JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This petition is directed against an order of the State Government dated 3rd December, 1974, removing the petitioner from the office of President, Municipal Board, Rampur. 2. The State Government framed 15 charges against the petitioner under Sections 48(2)(a) and (b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act calling upon him to she cause why he should not be removed from the office of President. The petitioner submitted his explanation and denied the charges. The State Government reconsidered the matter and thereupon it passed the impugned order. Initial 15 charges had been framed against the petitioner, but the State Government passed the impugned order of removal only on five charges, namely charges Nos. 4, 6, 9, 12 and 14, the rest of the charges were not relied upon by the Government in passing the impugned order of removal. The petitioner ins approached this Court for quashing of that order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the charges and the findings recorded thereon by the State Government in the impugned order and has urged that none of the charges has been made out and the findings recorded by the State Government are not sufficient to sustain the impugned order under Section 48(2)(a) or (b) of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 4. Before consider the petitioner's contention, it is necessary to examine the scope of Section 48 which makes provision for removal of the President of a Municipal Board. 4. Before consider the petitioner's contention, it is necessary to examine the scope of Section 48 which makes provision for removal of the President of a Municipal Board. Sub-section (2) of Section 48 of the Act provides that where the State Government has at any time reason to believe that there has been failure on the part of the President in performance of his duties, it may call upon him to show cause and after considering his explanation it may remove him from his office for the reasons to be recorded in writing Section 48(2)(b)(vii) which is material for the purposes of the present case, provides that where the State Government has reason to believe that the President has during the current or the last preceding term of his presidentship "so flagrantly abused his position" as President of the Board or being a President or member "wilfully contravened any of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law" or caused such loss or damage to the municipal fund or to property of the Board as to render him unfit to continue to be President of the Board, then the State Government may remove him from the office by a written order containing reasons. The provisions of Section 48 (2A) require recording of reasons and holding of enquiry and consideration of explanation of the President which imply that the State Government has to set in a quasi-judicial manner in considering the charges and passing the order of removal. The interpretation of the expression "so flagrantly abused his position" was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Stale of U P. v. Mewa Lal, 1961 ALJ 120. The Bench while considering the question observed as follows : "The use of expression 'flagrantly abused' in sub-section (3) of Section 40, therefore, requires that even if there is no manifest or oblique motive there must be something to show that in committing the acts complained of the member was using his position for a wrong purpose or that he was taking some advantage of his position which he ought not to have taken and that he was doing so in a glaring or scandalous manner. Without unduly strengthening the meaning of the expression, therefore, an act cannot be brought within its purview simply because it in time why contravenes any of the provisions of the Municipalities Act or the bye-laws made thereunder". The above observations are fully applicable in interpreting the expression 'so flagrantly abused his position" occurring in Section 48(2)(b)(vii) of the Act. Thus it is clear that before a President is held guilty of flagrant abuse of his power, an express finding must be recorded that he took some advantage of his position by the act complained of which he ought not to have taken and further that he committed the alleged act or omission in a glaring and scandalous manner for a wrong purpose for taking advantage of his position. 5. The expression "wilful contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law" occurring in Section 48(2)(b)(vii) of the Act was considered by me in detail in Civil Misc. Writ No. 1488 of 1973 (Om Kumar v. Slate of U.P.) decided on 24-10-1973. After considering the law laid down in Chhotey Lal v. Chaki gLai, AIR 1953 Allahabad 113. ; Ardashit Bhicaji Tamboli v. Agent G. I. P. Railway Co., AIR 1928 PC 24 . and Ram Chand Narasimha Kulkarni v. State of Mysore, AIR 1964 SC 1701 ., concluded thus : "The position which emerges from the above cases is that 'wilful contravention' means deliberate and intentional purpose in violation of the Act, rules or bye-laws An element of motive to achieve a purpose not permissible under the Act or Rules is involved in wilful contravention and the element of accident, error or inadvertence is excluded Mere wrong exercise of power by a President or issue of illegal order by him in violation of any provisions of the Act, Rules or bye-laws does not render him liable to removal under Section 48(2)(b)(vii) of the Act." Special Appeal was filed against my judgment in Om Kumar's case, being Special Appeal No. 31 to 1974, decided on 21st February, 1974 The Special Appeal was partly allowed but my interpretation about the scope of Sections 4-(2)(a) and (b)(vii) of the Act was upheld. Thus the interpretation of the expression "wilful contravention occurring in Section 4(2)(b)(vii) as given in the case of Om Kumar (supra) stands affirmed by the Division Bench. Thus the interpretation of the expression "wilful contravention occurring in Section 4(2)(b)(vii) as given in the case of Om Kumar (supra) stands affirmed by the Division Bench. The findings recorded by the State Government relied upon in passing the order of the petitioner's removal are therefore necessary to be examined in the light of the above principles. 