and 18 both. The first submission of Mr. Agarwal, therefore, fails. The next submission of Mr. Agarwal is that there was non-compliance of Rule 7. Rule 7 says that on receipt of a package containing a sample for analysis from a Food Inspector or any other person, the Public Analyst shall compare the seals on the container and the outer cover with specimen impression received separately and shall note the condition of the seals thereon. The report (Ex. 15) of the Public Analyst, however, proves due compliance of Rule 7. Mr. The report (Ex. 15) of the Public Analyst, however, proves due compliance of Rule 7. Mr. Agarwal relied upon notes of cases in (State of Maharashtra v. Vithalrao)4, 1976 Mh.L.J. Note 17, p. 10. The full report of the judgment was not made available to me. But from the few facts noted in the Notes show that there were several samples taken from various shops and sent to the Public Analyst and there was possibility of the report of the Public Analyst being in respect of a sample taken from a shop other than that of the accused. In the present case, there was no such possibility. On 9th May, 1972, besides Lakh-Dal, a sample of only Tur-Dal was taken. The samples of Tur-Dal and Lakh-Dal taken on 9th May, 1972 were separately sealed and the report of the Public Analyst shows that after comparing the seal on the sample packet of Lakh-Dal with the specimen seal and a copy of the memorandum in Form VII sent to him, the Public Analyst had carried out the analysis. No other sample of Lakh-Dal was sent to the Public Analyst. There is no question of the report being in respect of a commodity other than that purchased from the shop in question. The second submission of Mr. Agarwal that there was non compliance of Rule 7 also fails. The third submission of Mr. Agarwal is that the sale of Lakh-Dal as cattle feed was permitted by the circular dated 7th July, 1966. It is true that by the subsequent circular dated 27th June, 1969, the circular dated 7th July, 1966, was withdrawn and, therefore, on 9th May, 1972, and 14th June, 1972, Lakh-Dal could not be sold even as cattle feed. But no publicity was given to the circular dated 27th June, 1969. Before fastening criminal liability on a person, it was necessary for the prosecution to show that the circular dated 27th June, 1969 was published in the Official Gazette or was otherwise made known. As before, the Official Gazette or was otherwise made known. As before, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court (Harla v. State of Rajasthan)5, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 467, to show that if this is not done, criminal liability cannot be fastened on the person. As before, the Official Gazette or was otherwise made known. As before, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court (Harla v. State of Rajasthan)5, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 467, to show that if this is not done, criminal liability cannot be fastened on the person. The learned Additional Sessions Judge relied on the following view expressed by the Supreme Court in Harlas case : "The absence of any special law or custom, it would be against the principles of natural Justice to permit the subject of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural Justice requires that before a law can become operative, it must be promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is, or, at the very least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. In the absence, therefore, of any law, rule, regulation or custom, of law cannot come into being by merely passing a resolution without promulgation or publication in the Gazette or other means. Promulgation or publication of some reasonable sort is essential." The learned Additional Sessions Judge conceded that knowledge of the circular dated 27th June, 1969 could not be imputed to the petitioner in the absence of evidence that due publicity was given to that circular. But he took the view that the same could be said about the earlier circular dated 7th July, 1966. If, therefore, the petitioner had no knowledge even of the circular dated 7th July, 1966, then the position remained that there was total ben in the sale of Lakh-Dal with effect from 20th November, 1961, by virtue of the notification dated 15th November, 1961 issued under Rule 44-A. In view of the said notification, there was total ban on the sale of Lakh-Dal, and, therefore, the petitioner could not sell it even as cattle feed. Tuesday, 6th April, 1976. Now, this approach of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not correct. Tuesday, 6th April, 1976. Now, this approach of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not correct. It was not disputed on behalf of the State that the circular dated 7th July, 1966 had been issued under which the use of Kesari-Dal or Lakh-Dal as cattle feed was permitted. A copy of that circular was produced by the petitioner and it was his contention that the got knowledge of it through some private source. In the case of the Circular dated 7th July, 1966, therefore, which was admittedly issued by the Government, the petitioner could say that he was within law to sell Lakh-Dal as cattle feed. But the petitioner is different in respect of the circular dated 27th June, 1969. By that circular, the earlier circular dated 7th July, 1966 was sought to be withdrawn and after 27th June, 1969, Lakh-Dal could not be sold even as cattle feed, and if the petitioner sold Lakh-Dal as cattle feed it would be offence. But before the criminal liability could be fastened on the petitioner, it had to be shown that the petitioner had knowledge of the circular dated 27th June, 1969, or he could have got that knowledge with the exercise of reasonable diligence. It is not disputed that beyond issuing the circular, the Government had done nothing by which knowledge of the circular could be acquired by the petitioner either directly or with the exercise of due and reasonable diligence. In this State of affairs, the petitioner would be acting within law if he sold Lakh-Dal as cattle feed as was permitted by the circular dated 7th July, 1966. All this, however, does not improve the case for