6. Charge No. 4 as contained in Annexure to the petition stated that the petitioner got a telephone installed at the residence of Vice-President Sri Saulat Ali Khan, who was the petitioner's son-in-law, even though there was no provision for the installation of a telephone at the residence of Vice-President and yet the Board was made to incur expenses on that telephone. When complaints were made the petitioner by his latter dated 4th July, 1972, requested the S.D.O. Telephones to disconnect the telephone and to install it at other place. Thus the petitioner misused the funds of the Municipal Board which shows his negligence, as a result of which there was a failure on his part in performing his duties as contemplated by Section 48(2)(a) of the Act. In his explanation the petitioner denied the charge and stated that no doubt Saulat Ali Khan was his son-in-law but as he became acting President after the petitioner was incapacitated from functioning as President, the telephone connected had been installed at the residence of Saulat Ali Khan by the Board. It was not done under the petitioner's orders nor he was responsible for the installation of the telephone. Subsequently when the petitioner resumed office of President the got the same removed from the residence of Saulat Ali Khau although for sometime he was holding his office at the residence of Saulat Ali Khan and used the same telephone. 7. The State Government has recorded findings that Saulat Ali Khan ceased to be Acting President with effect from 5th May, 1971, but the petitioner did not take any action for disconnection of that telephone till 4th July, 1972, and thus the Board had to incur expenses as a result of which the Municipal Board was put to great loss, thereby the petitioner was guilty of failure in performance of his duty and of wilfully causing financial loss to the Board. On a clear scrutiny of the charge it is clear that the gravamens of the charge was that the petitioner was responsible for getting the telephone installed at the residence of the Vice-President and that he failed to get the same disconnected as a result of which the Board was put to financial loss. The charge in substance was covered by Section 48(2)(b)(vii) although in the charge-sheet it was mentioned that the facts stated in this charge made out a case under Section 48(2)(a). During the arguments, however, the learned Advocate General conceded that this could not be a charge under Section 48(2)(a) of the Act and the charge sheet wrongly mentioned the section. 8. The question then arises as to whether the findings recorded by the State Government made out a case for the petitioner's/removal under Section 48 (2)(b)(vii) of the Act. The findings recorded by the State Government under this charge clearly indicate that the petitioner's inaction in getting the telephone removed from the residence of the Vice-President caused serious financial loss 10 the Municipal Board, as a result of which he was liable to be removed. But he State Government has not recorded boy finding that the loss of the Municipal Board has been such that in its opinion the petitioner was reader ed unfit to continue as President. There is further no finding that the petitioner was responsible for getting the telephone installed at the residence of the Acting President. On the findings recorded by the State Government no case of the petitioner's failure to perform his duties is made out because admittedly the petitioner himself took action to get the telephone disconnected Further it is not the case of the State Government that the Board was made to incur expenses for two telephones, one at the residence of his son-in-law and the other at his own residence. On the other hand, it is clear from the petitioner's explanation that the petitioner used to hold his office at the residence of his son-in-law and there was no other telephone installed. In these circumstances the finding that he failed 10 perform his duties or caused loss to the Board cannot be sustained. The findings recorded by the State Government on this charge do not make out a cast for the petitioner's removal either under Section 48(2)(a) or (b)(vii) of the Act. 9. In these circumstances the finding that he failed 10 perform his duties or caused loss to the Board cannot be sustained. The findings recorded by the State Government on this charge do not make out a cast for the petitioner's removal either under Section 48(2)(a) or (b)(vii) of the Act. 9. Charge No. 6 alleged that Mohammad Fazil, a Municipal employee, had been under suspension for the last 7 or 8 years. He was paid suspension allowance although during the period of his suspension Fazil Khan was employed in a Biri manufacturing factory, the petitioner failed to perform his duties in ascertaining that Mohd. Fazi Khan was not engaged or employed elsewhere before sanctioning the suspension allowance, thereby he contravened Fundamental Rule 53 of the Financial Handbook Parts 11 to IV. The charge further stated that on these facts the petitioner was liable to removal under Section 48(2)(a) of the Act. In his explanation to the Government the petitioner submitted that a criminal case was registered against Fazil Khan and the care was under investigation for several years, the local police did not finalise the case in spite of repeated reminders sent by the Board. Previously suspension allowance was being paid to Mohd. Fazil Khan on the recommendation of the Octroi Superintendent but since long, payment of suspension allowance had been stopped by the petitioner on the receipt of information about his employment. The State Government held the explanation unsatisfactory. It observed that in granting suspension allowance to Mohd. Fazil the petitioner contravened the provisions of Fundamental Rule 53 and thereby he misused his powers. The element of wilful contravention of Rules is however absent in the findings. The State Government did not record any finding that in sanctioning the suspension allowance to Mohd. Fazil Khan the petitioner acted with same motive to achieve a purpose not permissible under the rules or that it was a deliberate or intentional act of the petitioner. It is not disputed on behalf of the State Government that the petitioner had himself stopped payment oi suspension allowance to Fazil Khan since long. In that situation it was difficult to come to the conclusion that the petitioner's action was deliberate, intentional or it had an element of motive to achieve some oblique purpose not permissible under the Act. It is not disputed on behalf of the State Government that the petitioner had himself stopped payment oi suspension allowance to Fazil Khan since long. In that situation it was difficult to come to the conclusion that the petitioner's action was deliberate, intentional or it had an element of motive to achieve some oblique purpose not permissible under the Act. The petitioner may have contravened Rule 53 of the Financial Handbook but unless it was shown that it was done with some oblique motive the petitioner could not be removed on that charge. The findings of the State Government thus do not make out any case for removal under Section 48(2)(b)(vii) of the Act. There is yet another infirmity, the charge purported to be framed under Section 48(2)(a) while the finding recorded by the State Government show that action has been taken under Section 48(2j(b)(vn) of the Act. 10. Charge No. 9 stated that the petitioner appointed one Saqib Ali as a teacher in a Basic School who was the brother of Amanat Kamal, a member of the Municipal Board in contravention of the Rule printed in the Municipal Manual at page 43, which lays down that no relation of a member of the Municipal Board should be appointed unless prior approval of the Prescribed Authority was obtained, was alleged that the petitioner wilfully contravened the said rule and thereby he was liable to removal under Section 48(2)(vii) of the Act in his explanation the petitioner stated that in his application form Saqib Ali had not declared that he was related to Amanat Kamal, a member of the Municipal board, instead he had left that column blank. The petitioner had no know edge about his relationship with Amanat Kamal, but later on when he came to know of the relationship he called explanation from Saqib Ali and thereupon Saqib AU resigned from service, in all he continued in service only for 17 days. The State Government has again held this charge proved on the lauding that the petitioner's explanation that he had no knowledge about the relationship of Saqib Ali with the Municipal Member was not convincing as he should have taken all precaution in ascertaining the relationship before making the appointment. It further recorded a finding that even though Saqib Ali had resigned from service, but the petitioner could not be exonerated from the charge. It further recorded a finding that even though Saqib Ali had resigned from service, but the petitioner could not be exonerated from the charge. As already discussed a mere contravention of rule contained on page 453 of the Municipal Manual could not be a valid ground for President's removal under Section 48(2)(b)(vii) of the Act. The element of wilful contravention is missing in the finding on the other hand in the findings recorded by the State Government there is nothing to show that the appointment had been made deliberately with some oblique motive. The fact stated in the petitioner's explanation and the findings recorded by the State Government make it clear that the petitioner took immediate steps to rectify the mistake that had been committed in appointing Saqib Ali. Therefore, the charge under Section 48(b)(vii) was not made out warranting the petitioner's removal. 11. Charge No. 12 alleged that the petitioner had wilfully contravened provisions of the rule printed at page 452 of the Municipal Manual which laid down that no person who may have undergone a sentence of imprisonment for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude should be employed except with the permission of the Prescribed Authority. It was further alleged that the petitioner appointed Rais Dulha Khan in the Municipality without obtaining prior approval of the Prescribed Authority although Rais Dulha Khan had been convicted in an opium case and in a case under Section 326/307, I.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of two years. In his explanation the petitioner stated that he had no information about the alleged conviction of Rais Dulha Khan either in the opium case or in the criminal case. He further submitted that the name of Rais Dulha Khan had been forwarded by tire Employment Exchange and in his declaration form he kept the relevant column blank. The State Government observed that the petitioner's explanation w is not satisfactory, he should have held a detailed enquiry before appointing Rais Dulha Khan in service. His ignorance about the conviction of Rais Dulha Khan was not a satisfactory explanation to the charge. The charge was, thus, held proved. In my opinion the findings recorded by the State Government do not make out a case of wilful contravention of the said rule printed at page 452 of the Municipal Manual. His ignorance about the conviction of Rais Dulha Khan was not a satisfactory explanation to the charge. The charge was, thus, held proved. In my opinion the findings recorded by the State Government do not make out a case of wilful contravention of the said rule printed at page 452 of the Municipal Manual. The State Government again failed to record a finding that the contravention was not accidental or due to ignorance and that it was deliberate and wilful or that though the petitioner had knowledge that Rabis Dulha Khan had been convicted for the offences which involved moral turpitude, even then he employed him in the Municipality without obtaining prior approval of the Prescribed Authority. 