the petitioner. Although under the circular dated 7th July, 1966, the Government permitted Lakh-Dal to be sold as cattle feed, that was subject to certain restrictions. The main restriction was that the sale of Lakh-Dal for animal feed should be permitted only through cattle feed shops and Lakh-Dal should not be allowed to be sold by groccers and shop-keepers who sell foodgrains and pulses for human consumption. It is not in dispute that the shops where the petitioner was employed was not in exclusive cattle feed shop but it was a grocery shop where food grains and pules for human consumption were sold. In fact, on 9th May, 1972, besides Lakh-Dal, Tur-Dal was also sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector. It is not in dispute that the shops where the petitioner was employed was not in exclusive cattle feed shop but it was a grocery shop where food grains and pules for human consumption were sold. In fact, on 9th May, 1972, besides Lakh-Dal, Tur-Dal was also sold by the petitioner to the Food Inspector. The petitioner could not thus take shelter behind the circular dated 7th July, 1966 that it permitted sale of Lakh-Dal as cattle feed and all that the petitioner had done was to sell Lakh-Dal as cattle food. Mr. Agarwal tried to contend that the bags of Lakh-Dal kept in the godown of the shop were not for sale at all, but they were to be taken to the agricultural lands of the petitioners master for being used as cattle feed. If the commodity was thus not for sale, at all, the mere storing of Lakh-Dal in the shop would not be an offence. Both the Courts below, however, have not accepted the above defence of the petitioner. Although they have not stated in so many words in their judgments, it follows from the reasoning of the courts that they were not accepting the defence of the petitioner. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, in particular, has held, on the authority of two decision of the Supreme Court, in (Mangaldas v. Maharashtra State)6, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 128, and (Food Inspector, Calicut v. Gopalan)7, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1725, that the sale by the petitioner to the Food Inspector amounts to sale within the meaning of the Act. Both these decisions proceed on the assumption that the commodity in question was on the premises which was ultimately to be passed to customers by sale. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, seems to hold that the bags of Lakh-Dal stored in the shop were meant or sale in the shop, though it may be as cattle feed, and this could be only on the basis that the defence of the petitioner was not acceptable. To me also, the defence of the petitioner does not seem to be true and acceptable. The only evidence adduced by the petitioner is that his master owns some lands at village Chikangaon. But there is no evidence if he also owns any cattle or what it their number. To me also, the defence of the petitioner does not seem to be true and acceptable. The only evidence adduced by the petitioner is that his master owns some lands at village Chikangaon. But there is no evidence if he also owns any cattle or what it their number. If there were no cattle at all, or their number was not large, it does not seem probable that 17 bags of Lakh-Dal were meant for being sent to village. Chikangaon as cattle feed. Moreover, if the bags were to be sent toe village Chikangaon as cattle feed, there is no reason why they were not so sent. On 9th May, 1972, the bags were found in the shop and after more than a month, on 14th June, 1972, when the Food Inspector again visited the shop, he found the same number of bags stocked at the same place in the shop. It is the suggestion of the petitioner that they were the same bags which were found by the Food Inspector in the shop on 9th May, 1972. This Rules out the possibility of the defence being true that the bags of Lakh-Dal were in the shop waiting to be sent to village Chikangaon for being used as cattled feed. The above defence also arrears to be an afterthought. The petitioner appears to be under the impression that under the Circular dated 7th July, 1966 he being not aware of the subsequent circular dated 27th June, 1969 he would be committing no offence, if he sold Lakh-Dal as cattle feed. He had sold the sample to the Food Inspector as cattle feed. Food Inspector Jadhav denied the suggestion i cross-examination that the petitioner had told him at the time that Lakh-Dal was not meant for sale as cattle feed but was to be sent to village Chikangaon, where his master had lands, to be used as cattle feed. The two courts below were, therefore, right in not accepting the defence and in holding that the Lakh-Dal in question was kept in the shop for sale, though it may be for sale as cattle feed. But that was also an offence as what the circular dated 7th July, 1966 permitted was sale of Lakh-Dal for animal feed only, through cattle food shops and not sale by grocers and shop-keepers who also sold food grains and pulses for human consumption. But that was also an offence as what the circular dated 7th July, 1966 permitted was sale of Lakh-Dal for animal feed only, through cattle food shops and not sale by grocers and shop-keepers who also sold food grains and pulses for human consumption. The third submission of Mr. Agarwal also thus fails. Before considering the question of sentence, which is common in both the criminal revision applications, I will deal with the additional submission of Mr. Agarwal made in Criminal Revision Application No. 559 of 1975. That submission is as follows:--- "On 9th May, 1972, the Food Inspector had found 17 bags of Lakh-Dal in the shop and a sample from this consignment was taken by him. On 14th June, 1972, these very 17 bags of Lakh-Dal were found in the shop and the Food Inspector had again taken sample from the sample consignment of Lakh-Dal. There could not therefore, be a second prosecution in respect of the event dated 14th June, 1972 on the principle of double jeopardy. It is true that Jadhav in his cross-examination has admitted that on 14th June, 1972, also, he had found 17 bags of Lakh-Dal and they were at the same place where the bags were stocked when he visited the shop on 9th May, 1972. It is also true that he has further admitted that on 9th May, 1972, he had not seized Lakh-Dal and on 14th June, 1972 his purpose was to seize Lakh-Dal. But even in these admissions there is no admission nor can an inference be drawn by necessary implication that what Jadhav had found on 14th June, 1972 were the very 17 bags of Lakh-Dal which he had found in the shop on 9th May, 1972. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Jadhav had taken sample on 14th June, 1972 from the same 17 bags of Lakh-Dal which were there on 9th May, 1972, the petitioner cannot escape liability for the even dated 14th June, 1972. The offence in the case would be a continuing one. On 9th May, 1972, Lakh-Dal was kept in the shop for sale. After a period of more than one month, on 14th June, 1972, again, the commodity was still found in the shop and that was in possession of the petitioner for the purpose of sale. The offence in the case would be a continuing one. On 9th May, 1972, Lakh-Dal was kept in the shop for sale. After a period of more than one month, on 14th June, 1972, again, the commodity was still found in the shop and that was in possession of the petitioner for the purpose of sale. I fail to see how there could be no prosecution of the petitioner in respect of the event dated 14th June, 1972 on the principle of double jeopardy. The submission of Mr. Agarwal in this behalf is, therefore, rejected. That brings me to the last submission of Mr. Agarwal, namely, that of sentence, which is common to both the criminal revision applications. The learned trial Magistrate has awarded the minimum sentence prescribed by section 16(1) of the Act. It does not appear that the question whether a sentence less than a minimum should be imposed on the petitioner was canvassed before him. But that question was canvassed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge. It was urged before him that proviso (ii) to section 16(1) was attracted and there was adequate and special reasons for imposing a sentence less than minimum in the instant case. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has held that the said proviso is not attracted but has not given any reason for his view. He, however, added that there were no extenuating circumstances to interfere with the sentence imposed on the petitioner by the learned trial Magistrate, and therefore, he refused to disturb the sentence. It is quite clear that proviso (ii) to section 16(1) is attracted. It say that if the offence under sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of section 16(1), the Court may for any adequate and special reason impose a sentence less than the minimum prescribed. It is not disputed by Mr. Barday on behalf of the State that the offence in this case falls under sub-Clause (ii) of Clause (a) in as much as Lakh-Dal was an article of food, the sale of which was prohibited under Rule 44-A, Proviso (ii) to section 16(1) is therefore, attracted. The question then is whether there are any extenuating circumstances to impose a sentence on the petitioner less than the minimum prescribed or even not to impose any sentence of imprisonment but to impose a sentence of fine only. The question then is whether there are any extenuating circumstances to impose a sentence on the petitioner less than the minimum prescribed or even not to impose any sentence of imprisonment but to impose a sentence of fine only. In the first instance, the petitioner was not trying to sell Lakh-Dal for human consumption, but was selling in as animal food, the sale of commodity for which purpose was permitted by the circular dated 7th July, 1966, though not by grocer and shopkeepers who also sold food grains and pulses for human consumption. He had no knowledge of the later circular, dated 27th June, 1969, by which the circular dated 7th July, 1966, was withdrawn nor could he have that knowledge by the exercise of due diligence. In similar circumstances, this Court in (Municipal Council, Akola v. Shirpat Ganeshlal)8, 1973 Mh.L.J. 399, for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 46 page 412, had sentenced the accused to pay a fine without imposing a sentence of imprisonment. In (Criminal Appeals No. 205 of 1674, and 206 of 1974 decided by Shimpi, J., on 24th March, 1976)9, also he had refrained from passing a sentence of imprisonment and had only imposed a sentence of fine on the accused, where also the sale of Lakh-Dal was in breach of Rule 44-A of the rules. The petitioner was only a servant in the shop and he was acting on the instructions of his master. The statement made by Mr. Agarwal at the Bar, that on immediately coming to know about the activities of the shop, the petitioner had left the shop, was not controverted on behalf of the State. The petitioner was not trying to sell Lakh-Dal for human consumption, but he was selling it only as cattle food, though that was also an offence, even under the circular dated 7th July, 1966, as Lakh-Dal could be sold as cattle feed only through shops exclusively for animal food and could not be sold by shops where foodgrains and pulses for human consumption were sold. Taking into account all these factors cumulatively, I am of the view that the ends of justice will be sufficiently met if a sentence of fine is imposed on the petitioner in each case and it is not necessary either to impose the minimum sentence prescribed by law or to impose a sentence of imprisonment in addition to the sentence of fine. In the result, both the criminal revision applications fail in so far as the order of conviction passed against the petitioner is concerned. The sentence imposed on the petitioner is, however, set aside and instead a sentence of fine of Rs. 500/- in each case is imposed on him. In default of payment of fine, the petitioner shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Subject to this modification in the sentence, the criminal revision applications are dismissed and the rules are discharged. If the fine is already paid, the bail bond of the petitioner to stand cancelled and the excess of fine, if any, to he refunded to him. -----