12. During the course of arguments enquired from the learned Advocate General as to what was the opium case in which Rais Dulha Khan was convicted as no particulars were given in the charge. The learned Advocate General could not give the details of that case nor a copy of the judgment in that case could be produced before me even though the original records of the State Government were present with him. The conviction of Rais Dulha Khan under Section 307, 326, I.P.C. in my opinion, did not involve moral turpitude. The ingredients of the said offence to not include any debasement or depravity of character Further the respondents have failed to show that the offence under Section 326/307, I.P.C. had been declared by the State Government involving moral turpitude. The State Government was thus again misdirected in relying upon this charge in removing the petitioner from the office of President. 13. Charge No 14 alleged that the petitioner had appointed several of his relations in the scenic of the Municipal Board as well as the relations of other members of the Board, Mehar Shah Khan and Zahir Ali Khan had been employed who were related to Sri Amanat Kamal, a member of the Municipal Board, without obtaining prior approval of the Prescribed Authority and thereby the petitioner wilfully contravened the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In his explanation the petitioner emphatically denied the charge and further asserted that the charge was vague as the names of his relations who were alleged to have been employed by him in the Municipality had not been mentioned in the charge. In his explanation the petitioner emphatically denied the charge and further asserted that the charge was vague as the names of his relations who were alleged to have been employed by him in the Municipality had not been mentioned in the charge. It is conceded that no such opportunity was ever given to the petitioner. In its findings the State Government held that though the petitioner had denied the charge and had stated that the charge was vague yet in its opinion the explanation was neither satisfactory nor convincing. It observed that the petitioner had appointed his own brother-in-law Zafar Shah Kban by an order dated 10th June, 1969, while Akbar Shah Khan son of Mohd. Shah Khan, who was brother-in-law of the petitioner, was appointed by Saulat Ali Khan, Acting President, by his order dated 18th December, 1969. Sri Saulat Ali Khan, Acting President, was the son-in-law of the petitioner and therefore the petitioner was responsible for the appointment of Akbar Shah Khan also. On these findings it was held that the charge was proved against the petitioner. 14. A close scrutiny of the charge and the findings of the State Government as contained in the impugned order shows that there is variance in the charge and the findings. The petitioner was never charged that he got Zafar Shah Khan and Akbar Shah Khan appointed nor it was alleged that he was instrumental in getting Akbar Shah Khan appointed through the Acting President. If Saulat Ali Khan appointed Akbar Shah Khan, the petitioner could not be held responsible for contravention of any rule or regulation. As regards Zafar Shah Khan, his name was not mentioned in the charge sheet and thus the petitioner was not given any opportunity of explanation with regard to his appointment. In the absence of any opportunity of explanation the petitioner could not be punished for the alleged lapse. It appears that permission for making the appointment of Zafar Shah Khan and Akbar Shah Khan was obtained from the Commissioner. The State Government held that the permission had not been obtained according to the rules and therefore the petitioner was guilty of having wilfully contravened the provisions of the Act and thereby he was liable to removal under Section 48(2)(b)(vii) of the Act. The finding of the State Government on charge No. 14 is again not sufficient to sustain the order of removal. 15. The finding of the State Government on charge No. 14 is again not sufficient to sustain the order of removal. 15. In addition to what have discussed above, a close scrutiny of the charges and the findings recorded by the State Government would show that the State Government has not recorded any reasons as contemplated by law. Instead it merely recorded its conclusion Recording of reasons implies that the explanation furnished by the petitioner should have been considered objectively and if the same was not found satisfactory reasons should have been stated. Instead we find that the State Government has merely staled the charge, the explanation and then it has recorded its conclusions without recording reasons. The State Government was acting in a quasi-judicial manner, it was required to consider the charge and the petitioner's explanation and to state reasons as to why the petitioner's explanation was not convincing or acceptable. Mere statement that the petitioners explanation was not satisfactory and that the charge is proved, does not fulfil the requirement of recording reasons. Any order of a quasi-judicial authority which does not contains reasons is bad in law. See Mahabir Prasad v. State of U.P., AIR 1970 SC 1302 . and Indra Prakash Kapur v. State of U.P., 1967 ALJ 808. 16. In view of the above discussion I am of the opinion that the impugned order of the State Government is not sustainable in law as none of the charges made out. any case for petitioner's removal as contemplated by Section 4 (2)(b)(vii) of the Act. 17. In the result, I allow the petition and quash the order of the State Government dated 3rd December, 1974. The petitioner is entitled to his costs.